Whether Any Creature Can Be Like God?
Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O
Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are
called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be
said to be like God.
Obj. 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
comparison between things in a different genus. Therefore neither
can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
whiteness. But no creature is in the same genus as God: since God is
no genus, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore no creature is
like God.
Obj. 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in
form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to
God.
Obj. 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for
like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will
be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To
whom have you likened God?" (Isa. 40:18).
_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gen. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to
Him" (1 John 3:2).
_I answer that,_ Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same
form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;
as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and
this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things
as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality,
though not according to the same measure, but according to more or
less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more
white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are
said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according
to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since
every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything
acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way
resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in
the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form
between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same
formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the
agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will
be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species;
as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
an agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created
things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and
universal principle of all being.
Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall
short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that
which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but
because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
Reply Obj. 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different genus, but as transcending every genus,
and as the principle of all genera.
Reply Obj. 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Reply Obj. 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are
in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not
between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue
is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of
as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
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