EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 8]

Whether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Things?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of

things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also

justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as

future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God,

before it exists."

Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the

knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is

the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

Obj. 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is

its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is

posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge

of God is not the cause of things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are,

does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He

knows them, therefore they are."

_I answer that,_ The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the

knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the

artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the

artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact

that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the

intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of

heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a

form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a

principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an

effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a

principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands

unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which

inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a

relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to

opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were

determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says

(Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His

intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His

knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined

to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually

called the "knowledge of approbation."

Reply Obj. 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge

to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is

joined to it, as is said above.

But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because

they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of

consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things

are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the

futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according

as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was

not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is

eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God

and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of

which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural

objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure,

so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the

measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the

knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one

who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 119 / 722 题