Whether This Name "God" Is Applied to God Univocally by Nature,
by Participation, and According to Opinion?
Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God
univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For
where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of
affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But
a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who
says: "An idol is God." Therefore "God" in both senses is spoken of
univocally.
Obj. 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth,
so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to
this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also
this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also
in opinion.
Obj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one
idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by
the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while
the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God."
Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.
_On the contrary,_ The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is
in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore
this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is
applied equivocally.
Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen
does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he
does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic
signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore
this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true
God, and to God according to opinion.
_I answer that,_ This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations
is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is
apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same
thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical
terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the
definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance,
"being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of
being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is
placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine.
For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the
cause of health.
The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as
signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to
denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god
by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of
the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we
understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is
manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said
analogically.
Reply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the
predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name
"man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is
predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name
"man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one
meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another
meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence
it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God
contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them
uses this name "God" to signify the true God. For when the pagan says
an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion,
for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use
the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the
Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).
The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these
reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not
from its various significations.
Reply Obj. 4 ["On the contrary," par. 1]: The term "animal" applied
to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the
Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including
analogous names; because also being, which is predicated
analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of
different predicaments.
Reply Obj. 5 ["On the contrary," par. 2] : Neither a Catholic nor a
pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one
knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or
remotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the
same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying
an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God
altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
names the meaning of which we know not.
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