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The Daily Telegraph
WAR BOOKS
HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR
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HOW THE WAR BEGAN
By W.L. COURTNEY. LL.D., and J.M. KENNEDY
THE FLEETS AT WAR
By ARCHIBALD HURD
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN
By GEORGE HOOPER
THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIEGE
By J.M. KENNEDY
IN THE FIRING LINE
By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK
GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD
By STEPHEN CRANE
Author of "The Red Badge of Courage."
BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT
The story of their Battle Honours.
THE RED CROSS IN WAR
By Miss MARY FRANCES BILLINGTON
FORTY YEARS AFTER
The Story of the Franco-German War. By H.C. BAILEY.
With an Introduction by W.L. COURTNEY, LL.D.
A SCRAP OF PAPER
The Inner History of German Diplomacy.
By E.J. DILLON
HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR
A companion volume to "How the War Began," telling how the world faced
Armageddon and how the British Army answered the call to arms.
By J.M. KENNEDY
AIR-CRAFT IN WAR
By S. ERIC BRUCE
FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE
REGIMENTS
THE TRIUMPHANT RETREAT TO PARIS
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE
_OTHER VOLUMES IN PREPARATION_
PUBLISHED FOR THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
BY HODDER & STOUGHTON, WARWICK SQUARE,
LONDON, E.C.
HOW THE NATIONS
WAGED WAR
_A companion Volume to "How the War Began"
telling how the World faced Armageddon, and how
the British Empire answered the call to arms_
BY
J.M. KENNEDY
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIV
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
The "Scrap of Paper"--Sir Edward
Grey's further Statement--The
Houses of Parliament and Belgium--Indian
Troops--The German
White Book 7
CHAPTER II
German Press Campaign--Disseminating
False News--The Secret Press
Society--Sir E. Goschen's Report--A
Suppressed Telegram 44
CHAPTER III
Position of Italy--German Intrigues--The
Triple Alliance--Turkey's Activity--Plans
for Attacking Egypt--A
British Warning 78
CHAPTER IV
Polish Independence--The Tsar's Rescript--Japanese
Action--Germany in the Far East--Samoa and Togoland 100
CHAPTER V
French Government leaves Paris--Triple
Entente Declaration--An
Important French Protest to the
Powers--Aid from Dominions and
India--South Africa's Expedition--The
King's Proclamations 121
CHAPTER VI
The Economic Position--Moratorium
Extension--Great Britain's Oversea
Trade--Germany's Commerce--Question
of Food Supplies--Importance
of the Balkans--"Petrograd" 165
CHAPTER I
The "Scrap of Paper"--Sir Edward Grey's further Statement--The Houses
of Parliament and Belgium--Indian Troops--The German White Book.
SINCE the first volume of this series appeared, additional particulars
respecting the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of war
have been made known; and to these, with some further details which
have not hitherto been sufficiently emphasized, the attention of the
public may now be usefully directed.
On August 27th, the Foreign Office issued an important dispatch
from Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward
Grey, respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German
Government. It is dated London, August 8th, and contains a complete
account of the Ambassador's final interviews with Herr von Jagow, the
German Foreign Minister; with Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary
of State; and with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor.
It was in the course of the interview with the latter that the
Chancellor referred to the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of
Belgium, in a phrase which had become notorious, as a "scrap of paper."
The document giving Sir E. Goschen's dispatch is as follows:
In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the
4th inst.,[1] I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and
inquired, in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial
Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von
Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must
be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the
frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated.
Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government
had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance
into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get
well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive
blow as early as possible.
It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the
more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity
of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through
without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss
of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up
their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great
German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this _fait accompli_ of
the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily
understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether
there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences,
which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he
had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.
During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same
date,[2] and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained,
I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office, and informed the
Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the
assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no
further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their
advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the
Imperial Government that his Majesty's Government would have to take
all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and
the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as
themselves.
Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other
answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that
the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the
Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency
a written summary of your telegram, and, pointing out that you had
mentioned twelve o'clock as the time when his Majesty's Government
would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible
consequence which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at
the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied
that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer
must be the same.
I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This
interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation
which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the
crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which
had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through
Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden
end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret
and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the
circumstances and in view of our engagements, his Majesty's Government
could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.
I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing
him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His
Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty
minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was
terrible to a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in
war time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper,
Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired
nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that
direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the
policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession
to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done
was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was
fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain
responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would
wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life
and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her
solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if
attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence
could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?
The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been
kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his
Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly
be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his
Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our
action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from
adding fuel to the flame by further argument.
As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining
Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment
he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our
efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this
was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at
the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and
cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding
our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had
spread, and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if
we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which
unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow workers. He
would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.
After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy, and
drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was
handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before nine p.m. It
was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.[3]
At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State,
came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly
official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he
asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a
declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international
law as he was known to be must know as well as or better than I what
was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where
diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war
had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my
instructions, of which I given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that
his Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by
twelve o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer
they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required.
Herr von Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of
war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance
required either that night or any other night.
In the meantime, after Herr von Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet,
issued by the _Berliner Tageblatt_, was circulated stating that Great
Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this
news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before
his Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent
to guard the Embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the
mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration
as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and
the landing of cobble-stones into the drawing-room where we were
all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I
telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr
von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force
of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the
street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct
unpleasantness occurred.
After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and
expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that
the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he
had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of
Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not
been authorized by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked
him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be
issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was
in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force
of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, as he had
thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract
attention and perhaps lead to disturbances.
It was the "pestilential _Tageblatt_," which had somehow got hold of
the news, and had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that
the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles
thrown from the Embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was
able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever),
and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which
had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry
impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no
apology could have been more full and complete.
Another remarkable passage in the Dispatch is that in which Sir E.
Goschen describes the Kaiser's indignation and his resolve to divest
himself of his English titles:
On the following morning, August 5th, the Emperor sent one of his
Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: "The Emperor
has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the
occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you
will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his
people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other
nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that
you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British
Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has
occurred he must now at once divest himself of these titles."
This resolve was made known in a manner which indicated that the
attitude of the English Government was keenly felt at Potsdam. "I would
add," remarks the Ambassador, "that the above message lost none of its
acerbity by the manner of its delivery."
The Dispatch continues:
On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through
this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow
and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about eleven
o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports--which
I had earlier in the day demanded in writing--and told me that he
had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should
follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that
I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen;
they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route,
only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to
this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no
repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night, as full
precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their
power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather
a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr
von Jagow, couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in
packing up such articles as time allowed.
The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong
force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter
Station, while the Embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the
station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever,
and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and
French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on
behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered
for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the
Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly
kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds, which thronged the
platforms at every station where we stopped, from insulting us; but
beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting
gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious
journey to the Dutch frontier.
Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should
like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable
behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible.
One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I
cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval
and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled
to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside,
and inside, hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and
assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel
most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support,
often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so
readily and cheerfully gave to me.
I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all
by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by
the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on
entering and leaving the Embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to
see me to ask how he could help us, and to make arrangements for the
safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from
extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and
his calmness and _savoir-faire_ and his firmness in dealing with the
Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British
subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and
able hands.
At the sitting of the House of Commons on August 26th, Mr. Keir Hardie
exhibited a tendency to quibble and to show his own country in a wrong
light. His interference on this occasion was, from his point of view,
fruitless; but it had the advantage of enabling the Foreign Secretary
to make an effective reply. In his statement, Sir Edward Grey dealt
with a few points which, although not at all obscure, were all the
better for emphasizing. The temper of the House is sufficiently well
indicated by the cheers and interruptions recorded in the following
report:
Mr. KEIR HARDIE (Lab., Merthyr Tydvil) inquired of the Foreign
Secretary whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by
the German Ambassador, together with his invitation to the Foreign
Secretary to put forward proposals of his own, which would be
acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered
by the Cabinet; and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching
possibilities were thus rejected.
Sir E. GREY: These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador
on August 1st, and without authority, to alter the conditions of
neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85, in the
White Paper.[4] The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the
next morning--that is Sunday, August 2nd--the conditions on which we
could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the
neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. The German
Chancellor had already been told, on July 30th, that we could not
bargain that away.
On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House, accordingly.[5]
I had seen the German Ambassador again, at his own request, on Monday,
and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the
plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality
of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was
a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning,
and I had no time to record the conversation. Therefore, it does not
appear in the White Paper; but it was impossible to withdraw that
condition--(loud cheers)--without becoming a consenting party to the
violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.
After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the
communication described in No. 153 in the White Paper, about the
neutrality of Belgium.[6] Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply
to that communication had not been received when the White Paper was
printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the
White Paper.[7]
I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123 in the White Paper
when I spoke in the House on August 3rd.[8] If I had referred to
suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality, I must have referred
to No. 85--the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but
officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the
Prime Minister subsequently.[9] This would have made the case against
the German Government much stronger--(cheers)--than I did make it in my
speech. I deliberately refrained from doing that then.
Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German
Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his
Government. He worked for peace, but real authority at Berlin did not
rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our
efforts for peace failed. (Loud cheers.)
Mr. KEIR HARDIE: May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up
negotiations with Germany, on the basis of the suggestions here set
forth by the German Ambassador?
Sir E. GREY: The German Ambassador did not make any basis of
suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of
suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal
initiative, and without authority, asked whether we would formulate the
conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question,
and the conditions were stated in the House and made known to the
German Ambassador. (Cheers.)
Mr. KEIR HARDIE (who rose amidst cries of "Order," "Oh, oh!" and "Sit
down"): May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated
these suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort
at all was made to find out how far the German Government would have
agreed to the suggestions put forward by their Ambassador? (Cries of
"Don't answer.")
Mr. T.M. HEALY (Ind. Nat., Cork, N.E.): Before the right hon. gentleman
answers that, may I ask him if the Socialists in the Reichstag are
asking any questions like this? (Loud and prolonged general cheers.)
Sir E. GREY, who was greeted with cries of "Don't answer," said: I
should like to have no misunderstanding on this. (Loud cheers.) The
German Ambassador did not make to us suggestions different to those
which his Government made. He never suggested to us that the German
Government would be able to agree to the condition of the neutrality of
Belgium. On the contrary he did suggest to me that we should not put
that condition forward because he was afraid his Government would not
be able to accept it. (Cheers.)
Mr. PRINGLE (R., Lanarkshire, N.W.): Is my right hon. friend aware
that Mr. Keir Hardie is constantly representing in the country that
these proposals were actually made by the German Government to England?
(Hear, hear.)
Sir. E. GREY: That was one of the reasons why I thought it very
desirable to answer very explicitly. (General cheers.)
Mr. KEIR HARDIE: On a point of personal explanation I entirely
repudiate the statement made by Mr. Pringle.
Mr. PRINGLE: I have to say in answer to that personal imputation that
my authority is a letter written by Mr. Hardie in the _Ardrossan and
Saltcoats Herald_ last Saturday. (Cheers.)
Mr. KEIR HARDIE: Those who cheer have not seen the letter. (Cries of
"Sit down.")
Mr. PRINGLE: Coward.
Mr. KING (R., Somerset, N.) asked the Foreign Secretary whether he
intended to lay upon the table copies of the German memorandum and the
official statements of other foreign Governments showing the different
explanations of the origin of the war which had been published by the
various Governments concerned in the European war.
Sir E. GREY: I have received no official explanation of the nature
referred to, except such as appear in our White Paper recently
published.
Mr. KING also asked whether Sir E. Grey was aware that the German
Government had presented gratis to certain American citizens copies
of a pamphlet, written in English, called "Germany's Reasons for War
with Russia"; and whether, with a view of permitting an answer to this
publication, he would obtain a copy and place it in the Library.
Sir E. GREY replied that he had given instructions for a copy of the
document in question to be placed in the Library at the disposal of
members.
On page 147 of this volume appears a reference to the German White
Book, which was issued at Berlin on August 3rd. This White Book was
intended to show that war with Russia was inevitable, and it was
brought down to August 1st. In other words, while it dealt more or less
adequately with the situation as between Russia and Germany, it threw
no light on the ultimate causes which led to war with this country.
The Memorandum of this German White Book has already been summarized
(p. 147-8) and two telegrams--one from the Kaiser to the Tsar on July
31st, and the Tsar's reply of the same date--have been quoted on p.
148-9. The _Manchester Guardian_ of August 24th contained translations
of telegrams which had been exchanged previously by the two Emperors on
the preceding days, _i.e._, from July 28th to July 30th, as follows:
The Kaiser to the Tsar.
_July 28th, 10.45 p.m._
I HEAR with the utmost disquietude of the impression created in
your realm by Austria-Hungary's proceedings against Servia. The
unscrupulous agitation which has for years been carried on in Servia
has led to the appalling crime of which the Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand
was the victim. The spirit which animated the murder of their own king
and queen is still supreme in that country. Doubtless you will agree
with me that we two, that you as well as I, and all sovereigns have a
common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for the
hideous deed should receive the punishment they deserve.
On the other hand, I am far from overlooking the difficulties you and
your government may find in opposing the tendency of public opinion.
Remembering the hearty friendship which for long has bound us two
securely together, I am throwing the whole of my influence into the
scale to induce Austria-Hungary to seek for an open and satisfactory
understanding with Russia. I confidently hope for your assistance in my
endeavours to put aside all the difficulties that may arise.
Your sincerely devoted friend and cousin,
(Signed) William.
The Tsar to the Kaiser.
Peterhof Palace,
_July 29th, 1.0 p.m._
I REJOICE that you are back in Germany. I beg you earnestly to help
me at this grave moment. A shameful war has been declared on a weak
country, and there is immense indignation in Russia, which I fully
share. I foresee that I shall very soon be unable to hold out longer
against the pressure exercised upon me, and shall be compelled to adopt
measures which will lead to war. To obviate such a misfortune as a
European war, I implore you, in the name of our old friendship, to do
all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.
(Signed) Nicholas.
The Kaiser to the Tsar.
_July 29th, 6.30 p.m._
I HAVE received your telegram, and share your wish for the maintenance
of peace. But I cannot, as I said in my first telegram to you, regard
Austria-Hungary's action as a "shameful war." Austria-Hungary knows
by experience that Servia's promises are wholly unreliable if merely
written on paper. In my view Austria-Hungary's action is to be regarded
as an attempt to secure guarantees that Servia's promises shall be
really translated into action. I am strengthened in this view by the
declaration of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary aims at no
territorial acquisitions at Servia's expense. I think, therefore, that
it is entirely possible for Russia to maintain the rôle of a spectator
of the Austro-Servian war without dragging Europe into the most awful
war it has ever experienced. I believe that a direct understanding
between your government and Vienna is possible and desirable, and, as
I already telegraphed to you, my government has done all in its power
to further such an understanding. Military measures on Russia's part,
which Austria-Hungary could view as a threat, would naturally hasten
a misfortune which we both wish to avoid, and would undermine the
position of mediator which I have readily assumed in response to your
appeal to my friendship and help.
(Signed) William.
The Kaiser to the Tsar.
_July 30th, 1.0 a.m._
MY Ambassador is instructed to draw the attention of your government
to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation: I said the
same to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has only mobilised
against Servia, and only a part of its army. If, as appears from
your communication and that of your government, Russia is mobilising
against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator which you entrusted to
me in friendly wise, and which I accepted at your express request, is
jeopardised, if not rendered impossible. The whole burden of decision
now rests upon your shoulders, the responsibility for war or peace.
(Signed) William.
The Tsar to the Kaiser,
Peterhof,
_July 30th, 1.20 p.m._
FROM my heart I thank you for your speedy reply. I am this evening
sending Tatisheff with instructions. The military measures now coming
into operation were decided upon five days ago for reasons of defence
against Austria's preparations. Most heartily do I trust that these
measures will in no way influence your position as mediator, which I
value highly. We need your strong pressure on Austria to secure an
understanding with us.
(Signed) Nicholas.
The two final telegrams have been given on pp. 148-150 of "How the War
Began."
On July 28th, a confidential communication was sent by the Imperial
Chancellor to the Governments of the various Federal States of Germany.
After recapitulating the story of the quarrel between Austria and
Servia, it proceeds as follows:
There are certain Russian voices accordingly who hold that it is a
self-evident right and the business of Russia to intervene actively on
Servia's behalf in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.
The _Novoye Vremya_ actually thinks that the responsibility for the
European conflagration that would result from such action on the
part of Russia can be thrown upon Germany, in so far as Germany
does not cause Austria-Hungary to give way. But here the Russian
Press is looking at things upside down. It was not Austria-Hungary
which started the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which, by its
unscrupulous encouragement of Greater Servian aspirations, even within
Austria-Hungary, endangered the very existence of the Monarchy, and
created a condition of things which finally found expression in the
atrocious deed of Sarajevo. If Russia believes it must intervene in
the conflict on behalf of Servia, its right is no doubt good, so
far as it goes. But in doing so it must know that it thereby takes
over as its own all Servia's endeavours to undermine the existence
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that on it will rest the sole
responsibility if the Austro-Servian business, which all the other
great Powers desire to localise, leads to a European war. Russia's
responsibility is clear, and the heavier in that Count Berchtold has
officially informed Russia that there is no intention of territorial
acquisition at Servia's expense, or any tampering with the continued
existence of the Servian kingdom--merely a desire for peace from the
Servian machinations which imperil its existence.
The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clear. The
final goal of the agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavists against
Austria-Hungary is, by breaking down the Danube Monarchy, to burst or
weaken the Triple Alliance, and subsequently to isolate the German
Empire completely. Our own interest, therefore, calls us to the side
of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the duty of preserving Europe, so far as
may be possible, from universal war, likewise directs us to support
the endeavour to localise the conflict, thereby adhering to that
straight line of policy which we have now pursued with success for
forty-four years in the interest of the maintenance of European peace.
If, however, contrary to what we hope, the interference (Eingreifen)
of Russia causes an extension of the conflagration, faithful to our
alliance, we should have to support the neighbour Monarchy with the
whole might of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall we grasp the
sword, but if we do, it will be with the calm consciousness that we are
guiltless of the disaster which a war must bring upon the peoples of
Europe.
This "calm consciousness" does not seem to have been disturbed by the
reflection that in the spring of 1913, when Europe appeared to be
settling down to a period of peace and prosperity after the Tripoli
and Balkan wars, the German Government suddenly startled the whole
world by imposing a special war levy of £50,000,000, and by increasing
the peace strength of the German army to 870,000 men. Under the
Quinquennial Army Law of 1905, the peace footing of the German army was
largely increased and reached a total of 505,839 men in 1911. A new
Quinquennial Law was voted by the Reichstag in 1911, and if it had been
carried into effect the army would have had the strength of 515,221 in
1915-6. This, one would have thought, was surely a sufficient peace
establishment; but in 1912 a still further Army Law provided for new
units and also for increases in the peace effective. Hardly were the
provisions of this law being applied when the special measure of 1913
was passed. The German army, in other words, rose from a peace strength
of 505,000 men (excluding the one-year volunteers) in 1911 to a peace
strength of about 512,000 in 1912, and a peace strength of 870,000
in the spring of 1914. There were no corresponding increases in any
European army to call for this drastic strengthening of the German
forces. Indeed, the French army had rather become reduced in numbers
in consequence of the two years' service; and the Balkan States were
exhausted. The Servia which had advanced against Turkey in the autumn
of 1912 was a very much more powerful country than the Servia with
which Austria picked a quarrel in 1914.
We were never told why this great increase in the German army was
rendered necessary; nor did we learn why, at almost the same time, the
Austrian Government voted huge sums for enlarging its land and sea
forces. There was a vague reference in the Reichstag to the balance
of military power. But, if the Balkan war had altered the military
power of Europe, it had altered that power to the advantage of the
Triple Alliance. The Balkan States, the perpetual menace of the
Danube Monarchy, if we are to credit the statements made at Vienna,
were exhausted after their campaigns, first against Turkey and then
against one another. Austria herself had had her way with regard to
Albania, and Russia had given up her project of securing an outlet on
the Adriatic for Servia. Italy, the third partner in the Triplice, was
beginning to recover from the effects of the Tripoli war; and France
and England wished for nothing better than to be let alone.
If we received but little information regarding the strengthening
of the German army, assuredly we had been receiving less for years
previously regarding the construction of strategic railways on the
German border where it meets Belgium and Luxemburg. An examination of a
detailed map of this district will show the most careless observer that
the strong German fortresses and garrison towns of Cologne, Coblenz,
and Germersheim, are connected with the western frontiers by railway
lines the only possible use of which must have been the transportation
of troops and munitions of war. There is certainly no trade in western
Germany demanding such a large number of tracks running east and west;
and it was only by means of these railways that Germany was able to
throw a million men across the frontier in less than forty-eight hours
after war broke out. The pacific intentions of France may be judged
from the fact that the lines on the French side of the frontier run for
the most part north and south.
One or two such items may pass. But when we consider them _seriatim_,
we are bound to admit that Germany has shown consistent provocation
for more than a decade. We may leave out of account, perhaps, the
Kruger telegram and the German desire to assist Spain against the
United States in 1898, not to mention the attitude of Germany at the
time of the Boer war. There remains an entire series of provocations;
the preamble to the first German Navy Act (1900), in which England as
the enemy is all but mentioned by name; the visit of the Kaiser to
Tangier; the bullying indulged in by the German representatives at the
Algeciras Conference; the trouble almost forced on France over the
Morocco question in 1907; the determined attitude taken up by the
Kaiser against all Europe at the time of the Turkish revolution and the
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria, in 1908-9; the stringent
terms of the Potsdam Agreement with Russia in 1910; the sending of
the _Panther_ to Agadir in 1911; the intractable attitude of the
Wilhelmstrasse over the settlement of the Balkan question in 1912-13.
With some effort, perhaps, any one of these incidents--and these are
only a few of the more important--might be explained away with a veneer
of plausibility; but, taken together, they are overwhelming in their
proof that the German Empire has been a hotbed of unrest in Europe,
not merely for the last two or three years, but for the last twenty.
Where Germany led Austria followed; and numerous were the threats
and imprecations levelled at Italy through the pliable medium of the
semi-official Press because Rome did not always see eye to eye with
Berlin and Vienna.
The remaining telegrams and other documents quoted by the _Manchester
Guardian_ need not detain us long. From the dispatches of the German
Ambassador at St. Petersburg to his Government at Berlin, it is clear
that the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonoff, laid the entire blame
at the door of Austria. No impartial statesman, as we can see from
our own White Paper, attempted to justify an ultimatum that demanded a
reply within forty-eight hours. The following messages, however, are
worth noting, and they help to complete our own official documents:
From the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs at Berlin.
_July 27th._
The military attaché reports conversation with War Minister:
Sazonoff has asked the latter to explain the situation to me. The
Minister of War gave me his word of honour that no mobilisation order
had as yet been given. Certain preparatory measures had been taken;
that was all: no reservists had been called up, no horses commandeered.
If Austria crossed the Servian frontier mobilisation would take place
in the military districts touching upon Austria: Kieff, Odessa, Moscow,
Kazan. Under no circumstances in those on the German front, Warsaw,
Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was earnestly desired. On my
inquiry as to the purpose of mobilisation against Austria he shrugged
his shoulders and referred to diplomacy. I said to the Minister that
we did justice to their friendly intentions towards us, but that even
mobilisation directed solely against Austria would be regarded as
highly threatening.
On July 28th--by which date Germany must have nearly completed her
arrangements for invading France through Belgium--we find the Foreign
Minister informing the Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, that
Germany is ready to co-operate with the other Powers in mediating
between Austria and Russia; and on July 29th France is warned that
Germany may be compelled to declare martial law. On July 31st the
ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg and a similar warning to Paris.
The following message was sent to St. Petersburg on August 1st:
In case the Russian Government should not give a satisfactory answer
to our demand, your Excellency will at five o'clock this afternoon
(Central European time) hand it the following declaration, in French:
"Since the beginning of the crisis the Imperial Government has
endeavoured to bring about a peaceful solution. In conformity with the
wish expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty
the Emperor of Germany, in agreement with England, was endeavouring to
act as mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when
Russia, without waiting for the results of his efforts, proceeded to
mobilise the whole of its land and sea forces.
"As the result of this threatening step, for which no motive was
afforded by any miltary preparation on Germany's part, the German
Empire found itself face to face with a serious and imminent danger.
If the Imperial Government had failed to parry this danger it would
have compromised the security and even the existence of Germany.
Consequently the German Government found itself compelled to address
the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and
to insist on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia having
refused the satisfaction of this demand, and having shown by this
refusal that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honour
to inform your Excellency, by my Government's command, as follows:
"His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, raises the gage in the
Empire's name and regards himself as in a state of war with Russia.
(_Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire,
relève le défi et se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie._)
"Please demand your papers and protection and put your affairs under
the protection of the American Embassy."
* * * * *
Among the numerous indications of loyalty which reached Great Britain
from her oversea dominions and colonies, those from India were
not the least striking and demonstrative. As many of the Indian
princes offered not merely money, but also men, it was decided that
representative contingents of Indian soldiers should take their places
on the battlefield side by side with their fellow-subjects from these
Islands and the Dominions. The announcement was made in the House of
Lords on August 28th by Earl Kitchener in the following words:
"In addition to reinforcements that will shortly proceed from this
country, the Government have decided that our Army in France shall be
increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops
from India.
"The first division of those troops is now on its way. I may add that
all wastage in the Army in France has been immediately filled up, and
there are some 12,000 men waiting for that purpose on the lines of
communication."
* * * * *
To Lord Kitchener's brief announcement the Secretary for India added an
explanation which the public welcomed with feelings of gratification.
"It has been deeply impressed upon us," he said, "from what we have
heard from India, that the wonderful wave of enthusiasm and loyalty
which is now passing over that country is, to a great extent, based
upon the desire of the Indian people that Indian soldiers should stand
side by side with their comrades of the British Army in repelling the
invasion of our friends' territories and the attacks made upon them."
* * * * *
Hardly less enthusiasm had been aroused on the previous day, August
27th, when Mr. Asquith moved:
"That an Address be presented to his Majesty praying him to convey to
his Majesty the King of the Belgians the sympathy and admiration with
which this House regards the heroic resistance offered by his army and
people to the wanton invasion of his territory, and an assurance of the
determination of this country to support in every way the efforts of
Belgium to vindicate her own independence and the public law of Europe."
* * * * *
In supporting his motion the Prime Minister delivered an eloquent and
moving speech, in the course of which he said:
"Very few words are needed to commend to the House the Address the
terms of which will shortly be read from the Chair. The war which is
now shaking to its foundations the whole European system originated in
a quarrel in which this country had no direct concern. We strove with
all our might, as everyone now knows, to prevent its outbreak, and when
that was no longer possible to limit its area. It is all-important,
and I think it is relevant to this motion, that it should be clearly
understood when it was and why it was that we intervened.
"It was only when we were confronted with the choice between keeping
and breaking solemn obligations, between the discharge of a binding
trust and of shameless subservience to naked force, that we threw away
the scabbard.
"We do not repent our decision.
"The issue was one which no great and self-respecting nation, certainly
none bred and nurtured as ourselves in this ancient home of liberty
could, without undying shame, have declined. We were bound by our
obligations, plain and paramount, to assert and maintain the threatened
independence of a small and neutral State. Belgium had no interest
of her own to serve, save and except the one supreme and over-riding
interest of every State, great or little, which is worthy of the name,
the preservation of her integrity and of her national life.
"History tells us that the duty of asserting and maintaining the great
principle, which is, after all, the well-spring of civilisation and of
progress, has fallen once and again at the most critical moment in the
past to States relatively small in area and in population, but great
in courage and resolve, to Athens and Sparta, the Swiss cantons, and
not least gloriously three centuries ago to the Netherlands. Never,
sir, I venture to assert, has the duty been more clearly and bravely
acknowledged, and never has it been more strenuously and heroically
discharged than during the last weeks by the Belgian King and the
Belgian people.
"They have faced without flinching, and against almost incalculable
odds, the horrors of an irruption, devastation, of spoliation, and of
outrage. They have stubbornly withstood and successfully arrested the
inrush, wave after wave, of a gigantic and overwhelming force. The
defence of Liège will always be the theme of one of the most inspiring
chapters in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves
the immortal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to
ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their alliance
and their friendship. We salute them with respect and with honour.
We are with them heart and soul, because by their side and in their
company we are defending at the same time two great causes--the
independence of small States and the sanctity of international
covenants--and we assure them, as I ask the House in this Address to
do, in the name of this United Kingdom and of the whole Empire, that
they may count to the end on our whole-hearted and unfailing support."
* * * * *
The reception which this speech met with was unmistakable; and the
motion was voted unanimously.
Mr. Bonar Law, in seconding, spoke with great feeling of the shameful
atrocities committed upon the Belgian people by the German soldiery,
and, in the Upper House, Lord Crewe, referring to the same theme,
observed that no country ever outraged humanity without sooner or
later paying for it: "It must be our part to see that the sword is not
sheathed till these great wrongs are redressed to the full."
Lord Lansdowne spoke of the "incalculable value" of the two or three
weeks gained by the heroic defence of Belgium; and Mr. Redmond, in a
few glowing sentences, bore witness to the generous enthusiasm which
had been excited in Ireland. There was no sacrifice, he said, which
Ireland was not willing to make for Belgium, and he suggested that,
instead of the loan of £10,000,000 which had been proposed, the Belgian
people should be asked to receive the money as a gift.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: In this telegram, which is quoted in full on p. 178 of
"How the War Began," Sir Edward Grey reproduced the appeal of the King
of the Belgians to King George for diplomatic intervention, and asked
for an assurance that the German demand on Belgium for permission to
pass troops over Belgian territory would not be persisted in.]
[Footnote 2: This was the British ultimatum, in which Sir Edward Grey
recapitulated the circumstances connected with the German occupation of
Belgian territory and demanded an answer by midnight. Quoted in full on
page 180-1 of "How the War Began."]
[Footnote 3: This telegram, says a footnote to the dispatch, never
reached the Foreign Office.]
[Footnote 4: This letter has been quoted in full on p. 106 of "How the
War Began."]
[Footnote 5: Sir Edward Grey's speech appears _ibid._, p. 150 foll.]
[Footnote 6: This refers to Sir Edward Grey's telegram to Sir E.
Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, which is given on p. 178 of "How
the War Began."]
[Footnote 7: Sir E. Goschen's report has been given at the beginning of
this chapter.]
[Footnote 8: Quoted on p. 136-7 of "How the War Began." In this
dispatch to Sir E. Goschen, Sir Edward Grey states that he refused to
give any undertaking even if the French colonies were respected, saying
that England must keep her hands free.]
[Footnote 9: See footnote No. 1.]