THE BATTLE Of THE SOMME.
(_a_) July and August, 1916.
The first half of the year 1916 was a period of comparative quiet for
the British Expeditionary Force. During those six months it attempted
no serious offensive, and the Germans were far too fully occupied in
the neighbourhood of Verdun to be able to expend much energy elsewhere.
The terrific attack on their eastern stronghold, caused the French much
anxiety, and it undoubtedly influenced their strategy. Nevertheless, it
did not prevent them making their preparations for the great offensive,
which had been planned for the summer, in conjunction with the British.
This attack was to take place on a wide front, where the allied lines
joined in the Somme district; and the battle which resulted takes its
name from that river.
The only part of the Somme battlefield which is of interest in a
history of the Fourth Battalion is the neighbourhood of the village
of Thiepval and the wood of the same name. From Albert the River
Ancre flows in a northerly direction to about St. Pierre Divion,
where it turns nearly east towards Miraumont. Its banks rise steeply
on both sides; its width is considerable; and the extensive marshes
and shallow lagoons, which fringe so much of its course, render it
a formidable obstacle. It is surprising that the enemy ever allowed
the French to establish themselves on the eastern bank in 1914. By
the summer of 1916, many military bridges had been built across the
river and its marshes; but the allied bridge-head, though wide, was
shallow, particularly at the northern end. Everywhere it was dominated
by the Germans, who occupied all the commanding positions on the
line of hills. To the north they held the village of Beaumont Hamel,
from which they could overlook the whole course of the river, as
far south as Albert. Their line crossed the Ancre near St. Pierre
Divion and then ran approximately south, including the village of
Thiepval, to La Boiselle. Few stronger defensive systems, than that
around Thiepval, have ever been constructed on the western front. To
the north the village was defended by the mighty Schwaben Redoubt, to
the south by the equally formidable Leipsig Redoubt and that network
of fortifications, well-styled the “Wonderwork.” Everywhere the line
was well supplied with deep dugouts, which were comparatively easy to
construct in the chalky soil of the district. The Germans thus had
many advantages over the British. Their commanding positions gave them
better opportunities for observation, and their machine guns could
sweep every inch of ground in No Man’s Land. The shallowness of the
bridge-head cramped the British, and hampered their assembly for the
attack, while it gave unrivalled opportunities to the enemy artillery.
Nevertheless, it was with the highest hopes that the allied armies
looked forward to “Z” day. Months of preparation had been necessary for
this offensive, and some account has already been given of the “spade
work” done by the Battalion in that connection. Towards the end of
June, much time was spent in reconnaissance. Before the battle began
all the officers, and most of the N.C.O’s in the Battalion, knew every
dump, aid post, ammunition store and source of water supply between the
Ancre and Authuille Wood.
The concentration of artillery on the British front was colossal, and
the reserves of ammunition seemed almost inexhaustible. A week before
the end of the month the guns opened fire, and, from that time, the
Germans can have had no doubt of what was coming, and which of their
positions were threatened. Day and night, for seven days, the rain of
shells poured down on the enemy line without ceasing. A good view of
much of the shelled area could be obtained from Senlis Mill, and many
officers of the Battalion visited the observation post there, to watch
the bombardment. All came away with the same opinion--that nothing
could live in the German lines. Their hopes of an early and decisive
victory were very high. They had yet to learn the strength of the
enemy’s deep dugouts.
The opening of the infantry attack was fixed for the morning of July
1st. The 49th Division formed part of the X. Corps, whose left rested
on the River Ancre and right near Authuille Wood. The Corps objectives,
including as they did the villages of Grandcourt and Thiepval, and all
their outworks, were second to none in difficulty on the British front.
The attack there was entrusted to the 32nd Division on the right, and
the 36th (Ulster) Division on the left. The 49th Division was held in
Corps reserve; it was to assemble in previously-selected positions and
there await orders. The Battalion’s assembly position was in Aveluy
Wood, where it was to occupy some of the very trenches it had dug
about two months before. Just before the battle, Lieut.-Col. E. G. St.
Aubyn was summoned to Corps H.Q. There he remained until nearly the
end of July, being held in reserve to take command of a brigade should
any Brigadier become a casualty during the battle. The command of the
Battalion thus devolved on Major J. Walker. “The Commanding Officer
wishes all ranks to remember that in the work in front of us we are
putting to the test our reputation as a Battalion and has absolute
confidence that Officers, N.C.O’s and men will worthily uphold the
honour of the Regiment to which we belong,” was his message to the
troops on the eve of battle.
About midnight on June 30/July 1st, the Battalion marched out of
Senlis. Though its role was still indefinite, everything had been
prepared so that it could move into battle at a moment’s notice. The
transport moved to lines near Hedauville. The Battalion itself marched
to B Assembly Trenches in Aveluy Wood, arriving long before dawn. There
was none too much room in the trenches, but all the men were got in
somewhere. The enemy was quiet. There can be no doubt that he knew
full well what was impending, but he reserved his fire for the better
targets which would soon present themselves. Few of the men even tried
to sleep; excitement was far too high for that.
At zero hour--7-30 a.m.--the British artillery fire lifted from the
enemy front line, and the British and French infantry “went over the
top.” Much has been written of that great assault, but nothing need
be noticed here, except what took place on the X. Corps front. There
the 36th and the 32nd Divisions went forward with a magnificent dash.
They swarmed over the first enemy lines; they over-ran Thiepval and
St. Pierre Divion, the Schwaben and the Leipsig Redoubts. Some of the
Ulstermen even reached Grandcourt Railway Station. But their casualties
were appalling. “Mopping-up” was then unheard of; counter-battery work
was in its infancy; creeping barrages were unknown. Down came the enemy
artillery barrage, and it was such as few had seen before. German
machine gunners and riflemen, emerging from the security of their
deep dugouts, took the attack in enfilade and in reverse. Men fell in
thousands. The survivors were too few to maintain the positions they
had reached. By an early hour the attack on the N. Corps front had
failed.
Of course, all this was only learned by the Battalion later. From
Aveluy Wood nothing could be seen of what was happening on the Corps
front. The men knew that the attack had opened; for a time they knew
nothing of its progress. They had nothing to do. They were not troubled
by enemy shelling, for the hostile artillery had far better targets
elsewhere. After some time, wounded began to pass, and also a number
of prisoners. The former were eagerly questioned, and some news of the
earliest stages of the attack was obtained; but it was not until much
later that authentic information was received.
Towards 11-0 a.m., orders to move across the River Ancre arrived.
The Battalion Intelligence Officer was immediately sent forward to
reconnoitre the bridges and report on the safest; none envied him his
job, but, as things turned out, it was simple enough. The enemy was
paying no attention to the bridges. About 11-30 a.m. the Battalion
moved off by platoons, at fifty yards’ interval, A Company leading.
Marching via Brooker’s Pass, it reached the Southern Dugouts near
Crucifix Corner, Aveluy, without incident. There it remained until
the evening of the next day. The 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s
Regt, was also there and accommodation was very crowded; but otherwise
the men were not uncomfortable. Aveluy was not shelled. Crowds of
stragglers from different battalions of the attacking divisions were
coming in to reorganise, and rumours of the failure of the attack were
increasing. Apart from carrying wounded to the neighbouring dressing
station, and helping men who came back from the line absolutely worn
out, the Battalion had nothing to do.
About 7-0 p.m. on July 2nd the Battalion left Aveluy and moved up to
relieve the 5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. in Johnstone’s Post.
This position was in the narrow and deep valley which lies along the
south-eastern edge of Thiepval Wood. Two large cemeteries now occupy a
great part of the valley, and the inscriptions on the weather-beaten
crosses bear eloquent testimony to the presence of the 49th Division
in that area. None who were there in July, 1916, will ever forget it.
It was a point at which many trenches met, but, apart from these and
a few shelters in the bluff along the edge of Thiepval Wood, there
was no cover. When the Battalion arrived that evening, the enemy was
putting down a terrific counter-preparation on Johnstone’s Post,
where he evidently suspected an assembly for the attack. A continual
stream of 15 cm. high explosive shells poured into the hollow from the
south-east. The cover of existing trenches was nothing like enough to
accommodate the Battalion, and all that could be done was to get the
men as close as possible to the steep south-eastern side of the valley,
which afforded a little protection.
Very early the next morning, orders were received for the Battalion to
support a fresh attack which the 32nd Division was about to make on
Thiepval. These orders did not arrive until about half-an-hour before
the attack was to begin. What was to be done? Very little was known of
the ground; there was no time for reconnaissance; there was not even
time to issue proper orders to companies. Fortunately, the instructions
were cancelled before zero hour. The 32nd Division, however, made its
attack. It had little success. One corner of the Leipsig Salient was
taken, and was very useful two months later as a starting point in the
operations which outflanked Thiepval on the south. It was also much
used as a “show ground” in the next few weeks, as there were many fine
enemy dugouts in the German line. Apart from this, the attack was a
failure.
The whole Battalion remained at Johnstone’s Post until the evening of
July 4th, when two companies moved to the Northern Dugouts, Authuille
Bluff. Throughout its stay it was never free from shelling, and
frequently the enemy put down counter-preparations of exceptional
intensity. Casualties were terrible. The Aid Post became frightfully
congested, not only with the Battalion’s own men, but with crowds
from other units; and it is no exaggeration to say that the dead lay
around it in heaps. None could have done more--few could have done
half as much--than Capt. S. S. Greaves, R.A.M.C., did. Day and night
he worked without ceasing. He might have been in a hospital, far from
the scene of action, for all the excitement he showed. Many a man owed
his life to the skill and care lavished on him by the 4th Battalion
Medical Officer at Johnstone’s Post. But the casualties of those first
days on the Somme were so appalling that the medical staffs were quite
inadequate to deal with them. Hour after hour the Battalion worked to
clear the wounded, but fresh cases streamed in far more quickly than
earlier ones could be evacuated. And all the time, into the midst of
that deadly valley, the 5.9’s screamed, taking their remorseless toll
of human life and limb. Without a chance of a fight, scores of the
Battalion went down. Chief among them was Capt. E. E. Sykes, M.C.,
an officer of magnificent physique and dauntless courage; one who
had gone to France with the original Battalion, and whose men would
have followed him “into the mouth of hell.” Fearfully wounded in the
abdomen, he died shortly after at the Aid Post, and his body rests in
Authuille Military Cemetery, not far from the scene of his death.
But enough has been said of these horrors. Men who were there will ever
remember them. Others who know what battle is can picture them, far
better than words can describe. To those who have been fortunate enough
never to see such things, no language can describe them.
[Illustration: Capt. W. N. EVERITT, M.C.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. C. HIRST.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Lieut. J. T. RILEY.
(Killed).]
[Illustration: Capt. S. S. GREAVES, D.S.O., M.C., R.A.M.C.]
On the evening of July 5th the Battalion relieved the 5th Battalion
Duke of Wellington’s Regt. in the front line, just in front of Thiepval
village. It was responsible for a sector about a thousand yards in
length, and all four companies held portions of the front line. These
trenches were the very ones from which the attack had been launched on
July 1st--no permanent advance had been made on that front, nor was
there to be any until late in September. No Man’s Land was thick
with dead; occasionally a wounded man, who had lain out for days,
succeeded in crawling into the British lines. Trenches and shelters
had been so terribly battered that all work had to be concentrated on
the necessary repairs. The enemy artillery was extremely active, and
many men were killed or wounded before the two days’ tour came to an
end. When the Battalion was relieved on July 7th, partly by the 6th
Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and partly by the 5th Battalion
King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, it withdrew to the assembly
trenches in Aveluy Wood, which it had occupied on the morning of July
1st. The relief was very late, everything was sodden with rain, and the
one night which was spent there was little enough rest for anyone.
On the way back to Thiepval Wood the next night, a shell near
Lancashire Dump wounded several men and killed Sec.-Lieut. W. S. Booth.
He had been bombing officer for some time and was a tower of strength
to the Battalion.
Then began the longest continuous stretch of duty, under battle
conditions, which the men were ever called upon to perform.
Tucked away near the point of the angle, between the enemy front
line and the River Ancre, was Thiepval Wood. It was bordered on the
west by the marshes of the river, and on the south and south-east by
the Johnstone’s Post valley; on the east and north-east the ground
sloped steeply up to the German lines on the heights above. With its
trees, its thick undergrowth and numerous “rides,” it must have been
a pleasant spot in pre-war days. But, during the early weeks of the
Battle of the Somme, it rapidly became a desolation little better than
the woods in the Ypres Salient the following year. Such was the home
of the Battalion from July 8th to August 19th. Never, during the whole
of that time, did the men leave it. Reliefs were carried out every few
days with the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.; but periods in
Brigade Reserve were little improvement on those in the front line, for
both were passed in the wood.
With the exception of its first tour, the Battalion always held the
extreme left sector. Its left flank rested on the River Ancre and
its right on Union Street, the length of front being about a thousand
yards. All four companies held portions of the front line, and, tour
after tour, they returned to the same positions--A, B, C, D from right
to left. No Man’s Land varied from about 250 to 400 yards in width.
Along it, and roughly parallel to the opposing lines, lay the sunken
Thiepval Road. Crowded as it was with the bodies of the Ulstermen, who
had fallen or crawled there to die on July 1st, this road was a ghastly
place. The British front line lay along the north and north-eastern
edges of Thiepval Wood. Hewn out of the chalk, the trenches had been
comparatively good up to the opening of the battle; but the fearful
hammering they had since received had almost obliterated them in many
places. There were some good deep dugouts, but not nearly enough to
accommodate all the men. The communication trenches, which led back to
Battalion H.Q. and the crossings over the Ancre, were badly constructed
and sited; the main ones lay along, or just beside, the chief rides in
the wood, and they were so straight that they could easily be enfiladed
by the enemy artillery.
Battalion H.Q. was at Gordon Castle. There, too, accommodation was
scanty. Some attempts were made to improve it, but these were greatly
hampered by enemy shelling. In particular, a bath-house was planned
and, after a week’s hard work, was completed, only to be demolished the
following morning by a shell. Nothing daunted, Lieut. J. T. Riley set
to work to rebuild it. But the second attempt had no more success than
the first. The very night the building was pronounced ready for use,
another shell knocked off one of the corners. That was too much. The
yearning for cleanliness had to remain unsatisfied, while the remnants
of the building were used for the holding of the numerous courts of
enquiry which were so popular about that time.
Throughout this period, though the role of the Battalion was the purely
passive one of holding a portion of the line, that line was situated
right in the middle of a furious battle. The first attacks on Thiepval
had failed; but the very substantial successes, which were being
gained further to the south, were gradually turning the defences of
that village on the east. The enemy undoubtedly feared a repetition
of the attack, made by the X. Corps on July 1st. His artillery was
always active, and often regular barrages would fall on the wood. The
front line came in for a great deal of attention, and it was only by
much labour that posts at all fit for occupation could be maintained.
Elgin and Inniskilling Avenues, the two chief communication trenches
to Battalion H.Q., were often enfiladed by field guns. But the worst
shelled area of all was the Ancre, in the neighbourhood of which
ration-carrying parties had a very bad time. As the weeks dragged on
the wood became thinner and thinner, until all the trenches were easily
visible to aircraft and even to ground observers. Then artillery,
from the heights north of the river near Beaumont Hamel, began to
take the wood in enfilade, and caused much damage. But, apart from
artillery fire the enemy was not very aggressive. There was not much
rifle fire, and, except to repel a definite attack, machine guns were
little used. Taking everything into account, the casualties suffered by
the Battalion were not excessive. They were constant--it is doubtful
whether a day passed without some men being killed or wounded--but they
were not out of proportion to the enormous weight of artillery fire.
Since the early days of July, the direct attacks on Thiepval had been
discontinued, and a defensive policy had been adopted on that sector,
for the time being. Nevertheless, there was considerable activity,
every effort being made to pin the enemy to his ground, and to distract
his attention as much as possible from the operations of the Fourth
Army on the right. The British artillery fire never slackened; day
after day, and week after week, the deluge of shells was kept up. This
fire was supplemented by the trench mortars, with which the troops were
now much better supplied. Considerable use was made of the new Lewis
guns, especially at night; and C.S.M. McNulty was again to the fore
with his Winchester. Minor demonstrations were constantly being made,
with the object of deceiving the enemy and making him believe that an
attack was imminent. The following order, from 147th Infantry Brigade,
is an example of what the Battalion was frequently called upon to do:--
“The Army Commander wishes everything possible to be done to
keep the enemy in front of the Division on the alert, make him
man his parapets and get him under our shrapnel fire.
With this object the following demonstration will be made to
induce the enemy to man his parapets. At 1-0 p.m. to-day as
many bayonets as possible will be shown along the whole front
of the Brigade as if assault is imminent and timed for 1-0 p.m.
For five or ten minutes previous to this hour whistles should
be blown at intervals along the front as if signals were being
made. The tops of ladders or trench grids should be shown over
the parapets. The artillery immediately after 1-0 p.m. will open
bombardment on enemy front and support trenches, especially on
those trenches which can be taken in enfilade.
Any other device which can lead the enemy in front line to
expect an assault at 1-0 p.m. should also be employed and
Machine guns will fire during the artillery bombardment.”
On several occasions smoke barrages were put up by the Battalion.
For this purpose, special emplacements were constructed about every
twenty-five yards along the front line, and from these smoke bombs were
thrown out into No Man’s Land. Usually the wind changed just before
zero hour and Thiepval Wood was enveloped in a wonderful haze of smoke.
There can be no doubt that these activities met with a certain amount
of success. This was amply proved by the speed with which the enemy put
down his defensive barrages time after time.
Patrolling too was very active. It was mainly carried out by the
Battalion H.Q. Scouts, and much very useful, and often dangerous,
work was done by them. In particular, some extremely daring and
skilful patrols were done by Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd, the Battalion
Intelligence Officer, in the Ancre valley, for which he was awarded
the Military Cross. On one occasion, when visiting the neighbouring
battalion’s post at the Mill, he had the unpleasant experience of being
mistaken for an enemy patrol, and was heavily bombed.
Reliefs were carried out with the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s
Regiment every few days and soon became very simple, for companies
always occupied the same positions, both in the front line and in
reserve. Battalion H.Q. only had to move about two hundred yards from
Gordon Castle to Belfast City. When in Brigade Reserve, two companies
were in support to each of the battalions in the front line. During
the day there was little to do, but at night working parties had to
be found. It was a dreary life, though enlivened occasionally by the
exploits of the Intelligence Officer. He it was who, whilst engaged in
a scientific investigation of German flares, nearly burnt out Battalion
H.Q. To him also was due the wondrous camouflaging of Belfast City, the
remains of which may still be seen in Thiepval Wood.
The long and unbroken spell in Thiepval Wood caused much hardship to
the men. There were no facilities for cooking, and so all food had to
be sent up cooked from the transport lines. For six weeks, no one had
a decently-prepared dinner. Supplies of clean clothing were not often
available, and baths for the men were absolutely impossible. It can
be imagined what an awful state they got into, living as they were
under filthy conditions during the hottest season of the year, with
never a chance of a good wash. At first some men bathed in the Ancre,
but this was very dangerous owing to the thick weeds; after a man had
been accidentally drowned there about the middle of July, all bathing
was strictly forbidden. There can be no doubt that this long period of
harassing and filthy conditions seriously affected the men physically.
Towards the end of July, Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn came back to the
Battalion. From that time, until August 19th, Major J. Walker and Capt.
A. L. Mowat shared the duties of second-in-command, taking turns in the
line and with the rear echelon.
During July work had consisted mainly of keeping the front line in
a habitable condition, and repairing the communication trenches,
which were continually being damaged by shell fire. Many bodies too
were recovered from No Man’s Land and decently buried. But, about
the beginning of August, the digging of the famous parallels began.
It had been decided to renew the frontal attack on the sector from
Thiepval to the River Ancre, but, after the experience of July 1st,
No Man’s Land in that area was considered too wide to attack across
successfully. Hence it was determined to push forward the British
front line by digging a series of trenches in No Man’s Land. These
“parallels” stretched from the Ancre to the top of Inniskilling Avenue,
the foremost being roughly along the line of the sunken road, though
on the extreme right it crossed the road. In other words, the front
on which they were dug corresponded almost exactly with the Battalion
sub-sector. Practically none of the actual digging was done by men of
the Battalion, but, whenever they were occupying the front line, they
had to find covering parties for the work. Every night, as soon as it
was dark enough to conceal movement, one platoon per company moved
out into No Man’s Land, and took up a line along the northern edge
of the sunken road. There they remained so long as the work was in
progress. Company Commanders took turns in charge of the whole covering
party. The actual working parties--nearly a thousand men nightly--were
provided by the 148th Infantry Brigade. Really this number was much too
big. Heavy shelling had reduced the communication trenches in Thiepval
Wood to a very derelict condition; the movement of large parties along
them became very slow, and much time was wasted in coming and going. No
Man’s Land too became very congested. As a result, the amount of work
done on the parallels was small compared with the number of men engaged.
The work of the covering parties proved tedious, but not particularly
dangerous. The enemy infantry made practically no attempt to interfere
with the digging, and only once was a party of Germans encountered.
It happened in this way. An officer of A Company was on the right of
the covering party one night. Following a not uncommon practice of
his, he was moving about alone, when he saw a party of men, a little
way off on the flank, who did not appear to be working. He went up and
gently exhorted them to get on with their job. A chorus of gutterals
was his answer, as an affrighted party of Germans made off. But though
the enemy infantry was comparatively inactive, this cannot be said of
his artillery. Even if the actual working parties were not observed
the first night, the results of their labours cannot have escaped the
German observers the next day, for the newly-turned chalk showed very
white on the ground. From that time the enemy made a practice of
putting down a barrage regularly soon after midnight, and there were
many casualties among the crowds of men in No Man’s Land. But the
barrage did not seriously affect the covering parties, which escaped
with very little loss. The parallels were nearly complete before the
Battalion left Thiepval Wood, and had been absorbed into the front line
system.
[Illustration: Thiepval Wood.
1916.]
All things considered, there was not much recognition of the good work
done by the men of the Battalion at this period. Mention has already
been made of the Military Cross awarded to Sec.-Lieut. H. H. Aykroyd.
The only other officer to receive that decoration was Sec.-Lieut. F. V.
Blackwell, who was brought to notice by a daring daylight patrol, which
resulted in the recovery of several machine guns lost by the British
on July 1st. R.S.M. F. P. Stirzaker was also awarded the Military
Cross, more for his continuous gallant work than for any specific
act; throughout all this period he earned a magnificent name for hard
work, devotion to duty and gallantry. But he was not the first warrant
officer of the Battalion to receive the Military Cross. That honour
had already been won by C.S.M. (now R.Q.M.S.) W. Lee, for conspicuous
gallantry while the Battalion was near Ypres in 1915, particularly for
his conduct on that never-to-be-forgotten December 19th.
The longest tour comes to an end at last. On August 19th the 9th
Battalion Loyal North Lancs. Regt. relieved the Battalion, which moved
back to billets near Raincheval. There it remained until August 27th.
The 49th Division was at last to be thrown into the attack, and the
time at Raincheval was mainly occupied with special assault training. A
facsimile of the enemy trenches, which formed the objectives, had been
taped out, and over this the men practised every morning. The rest of
each day was occupied with the thousand and one preparations essential
to the success of any operation.
When the Battalion first moved back to Raincheval, the operation was
expected to take place within a very few days. But, like so many of the
British attacks, it was postponed. It was a pity that the Battalion did
not know from the very first how long a time it would have out of the
line. The men were very run down after their long spell in Thiepval
Wood, and much might have been done to improve their condition.
Instead, they were kept for many days in that nervous state which must
precede every attack, and the period of rest could not be utilised
nearly so fully as it might have been. Even after a move had been made
to Forceville on August 27th, the exact date of zero day still remained
for a time in doubt. At length the attack was definitely fixed for
September 3rd.
Two days before the operation, the Battalion suffered a great loss.
Lieut.-Col. E. G. St. Aubyn became so seriously ill that he was
evacuated sick on September 1st, and soon afterwards was sent to
England. So ended his connection with the Battalion, for which he had
done so much. He returned to the 147th Infantry Brigade in the autumn,
but took command of the 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. Thus
it fell to Major J. Walker to command the Battalion in its first big
attack.
(_b_) September 3rd, 1916.
The attack made on September 3rd, 1916, is one of the most important
events in the Battalion’s history. Never before had it been selected
for an operation of that kind. It is therefore very unfortunate that
the difficulties of writing a strictly accurate account are so great.
Yet, of all the operations in which the Battalion took part during the
war, none is so obscure in many of its details, and around none has
so much controversy raged. At the time, the higher commands certainly
did not understand clearly what had taken place. Nearly all the
officers and senior N.C.O’s, who took part in the assault, were killed.
Survivors’ narratives differ considerably in matters of detail. In
short, it is impossible to write an account which is absolutely exact
in such details as the precise times at which certain events took
place. The following account has been written after a careful study
of all the available official documents, supplemented by the personal
narratives of many of the survivors. Among the official papers, none
is of greater interest and importance than a German narrative, which
was captured two or three weeks after the event. This is the report
of the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion 180th Infantry Regt.--the
unit which was holding the line south of the Ancre when the Battalion
attacked. In it are detailed the extent of the British success, the
dispositions made by the Germans to counter-attack, and the operations
which finally resulted in the recapture of the positions, which the
enemy had temporarily lost.
The operation was part of a big attack, which was to be made about
dawn, on both sides of the River Ancre. South of that river the 49th
Division was attacking, with the 147th Infantry Brigade on the right
and the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left. On the front of the 147th
Infantry Brigade, the 4th Battalion on the right, and the 5th Battalion
on the left, were detailed for the assault; the 6th and 7th Battalions
were in support and reserve respectively. The Battalion was thus on the
extreme flank of the divisional front, and, as no one was attacking
further to the south, had its right “in the air.” The following is a
brief summary of the Operation Orders:--
1. Companies were to assemble in the parallels before dawn, in
the positions shown on the map.
2. At zero hour A, B and D Companies were to advance
simultaneously. As soon as B Company had taken the First
Objective, A and D Companies were to go through it to the
assault of their respective objectives.
3. Company objectives were as follows:--
B Company. Enemy front line from point 84 to point 54.
A Company. Enemy support line from point 95 to point 66. One
platoon was to push up the Munster Gasse, and make a block in
that trench beyond the support line.
D Company. Enemy communication trench from point 84 to point
95. Blocks were to be made in the enemy front and support lines
towards the Schwaben Redoubt.
C Company was to remain in Battalion reserve.
4. A hurricane bombardment was to open at zero hour on the
objectives; it was to remain on the enemy front line for three
minutes, and on the enemy support line for eight minutes.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in the operation was the keeping of
direction. A glance at the map will show that A and B Companies had to
advance approximately half right on leaving the parallels--an extremely
difficult manœuvre to carry out in battle, in the half light of early
dawn, and in a country where there were no landmarks. The task of D
Company was even harder. Not only had the men to advance on an incline,
but, on reaching point 84, they had to “right form,” in order to
occupy the communication trench, with their front towards the Schwaben
Redoubt. Of course these manœuvres had been carefully practised
over the “tapes” at Raincheval, but the carrying of them out in the
excitement of battle, under heavy fire, was a very different matter.
The parallels, in which the Battalion was to assemble, were already
very well known to many of the men. They were rough and narrow, and
so deep that ladders had to be provided for the men to leave them
by. The first objective--the enemy front line--was about two hundred
and fifty yards from the foremost parallel. No Man’s Land was to be
crossed in quick time and three minutes were allowed for this, rather
a short period when it is remembered that the ground was one mass of
shell holes and debris, and that the advance was up a decidedly steep
slope. The enemy front line, owing to the shape of the ground, was
barely visible from the parallels. The Battalion’s objectives lay in a
re-entrant between the Schwaben Redoubt and the Pope’s Nose, from which
positions a deadly cross-fire could be brought to bear on the advance,
unless it were well protected by the British artillery. The slope and
condition of the ground, between the enemy first and second lines, was
very similar to No Man’s Land. The shelling of the past two months
had so battered the enemy defences that it was extremely difficult to
recognise definite points, or even stretches of trench.
During the afternoon of September 2nd, the Battalion marched from
Senlis to Martinsart Wood, where it halted until evening. A hot meal
was served at 8-0 p.m., and, about an hour later, the platoons began
to move off to their positions of assembly. No smoking was allowed,
and the strictest orders about silence had been issued. So, with no
noise save the squelch of boots in the mud and the occasional rattle
of equipment, the men passed through Aveluy Wood, along a specially
taped line, drew bombs and other battle equipment at the bottom of
Black Horse Road, and crossed the Ancre. During the crossing they
were somewhat harassed by enemy shelling, and D Company suffered some
casualties. But, apart from this, the march was not seriously hampered,
and all were in position by 3-25 a.m. on September 3rd. Then followed
two weary hours of waiting for the dawn and that hurricane burst of
artillery fire, which was to be the signal for the assault. High as
was the nervous tension, and great the excitement in those crowded
parallels, some of the men actually slept. How few realised that,
within the next few hours, scores would be sleeping for ever!
About 5-0 a.m. dawn was breaking. The enemy had been very quiet
during the night, but he now began to show traces of nervousness
and occasional bursts of machine gun fire clipped the parapets. The
Battalion[7] stood to, and bayonets were quietly fixed. At 5-10 a.m.
one great gun spoke, and then, to quote the words of one who took
part in the attack, “the whole sky seemed to light up suddenly.” The
hour had come. Up rose the three companies like one man. There was no
hesitation. Over the parapet they swarmed. The attack had begun.
The enemy was thoroughly on the alert. Flares went up all along the
front, and, in spite of the British barrage, which was very good, a
deadly cross fire of machine gun bullets opened from the directions of
the Schwaben Redoubt and the Pope’s Nose. There is some doubt as to the
exact time when many of the officers and senior N.C.O’s were hit; but
it is practically certain that Capt. C. Hirst, Sec.-Lieut. A. E. Hirst
and Sec.-Lieut. C. W. Tomlinson were all killed, and Sec.-Lieut. G. F.
Robertshaw wounded, before the first objective was reached. Many men
fell, but the lines went forward splendidly. Steadily they crossed No
Man’s Land, halted, and got down a few yards from the enemy front line,
waiting for the barrage to lift. But already there was apparent one
point, which seriously affected the success of the operation. Companies
were becoming mixed. Some of the men of A and D Companies were mingled
together; and many men of the 5th Battalion were in the ranks of the
4th Battalion. Also, in the half light, the rear waves of the attack
did not notice quickly enough that the first wave had halted, and
so they crowded up on it. The difficulties of keeping distance and
direction had been too great.
The enemy artillery barrage did not open properly until nearly ten
minutes after zero hour, but then it was very heavy. The old British
front line and the first parallel received most attention, and were
soon almost obliterated. Heavies rained down on the tunnel entrances;
shrapnel deluged the communication trenches. The barrage embraced the
whole of Thiepval Wood, and many casualties were suffered by the two
reserve battalions of the 147th Infantry Brigade. But the foremost
parallel and No Man’s Land were not heavily shelled at first, and thus
machine gun fire was the only serious danger to the men lying near the
enemy front line.
Immediately the British barrage lifted, B Company charged and captured
its objective without much difficulty. This line had been terribly
shattered by the bombardment of the previous two months and in places
had almost disappeared. It was so bad that most of the men did not
enter it at all, but remained in shell holes in the open, where they
began to consolidate. Their position was very exposed and, as time went
on, they lost heavily from machine gun fire. Others, among whom C.S.M.
W. Medley was most conspicuous, worked along the trench, bombing the
deep dugouts with which it abounded, and collecting prisoners. The
latter were sent back across No Man’s Land, but only one is known to
have arrived at Battalion H.Q. The rest probably perished under the
fire of their own artillery and machine guns. One part of B Company
worked a considerable distance along the enemy front line towards
the Pope’s Nose, bombing as it went. All that trench was thoroughly
cleared, but the company, and the men of the 5th Battalion who were
with it, were not strong enough to hold the whole, and it had to be
left unoccupied. Numbers of Germans, some without rifles, were seen
making off across the open on the left, and were heavily fired upon. It
seems probable that, for some time, the Pope’s Nose was evacuated by
the enemy; but it was never occupied by the British.
Meanwhile, A Company had advanced, hard on the heels of B Company.
Passing straight over the captured line, the men moved across the open
until about fifty yards from the enemy support trench. There they
halted, sheltering in shell holes, and waiting for their barrage to
lift. Already they had suffered very heavy casualties. Some, in their
over-eagerness, had advanced too far, and had been hit by their own
shells. Only one officer--Lieut. W. N. Everitt, M.C.--had survived;
C.S.M. A. Stirzaker, D.C.M., had fallen between the first and second
objectives; and scores of N.C.O’s and men had been killed or wounded.
But they had been reinforced by some men of B Company, who had gone
forward with them, and by Cpl. A. Denham’s Lewis gun team, which had
lost D Company and had advanced on the right of A Company. The men came
under a very heavy fire from the German support line. Numbers of the
enemy were seen making off across the open, and Cpl. Denham did some
execution with his Lewis gun; but the bulk of the German garrison held
its ground and fought well. For some time the Company lay in the open,
exchanging shots with the enemy in his line. The British barrage had
now lifted, and there was thus nothing to interfere with the German
marksmen and machine gunners. Casualties were piling up, but the second
objective was not yet taken. Lieut. Everitt, with Sergt. Bancroft, had
already reconnoitred right up to the line, and had thrown some bombs
among the enemy there. He now determined to try to rush the position,
after a short burst of Lewis gun fire. Assisted by Sergts. Haigh and
Bancroft, he crawled round and informed the men of his intention. They
were told to charge as soon as the Lewis gun ceased fire. The gun
opened, but stopped almost at once with a broken return spring; quite
coolly the N.C.O. on the gun--his name is now unknown--changed the
part, and reported to Lieut. Everitt that he was ready to reopen fire.
One magazine was fired, and then A Company charged. Everitt himself
was first in the trench, and was followed closely by Haigh. The bay
they entered was unoccupied, but the next was full of the enemy. These
were bombed, and either fled or dived into their deep dug outs. Parties
then moved to right and left along the trench, bombing dugouts and
collecting prisoners. The latter were sent back across the open, but
none appear to have arrived. Many Germans were killed in the second
objective. Of the parties which moved along the support line, that
to the right got well beyond point 95, towards the Schwaben Redoubt,
without encountering any of the enemy; but it could find no trace of
D Company, which should have had a post near that point. The other
party cleared and occupied the whole line to beyond point 66, where
Sergt. H. Haigh got in touch with a small party of the 5th Battalion.
Consolidation of the line, which was very wide and deep, then began.
Only about forty of the Battalion had reached the second objective.
These were organised in a line of posts from point 86, which was held
by Sergt. Bancroft and Cpl. Denham, to beyond point 66. The second
objective had been taken a little before 6-0 a.m. Soon after, the
Germans began to bombard it heavily with artillery and trench mortars,
and the discomfort of A Company was added to by some of the British
guns, which had not “lifted” sufficiently and were firing into its back.
[Illustration: Lieut.-Col. J. WALKER, D.S.O.]
Meanwhile, except for such men as Cpl. Denham’s Lewis gun team which
had become detached from its company, no one had seen or heard anything
of D Company since the opening of the attack. Like the rest it had
advanced at zero hour, and had crossed No Man’s Land on a right
incline. Its two waves had halted near the enemy front line, waiting
for the barrage to lift. Comparatively few casualties had been suffered
in the advance, but these included Sec.-Lieut. C. W. Tomlinson missing,
and Lieut. J. T. Riley and C.S.M. J. C. Walker wounded. Both of the
latter refused to go to the rear to have their wounds dressed, and
continued the advance with the rest of the company. When the barrage
lifted, the men stormed the enemy front line, and some of them extended
up a very battered communication trench, which they believed to be
their objective. All dugouts were bombed, and several prisoners were
taken; these apparently suffered the same fate as most of the other
prisoners that day. The men set to work to consolidate what had been
captured. They had not been long in their new position when the enemy
made a weak counter-attack, from the direction of the Schwaben Redoubt.
This was driven off without difficulty, but the men had very little
opportunity to carry on with the consolidation. Their position was
very exposed and the enemy defences, which had been captured, were so
shattered that they afforded little cover. Very heavy rifle and machine
gun fire, both from the Schwaben Redoubt and the east, was directed
on them; and shells were soon bursting in their midst. But where was
the Company? The exact position it reached that day has been a matter
for controversy ever since. No other company ever got into touch with
it, and the German report, already mentioned, sheds no light on the
mystery. It seems probable, indeed almost certain, that they inclined
too much to the right in crossing No Man’s Land, and entered the enemy
front line to the south-east of point 84; in fact, it would appear that
the Company actually captured, and held for some hours, the fringe
of the Schwaben Redoubt. But it is only fair to say that Sergt. (now
C.S.M.) W. Brooke, the only senior N.C.O. of D Company who got back to
the British lines, is still convinced that the Company reached point
84, its correct objective.
It is convenient, at this point, to interrupt the narrative for a short
time, in order to summarise the situation about 7-0 a.m. and to note
what steps had been taken by the enemy to deal with it.
About 7-0 a.m. the positions of companies were as follows:--
A Company held the German support line from point 86, where
there was an isolated post, to a little way beyond point
66. On both flanks the line was clear of the enemy for some
considerable distance.
B Company held the German front line, from about midway between
points 84 and 54, to beyond point 54. No enemy was in the line
between the Company and point 84, nor for some distance on the
left.
D Company held a position facing south-east, on the fringe of
the Schwaben Redoubt; exactly where cannot be said.
All companies were very weak and no reinforcements had arrived, for
reasons which will be indicated later. Only one officer per company
was left--Lieut. W. N. Everitt, M.C., with A Company, Sec.-Lieut. H.
E. Pohlmann with B Company, and Lieut. J. T. Riley with D Company.
Sec.-Lieut. V. A. Horsfall of B Company fell soon after the first
objective was taken. Sec.-Lieut E. C. Mee of D Company was lying dead
in the enemy wire. Supplies of S.A.A. were running very low, and bombs
were almost exhausted. No carrying parties had been able to get up to
the captured positions, and the only way to replenish was to collect
from the dead and wounded who dotted the ground. But the most serious
aspect of the situation was that the rest of the attack south of the
Ancre had failed. By 7-0 a.m. the only British troops maintaining their
positions in the enemy defences were those of the Battalion, with
elements of the 5th Battalion--all hopelessly mixed up. The enemy,
finding there were no British near the Pope’s Nose, was re-occupying
his front line there, and cautiously feeling his way along the trench
towards B Company.
Meanwhile, energetic measures had been taken from the start by the
German commander opposite. As soon as the situation began to develop
clearly, he directed part of his reserve troops to counter-attack
along, and parallel to, the Munster Gasse. The remainder were sent
to the Schwaben Redoubt to strengthen the garrison there, and to
counter-attack from that direction. There is no doubt that the enemy
attached more importance to the holding of the Schwaben Redoubt than to
anything else on that front. This is amply proved by the dispositions
of his reserve troops on September 3rd. It is also borne out by men of
the Battalion who were captured that day, and who have given accounts
of their examinations by the enemy. And the enemy was right. With the
Schwaben Redoubt still in his hands, he could dominate and enfilade
practically all the objectives of the 49th Division. It would also
appear, from their own account, that the Germans found it necessary to
utilise the whole of their regimental reserve that day, before they
succeeded in repelling the British; and that they even began to draw
reinforcements from another unit--the 66th Infantry Regt.
Soon after 8-0 a.m., serious enemy counter-attacks began on A Company’s
position. For some time the barrage had slackened, and even rifle and
machine gun fire had died down. What puzzled the men of A Company was
to see Germans in the neighbourhood of the Pope’s Nose, and in the
support line in rear of it; for it must be borne in mind that no one
knew anything of the situation on any other front than his own. These
Germans, as has already been said, were cautiously working their way
along the trenches towards the British, bombing as they went; but they
were still a long way off. The real counter-attack at length came from
enemy troops who advanced across the open, on both sides of the Munster
Gasse. The post at point 86 had, by this time, completely run out of
S.A.A. and bombs, and so was unable to offer any real resistance to
the advance. The Germans came cautiously forward; avoiding a frontal
attack, they worked round the right flank of the post until they
were in its rear. Bombing it from this position, they caused many
casualties. Sergt. Bancroft, Cpl. Payne and several men were killed;
Cpl. Denham and a number of others were wounded. Having thus prepared
the way for an assault, the enemy rushed the post, overwhelmed and made
prisoners of the few survivors. This happened unbeknown to the rest of
the men of A Company. The first indication they had of it was the enemy
bombing along the second objective from the right. The situation soon
became impossible. With no bombs and scarcely a round of S.A.A. left,
they were forced slowly to withdraw towards their left. On arriving
at point 66, they found themselves between two fires, for the enemy
bombing party from the west was also approaching along the trench. The
position was clearly untenable. Lieut. Everitt had only a handful of
men left. He gave orders to withdraw down the communication trench to
point 54. The withdrawal was conducted slowly and in good order, two or
three men waiting at each bend in the trench to cover it. At length the
front line was reached, but only a few isolated men of B Company could
be found there; the enemy artillery and machine guns had done their
work only too well. The party reconnoitred along the trench towards the
Pope’s Nose; another enemy bombing party was encountered. With so few
survivors, and almost without ammunition, Lieut. Everitt could do no
more. He gave the order to withdraw to the parallels. The men jumped
out of the trench and started across No Man’s Land, but they did not
scatter sufficiently. Few ever reached the comparative safety of their
own lines. A machine gun opened from the Pope’s Nose, and most of them
fell. Of the fate of Lieut. Everitt nothing certain is known. For
some time it was hoped that he was still alive. But nothing definite
was ever learned of what happened to him after he gave the order to
withdraw. One of the most gallant, competent and hardworking officers
the Battalion ever had, he probably fell when so many of his men went
down in that last crossing of No Man’s Land.
And what of D Company? Its fate was much the same as A Company’s.
Harassed by machine guns from the Schwaben Redoubt, and by rifle fire
from snipers to the east, it beat off several counter-attacks. S.A.A.
and bombs ran out, and the men searched the dead to replenish their
supplies. Rapidly their numbers dwindled. Severely wounded and in
great pain, Lieut. J. T. Riley fought fiercely until he was at length
killed. C.S.M. J. C. Walker, who had carried on though wounded early
in the action, was also killed. Yet, practically leaderless, the men
still fought on, until an officer of the 5th Battalion, who had become
mixed up with D Company, ordered a withdrawal. Then the remnants of
the company--they did not muster twenty, all told--withdrew to the
parallels.
Everything that had been gained was lost. Not a Britisher remained in
the enemy lines, save the few men who had been captured. The number of
these was very small. On the authority of the Germans themselves, only
seven unwounded prisoners from the 4th and 5th Battalions were taken
that day. Many men were still lying out in shell holes, and, during the
rest of the day and night that followed, some of these crawled back
into the lines. But there were far more lying out there who would never
crawl again.
Throughout the action Battalion H.Q. was located in a deep dugout, near
the junction of Inniskilling Avenue with Whitchurch Street; C Company
was in Battalion reserve, either in or near the old British front line.
All arrangements had been made for sending up stores soon after the
objectives were taken. East Koyli Sap was to be improved, and used as a
communication trench for that purpose. But this was never done. Early
in the action it became so crowded with casualties and others that
parties could not move along it. Even if they had been able to do so,
it entered the enemy front line at the Pope’s Nose, which was never
occupied by the British on September 3rd.
Lack of reliable information was the most serious difficulty with which
Battalion H.Q. had to contend dining the battle, and the 5th Battalion
was even worse off in that respect. Signallers had gone forward with
the assaulting companies, but no message ever came back from them. Cpl.
C. Landale, D.C.M. made gallant attempts to run a telephone line across
No Man’s Land, but it could not be maintained on account of the enemy
barrage. Most of the runners who left with messages were killed. No
information was ever received from the observation post. The result was
that, during the whole operation, Battalion H.Q. was almost completely
ignorant of what was happening.
For a long time the sole information obtained was from wounded men,
and was very indefinite. At 5-55 a.m. it was learned that the first
objective had been taken, that the second was being attacked, and that
the two assaulting battalions were badly mixed. Ten minutes later a
wounded man reported that A Company had taken its objective. Then there
was little news for more than an hour and a half. Two carrying parties
were sent forward, and it is believed that a few bombs did reach the
German front line and were used by the 5th Battalion. Runners were
twice sent out to get in touch with B Company, but none came back.
Information that the attack of the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left
had failed was received by the Battalion about 6-30 a.m. Knowing so
little of the situation, the Commanding Officer naturally hesitated to
throw any more troops into the battle; and, as events turned out, it is
well he did not use his reserves, for they could have done little real
good, and there would only have been more casualties.
At last a wounded runner arrived from B Company, bearing the following
message from Sec.-Lieut. H. E. Pohlmann:--
“To I.R.
Am holding point 54 and to left 100 yds. In touch with 5th. Only
remaining officer in B Coy. Bombs wanted. 6-40 a.m. 3.9.16.
H. E. Pohlmann, 2 Lt. B Coy.”
It had taken the runner two hours to come.
At once Major Walker ordered two platoons of C Company, and two of
the reserve bombing teams, to advance across the open and reinforce
B Company. But these orders were never issued. Before they could be
written out the advanced signal station reported that the men of the
147th Infantry Brigade were withdrawing.
C Company had not been engaged, but it had suffered many casualties
from shell fire. When it was clear that the attack had failed, Capt.
Marshall was ordered to man the parallels, in case the enemy tried to
counter-attack. But no such attempt was made.
At 11-50 a.m., more than four hours after it had been written, a
message was brought in from Lieut. Everitt, by a wounded runner.
Arriving so late, it was of no practical use; the situation had
entirely changed. But as evidence of the deeds of A Company that day,
it deserves to be quoted in full:--
“To the Adjt.
My right is only at the communication trench point 86. I am
partly in the fifth lines. I have only roughly 25 men including
six from B Coy. Have no bombers. Short of bombs and Lewis Gun
ammunition. Our artillery firing into our back especially on the
right.
Don’t know where D Coy. are.
W. N. Everitt, Lt.,
3.9.16. 7-40 a.m. O.C. A Coy.”
About 5-0 p.m. troops of the 148th Infantry Brigade relieved the
Battalion in the line. The weary men withdrew to Martinsart Wood to
reorganise, but a party of C Company was left in for the night, to
search No Man’s Land for wounded, and to help in the evacuation of
those who had already come in.
Only once--October 11th, 1918--has the Battalion had heavier casualties
than on September 3rd. It went into action 18 officers and 629 other
ranks strong; of these only three companies, each consisting of 3
officers and 127 other ranks, and a few Battalion H.Q. details, went
“over the top.” The total casualties that day were 11 officers and
336 other ranks. More than half were either known to be dead, or were
missing; and as the number of prisoners taken by the enemy was very
small, it may fairly be presumed that the Battalion lost, in killed
alone, at least 150 other ranks. Of the nine officers who went over
with the assaulting companies, only two, both wounded, returned; in
addition, Sec.-Lieut. F. A. Innes was killed at 147th Infantry Brigade
H.Q., and Sec.-Lieut. W. Smith was wounded with C Company. September
3rd is the blackest day in the Battalion’s history, for, unlike October
11th, 1918, it had no success to compensate for its casualties. To-day,
upon the very line of the first objective, which B Company carried
that eventful morning and was later forced to evacuate, there stands
a great cemetery. In it have been collected the remains of many men,
from scores of solitary graves; and on the crosses the legend “Unknown
soldier 1/4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt.” is one of the most
common. There rest many of the gallant men who fell that day.
It is not the purpose of this book to criticise as a general rule, but
some slight exception must be made in connection with the attack on
September 3rd. At the time there was a widespread belief, which was
certainly held by most of the higher authorities, that the Battalion
never gained its objectives. This was wrong. A and B Companies
reached, and cleared the enemy from the whole of the first and second
objectives; it is true they did not occupy the whole of them, but that
was due simply to lack of men. For more than two hours there were no
Germans in either of the lines which the Battalion was ordered to
capture. These facts are clearly proved, not only by the evidence of
the men who carried out the assault, but also by the German official
report on the action. The men of D Company, as has been stated, seem to
have got too far to the right; but even they fulfilled their role, for
they successfully defended the Battalion’s exposed right flank so long
as there were men enough to hold the ground which had been won. During
the next few weeks several divisions successively failed to carry the
objectives of September 3rd. Even after Thiepval itself had fallen, it
was some time before the Schwaben Redoubt and the defences north of it
passed into British hands.
(_c_) The Leipsig Redoubt.
The day after the Battalion’s unsuccessful attack on the German line,
Major R. E. Sugden, D.S.O., rejoined and assumed command, being
promoted Lieut.-Colonel a few days later. He had been in England for
nearly nine months, as the result of his wound received near Ypres the
previous December; but now, though he had not yet fully recovered the
use of his hand and arm, he had returned to France. For nearly two
years from this date he held command of the Battalion, only leaving it
when he was appointed G.O.C., 151st Infantry Brigade, in June, 1918.
After a few days in Martinsart Wood, the Battalion moved back to
bivouacs near Hedauville. Little work was done except reorganisation,
which was very necessary. Not only had an enormous number of officers
and N.C.O’s become casualties, but three whole companies had been
practically wiped out. Out of these companies no officers, only one
warrant officer--C.S.M. W. Medley--and very few N.C.O’s had survived.
The elaborate B Echelons of later days were only in their infancy, and
so little framework existed on which to rebuild. The only thing to do
was to make use of the personnel of C Company to provide the necessary
framework. Hence, many N.C.O’s and specialists were transferred to
other companies. Sec.-Lieut. F. Walker and Lieut. J. G. Mowat were
appointed to the command of A and B Companies respectively. C.S.M. A.
McNulty again became C.S.M. of A Company, and C.Q.M.S. A. L. Lord of C
Company was transferred to D Company as C.S.M. The supply of men was
simpler. Large drafts arrived within a few days, and, by the middle of
September, the Battalion’s fighting strength was practically the
same as it had been at the beginning of the month. On September 21st a
draft of eleven officers arrived, and several more joined a few days
later. Among them were three or four who had already served with the
Battalion abroad, either as officers or in the ranks, while others had
seen active service elsewhere.
[Illustration: Sept. 3rd. 1916.]
While the Battalion was at Hedauville, Brig.-General E. F. Brereton,
C.B., D.S.O., came over to say farewell. The men were drawn up in a
hollow square, and were first addressed by the Divisional Commander.
Then the Brigadier spoke. In a magnificent speech, which deeply
impressed all who heard it, he paid a glowing tribute to the dead and
said good-bye to the living. The parade was dismissed and all rushed
down to the road. Roar upon roar of cheering burst forth as the car
passed slowly through the lines of men and, at length, disappeared from
view. If he had ever doubted it, the demonstration must have proved to
the General how much he was beloved in his Brigade. Brig.-General C. G.
Lewes, D.S.O., assumed command of the 147th Infantry Brigade.
By September 15th the Battalion was considered ready for active service
again; it moved up to Martinsart Wood and from thence, the next day,
to Crucifix Corner, Aveluy. On September 17th it was in support to an
attack, made by the 1/7th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., on part
of the Leipsig Redoubt. Unlike the bigger operation of September 3rd,
this attack was planned to take place in the evening, zero hour being
6-30 p.m. Thus the assaulting troops would have the whole night for
consolidation. The main duty of the Battalion was to provide a number
of carrying parties, no less than 7 officers and 215 other ranks being
detailed for that purpose. Of these, about half were to work with the
assaulting troops, while the remainder were responsible for keeping
the various dumps supplied. Profiting by the experience of September
3rd, Brigade H.Q. had decided that carrying parties should actually
accompany the assaulting troops when they attacked. It was hoped, in
this way, to get some supplies of ammunition up to the objectives
before the enemy barrage came down. The men for this duty were divided
into three separate parties, under Sec.-Lieuts. H. N. Taylor, E. W.
Flatow and E. Rawnsley respectively. A further party, under Sec.-Lieut.
G. Rawnsley, was to carry up water in petrol tins.
Half-an-hour before zero all parties were in their assembly positions.
Many of the men, who had only left England a few days, had never even
been in the line before, and it must have been a particularly nervous
time for them. The principal supplies to be carried up were Mills
bombs, and every man had a box under each arm. When the assaulting
troops went over, the carrying parties advanced immediately in rear of
them. The ground was not easy to cross, being one mass of shell holes,
and littered everywhere with the debris of shattered trenches and
wire entanglements. Nevertheless, the men went well, and most of them
succeeded in delivering their first load before the enemy barrage came
down. Back they went for a second load, and this time the crossing was
more dangerous. Though rather scattered, and not particularly heavy,
the enemy barrage was most uncomfortable; and machine guns did not
make the situation any pleasanter. But through it all the men worked
splendidly. Backwards and forwards they went, time after time, until at
length the unusual message came back “Enough bombs.” That message is
the best criticism that can be given of the way in which the carrying
parties did their work. By this time they had naturally become very
scattered. Many were being employed as messengers or guides; some had
lost their bearings, for it was now quite dark; and there were many
casualties. Altogether, the Battalion lost that day 12 other ranks,
including C.S.M. T. H. Greenwood of C Company, killed, 7 missing,
and 39 wounded. But the work had been well done. Officers collected
all they could find of their parties, and rejoined the rest of the
Battalion; but many men did not report back until long after dawn the
next day.
The day after the attack the Battalion moved up into close support to
the 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., which had taken over the
captured trenches. Three days later it took over the defence of the new
line. D Company, with C Company in close support to it, held the whole
of the captured ground; the other companies occupied the old British
line. D Company’s sector was a ghastly place. Rain and shell-fire had
turned the ground into a mass of mud, littered with the awful debris of
battle. Never had the Battalion seen so many dead Germans; and there
were many British too. Bodies were lying all over the ground in the
open; many more were exposed by the shovel, and hastily recovered. A
hot September sun beat down in the daytime, and the air was filled with
the stench of decaying humanity. Water was scarce, as every drop of
it had to be carried up, and had to be used very economically. Ration
parties had a very hard task, for there were neither tracks nor proper
communication trenches. Almost the only real comfort was provided
by the excellent German tunnelled dugouts which abounded, and were
sufficient to accommodate the whole company. These were from twenty to
thirty feet down; they were splendidly built and, in some cases, quite
comfortably furnished; and they were proof against the heaviest shell.
This was as well, for the hostile artillery was very active. Though the
Germans probably had a very hazy idea of the British positions, they
knew where their own deep dugouts had been and persistently shelled
those localities. Practically all movement could be easily observed,
and there was much coming and going of staff officers and others in
connection with the new attack on Thiepval which was planning. D
Company came in for all the shelling, which was brought on by this
movement, and also for the not infrequent barrages put down by the
enemy. The other companies had an easier, though far from pleasant,
time.
Much work was done by the Battalion while it was in the Leipsig
Redoubt. Its role was to prepare the way for an attack on Thiepval by
the 18th Division. Assembly trenches had to be dug; the dead had to
be buried. Most of this work was done by the support companies, who
sent up large parties each night. D Company’s duty was restricted to
holding the line--quite a sufficient task for the new men of whom the
company was mainly composed. Casualties occurred almost hourly. It was
a nerve-racking time.
At length the relief came on September 24th. A heavy bombardment of 15
cm. shells about 5-0 p.m., which at one time seemed likely to hinder
the relief seriously, was stopped by the British retaliation. An
unusually quiet night followed. Soon after dark the 12th Battalion
Middlesex Regt. began to arrive; and when, about midnight, D Company’s
relief was complete, the Battalion turned its back on the Somme
battlefield for ever. B and C Companies had been relieved earlier and
they marched straight through to Lealvillers. A and D Companies were
to be met by buses at the bottom of Black Horse Road. The former got
away after a long wait, but there were no conveyances for the latter.
Wearily--few of them had had any sleep to speak of for three days or
nights--the men dragged themselves along to Martinsart Wood, where
they simply dropped down by the roadside and slept. About dawn buses
did arrive, and the company was quickly taken to Lealvillers, where
a halt was made for breakfast. Then it bussed straight through to
Halloy, while the rest of the Battalion had to march. The ride was some
satisfaction for the night spent on the road.
The day after its arrival at Halloy the Battalion learned of the fall
of Thiepval. In the midst of the satisfaction caused by this news,
there was naturally some little disappointment that, after so many
months of work and fighting, it had not been “in at the death.”