EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 8]

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All in God?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all

things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,

who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore

those who see God see all things.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in

the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in

a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees

God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand

the least, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. But all that God does, or can

do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can

understand all that God does, or can do.

Obj. 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know

all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,

its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it

will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees

God knows all things.

_On the contrary,_ The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not

know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the

inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels."

Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret

thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever

sees the essence of God, does not know all things.

_I answer that,_ The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,

does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest

that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things

are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all

things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is

clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects

can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as

one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge

of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for

he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect

can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects

in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no

created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above

(A. 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all

that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power;

but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the

more perfectly it sees God.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient,

namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all

things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all

things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should

see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the

mirror itself.

Reply Obj. 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things

else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are

known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but

the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in

this article that the more things are known in God according as He is

seen more or less perfectly.

Reply Obj. 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know

everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,

the species and the genera of things and their types, and these

everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know

other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to

the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire

go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things

that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God

alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of

all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that

nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely

beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who

knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but

happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso

knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee

alone."

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 92 / 722 题