Whether to Be Immutable Belongs to God Alone?
Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created
substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
immutable does not belong to God alone.
Obj. 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What
therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But
some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the
blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
Obj. 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But
forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does
not belong to God alone to be immutable.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
mutable."
_I answer that,_ God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal,
but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into
existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends
on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things
should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by
ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from
them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's
power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise
it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring
them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of
another--namely, of God--they are mutable, inasmuch as they are
producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from
existence to non-existence.
If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as
regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with
privation of accident; as, for example, this subject _man_ can exist
with _not-whiteness_ and can therefore be changed from white to
not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the
essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an
accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be
changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot
be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent
with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole
potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as
to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is
consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand
incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with
respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not
consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is
consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form.
Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so
these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards
their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from
every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards
their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a
mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says
(De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their
finite power they attain to certain fresh places--which cannot be
said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above
(Q. 8, A. 2).
Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none
of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
such movement.
Reply Obj. 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment
of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
Reply Obj. 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they
cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
_______________________