NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 9]

Whether This Name "God" Is Communicable?

Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For

whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name

itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is

communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us

great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we

[Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet.

1:4). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.

Obj. 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this

name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears

from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have

said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is

communicable.

Obj. 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained.

But other names given to God from His operations or effects are

communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name

"God" is communicable.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to

wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name.

Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.

_I answer that,_ A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by

similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole

signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable

according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance

this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same

nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who

participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or

strength, and those who thus participate are called lions

metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly

communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the

singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many

either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in

reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to

many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be

understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the

mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the

singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside

the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a

species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular,

from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others.

Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is

incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this

individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no

name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,

but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called

"Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of

the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms

which are individualized not by any _suppositum,_ but by and of

themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in

themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea;

but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals.

Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms

as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms

in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them

concrete names signifying a nature existing in some _suppositum._

Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we

impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to

us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as

stated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied

as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3), it follows that this name "God" is

incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the

same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the

opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is

written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8),

and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion."

Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole

signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that

those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to

the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6).

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as

to His _suppositum,_ accordingly as He is considered as "this

something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for

instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is

like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the

participation of some similitude.

Reply Obj. 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a

proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor;

although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.

For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon

the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable

according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the

name "sun."

Reply Obj. 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed

from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do

not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections

themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable

to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper

operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine

nature.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 107 / 722 题