WITH THE THIRD ARMY.
(_a_) Hannescamps.
Many expected, and all hoped for, a fairly long period of rest when the
Battalion moved back to Halloy, after nearly three months of the Somme
Battle. But it was not to be. The 49th Division was transferred to the
Third Army, and, within five days of its relief in the Leipsig Redoubt,
the Battalion was holding a front line sector again. Two days of easy
marching, and a night each at Humbercamps and Bienvillers, had brought
it to the Hannescamps sector, where it relieved the 2nd Battalion Royal
Welsh Fusiliers, on September 29th.
The new sector lay astride the Hannescamps--Essarts Road, and was the
longest front the Battalion had held up to that time. It was outside
the area of the Somme Battle, had been quiet all the summer, and so
had suffered little from shell fire. At a first glance the trenches
appeared to be in splendid condition, and in places they really
were--Lulu Lane, the communication trench on the left, was about as
fine a piece of field engineering as the Battalion had seen. But the
greater part of the front line and most of the communication trenches
were far from good. The weather was dry when they were taken over and,
fortunately, there was practically no rain while the Battalion was
there. Very little of the work had been properly revetted, and it was
obvious that the trenches would slide in as soon as the wet weather
came. The front line was of the regulation type--six yard bays and
four yard traverses--with two or three long saps running out into No
Man’s Land. It was fairly well provided with shelters, B Company in
the centre being particularly well off with a number in the sunken
Hannescamps--Essarts Road. It was garrisoned by three companies; the
fourth was in reserve, with two platoons near Battalion H.Q. and two
about halfway up Lulu Lane. Battalion H.Q. lived in shelters along the
road, just south of the village of Hannescamps. These were moderately
comfortable, except for the rats; but few would have been any good
against shell fire.
The enemy was very quiet. Apart from a few light shells now and then,
his artillery was practically inactive. Trench mortar, machine gun and
rifle fire were almost unknown. This was due mainly to the extent of No
Man’s Land. On the extreme left, the opposing lines approached within
about 250 yards of one another; but on the greater part of the front
they were over 1,000 yards apart. The main activity of the Battalion
was patrolling. In that department Sec.-Lieut. G. Crowther, who had
succeeded Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd, M.C. as Battalion Intelligence
Officer, was extremely active. Night after night he penetrated deeply
into No Man’s Land in his efforts to secure an identification--but
without success. On one occasion he did encounter the enemy--near the
Osier Bed, which was his particular haunt--but he failed to make a
capture, though he certainly wounded one German. Apart from this, the
Battalion only came in contact with the enemy once. During their first
night in the sector, some men of C Company, who were holding a sap-head
on the left, were bombed, and suffered several casualties.
At Hannescamps, the Battalion had taken over the most elaborate and
well-organised system of cooking they had ever seen in a front line
sector. A good kitchen had been built in a sunken road not far from
the village, and there hot meals were regularly prepared for the whole
Battalion. These were carried up, in hot food containers, by the men of
the reserve company, and living was almost as good in the front line
as in rest billets. The only serious difficulties were the shortage
of water, and the rats. Rats! Everyone who has seen much of trench
warfare knows how prevalent rats are. But never, at any other time or
place, has the Battalion had to contend with such a pest as it found
at Hannescamps. Everywhere the trenches swarmed with them; but nowhere
were they so bad as among the shelters near Battalion H.Q. They ate
everything they could get their teeth into. The very first night the
Battalion was there, not only were nearly all iron rations spoiled, but
more than half the packs and haversacks of the men of D Company, who
were in reserve, were ruined. Nothing could be done to cope with them
and they had to be endured. The remaining packs and haversacks were
only saved by taking them out nightly and hanging them on thin wires,
which were stretched from tree to tree in a neighbouring orchard.
After four days in this sector, the Battalion was relieved by the 1/5th
Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and went to Souastre
for a rest. There all efforts were concentrated on smartening up. This
was very necessary. For practically three months there had been little
opportunity for a man to keep himself bodily clean, much less smart;
and there had been few proper parades. The result had been a distinct
falling off in smartness; but, after one or two periods in Brigade
Reserve, the improvement was very marked.
Only two tours were done in the Hannescamps Sector and then the 146th
Infantry Brigade took over the line. While the remainder of the
Battalion moved to Bienvillers for the night, D Company was sent to the
Bluff, south of Fonquevillers, where it came under the orders of the
5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. There it provided shifts for
work in the tunnels for two days, and then rejoined the Battalion at
Humbercamps. After two more short moves, the Battalion arrived again at
Souastre.
(_b_) Fonquevillers.
From the middle of October until the beginning of December, the
Battalion was inter-relieving with the 5th Battalion Duke of
Wellington’s Regt. in the Y Sector, Fonquevillers. This sector had
a frontage of rather over a thousand yards, and extended from the
Fonquevillers-Gommecourt Road on the left, to the “Mousetrap,” an
unoccupied rectangle of ground opposite Gommecourt Park, on the right.
It had been the scene of one of the most costly failures of July
1st, for from it the men of the 46th Division had started when they
attempted to take Gommecourt in conjunction with the 31st Division.
When the Battalion first took over the sector, it was held with two
companies in the front line and two in support. But, before long, these
dispositions were altered. The front line system was divided into three
company sectors, each company finding its own immediate support; and
the fourth company became battalion reserve. The front line had been
continuous at one time, but now parts of it were practically derelict;
communication along it was still possible without much difficulty, but
there were unoccupied gaps between the three companies. The position
was a strong one, though it was not to be compared with the magnificent
defences which the enemy had constructed for himself round Gommecourt.
Battalion H.Q. occupied a line of shelters and dugouts along the
Fonquevillers--Hebuterne Road, commonly known as Thorpe Street. Chief
among these was the Bairnsfather Dugout, so-called because it had once
been occupied by the artist whose work is so well known to all readers
of the _Bystander_. It was a comfortable little place, like
several more in the vicinity. Its walls were lined with whitewashed
timber and adorned with many drawings by the creator of “Old Bill,”
some executed in pencil, some apparently with the end of a red-hot iron.
Things were not so quiet in the neighbourhood of Fonquevillers as they
had been at Hannescamps. The enemy did not make much use of heavy
artillery, but his field guns were often active. These did not harass
the front line troops greatly, but a good deal of shrapnel was fired
on Thorpe Street, and various parts of the village frequently received
attention. The most “unhealthy” spot was the Shrine, at the western
entrance; it was never advisable to loiter near there for long. Trench
mortars caused a lot of trouble. On the left in particular these often
fired, and, though actual “minnies” were uncommon, there were plenty
of “rum-jars.” On one occasion the Commanding Officer was confined for
some time in a dugout, the entrance to which had been blocked by one
of these trench mortar shells. The roof of this dugout was at least
fifteen feet thick, but it was bulged in by the force of the explosion.
As at Hannescamps, the offensive spirit of the Battalion was mainly
confined to patrolling. No Man’s Land varied from 200 to 400 yards in
width. With the exception of the ruins of the Sucherie, which were
really on the next battalion’s front, there was little of interest
between the lines. Sec.-Lieut. G. Crowther was again to the fore in
his efforts to capture a prisoner, but he had no success. The enemy
appeared to be quite willing to leave No Man’s Land to the British;
at any rate, few patrols of his were encountered. At length, when all
minor attempts to secure identification had proved unsuccessful, 147th
Infantry Brigade H.Q. determined to make a raid--the first operation
of that type to be carried out in the Brigade. It was undertaken by
the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., who made the attempt one
night through the 4th Battalion, which was then holding the line. The
operation was well planned and executed; the raiding party succeeded
in entering the enemy lines and did a great deal of damage; but they
failed to secure an identification. Apart from a few minor duties,
such as providing covering fire from Lewis guns and assisting in
the evacuation of the wounded, the Battalion took no part. But some
casualties were suffered from the defensive barrage which the enemy put
down.
While the Battalion was in this sector, the successful attack north
of the River Ancre, which resulted in the capture of Beaumont Hamel
and other positions, took place. The battle was too far off to have
any real effect on the Fonquevillers front, though, at one time, it
was intended that a smoke barrage should be put up by the Battalion
to distract attention from the real attack. Elaborate preparations
had been made for this, but eventually the orders were cancelled and
nothing was done.
At Fonquevillers, Battalion H.Q. once spent a very uncomfortable
half-hour. “Authentic” information had been received from Brigade that
the enemy had driven a mine right under H.Q. mess. The exact time at
which this was to be exploded was known, and it was found that it came
in the middle of a relief. This was most inconsiderate on the part of
the Germans, for the necessity of handing over correctly prevented
officers visiting their friends, or making expeditions “on duty” to
distant parts of the line. There was an anxious minute when the time
came to go into the air. Nothing happened.
Winter had begun soon after the Battalion came into the sector, and,
with its coming, conditions became very bad. The trenches were in no
condition to stand bad weather. Very little work had been done on them
for months, probably because everyone hoped that the British would have
advanced far beyond them ere winter set in. Now, when the rain came,
they immediately began to cave in. But the Battalion had behind it
the experience gained at Ypres the previous winter. There was indeed
more work to do than could possibly be done; so parts of the line were
allowed to become derelict, and one or two communication trenches fell
into disuse. Work was concentrated on what was most necessary, and
the battalion in the line had the assistance of large working parties
sent up by the battalion in reserve. Long hours had to be worked,
but excellent results were obtained. There was plenty of mud, but
no part of the trenches in use ever became really water-logged. How
well the men worked during one tour is shown by the following highly
complimentary letter, which was received from the Brigadier:--
“O.C. 4th W. Riding Regt.
I wish to express to the Battalion under your command my great
appreciation of the work done in your sector, and the excellent
spirit shown by your men during the past 6 day tour in the
trenches under circumstances of exceptional difficulty.
Your work was good, not shoddy, and when not working your men
were trying to shoot Bosches.
My only regret is, that owing to circumstances, I was unable to
spend more time with you, but it was a compliment that after
what I saw on Wednesday, I knew I could leave the Battalion to
do its best.
This excellent spirit of keenness and hard work in a Battalion
is worth a great deal to its Brigade Commander.
Please circulate my remarks to your officers and men.
C. Lewes, B.-General,
Commdg. 147 Brigade.”
Periods of Brigade Reserve were usually spent in Souastre, at which
village the Battalion transport was permanently billeted. Most of the
men occupied barns of the familiar French type, those timber and
clay structures so well known to all who have served with the British
Expeditionary Force. Generally speaking, the troops were fairly
comfortable. The barns were in fairly good condition. There were plenty
of civilians still living in the village, though it was not far from
the line. There were plenty of estaminets, and there was a Y.M.C.A.
hut. Little training was possible owing to the large working parties
which had to be found. Needless to say, the men groused at these, but,
as they worked mostly on the trenches which they occupied themselves
in the line, they realised that the work was for their own benefit.
Sometimes only half the Battalion went to Souastre, the rest stopping
in billets in Fonquevillers, under the command of Major A. L. Mowat.
This arrangement was made in order to have two companies on the spot to
work under the direction of the 57th Field Company, Royal Engineers.
For the greater part of this period the Battalion was very short of
officers. When it left the Somme area it was well over strength, but,
soon after its arrival in the Third Army, it had been called on to
transfer ten to other battalions of the Regiment. No further drafts
had been received, many officers were absent on courses, and the usual
wastage through sickness was going on. The result was that, during the
latter part of the time at Fonquevillers, there were seldom more than
two officers per company doing duty in the line.
On December 5th the Battalion was relieved in the Y Sector by the 1/5th
Battalion Sherwood Foresters--the battalion which had gone “over the
top” from those very same trenches on July 1st. As each platoon was
relieved it marched back to Souastre, where a halt was made in a field
for dinner, after which companies formed up and marched to Warlencourt.
The next day the Battalion marched to Halloy, where it was to stop
until early in the New Year.
(_c_) Halloy.
Halloy was one of the worst places for billeting in the whole of
France. The barns were mostly in a bad state of repair. The hutment
camps were exceptionally muddy. The inhabitants of the village were
far from sweet-tempered, as a general rule. To make matters worse, it
seemed to be the invariable custom of the British authorities to crowd
far more troops into the place than it could reasonably be expected to
hold. The weather was not particularly bad for the time of the year,
but December is never an ideal month. Hence the conditions, under which
the Christmas of 1916 was spent, were none of the best.
There was not a great deal of training. Occasional battalion route
marches were held, but the companies attempted little except specialist
training. No. 5 Platoon of B Company won the 147th Infantry Brigade
Platoon Competition; but it was not successful when it represented the
Brigade in the 49th Divisional Competition. Towards the end of the
time at Halloy, large working parties had to be provided for unloading
stores at Mondicourt Railhead. Several large drafts of men arrived to
replace the wastage of the previous autumn, and, by the beginning of
January, the Battalion’s “paper” strength was over 1,000 other ranks.
The chief event was Christmas Day. Great preparations were made as
usual. A motor lorry was obtained to fetch additional supplies from
Amiens. Cpl. F. Smith was, of course, very much to the fore; Sergt.
Lockwood rose to the occasion, as he always did at that season of the
year. Dinner accommodation was a difficulty. Only one suitable room, at
an estaminet, could be obtained, and that would only hold one company
at a time. So the dinners started at noon and ran on right through the
afternoon, the men sitting down in four company shifts. But everything
went off well, the usual smoking concerts helped to pass the time, and
the anniversary was thoroughly enjoyed by all.
(_d_) Berles.
On January 7th, the Battalion left Halloy, and, moving by march route,
relieved the 2nd Battalion Bedfordshire Regt. in Brigade Reserve to the
B1 Sub-sector. Battalion H.Q. and two companies were accommodated in
the village of Berles; the other two companies were at Humbercamps.
These were to be the dispositions of the Battalion for the rest of the
month, whenever it was out of the line, except on one occasion when
the whole went to Humbercamps. Though very much nearer the enemy--the
village was only about a mile from the British front line--the troops
at Berles were far more comfortable than those at Humbercamps. Parts
of the village had been very little shelled. Quite a number of French
civilians were still living there and a few small shops were open.
There were many very comfortable billets in private houses, some of
which still contained a good deal of furniture; and the men were not at
all crowded. Here and there extensive tunnels had been dug in the hard
chalk, and to these the men had orders to retire if the enemy started
shelling. Working parties had to be provided as usual, but these could
be borne with ease in such comfortable surroundings.
The Battalion first took over the B1 Sub-sector on January 10th. Its
dispositions were somewhat peculiar. The front line was divided into
three company sectors, but one platoon was drawn from each to form a
composite company, in reserve at Battalion H.Q. The fourth company
lived in extremely comfortable billets in the village, where it was
in reserve if needed; but it was mainly employed on working parties.
Seldom has part of a battalion in the line been more comfortably off.
The sector was in an awful state. Laterally, each company was
completely isolated from its neighbours by absolutely derelict trench.
Long stretches of the communication trenches were deep in water, while
portions of the front line fairly beggar description. It had been very
badly constructed; in some places the revetments had bulged so much
that there was scarcely room to force one’s way along the trench;
elsewhere, the sides had collapsed altogether, and the trench was
nothing but a cavity, filled with mud and debris. The pumps were kept
constantly at work, but were quite inadequate to deal with the water.
So bad was the front line on the left company front that, during the
moonless nights of the first tour, it took the subaltern on duty two
hours to walk once each way along the line--and yet the company sector
was only about two hundred yards in length. But the men stood it well.
Kitchens, similar to those at Hannescamps, provided plenty of hot
food; and thigh-boots were available for all.
Artillery was fairly active on both sides. The vicinity of Battalion
H.Q. received most attention and several casualties were suffered
near there, the chief being R.S.M. T. Glover, who was wounded in the
arm by a shell splinter. There was also a certain amount of trench
mortar fire, particularly on the right, where the lines were not
more than eighty yards apart; indeed, at one point, only about forty
yards separated the saps of the opposing troops. The British had a
heavy trench mortar which occasionally fired on the enemy defences,
opposite to the left company. Owing to doubts as to the accuracy of
this infernal machine, it was customary to clear a portion of the
front line while it was firing. Certainly it produced most terrific
explosions, and it provoked a good deal of retaliation until, one day,
a “premature” destroyed not only the gun but the whole of the team
which was working it.
Towards the end of the month an exceptionally hard frost began.
Quickly, all the mud and water froze hard, and sheets of ice covered
the bottoms of many trenches. Snow fell and the ground became white.
It froze on the trench grids, making them so slippery that it was
almost impossible to walk without sandbags tied over the boots. The
change in the weather had its advantages as well as its disadvantages,
and probably the former outweighed the latter. Iron-hard ground was
a great improvement on the awful mud; ice was better than water; and
the weather was dry. But the lot of the sentry was most unenviable. To
stand on the fire-step, in the face of a biting north-easterly wind,
with the thermometer registering as much as 28 degrees of frost, was
a terrible task. Everything possible was done. Hot drink and rum were
provided. Section commanders actually put their men through some of the
exercises in bayonet fighting and physical drill in the front line. But
the weather of early 1917 will not be forgotten by those who were in
the trenches at that time.
During the earlier part of the month patrolling had been very active,
in spite of the bad condition of No Man’s Land. Little had been
possible on the right company front, where the lines were so near
together; but, further north, they were as much as five hundred yards
apart in places. Sergt. J. Bancroft, of C Company, was particularly
energetic. Twice he reached the enemy wire, reconnoitred it for several
hundred yards, and brought back very valuable information as to its
strength, the enemy dispositions, defences and working parties. On
one occasion, finding his men rather “windy,” he fell them in in No
Man’s Land, put them through some bayonet fighting drill, and then
proceeded with the patrol. But the deed for which he won the Military
Medal happened after the cold weather had set in, when the snow-covered
ground shone white in the rays of the moon. Sec.-Lieut. G. Rawnsley,
with Bancroft and two men, was out on patrol. He had reached a point
about thirty yards from the enemy line when a flare revealed his
presence, and he was shot through the head. In spite of the heavy fire
maintained by the enemy, Bancroft remained with the body for some time,
trying to get it back. Finding the task beyond his power, he returned
to his own line, collected and led a party to the spot, and succeeded
in bringing the body in. All this was done in the face of heavy fire,
and his coolness and daring thoroughly merited the decoration which he
received.
Before the frost set in, all work had been concentrated on keeping
the trenches in a habitable condition. But, with the frost, such work
became temporarily unnecessary, even had it been possible. Meanwhile,
new theories of how a line should be held were developing. The gradual
increase of fire power, due to the introduction of Lewis guns and
the growth of the British artillery, made it unnecessary to keep so
many men in the front line; the increase in the strength of the enemy
artillery and trench mortars made it inadvisable to do so. Instead
of a line in which practically every fire-bay was manned, the system
of semi-isolated posts was coming in. To adapt the old trenches to
this new idea of defence, now became the chief form of work. Derelict
trenches had to be filled in; the trenches which were to be preserved
had to be adapted for all round defence by platoon or section posts.
This was mainly carried out by filling the disused trenches with wire,
so that they could not be occupied by the enemy.
Bombing too had had its day, and the utility of the numerous
saps, which covered most front lines, was discounted. Among other
improvements in the Battalion’s sector, it was decided to fill in the
T head sap which lay only about forty yards from the enemy, on the
right company front. This was a delicate task. The order was to fill it
in with earth; but it approached so near to the German line that the
least stroke of a pick on that iron-bound ground could easily be heard.
What was to be done? As luck would have it, the enemy was engaged in
wiring his sap just opposite; and so it became the nightly custom to
assemble a working party in the British front line and wait until the
enemy party was heard. Then the work of filling in the T head sap would
begin, for no fire was likely to come from the enemy while his own
party was out. This went on for several nights without incident; but
the work progressed very slowly, owing to the frozen condition of the
soil. On the last night the Battalion was in the line it changed its
tactics. Instead of sending out a working party, it trained a Lewis gun
on the enemy sap and opened fire as soon as the wiring party was heard.
Whether any casualties were caused cannot be said; but the wiring came
to an abrupt conclusion.
Had the Battalion remained longer in that sector, it would probably
have been called upon to do a raid on the enemy line. Much time had
been expended on reconnaissance for that purpose, and the order was
fully expected. Perhaps it was due to its own intentions that the
Brigade was so nervous about the enemy; whatever the cause, it seemed
most anxious to ascribe to the Germans designs on the British line. A
sign of this nervousness was the great interest taken in a gap in the
enemy wire near the Berles-Monchy Road. It is probable that the gap was
an old one, which had escaped notice up till then; but the amount of
paper that flew about on the subject was enormous. Of course, nothing
happened.
The Battalion’s departure from the B1 Sub-sector was the result of a
rearrangement of divisional fronts. The 46th Division was extending
north and taking over the whole of the 147th Infantry Brigade sector,
while the 49th Division was doing the same on its left. Hence, when the
Battalion was relieved on January 30th, and moved to Humbercamps, it
knew that it was not to return.
[Illustration: Brig.-Genl. R. E. SUGDEN, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.]
(_e_) Riviére.
On February 1st the Battalion moved to Riviére, where it relieved the
8th Battalion King’s Royal Rifle Corps, in Brigade Reserve to the F1
Sub-sector. The 1/5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. followed,
and, throughout the next month, the two were inter-relieving as they
had been at Berles. The accommodation in brigade reserve was very good,
considering its nearness to the line. Three companies lived in billets
in the village; the fourth garrisoned the Wailly Keeps, a reserve line
of platoon posts. This latter was an ideal duty for an enthusiastic
platoon commander. He had his own little command, nicely compact; he
lived with his platoon, looked after its food, and supervised its work
and training; and, except in one case, his company commander was not
too near. What could a keen young subaltern want better? The bulk of
the Battalion in Riviére found working parties, so there was little
chance for training. But the Battalion had a tour in the line to do
before it was really able to taste the joys of brigade reserve. On
February 2nd it took over the F1 Sub-sector from the 7th Battalion
King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
This sector was, in one respect, the most “perfect” the Battalion
ever occupied. Students of the many official handbooks on “Trench
Warfare,” which were produced in the first two years of the war, will
remember the excellent instruction on the planning of trenches--how
each system should have a continuous front line, supervision trench,
support line and reserve line, with numerous communication trenches
from front to rear. They will remember too how each of these, except
of course the supervision and communication trenches, was to consist
of alternate bays and traverses, etc., etc. And those of them who knew
the Western Front will remember how seldom, if ever, they saw these
theories put into practice. Well, the F1 Sub-sector was an exception.
The supervision trench did not, indeed, run the whole length of the
front; but there were the continuous front, support and reserve lines,
properly traversed and supplied with fire bays, and connected by
numerous communication trenches. In fact, an aeroplane photograph of
the sector might almost have been reproduced in one of the textbooks,
as a perfect example of what ought to be done. The bombing expert
had also been at work, and the protection of the main communication
trenches was “beautiful,”--but was it effective? Perhaps it was due to
this theoretical accuracy of the sector that the authorities selected
it as a training ground for embryo officers. At any rate, several
privates from the Artists’ Rifles were attached to the Battalion for
instruction while it was in that area. So much for theory!
In practice also the line was not at all bad. The trenches were deep
and narrow, and afforded good protection against shell fire. At the
beginning of February everything was frozen hard, and so there was
no trouble with the mud; but when a thaw set in, shortly before the
Battalion left the sector, the support line and several communication
trenches soon became impassable. Accommodation was adequate; most
of the dugouts were sufficiently deep to withstand any ordinary
bombardment and a few were really comfortable. In short, the line
had been carefully constructed, in accordance with ideas now quickly
becoming obsolete; it had been well looked after, and might have been
a pleasure to live in--but for the enemy. The archaic atmosphere was
rather heightened by the presence of such “prehistoric” appliances as
the West Spring Gun, and rifle batteries.
One of the most interesting features of the sector was a Russian sap,
near the boundary between the centre and left companies. About 75
yards out in No Man’s Land, and nearly parallel to the left company
front, was a bank, behind which patrols could move quite out of sight
of the enemy. The remains of a derelict sap ran out to its southern
end, but this had been replaced by a Russian sap--that is, a covered-in
passage--well revetted with timber. A listening post was permanently
established at the end of this sap; during the day it remained under
cover, but at night it occupied a shell hole in the open. It was in
touch with a second post, at the entrance to the sap, by means of a
bell worked by a string. This apparatus was tested frequently to make
sure that it was in working order. The existence of both listening post
and sap was supposed to be unknown to the enemy; probably he knew all
about them, but, at any rate, he was not supposed to.
The front system, embracing both front and support lines, was divided
into three company sectors. The fourth company was in battalion
reserve. Battalion H.Q. was, of course, in its “correct” position, a
little in rear of the reserve line. Companies did not always hold the
same sectors, for the right was generally considered to be the most
uncomfortable; but there was not much to choose between them.
The F1 Sub-sector was the “liveliest” the Battalion held while it was
with the Third Army, but it is not to be compared with such places as
Thiepval Wood or Nieuport. Heavy artillery was not much used by the
enemy, though the reserve company H.Q. had the reputation of being
the datum point for 5.9’s. But the German field guns were very active
on many parts of the front. The most frequently-shelled spot was the
top of Forest Street--the communication trench on the extreme right.
That point was constantly and very accurately “whizz-banged,” for the
enemy could easily detect any movement there. All parts of the front
line came in for attention. The enemy also used “rum-jars” and vane
bombs very freely. The latter probably caused far more annoyance than
casualties. However, Lieut.-Col. H. A. S. Stanton, D.S.O.,[8] was
severely wounded by one of them.
There was also a good deal of back area shelling, and the transport
was harassed more than once on its nightly journey with rations.
Near Basseux its route led through the position of a 6-inch howitzer
battery, which the enemy frequently shelled. There Pte. H. Bibby, while
driving a limber up to Riviére one night, had his ride horse killed
under him. He coolly cut it out of the traces and completed his journey
with one horse, himself walking by the side and supporting the pole
for a distance of a mile and a half. It was not the first time that he
had been brought to notice, and the award of a Military Medal, which
followed, was well deserved.
The British were not idle. Their artillery did plenty of work on that
front, and their trench mortars were always ready to fire. There were
some excellent and well-hidden Stokes mortar positions, and also some
2-inch in the line. Both of these were eager to retaliate, and it was
soon found that the former quickly stopped the enemy’s use of vane
bombs. Targets for Lewis guns or rifles were not common, but C.S.M. A.
McNulty did some excellent practice with his Winchester. His gory tale
of how, after more than four hours’ waiting, he saw the blood splash
from the forehead of a German officer, was much appreciated by all who
heard it. The snow made patrolling difficult at first, but it did not
stop it. The higher authorities were clamouring for identification, and
every possible means was tried. But enemy patrols were conspicuous by
their absence. Once a working party was located near the head of the
Russian sap, and a plan was made to secure a dead or wounded German. A
party was to lie in wait in the sap, and, when it heard the enemy, to
signal to the artillery, who would open a heavy burst of shrapnel fire;
the party was then to rush out, pick up the killed and wounded, and
return. But though Lieut. F. H. Kelsall waited in the sap for several
hours, on more than one occasion, the enemy party did not again appear.
So, when all other means of obtaining identification had been tried
without success, the Battalion was ordered to make a raid on the enemy
line.
Capt. J. G. Mowat was selected to command the raiders. Arrangements
were made for the whole party to stop out of the line during the next
tour, to rehearse the operation. Comfortable billets were provided for
the men, they were not worked too hard, and they enjoyed themselves
thoroughly. Once their billets were changed owing to a rumour about
a spy. There may have been some truth in the report. Certainly the
inhabitants of Riviére, in some unknown way, learned much about the
operation beforehand. They even knew zero hour, a point which had been
kept secret from nearly all the raiders themselves.
[Illustration: _Raid near Ficheux._
17.2.17.]
After careful consideration the enemy front line, immediately to the
west of the Wailly-Ficheux Road, was selected as the objective for
the raid. No Man’s Land was thoroughly reconnoitred by Battalion H.Q.
scouts. The operation was fixed for the evening of February 17th, and
was planned to take place as follows:--
1. Zero hour was fixed for 10-0 p.m. Fifteen minutes before zero the
raiders were to be assembled in No Man’s Land, along the bank by the
Russian sap, divided into the following parties:
(_a_) Right Flank Party. Sec.-Lieut. R. C. Purvis and 12
other ranks.
(_b_) Left Flank Party. Sergt. G. Moscrop and 12 other
ranks.
(_c_) Communication Trench Sec.-Lieut. E. V. Blakey and 12
Party. other ranks.
(_d_) Dugout Clearing Party. Sec.-Lieut. A. Butler and 15
other ranks. (Sub-divided into
two parties under the officer
and Sergt. F. Johnson respectively.)
(_e_) Parapet Party. Capt. J. G. Mowat and 14 other
ranks.
(_f_) Bangalore Torpedo Sec.-Lieut. W. L. Hirst and 5
Party. other ranks.
2. At 10-0 p.m. a heavy shrapnel barrage would open on the enemy
front line, from point A to point B (see map). After four minutes it
would gradually open out to form a box barrage round the objective.
Meanwhile, the enemy front line on both flanks, and all communication
trenches and ground in the vicinity, were to be swept by artillery,
trench-mortar, machine and Lewis gun fire.
3. The Bangalore Torpedo Party was to advance, immediately under the
barrage, and blow a gap in the wire at point C. The other parties were
to follow, in order as above, pass through the gap, and enter the enemy
line.
4. Parties (_a_) and (_b_) were to move along the trench
towards the right and left respectively, approach as near to the
barrage as possible, and cover the flanks of the operation. Party
(_c_) was to move down the enemy communication trench from point
C, and establish a block in it. Thus protected, party (_d_) was to
secure identification and do as much damage to the enemy trenches as
possible.
5. Capt. J. G. Mowat, with party (_e_), was to remain on the
parapet. Signallers were to run a telephone wire across No Man’s Land
so that he would be in direct communication with Battalion H.Q. When
he considered that nothing further could be done, he was to give the
recall signal and supervise the withdrawal.
6. The assembly was to be covered by fighting patrols, sent out by the
5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., then holding the line.
At length February 17th arrived, and, in the evening, the raiders began
to move up to their positions. All were assembled, according to plan,
before zero. Apart from an enemy searchlight, which swept No Man’s
Land during the assembly but did not reveal the men to the Germans,
the preliminaries passed off without incident. Just before the barrage
opened, Sec.-Lieut. W. L. Hirst advanced with his torpedo party. The
torpedo was a cumbersome affair, twenty-two feet long, which required
three men to carry it. As the party moved forward it laid out a tape,
to show the direction to the raiders. The barrage had now opened,
the enemy was thoroughly aroused, and the flares which he was firing
considerably helped the party, as it hurried forward. The barrage was
excellent. On reaching the enemy wire, the men pushed the torpedo
well in, though not without difficulty, for it was heavy and the wire
was very thick. They then withdrew, except the officer and one Royal
Engineer who remained to light the fuse. As soon as this had been done,
the two rushed back about thirty yards and threw themselves flat on the
ground. Almost at the same moment the torpedo exploded with a terrific
crash.
Meanwhile, the raiders, in column of parties, had advanced to a
position about forty yards from the enemy wire. Immediately the torpedo
exploded they rushed forward, only to find that much of the wire
still remained uncut. Capt. Mowat, Sergt. Moscrop and others flung
themselves upon it. Slashing at it with bill-hooks, and hurling great
chevaux-des-frises to one side, they forced a passage. Sergt. Moscrop
was the first to enter the trench, and he was quickly followed by all
the men of the flanking parties. By 10-6 p.m. every man was in the
trench and at work.
The left flank party came upon an enemy sentry post almost at once.
One unwounded prisoner was taken and was passed out of the trench to
Capt. Mowat, who was waiting on the parapet. The rest of the Germans
were killed. The party then began to work its way along the trench
to its left. A second enemy party was encountered, and, for a short
time, held up the advance. But half of the British party was working
on the parapet. Cpl. E. Jackson, who was in command of these, quickly
worked round the Germans, dropped into the trench behind them, and
attacked them from the rear. One was taken, the rest were killed. But
the prisoner, after his capture, fired at and wounded Moscrop; so he
was promptly killed. The party then continued its way towards the left,
where it became engaged with some German bombers. These it successfully
held at bay until the recall signal was heard.
The right flank party, under Sec.-Lieut. R. C. Purvis, moved along the
trench in a similar manner. It had barely started when word was passed
down that identification had been obtained. Sergt. J. S. Sheard led
the way, and himself accounted for the first three Germans who were
met. Moving further along, the party became heavily engaged with some
of the enemy, who were bombing from the parados. Several casualties
were suffered, including Sergt. Sheard severely wounded. But here, as
on the other flank, the advantage of having a party on the parapet was
apparent. This party, of whom Lance-Cpl. R. Knox shot two Germans, was
able to hold the enemy bombers at bay; and the right flank was well
covered until the end of the operation. When the recall signal was
sounded, all began to withdraw. Before leaving the trench, Cpl. S.
Jessop threw a petrol can, with Mills bombs attached, down a dugout
entrance; great sheets of flame shot up the stairway and “the results
appeared satisfactory,” says the official report.
It would appear that the Bangalore torpedo had not been exploded
exactly at the pre-arranged spot. As a result, the raiders entered
the trench more to the left than had been intended. Sec.-Lieut. E. V.
Blakey searched for the communication trench, which it was his duty
to block and hold, but was unable to find it. He was able, however,
to give assistance both to Sergt. Moscrop and to the dugout-clearing
party; and, as the enemy does not seem to have made any attempt to
counter-attack along the communication trench, the failure to find it
did not affect the operation.
Both flanking parties had received strict orders to ignore all dugouts.
These were left to Sec.-Lieut. A. Butler, Sergt. F. Johnson and their
men. The former worked to the right, the latter to the left. Each party
carried with it a plentiful supply of Mills bombs and short-fused
Stokes shells. Every dugout was bombed, and the crashing explosions
showed clearly how effective the Stokes shells were. No one can attempt
to estimate the number of casualties which were inflicted, but they
were certainly heavy. There is no doubt that many Germans were in the
dugouts. A light flashed down the entrance to one showed four bodies
lying on the steps. Lance-Cpl. H. Kane was particularly prominent in
this work. He shouted down the entrance to one dugout and was answered
by much talking; but as he did not understand the language he thought
it best to drop a bomb down. So he did.
Meanwhile, Capt. J. G. Mowat was hard at work on the parapet. He was
in communication with Battalion H.Q. by telephone the whole time. He
had to keep a careful watch on the operation, in order to be ready to
deal promptly with any unforeseen development. Also he was largely
occupied in improving the gap in the enemy wire, so that the return
of the raiders might be easier. By 10-18 p.m. he saw clearly that
enemy bombing attacks were becoming serious on the flanks, and, as
identification had been obtained early on, there was no reason to
remain longer in the enemy lines. He ordered the recall to be sounded.
Two buglers were with him for that purpose. Their notes rang out and
were heard by all. The pass-word “Mowat” was shouted everywhere. The
withdrawal began.
Everything went well. The parties of Sec.-Lieuts. E. V. Blakey and A.
Butler withdrew first, leaving the trench by means of light ladders
which they had carried forward with them in the first advance. Their
withdrawal was covered by the flank parties, who afterwards moved
towards the point of entry, covered by their own parapet men. By 10-20
p.m. every man had left the trench, and “All Clear” was sent back along
the wire. The artillery barrage again dropped on the enemy front line,
to cover the withdrawal across No Man’s Land. This was soon effected,
Capt. Mowat bringing up the rear. In a few minutes every man, including
all the wounded, was back in the British line. There were no “Missing.”
The raid had been an unqualified success, and was therefore a great
source of satisfaction to the Battalion. It was an example of what
careful and thorough training can do. With the exception of the
slight loss of direction in the first crossing of No Man’s Land,
which resulted in the trench being entered too much to the left and
Sec.-Lieut. Blakey failing to find his objective, everything had worked
like clockwork. Identification had been obtained, an enormous amount of
damage had been done to the enemy defences, and many Germans had been
killed or wounded--17 dead Germans were actually counted, and there
must have been many more in the dugouts which were bombed. All this had
been done at a cost of only seven wounded, of whom, however, Sergt. J.
S. Sheard died a few days later. All these casualties had been suffered
in the enemy trench; not a man had been hit either during the advance
or the withdrawal. There can be no doubt that the effect on the morale
of the Battalion was very great. The raiders themselves were most
enthusiastic and would have dearly liked to do another raid. Everyone
else in the Battalion envied them their good luck.
Capt. J. G. Mowat shortly after received the Military Cross which he
had thoroughly earned, both by his good work in training the party and
by his gallant leadership. Sergt. G. Moscrop received the Distinguished
Conduct Medal, and several Military Medals were awarded to the N.C.O’s
and men who had been most prominent in the operation.
The Battalion did two more tours in the same sector before it was
finally relieved. Little of special note happened. The enemy artillery
and trench mortars were rather more active than they had been earlier
in the month, probably as a result of the raid. About this time one
or two officers of the 62nd Division, which had only recently landed
in France, were attached to the Battalion for instruction. The only
event of real importance was a fire in the Assistant Adjutant’s dugout;
this consumed many “valuable” official documents, and was thus a great
source of satisfaction to the Orderly Room for many weeks to come.
On the last day of February the Battalion was relieved by the 2/9th
Battalion London Regt., and moved back to Bailleulval. As a parting
message of hate, the enemy shelled the village that night and caused
several casualties. But the Battalion had now finished with the Third
Army. For a few days it marched and counter-marched about the district,
never stopping more than a night at one place, except Halloy. None of
these places was of much interest, except perhaps Neuvillette, where
the billets were exceptionally good. On March 7th the Battalion marched
to Doullens, and, after waiting in the streets all day, entrained in
the evening. Soon after dark the train started on its slow northerly
journey, and so, without interest and unnoticed, the Battalion left the
Third Army.