SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 7]

Whether the Knowledge of God Is Discursive?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the

knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now

the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard

many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing

at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as

shown above (AA. 2, 5), it seems that He does not understand all at

once, but discourses from one to another.

Obj. 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through

its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is

known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.

Obj. 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know

it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go

discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that

the same applies to God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all

things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately

here and there; but He sees all things together at once."

_I answer that,_ In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the

proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold

discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have

actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand

something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to

causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of

conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For

many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered

in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one

thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see

different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing),

which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not

successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be

applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion

presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to

conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to

discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it

is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still

unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the

first. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the

second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their

causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects

in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

Reply Obj. 1: Although there is only one act of understanding in

itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),

as shown above.

Reply Obj. 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were

previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause;

and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes

themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner

that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge

of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His

knowledge is not discursive.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 118 / 722 题