Whether God Is Everywhere?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere
means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for
"incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a
place." Therefore God is not everywhere.
Obj. 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same
as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of
action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither
can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every
place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore
God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
Obj. 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.
_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer.
23:24).
_I answer that,_ Since place is a thing, to be in place can be
understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as
one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the
accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and
thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some
way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He
is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in
every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things
placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every
place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place
inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by
God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every
place, He Himself fills every place.
Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact
of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
Reply Obj. 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
and in a small or large place.
Reply Obj. 3: A whole is so called with reference to its
parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form
and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and
difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any
place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place,
because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the
quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity
without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is
whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of
it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental
quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the
surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to
the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of
the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity
which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the
surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality
either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the
perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every
part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
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