is scarce. We are exhausted, but still we all live. Almost all our
horses have been taken, so that what we require we have to take from
the enemy. Thousands of our people are prisoners-of-war. We have some
thousands of our own people, who are in arms against us. Our women and
children have been cooped up for almost two years in the Concentration
Camps, where they die by thousands. Not only do they die, but they are
exposed to destructive moral influences. The Kaffirs are armed against
us, and only recently 56 burghers were murdered by Kaffirs. Truly, our
prospects are not bright. In how far all this must weigh with the
Delegates, I leave to you. As far as I am concerned, I must confess
that all these things have made a tremendous impression on me. No one
with a heart can feel differently. I shall always respect Commandant
General Botha, because he has proved to have a heart that feels all
these matters, and because he has had the courage to lay before his
people and before us with great honesty precisely how matters stand.
We are here under exceptional circumstances. Awful wars have already
been fought, but I do not believe that a war has ever been waged in
which the people have proportionally suffered so much and sacrificed
so much as our people have done in this war. In the American War of
Independence the people did not suffer a third of what we have
suffered. But all this has not yet turned the scales as far as I am
concerned. We consider all these matters, but we must consider
particularly what awaits us if we give up our country. What will our
future be? Will there then be such satisfaction in the Orange Free
State and in the South African Republic that we shall be able to say:
We will await the day of deliverance from God's hand? If I knew that
there would be a rising in a few years, I would rather fight on till I
am dead. If I conclude peace I want a lasting peace.
There is a matter that weighs more heavily with me than all this, and
that is the holding of this meeting. I regret from the bottom of my
heart that it ever took place. This meeting gives us a death blow. I
also experienced hard times, when my burghers surrendered in hundreds,
but I always found comfort in the thought that I was not fighting
alone, and I knew that when I had a hard time of it, my comrades in
the struggle elsewhere had an easy time. However, I do not wish to
blame anyone for the holding of this meeting, because I am convinced
that everything was done with the best intentions. Now, what has been
the result of this meeting? The Commandant General has had to express
his views, and expose the situation, and this has had the effect of
disheartening some of our burghers. If we now decide to continue,
hundreds and thousands will go over to the enemy who would otherwise
have remained with us. I would have suggested that the discouraged
ones leave us, but now those who were not discouraged have also become
so.
Although all these facts have made me dubious, I am not yet convinced
that we should stop the war. If I were a delegate, I should say: "Go
on," because I think that if we are in doubt we should lay down this
as an axiom: "Proceed on the road we are on." In the proposal before
us we get nothing at all of what we have the right to lay claim to.
General L. J. MEYER (Member of the S.A.R. Government) said: According
to General Hertzog, the persons who went to the various commandos to
have delegates elected explained the situation of the country to the
people. But that was not done. We said to the burghers: "You must
elect someone whom you can trust as a delegate to the meeting at
Vereeniging. To him the situation of the country as a whole will be
laid bare, and then he must act according to circumstances."
Now I want to express my views also. The question of independence is
so dear to every Africander that this word can hardly be spoken. Our
condition, however, has now become such that we must express our
opinions on this matter. I am well acquainted with the condition of
the commandos north of the Eastern Railway to the other side of the
Sabi River, and I can assure you that every commando finds it very
difficult to obtain food. All officers complain that clothing, horses,
and food are scarce. All burghers long for peace, if they can retain
their flag and their Mauser, but after the accounts which have been
given us here, every responsible person must feel that a great
portion, if not the half, of the South African Republic is not able to
continue the war. Now if half of the South African Republic must be
abandoned, the burghers must move from there to the other districts,
and it is clear that those districts which still have food have only
barely sufficient for their own commandos. What will happen if the
burghers from the other parts of the Transvaal resort to those
districts also?
Our burghers have done what almost no other nation has ever done. Our
bitterest enemies acknowledge this. Then we still have to contend with
the large hordes of Kaffirs who go about to murder and plunder. The
people expect from us that we will save what can still be saved.
Everyone takes the matter up seriously, and it is so serious that if
we pass an ill-considered resolution we shall exterminate the
Africander people. It has rightly been remarked that everything is
dark. If I was sure what to do I would be very glad. The Lord,
however, has given us reason, and in my opinion we have now got to
such a stage that we must do what we can to keep the head of the
Africander people above water, so that later on they can develop
again.
The position of our families is a very tender point with me. They are
dying out in the Concentration Camps, and must submit to much misery.
We have already sacrificed much blood, and if we had hopes and ground
for a favourable result we could sacrifice still more. My blood, which
is no better than the blood of so many others that has been shed, can
also be shed, but my conscience tells me that we may not allow one
more man to be shot, if there is no hope for us.
If we were to decide now to go on, we should never get the opportunity
to negotiate again. The end would be that we should all be dead or
captured or shall have surrendered to the enemy. It is asked what will
future generations say, if they read that we decided to make peace and
to give up our independence? My reply is: We do not fight for name and
honour, but for our people. What will future generations say, if we do
not save what can still be saved? They will say that we fought
bravely, but without wisdom.
With reference to the terms offered, I must say that I expected more.
The three millions are nothing, but yet there is a promise that our
people will later have a vote again, and be allowed to govern
themselves, and further--God will help us. Some are of opinion that we
must show our manliness by continuing the struggle. It may, however,
be more manly to conclude peace. In the Volksraad I was in favour of
granting the franchise, after a five years' residence, but that
proposal was rejected by twenty-one votes to seven, and three of those
seven persons are now here with us. We did not vote as we did because
we were afraid, but because we did not wish to drench the soil with
blood, and we knew that England sought cause for war. Shall we now
continue to shed blood?
Before Lord Roberts entered Pretoria the Government considered whether
the time had not arrived to put an end to the war. That was, of
course, a secret. But the Orange Free State would not agree, and I am
convinced that we would have obtained better terms then than now. The
people were then not so ruined and exterminated. The Government in its
wisdom decided to continue the war. A year later the two Governments
met each other again at Waterval, in the Standerton district. It was
again resolved to go on with the war. Later we again suggested that we
should make peace proposals to the British. President Steyn agreed,
but no agreement had yet been arrived at with reference to the time
and conditions, and the enemy operated against us with such great
forces that we could not make any progress in the matter. Now, as far
as human judgment goes, there is no chance for us to continue the war.
There is no hope of intervention, for the big Powers do not make war
so easily. We have now come to such a pass that we must save the
seedling, otherwise I fear it is all over with the Africander people.
It is argued that we must go on because so many have already given
their lives for their country, but everyone must admit that unless a
miracle is worked, we shall not get the enemy out of our country by
force of arms. We have taught the British how to wage war. Our own
people are with them, and show them how to trek in the night, and
where the footpaths are.
Much reference is made to the American War of Independence, but this
war cannot be compared to that one. The enemy had only 40,000 troops
in America, whereas they have 240,000 here. And then Americans a large
country, and had harbours through which to import, and had in addition
the assistance of France. I am convinced that our struggle cannot be
maintained.
Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Kroonstad): With reference to the Cape
Colonists, I wish to say that we expected much help from them, and
they did assist us largely. Must we now jump out of the door and leave
them in the lurch? Many of them have already been banished, some shot,
and others hanged. It is sad to think of laying down our arms. The
promise that landed proprietors can retain their arms is more of a
comfort than a reality. If I consider everything I must say--let us
rather offer passive resistance, but concede nothing.
General BOTHA was the next speaker. He first explained his attitude at
the various meetings of the people, and said that he had caused them
to elect Delegates with power to act. He continued: When the war
began, we had about 60,000 burghers, and we further relied upon help
from the Cape Colony. We expected that that Colony would not allow her
railways to be used to convey troops to fight against us. I also hoped
that the Powers would interfere, but they were silent spectators of
how Britain waged war against us, and how she introduced all kinds of
new methods into that warfare--methods contrary to international law.
Further, we had provisions in abundance, and commandos could be
supported for weeks in the same place. However, matters have now so
changed that a man must consider himself fortunate if his family is
away. It is argued that to save the families still with us, the
husbands of such families can surrender with their families. The
husbands, however, of most are unfortunately already in the hands of
the enemy. Whom can I send to care for those whose natural protectors
are already prisoners of war? These families are thus thrown upon us,
and we must care for them. As long as we had plenty of food, the enemy
gladly received our families into their Camps, but now that they are
in want, and they (the enemy) can do something for them, their
kindness has come to an end. What shall we now do with these families?
That is the great difficulty.
It is stated that we do not rely on help through the medium of the
Deputation in Europe, but when the enemy refuses to let the Members
of the Deputation come out to see us, it is at once said that that is
a proof that the Deputation are doing something to our advantage.
Reliance is thus placed upon the Deputation, because they can only
tell us that there is hope of intervention. The Deputation have
already been in Europe for more than two years, and our State
President is there too, and up to this day the Deputation have not yet
succeeded in getting itself acknowledged by any other Power than the
Netherlands Government. They were accredited by us to all the Powers,
but it appears that they did not consider it advisable to hand in
their credentials to any Power except to Holland, naturally because
they were given to understand that they would not be acknowledged.
Now, if a Power refuses to acknowledge our Deputation, what help can
we as a nation expect from such a Power? There is another point.
Before President Kruger left us we received letters from the
Deputation, from which it clearly appeared that they could do nothing
for us, and in which they informed us that they would return and land
in Delagoa Bay. The Government, however, in consultation with
President Steyn, who was with us then, decided to ask the Deputation
not to return, even though they could effect nothing, because, if they
came back, it would be a death blow to our people, who were always
still expecting something good from the efforts of the Deputation. I
say these things, so that the people may not be misled. In my opinion,
we have nothing else than the sympathy of the European nations, and
than that we shall get nothing else, but that will not save us. A year
ago we were in communication with the Deputation, and all they could
then tell us was that we should persevere, on the ground of all the
personal and material sacrifices which had already been made, until
all means of resistance were exhausted. Well, we have done that, and
it is very plain to me that there is no hope of any help from the
Deputation. But I wish to go further. We know that there is one
friendly Power, and that it wishes to help us as much as possible.
That Power is the Netherlands Government. What did the Netherlands
Minister write to the British Government on the 1st of January, 1902?
He wrote as follows:--
"The Government of her Majesty the Queen is of opinion that the
exceptional circumstances, in which one of the belligerent parties in
South Africa is situated, and which prevents it from putting itself
into communication with the other party by direct means, constitutes
one of the causes of the prolongation of the war, which continuously,
without interruption or termination, harasses that country, and is the
cause of so much misery."
Thus wrote the Power in Europe who is best disposed towards us, a few
months ago; and in that same letter they suggested that our Deputation
should come out here with the object of meeting the leaders of the
people, in order to bring about peace. It was certainly never the
intention that peace would be concluded on the basis of the
independence of the Republics. Can we thus cherish any hopes of
assistance from European nations? I am convinced that we can arrive at
a decision in this matter without worrying ourselves for a moment with
the idea that we shall obtain help elsewhere. A war in Europe is, of
course, possible, but the war we are engaged in has opened the eyes of
all the Powers, so that every European Government now avoids war as
much as possible. I will even go so far as to say that it is in the
interest of more than one Power that this war continues.
A great difficulty is also the unfaithfulness of our own burghers, and
much injury is done us by those who lay down their arms. A year ago we
took a resolution at Waterval, in the Standerton district, to continue
the war vigorously. We kept it up for a year, and fought and
sacrificed. What have we gained by it? I say we are now so broken up
and weakened that if matters go on like this a little longer we shall
no more be able to assert ourselves as a party. It is maintained that
this proposal goes further than the proposal made to us at Middelburg
in March, 1901, but I do not think that that argument is correct,
because we did not negotiate on that proposal. We simply replied that
we could not negotiate on the basis proposed. If we had negotiated
then we might perhaps have obtained better terms than now. But even
granted that the present proposals are more favourable, what have we
not sacrificed for such improvement? Twenty thousand women and
children have been laid in their graves in the Concentration Camps.
Almost the half of our burghers are prisoners of war; we have had to
bury hundreds of our comrades. When I review the past year, I must say
that we have lost ground tremendously. We can only gauge the future by
the past. We now stand face to face with the fact that we shall have
to abandon a large tract of our country, and I do not see any chance
of retaining our independence in that way. We commenced with 60,000
men, and now we have only 15,000 in the field. Our Information-bureau
in Pretoria informs me that the enemy has already 31,400 of our
burghers as prisoners of war, and that 600 have already died in the
prisoner-of-war camps. Three thousand eight hundred of our burghers
have fallen during the war. Is it not a serious matter that so many
fell in the course of two and a half years? What must not the
sufferings of our women and children in the Concentration Camps have
been at the death of so many of their number?
The question is asked, and rightly too: What about the Cape Colonists
who have thrown in their lot with us? I have always said that if we
lose our independence it will be our first and foremost duty to care
for them because they have got into trouble through us. I was always
prepared to say: "Banish me, but give terms to the Cape Colonists."
And now there is a chance for us to-day to save those comrades. Would
it therefore be advisable to miss that chance, and simply to say that
we must persevere in the struggle? I say it is not advisable. The
other members of our Commission and I did our best at Pretoria for
those Colonists. Let us now take what we can get. If we decide to
continue, it would only be honest to these Colonists to say that they
must stop fighting and accept these terms. A few thousand men become
free with the temporary loss of the franchise. If we can get no better
terms for them they cannot blame us, nor will they do so if the facts
are put before them.
I am referred to what I said about a year ago at the Warmbaths, but
let me remind you that, when I spoke there, the commando of that
division was 2,000 men strong. What is the situation there to-day? The
commando consists of only 480 men. I said then that the war must
continue till famine stared us in the face. Now I do not stand here to
dishearten anyone, but I must acquaint you fully with all
circumstances, and I tell you that there are districts in our country
where famine truly and actually stares the commandos in the face, and
many of the Delegates can testify to this. Our great strength always
lay in this, that we could keep a commando, however small, in each
district, which compelled the enemy to divide its enormous armies over
the entire country. But if we must give up portions of our country we
must trek to other parts; in other words, we must concentrate, and
therein lies great danger for us, because that will enable the enemy
to concentrate their large forces against us, and our fall will
speedily follow. Some say we can go to the Cape Colony. I also know
something about that. Chief Commandant de Wet could not get into the
Cape Colony in good times with good horses and with a large force. How
shall we get there, now that winter is approaching and our horses are
so poor that we can only ride at a walk, and the distance for most of
us is so much further? I tell you we shall not get there. On the way
there, most of the commandos will dwindle away.
The question is asked: "What will the future bring us if we
surrender?" Well, that is a most vital question, and for every
Africander who has done his duty, surrender is a terribly bitter cup.
But we must take the situation as it is, and, however bitter, we must
choose the better of two bad roads. It is maintained that we must
persevere, but unless we can do so for ten or twelve years, I do not
see any grounds for hoping that we shall be able to retain our
independence, and I do not see any chance whatever of keeping up the
struggle so long. What chance have we of persevering so long? If in
two years' time we have been reduced from 60,000 men to a fourth of
that number, to what number shall we have sunk in another two years? A
hopeless perseverance may also later bring us to a forced surrender,
which will be very fatal to us. Let us use our reason, and not stand
in relation to each other as two parties. Let us try to find a common
way. I shall remain in the field as long as fighting goes on.
Personally, I have no objection to persevere.
It is further asked: What will become of our widows and orphans if we
make peace? But I in turn ask: Who will care for them if we are later
forced to surrender? Even though we conclude peace now we remain in
existence as a people, though under the British flag, and if we in
surrendering stand by each other we can, after the surrender, also
stand by each other, and devise means to assist the widows and
orphans. If, on the other hand, we entirely cease to exist, we can do
nothing more. We cannot, for instance, even send people to Europe to
seek financial help to build up the fortunes of our people again.
There are three ways open to us, and I shall submit to the decision of
the majority, but I shall feel it keenly if we are not unanimous in
our decision. I must say I can see no salvation for us in the
continuance of the war, but only the extermination of our people. The
other two ways are: Surrender _with_, and surrender _without_
conditions.
I always held the opinion that when the day dawned that we could not
maintain the struggle any longer, it would be best to stop without
making any terms, and to say to the enemy: "Here we are. We cannot go
on any longer. Banish the leaders, deal with the people as you wish;
we refuse to submit." But the question is whether we can to-day adopt
that course and act accordingly. I think we cannot. Our people have
been totally ruined, and will therefore be entirely exposed to the
mercy of the enemy. They must be financially assisted, and if the
enemy do so they can stipulate what they like and demand an oath to
their taste from every one they help. The enemy will then also be able
to carry out all their proclamations, and so destroy our national
existence. They can banish all the leaders, and further, they can
refuse to let the prisoners of war return until such time as it suits
them. In these terms the return of all prisoners of war is at least
stipulated, and all the enemy's proclamations against our persons and
property nullified. I am thus of opinion that it will be better for us
to accept these terms than to surrender unconditionally. Our cup is
bitter, but do not let us make it more bitter still. If we are
convinced that our cause is hopeless, it is a question whether we have
the right to allow one more burgher to be shot. Our object must be to
act in the interest of our people.
General HERTZOG remarked that in his opinion the extract from the
letter from the Netherlands Government to Lord Lansdowne read by
General Botha had not been well translated. Instead of "... the war
which raged in the country _without object or termination_," the
translation should be: "... the war, which _without interruption or
termination_ rages in that country," and that this made a difference.
The meeting was adjourned till two o'clock that afternoon.
At two o'clock the meeting resumed.
General MULLER (Boksburg) said: The burghers suspect something from
Lord Kitchener's refusal to allow the Deputation to come out, and have
instructed me to try and come into communication with the Deputation.
Some of my burghers commissioned me to stand for our independence, but
others gave me a free hand, to act according to circumstances, and, if
there was no other course, to accept the best possible terms. I have
always pointed my burghers to the Lord, and told them that as we were
at present situated it was impossible for us to succeed in the
struggle in our own strength and by means of our own arms, but that we
should trust in God, and that He would help us in His own way and in
His own fashion. If I now return to my burghers and inform them that I
have not been in communication with the Deputation, and that the
proposal before us has been accepted, there will be awful
dissension--I cannot think of surrender. It will be a painful matter
for me, if I must vote for making peace on these terms, but, taking
into consideration what I have heard here about the situation in the
other districts and from the Commandant General, it will be difficult
for me to go and continue the fight alone, although I and my burghers
are still prepared to go on. They also have a hard time of it, and all
necessaries are scarce, but provision is always forthcoming. If we
cannot agree with reference to the terms before us, I can suggest only
one course, and that is, that we all together make a compact with the
Lord. Then we shall have something to stand on, which we can make
clear to the people. We commenced the war with faith in the Lord.
Where then shall we stand with regard to Him if our faith now forsakes
us?
I wish to say, further, that the three million pounds, which the enemy
offers, will go only to the burghers who have remained in the field,
and to the prisoners of war. What will become of all the other
thousands of poor in the country? I represent some of the poorest in
the land. They have lost everything in the war, and no provision is
made for them. With the instructions I have and according to the
dictates of my conscience I do not know whether I can vote for this
proposal.
Commandant DE KOCK (Vrede) pointed out that the 30 Free State
Delegates represented 5,000 or 6,000 burghers, and the 30 Transvaal
Delegates 10,000, and General Smuts' 3,000 burghers of the Cape
Colony, and asked what the position would be if the 30 Free Staters,
who represented a minority, decided to continue the war? Would those
representing the majority have to submit?
The CHAIRMAN replied that although the Free State Delegates
represented a smaller number of burghers, the Free State had an equal
vote with the Transvaal in this matter.
General J. C. SMUTS spoke as follows: Hitherto I have not taken part
in the discussion, although my views are not unknown to my Government.
We have arrived at a dark stage in the development of the war, and our
cause is all the darker and more painful to me because I, as a member
of the Government of the South African Republic, was one of the
persons who entered into the war with England. A man may, however, not
shrink from the consequences of his acts, and on an occasion like
this, we must restrain all private feelings, and decide only and
exclusively with a view to the permanent interests of the Africander
people. These are great moments for us, perhaps the last time when we
meet as a free people, and a free Government. Let us thus rise to the
magnitude of the opportunity and arrive at a decision for which the
future Africander generation will bless and not curse us. The great
danger before this meeting is, that it will come to a decision from a
purely military point of view. Almost all the representatives here are
officers who do not know fear, who have never been afraid, nor will
ever become afraid of the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and who
are prepared to give their last drop of blood for their country and
their people. Now, if we view the matter merely from a military
standpoint, if we consider it only as a military matter, then I must
admit that we can still go on with the struggle. We are still an
unvanquished military force. We have still 18,000 men in the field,
veterans, with whom you can do almost any work. We can thus push our
cause, from a military point of view, still further. But we are not
here as an army, but as a people; we have not only a military
question, but also a national matter to deal with. No one here
represents his own commando. Everyone here represents the Africander
people, and not only that portion which is still in the field, but
also those who are already under the sod and those who will live after
we have gone. We represent, not only ourselves, but also the thousands
who are dead, and have made the last sacrifice for their people, the
prisoners of war scattered all over the world, and the women and
children who are dying out by thousands in the Concentration Camps of
the enemy; we represent the blood and the tears of an entire nation.
They all call upon us, from the prisoner-of-war camps, from the
Concentration Camps, from the grave, from the field, and from the womb
of the future, to decide wisely and to avoid all measures which may
lead to the decadence and extermination of the Africander people, and
thus frustrate the objects for which they made all their sacrifices.
Hitherto we have not continued the struggle aimlessly. We did not
fight merely to be shot. We commenced the struggle, and continued it
to this moment, because we wished to maintain our independence, and
were prepared to sacrifice everything for it. But we may not sacrifice
the Africander people for that independence. As soon as we are
convinced that, humanly speaking, there is no reasonable chance to
retain our independence as Republics, it clearly becomes our duty to
stop the struggle in order that we may not perhaps sacrifice our
people and our future for a mere idea, which cannot be realised. What
reasonable chance is there still to retain our independence? We have
now fought for almost three years without a break. Without deceiving
ourselves we can say that we have exerted all our powers and employed
every means to further our cause. We have given thousands of lives, we
have sacrificed all our earthly goods; our cherished country is one
continuous desert; more than 20,000 women and children have already
died in the Concentration Camps of the enemy. Has all this brought us
nearer to our independence? On the contrary, we are getting ever
further from it, and the longer we continue, the greater will be the
gap between us and the object for which we have fought. The manner in
which the enemy has carried on this war and still carries it on has
reduced us to a condition of exhaustion which will ultimately make the
continuance of the war a physical impossibility. If no deliverance
comes from elsewhere, we must certainly succumb. When a year ago I, on
behalf of my Government, communicated our condition to His Honour
President Kruger in Europe, he expressed the opinion that, with a view
to the situation in the Cape Colony, and to the feelings of the
European peoples, we should continue with the struggle till the last
means of resistance was exhausted. With reference to foreign politics,
I only wish to direct your attention to the indisputable facts. (The
speaker here discussed fully the political developments in America and
of the principal European Powers during the last two years, and then
proceeded.) For us the foreign situation is and remains that we enjoy
much sympathy, for which we are, of course, heartily thankful. That is
all we get, nor shall we receive anything more for many years. Europe
will sympathise with us till the last Boer hero lies in his last
resting-place, till the last Boer woman has gone to her grave with a
broken heart, till our entire nation shall have been sacrificed on the
altar of history and of humanity.
With reference to the situation in the Cape Colony, I have stated
fully on a former occasion what that is. We have made mistakes, and
the Cape Colony was perhaps not ripe for these events. In any case we
cannot expect any general rising there. The 3,000 men who have joined
us are heroes, whom we cannot sufficiently honour, for having
sacrificed their all for us, but they will not regain our
independence.
We have now for twelve months acted on the advice of President Kruger,
and have tried both the means indicated by him, and in both cases we
have become convinced that, if we still wish to fight, we have only
ourselves to depend upon.
The facts laid before this meeting by the Delegates from both the
Republics convince me that it will be a crime for us to continue this
struggle without the assurance of help from elsewhere. Our country has
already been ruined to its foundations, and by our continuance,
without any reasonable prospect of success, we shall hopelessly ruin
our people also.
Now the enemy approaches us with a proposal which, however
unacceptable, is coupled with the promise of amnesty for the Colonial
comrades who have joined us. I fear that the day will come when we
shall no more be able to rescue the so-called rebels, and then they
will have just grounds to reproach us that we have sacrificed their
interests also for our already hopeless cause. And I am afraid that
the rejection of the proposal of the British Government will cause us
to lose much sympathy abroad and greatly weaken our position.
Comrades, we decided to stand to the bitter end. Let us now, like men,
admit that that end has come for us, come in a more bitter shape than
we ever thought. For each one of us death would have been a sweeter
and a more welcome end than the step which we shall now have to take.
But we bow to God's will. The future is dark, but we shall not
relinquish courage and our hope and our faith in God. No one will ever
convince me that the unparalleled sacrifices laid on the altar of
Freedom by the Africander people will be vain and futile. The war of
freedom of South Africa has been fought, not only for the Boers, but
for the entire people of South Africa. The result of that struggle we
leave in God's hand. Perhaps it is His will to lead the people of
South Africa through defeat and humiliation, yea, even through the
valley of the shadow of death, to a better future and a brighter day.
Commandant A. J. BESTER (Bloemfontein) said: I have been delegated by
a commando of 800 men, and although General de Wet clearly explained
our position to them, these 800 men declared that they would not
submit to England. My commando has been taking part in the war since
the commencement, and we have sacrificed everything already that was
dear to us, all for our national existence and independence. Eight
months ago my commando was in very bad circumstances. We were badly
supplied with horses and clothing, but now we are furnished with all
we want, almost as well as when we commenced the war. Every burgher
has at least two horses, and some have five, and they are all full of
courage. Where they get the courage from is a riddle to me, because
dark days have passed over them.
Arguments with reference to our circumstances are piled up, but I must
point out that we did not commence with arguments. In 1880 the South
African Republic dared to rise against the powerful England. The view
then taken was that the Africander, who had settled here, and who had
shed his blood for his country, had a just claim to this country, and
by the London Convention the enemy had acknowledged that right, that
claim. Now the enemy has broken that Convention, and we took up arms
in the hope that right would triumph. The war was forced upon the
South African Republic and her confederate, the Orange Free State, and
why? For the sake of the franchise? No, but for the gold of
Johannesburg. That is what England wished to have, just as formerly
she wanted the diamond fields of Kimberley and scooped them in.
We commenced the war knowing that London alone had about 5,600,000
inhabitants, and we barely 200,000, but we relied on the justness of
our cause, and on the firm conviction that a just cause could never be
put down. The facts which have been summed up against the continuance
of the war cannot be reasoned away, but neither can the fact be
reasoned away that for two years and eight months we had pitted
against us the greatest Power, with unheard-of forces, with Kaffirs
and with even our own people against us, and yet they cannot
exterminate us. And how does the enemy fare? A force or 500 or even of
1,000 men dare not trek out, or 200 burghers make mincemeat of them.
We have already performed such deeds that they cannot be otherwise
described than as miracles. We must only be unanimous. I stand or fall
with my freedom.
Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK asked whether the proposal of the British could not
be accepted under protest.
General J. C. SMUTS replied that the meeting could authorise the
Governments to sign the proposal under certain conditions.
Commandant A. J. BESTER was of opinion that it was not necessary to
discuss the matter further, and proposed that the discussion be
closed.
His proposal received no seconder.
Commandant J. E. MENTZ (Heilbron) said: I represent the Vechtkop
division of the Heilbron district. I believe there is nothing else for
us to discuss than the questions: Shall we continue the war, or shall
we accept the terms before us? In my opinion, unconditional surrender
is out of the question, and I must say that after my experiences, and
taking into consideration the general condition in which, according to
the communications made to us here, we are in, I do not see a chance
of going on further with the struggle. The conditions in Heilbron,
Kroonstad, and parts of Vrede and Bloemfontein are most pitiable. Not
five cattle have remained over in these districts for the families to
slaughter. In my division, there are between 200 and 300 women and
children, and the husbands of most of them are prisoners-of-war. Many
are widows, whose husbands have sacrificed their lives, and now they
are helpless. If the war must continue I shall have to leave my
district; but will it be right and honest of me to leave the families
there to the mercy of the enemy? There is, indeed, a chance of getting
cattle through the block house lines of the enemy, but in about half a
day the cattle are retaken from us. I can assure you that when I left
my commando they had nothing to live on except a little mealies. Our
horses are also poor, and we have no forage for them. Since March the
enemy has continually been surrounding us, and we have been very much
harassed. We are beginning to be so hard pressed that we are obliged
even by day to break through the cordon which the enemy draws round
us. A week before I came here I had to fight my way twice through a
cordon, and 40 of my burghers, whose horses were poor, were captured.
I was surprised to learn that our Deputation wished to return, because
we were always hoping that they would be able to do something for us.
I am afraid that if we do not accept these terms we shall crumble away
bit by bit. I see no other prospect for us if we continue the
struggle, and fear that the longer we continue the worse we shall
fare.
General J. KEMP (Krugersdorp) spoke as follows: Although I have
already expressed my opinion, I wish to do so again. This is a grave
moment for every Africander, because if we take a wrong step, it can
have fatal consequences for our people. As far as my division is
concerned, I still see a chance of going on with the struggle, and the
instruction of my burghers was: "Stand for the independence." In spite
of the legal opinion given here, I must ask: Where shall I stand, if I
vote for this proposal, and my burghers do not approve of it, since
they gave me a definite instruction? The document before us is so
vague and unintelligible, that it will enable the enemy to suppress us
altogether. The three millions for payment of Government Notes and
receipts will not cover a third of the amounts owing. I say that the
enemy will make the payment of these three millions so troublesome
that the poor will see very little or nothing of it. The Dutch
language will be allowed where the parents of the children desire it,
but what does that avail against the declaration of Lord Milner, that
he wants only one language in South Africa? It is plain that it is
intended to entirely suppress and Anglicise the whole Africanderdom.
We have struggled so long for our independence, and although our
situation is difficult and dark we may not give up the fight. Two
years ago everything was just as dark. If we accept these terms, our
people will go under entirely, while by continuing we may still be
able to right matters. If we stand together we are invincible; if we
accept these terms, then all our suffering and struggling and
sacrifices will have been in vain. I must carry out my instruction and
stand for our independence.
Acting State President S. W. BURGER said: I intended not to say a
single word more on this question, because I have already expressed my
opinion, but in these grave moments there are a few points I wish to
put forward. There are in this meeting two parties, as it were, and
that is to be regretted. We must stand together as one man, one in
heart, one in opinion, and with only one object in view--the future
salvation and welfare of our people.
I notice that most of those speakers who plead for the continuance of
the war are still young men, and it is perhaps the first time that
they have had to decide on such a weighty matter. I ask you: Can we
under the existing circumstances prosecute the war? And to that I must
reply that, according to my views, based on what I have seen, on what
I have heard here, on what I have experienced myself, there is no
reasonable possibility for us to prosecute the war with the
expectation that the result will be favourable to us. We are referred
to the war of 1880-1881, but that cannot be compared with the present
struggle. I took part in it from beginning to end. We were then a
small people, and we triumphed--yes, but not with our arms. There were
other circumstances, which gave us the victory. President Brand, of
our sister State, who remained neutral, assisted us, and Gladstone in
England stood by us, and did us justice. There were then better men in
England than now. It was not by the sword that we gained the victory.
It is argued that we have carried on the struggle for more than two
years, and that we can still go on. But if we observe with what we
commenced, and how we are situate now, it must be seen that we are
going to certain ruin, as has already been explained. If I take into
consideration the means we had and our numerical strength when we
commenced, and our present condition, then I can cherish no hope of
gaining the victory. Every man we lose makes the enemy stronger, and
the troops against us have not been reduced, but increased, since Lord
Roberts entered Pretoria, and the enemy is being taught by us, and by
our people who fight for them, how to carry on war against us. I do
not even wish to mention all the Kaffirs which the enemy have on their
side and who help them. If you do not see facts it is impossible for
me and others to open your eyes to them.
It is stated that we commenced the war with faith and trust in God,
but is that quite correct? Let each one ask himself whether he had
such faith and trust only. Was there not also a spirit of
self-confidence, of trust in our own arms, and our efficiency to
handle those arms? Was there not also a contempt of our great enemy?
There was also a spirit of war amongst the people without considering
what war could bring us. Only victory and not defeat was thought of.
No one may deny this. But the question is, what must we do now? I do
not think much of the document that lies before us. What is offered us
in it does not urge me to make peace. On me, as acting Head of the
Transvaal, there rests a great responsibility, especially towards all
those who with me have hitherto tried to do their duty to their
country and people, and if I am convinced that by the continuance of
the war we dig a grave for our people for ever and aye, can I then
vote for the continuance of it? Am I not called upon to guard the
interests of that people committed to my guidance by my reason? I say
it is my holy duty to stop this struggle now that it has become
hopeless, and not to allow one more man to be shot, and not to allow
the innocent, helpless women and children to remain any longer in
their misery in the plague-stricken Concentration Camps. We are now
called upon to sacrifice our freedom, just as Abraham was called upon
to sacrifice his son; and faith is to walk on the path on which we are
led, however dark it may be.
If we decide to continue, two facts stare us in the face. The one is,
that many burghers will be compelled to lay down their arms, and the
other, that we shall have to abandon parts of the South African
Republic, as well as of the Orange Free State. Is that progress? If
parts of the country are abandoned by us, they, of course, fall
entirely into the hands of the enemy, who will certainly make use of
that circumstance.
It is asked whether we shall not later on get an opportunity again for
negotiating if we desire to do so. I say: No. We must not lose sight
of the position in which the enemy stands towards us, and their power.
If we separate now without making peace, the enemy will never again
acknowledge us as a party, and a later opportunity for negotiation
will in my opinion be out of the question. This is probably our last
meeting. The time for unconditional surrender is past, and in reply to
the question, What will become of our people if we accept these terms?
I say: "There remains a root, and that root will again sprout up as a
child, and the time will arrive when we shall again have the right to
speak in the government of our country. Let us thus preserve the root,
because, if that is eradicated, it is all over with us. Chop off a
tree, and it will sprout again; but root it out, and it is no more.
And surely our people have not deserved to be rooted out.
Other speakers have clearly pointed out what the continuance of the
war will bring us. Those who are in favour of its prosecution speak
only of hope. But on what do they build that hope? On our arms? No one
says that. On intervention? No, every one declares he does not believe
in that. Upon what, then, is the hope founded? Speaking of
intervention, I wish to say that I do not believe or expect that any
Power will help us. My experience is that the Powers make use of the
difficulty in which England is situated in South Africa to settle all
their outstanding questions with that country. They profit by this
war, and will therefore not lift a finger for us.
There are men among you who will not hear of giving up the struggle.
But they follow the dictates of their hearts, and not of their heads.
However painful it is, I must say, with the facts before us, we must
give up the fight.
I very much regret that, since the Orange Free State, our confederate,
threw in her lot with us, the Transvaal should to-day exhibit the
greater weakness, and is obliged to say that she cannot go on any
more, while many of our Free State comrades still wish to maintain
the struggle. But you must know that the enemy have latterly specially
applied themselves to subjugate the Transvaal first, and for that
purpose have concentrated all their forces upon us. However painful it
is to me, my reason tells me that we cannot go on any further, but
that it is better to bow to a foreign flag and to save our people,
than to continue and to allow our people to be entirely exterminated."
Mr. L. J. JACOBSZ (Acting State Attorney of the South African
Republic) said: I have not yet expressed an opinion, because I am not
a fighting burgher. I have, indeed, suffered great privations and been
in great danger, but I consider that as nothing compared to what
others have suffered. I also maintained silence from fear that my
views might make a wrong impression on others, and in that way
prejudice our cause, while those who do the actual fighting know what
they can still effect.
I have heard all the discussions, but I have heard nothing that has
made me change the opinion which I have long held and which I
expressed at Klerksdorp, viz., that we cannot continue the struggle
any longer. My opinions have been voiced by our military leaders. We
have heard the opinions of Generals de la Rey, Louis Botha, and J. C.
Smuts, and also of some of the Free State Delegates, and I fail to see
how it will be possible for us, if we should decide to continue and
return to our burghers, not to convey to them the impression made on
us by these opinions. And if these opinions become known, what will
the result be? Dissatisfaction and paralysis will at once follow, with
the result that the burghers will not be able to prosecute the
struggle any further. Those opinions are based on facts, and will
undoubtedly dissipate the courage which so many still had. We all know
what the condition of our country is. The country cannot support the
commandos any longer. This has been proved. And, further, what is the
condition of our women and children? We have officially been informed
that over 20,000 have already died, and there is another more
important matter, viz., the immorality in the Concentration Camps,
about which we hear from various sources. This is the worst cancer
which can attack a people. Our female sex stands under the influence
of the enemy, and is beginning to deviate from the morals of their and
our forefathers, and that deviation touches the root of our national
existence. No one can argue that away.
If we were more or less certain that by perseverance we should succeed
in our object, then let us persevere and defy all privations and
dangers. Many of us have hoped for and built on intervention, but
personally I see no ground for such hope.
I have great sympathy for men like Commandant Bester, who do not even
think of laying down their arms, but we stand face to face with facts,
and we must not proceed with our head against the wall. It is argued
that we must have faith, but faith must have grounds, and what grounds
have we? We cannot compare our people to the Israelites of old. Israel
had definite promises. General de Wet has attempted to adduce some
grounds, but they were, in my opinion, not satisfactory or sufficient.
The idea of accepting terms from the enemy never occurred to our
Government at first, and an unconditional surrender is what will be
agreeable to our feelings, but what our reason dissuades us from. For
the sake of our people, we must take what we can get in order to help
them, even though the three millions is so trifling and the terms
before us so disappointing. The Commission delegated by us did what
they could, and all the members have our perfect confidence. Our
people are longing for peace, and if they know that we did our best,
they will be satisfied.
I want to add further that I am of the same opinion as Advocates
Hertzog and Smuts with reference to the difficulty of some of the
Delegates, that they have a definite instruction, and must vote
accordingly.
Commandant J. J. ALBERTS (Standerton) spoke more or less in the
strain of his former speech. He was in favour of terminating the war
by sacrificing some territory, but if that was impossible, the war
should in any case be concluded.
General DE WET was of opinion, with a view to the limited time within
which the Meeting had to decide, that, if possible, proposals should
be submitted to the Meeting.
General G. A. BRAND held the same view.
Field Cornet D. J. E. OPPERMAN (Pretoria) said: I have no definite
instruction from my burghers, except that I must make the best of the
situation when we have considered all the circumstances. It is well
that in this important matter we have men of different opinions, which
they express, because in that way we become well posted on all
matters, and are thus enabled to arrive at a good decision.
Unconditional surrender we can put out of our minds, because, in my
opinion, we have gone too far for that. It is as difficult for me to
decide to continue the war as to accept these terms before us. Before
I came here I was of opinion that we should continue the struggle
because we have already experienced too many hardships and too much
bitterness to have to give up our country to the enemy after all. My
burghers will stand by me if I tell them that we must go on, but if
they are informed of the condition of affairs over the entire country
as we know them now, then I do not believe that they will follow me or
any officer in maintaining the fight. My great difficulty is the
condition of the families with us. Formerly, when we still had food in
abundance, the enemy gladly took the families into their Concentration
Camps, but now that they know that our supply of food is almost
entirely exhausted, they refuse to receive any more families, in order
to force us to surrender on account of their fatal condition. All
provisions with which we supply them are looted by the enemy, who
leave them deprived of everything. My conscience will therefore not
allow me to say that we must continue the war, because that will mean
that the families will have to die of hunger. We men can make some
arrangement to help ourselves, for we can move about from one place to
another to look for food, and if it came to a push, we could take
provisions from the enemy; but the women and children are helpless
victims. According to the dictates of my conscience, therefore, I must
vote for the acceptance of these terms before us in order to save our
families, but I shall record my vote only under protest and with
notification that I give it thus for the said reasons.
On the motion of Field Cornet B. J. VAN HEERDEN, seconded by Field
Cornet B. J. ROOS, it was unanimously resolved to close the
discussion, after which the Meeting was closed with Prayer till the
following morning.
SATURDAY, MAY 31ST, 1902.
At 9.30 o'clock in the morning the Meeting was opened with Prayer.
The following two proposals were handed in:--
(1) By General NIEUWOUDT, seconded by General BRAND:--
"This Meeting of special Delegates from both the Republics having
considered the proposal by His Britannic Majesty's Government for the
restoration of peace, and considering--
"(_a_) The wishes and the instructions of the Burghers in the Field;
"(_b_) That they do not feel themselves justified to conclude a peace
on the basis laid down by His Majesty's Government before having been
placed in communication with the Delegates of the Republics at present
in Europe, Resolves--
"That they cannot accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and
instructs the Governments to communicate this Resolution to His
Britannic Majesty's Government through their Representatives here."
(2) By General P. R. VILJOEN, seconded by General H. A. ALBERTS:--
"That this Meeting resolves to accept the Proposal of the British
Government."
State Secretary F. W. REITZ now addressed the Meeting, and said: I
consider it a duty to myself, as State Secretary and as burgher, to my
nation, and to posterity, to say that if this Meeting decides to
conclude the war and to accept the British terms, they will have to
make provision for the signing thereof, because I shall affix my
signature to no document by which our independence is relinquished.
But I must also say that if this Meeting does not see its way clear to
go on with the war, they ought not to accept any terms from the enemy,
but should simply say: "Here we are, here are our people. We cannot
continue the war any further; take us." I do not wish to hurt
anybody's feelings. On the contrary, I have the greatest respect for
the feelings of those brave men here who have fought so well and so
faithfully for their country and people, but I consider that it would
be wrong of us to make terms with England.
The CHAIRMAN remarked that the State Secretary was out of order.
General P. R. VILJOEN said: I have prayed that God may grant that I
shall not trample on the precious blood that has been shed, on the
blood of my own son, but after all that I have heard here I have
become convinced that we must terminate this war. I have tabled a
proposal from which the future generations can see that we are obliged
and forced to sacrifice our independence. I only trust that we shall
be unanimous in our resolution.
[Illustration: _Facsimile of the original proposal by Commandant H. P.
J. Pretorius, seconded by General Chris. Botha, to accept the British
Peace Proposals._]
General DE WET said: The time is too short to admit of further
discussion on these proposals, and we must arrive at a decision. I
propose that we appoint a committee, consisting of Advocates Smuts and
Hertzog, to draft a proposal embodying the views of this Meeting. I do
not say what the proposal must embrace. Let us then adjourn for an
hour, and let the Delegates of the South African Republic and of the
Orange Free State meet each other separately, in order to try to come
to unanimity. We must arrive at a unanimous decision, because
that will be of incalculable value to us for the future.
General BOTHA: I think we must adopt General de Wet's suggestion. We
have fought and suffered together; let us now decide together. In this
matter we can and must devise means to be unanimous.
General DE WET'S proposal was unanimously adopted by the Meeting, and
the Orange Free State Delegates withdrew to the tent of General de
Wet, while those of the South African Republic remained in the tent in
which the meeting was held.
Fully an hour later all the Delegates met again, and the following
resolution drafted by Generals HERTZOG and SMUTS was read:--
"This Meeting of Representatives of the people of both the South
African Republic and the Orange Free State, held at Vereeniging from
May 15 to 31, 1902, has with regret taken cognisance of the proposal
made by His Majesty's Government relative to the termination of the
existing hostilities, and of its communication that this proposal must
be accepted or rejected without alteration. It deplores the fact that
His Majesty's Government has absolutely refused to negotiate with the
Governments of the Republics on the basis of their independence, or to
permit their Governments to communicate with their Deputation. Our
People have, indeed, always been of opinion that not only on the
ground of Right, but also of the great material and personal
sacrifices made for their independence, they had a well-founded claim
to that Independence.
"This Meeting has seriously weighed the condition of their Country and
People, and has specially noted the following facts:--
"1. That the Military policy followed by the British Military
Authorities has led to the entire devastation of the territory of both
the Republics with the burning of farms and villages, the destruction
of all means of subsistence, and the exhaustion of all sources
necessary for the support of our families, for the existence of our
troops, and for the continuation of the war.
"2. That the placing of our captured families in the Concentration
Camps has led to an unheard-of condition of suffering and disease, so
that in a comparatively short time about 20,000 of our dear ones have
perished in those camps, and the horrible prospect has arisen that by
the continuance of the war our entire race may in that way die out.
"3. That the Kaffir tribes within and without the boundaries of the
territory of both Republics have almost all been armed, and have taken
part in the struggle against us, and, by perpetrating murders and
committing all kinds of atrocities, have brought about an impossible
state of affairs in many districts of both the Republics, as has only
been recently proved in the Vrijheid district, where on a single
occasion 56 burghers were murdered and mutilated in an awful manner.
"4. That by the proclamations of the enemy to which they have already
begun to give effect the burghers who are still fighting are menaced
with the loss of all their movable and immovable property, and thus
with entire material ruin.
"5. That through the circumstances of the war it has long ago become
impossible for us to retain the many thousands of prisoners of war
taken by our forces, and that we can thus do comparatively little
damage to the British Forces while the burghers who are captured by
the British are sent out of the country, and that after the war has
been raging for almost three years there remains only an insignificant
portion of the fighting force with which we commenced the war.
"6. That this struggling remnant, which constitutes only a small
minority of our entire people, has to fight against overwhelming odds
of the enemy, and is, moreover, practically in a state of famine and
privation, wanting even the indispensable necessaries of life, and
that in spite of the application of our utmost endeavours and the
sacrifice of all that was dear and precious to us, we cannot
reasonably expect ultimate victory.
"This Meeting is therefore of opinion that there is no reasonable
ground to expect that by carrying on the war the People will be able
to retain their independence, and considers that, under the
circumstances, the People are not justified in proceeding with the
war, since such can only tend to the social and material ruin, not
only of ourselves, but also of our posterity.
"Forced by the above-mentioned circumstances and motives, this Meeting
instructs both Governments to accept the proposal of His Majesty's
Government, and to sign the same on behalf of the People of both the
Republics.
"This Meeting of Delegates expresses the belief that the conditions
thus created by the acceptance of the proposal of His Majesty's
Government may speedily be so ameliorated that our People will thereby
attain the enjoyment of those privileges to which they consider they
can justly lay claim, on the ground not only of their past history,
but also of their sacrifices in this war.
"This Meeting has noted with satisfaction the decision of His
Majesty's Government to grant a large measure of amnesty to those
British subjects who took up arms on our side, and to whom we are
bound by ties of blood and honour, and expresses the wish that it may
please His Majesty to extend this amnesty still further."
This proposal was moved by Commandant H. P. J. PRETORIUS (Jacobsdal),
and seconded by General Chris. BOTHA.
General NIEUWOUDT withdrew his proposal, which was, however,
immediately adopted by General C. C. J. BADENHORST (Boshof), and
seconded by Commander A. BESTER (Bloemfontein).
The Meeting then adjourned till two o'clock.
At two o'clock the Meeting was resumed.
The proposal of Commandant H. P. J. PRETORIUS, seconded by General
Chris. BOTHA, was then put to the vote.
The voting was as follows:--
FOR.
H. A. Alberts.
A. J. Bester (Bethlehem).
L. P. H. Botha.
G. A. Brand.
H. J. Bruwer.
J. F. de Beer.
C. J. Brits.
H. J. Bosman.
Chris. Botha.
C. Birkenstock.
C. F. Beyers.
B. H. Breytenbach.
F. R. Cronje.
D. H. van Coller.
J. de Clercq.
J. G. Cilliers.
T. A. Doenges.
C. C. Froneman.
D. F. H. Flemming.
H. S. Grobler.
J. L. Grobler.
J. N. H. Grobler.
F. J. W. J. Hattingh.
J. A. M. Hertzog.
B. J. van Heerden.
J. N. Jacobs.
F. P. Jacobsz.
J. F. Jordaan.
J. J. Koen.
H. J. Kritzinger.
A. J. de Kock.
P. J. Liebenberg.
J. A. P. Van der Merwe.
F. E. Mentz.
C. H. Muller.
T. K. Nieuwoudt.
H. van Niekerk.
J. J. van Niekerk.
D. J. E. Opperman.
A. M. Prinsloo.
H. P. J. Pretorius.
A. Ross.
L. J. Rautenbach.
P. D. Roux.
F. J. Rheeder.
B. Roos.
D. J. Schoeman.
T. Stofberg.
S. P. du Toit.
P. L. Uijs.
W. J. Viljoen.
P. W. de Vos.
W. J. Wessels.
P. R. Viljoen.
AGAINST.
J. J. Alberts (S.A.R.).
J. Kemp (S.A.R.).
J. Naude (S.A.R.).
A. J. Bester (Bloemfontein), (O.F.S.).
C. C. J. Badenhorst (O.F.S.).
C. A. van Niekerk (O.F.S.).
By 54 votes to 6 the proposal was adopted.
When this resolution had been passed there were not many tearless eyes
in the tent.
Acting President S. W. BURGER then addressed the following words to
the Meeting: We stand here at the graveside of the two Republics. Much
remains for us to do, even though we cannot do what lies before us in
the official positions which we have hitherto occupied. Let us not
withdraw our hands from doing what is our duty. Let us pray God to
guide us and to direct us how to keep our people together. We must
also be inclined to forgive and to forget when we meet our brothers.
We may not cast off that portion of our people who were unfaithful.
With these words I wish officially to bid farewell to you, our
respected Commandant General, General de Wet, Members of both
Executive Councils, and Delegates.
With this the last meeting of the two Republics terminated. It was
closed with Prayer.
[Illustration: _Facsimile of the document on which the voting on the
proposal by Commandant H. P. J. Pretorius, seconded by General Chris.
Botha, was recorded._]
The Secretary, Mr. D. E. van Velden, was then instructed to request
Lord Kitchener's representatives in the camp--namely, Captain P. J.
Marker and Major Henderson--to come to the tent in which the meeting
was held in order that the decision of the Meeting might be
communicated to them.
They speedily arrived, and under a death-like silence General Botha
informed them that the Meeting had accepted the peace proposals of the
British Government.
Immediately afterwards the British Authorities made the necessary
arrangements for the conveyance by rail to Pretoria of the members of
both Republican Governments to sign the Treaty of Peace in accordance
with the instruction of the Meeting.
That night, shortly before 11 o'clock, the said Governments duly
arrived at Pretoria.
On arrival at the Railway Station they were conveyed in great haste to
the residence of Mr. George Heys in Mare Street, which was occupied by
Lord Kitchener, and served as the Army Headquarters in South Africa.
For a few moments the members of the two Republican Governments, who
were accompanied by the two Secretaries, Rev. J. D. Kestell and Mr. D.
E. van Velden, were left alone in the spacious dining-room, as they
wished to read the resolution of the Delegates once more in order to
satisfy themselves that it was correct.
When this had been done, Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner entered.
The two Representatives of the British Government sat at the head of
the table next to each other at the south side of the apartment. On
the left of Lord Milner sat Acting President S. W. Burger, State
Secretary F. W. Reitz, Commandant General Louis Botha, General J. H.
de la Rey, Mr. J. C. Krogh, and General L. J. Meyer. On Lord
Kitchener's right sat Acting President C. R. de Wet, General C. H.
Olivier, General J. B. M. Hertzog, and Acting Government Secretary Mr.
W. J. C. Brebner.
The Peace Treaty had been typed in quadruple on parchment. One copy
was intended for the King of England, one for Lord Kitchener, one to
be preserved in the Archives in Pretoria, and one in the Archives in
Bloemfontein.
There was perfect silence when Acting President S. W. Burger took up
the pen.
It was five minutes past eleven on May 31, 1902.
Acting President Burger signed. After him the members of the
Government of the South African Republic. Then Acting President de Wet
and the Members of the Orange Free State Government. Lord Kitchener
followed, and last of all Lord Milner signed.
Before signing State Secretary Reitz rose in his seat, pen in hand,
and stated that he signed only in his official capacity, and not as F.
W. Reitz.
President Steyn was not there. Physical prostration due to his serious
illness prevented him from doing what he had always said he would
never do, viz., put his hand on paper to sign away the Independence of
his People.
The document was signed.
Everything was silent in the apartment where so much had taken place.
For a few moments everyone sat still.
As the members of the Governments of the now late Republics stood up,
as men stupefied, to leave the apartment, Lord Kitchener rose, and,
going up to each of them, offered his hand, saying, "We are good
friends now."
They then left the apartment and proceeded to the adjoining house (the
residence of Mr. Carl Rood), which had been placed at their disposal.
* * * * *
After the resolution of the meeting had been communicated to the
British Representatives, the Delegates met again, when the following
proposal by Commandant Jacobsz, seconded by General Muller, was
unanimously adopted:--
"This meeting of Delegates, considering the pressing necessity to
collect means to provide for the wants of the suffering women and
children, widows and orphans, and other necessitous persons who
have been reduced to a state of indigency by the war,
"And considering the desirability of appointing a Head Committee,
whose duty it shall be to take the necessary steps to make
provision herein and to decide finally about the Administration
and application of the means to be collected,
"Resolves to appoint Messrs. M. T. Steijn, S. W. Burger, L.
Botha, C. R. de Wet, J. H. de la Rey, Rev. A. P. Kriel, and Rev.
J. D. Kestell (Secretary), a Head Committee, to make all such
further arrangements for carrying out the said objects as may
appear desirable and practical to them, and especially to add new
members to their number, to appoint Sub-Committees and an
Executive Committee, which is authorised to draw up Statutes and
amend the same whenever necessary."
It was further proposed by Commandant Jacobsz, seconded by General
Muller, and carried by the meeting:--
"This meeting further resolves to delegate General C. R. de Wet,
General Louis Botha, and General J. H. de la Rey, of the said Head
Committee, to proceed to Europe to collect the said funds."
APPENDIX
THE MIDDELBURG PROPOSALS.
_Pretoria, March 7, 1901._
YOUR HONOUR,
With reference to your conversation at Middelburg on February 28, I
have the honour to inform you that, in the event of a general and
complete cessation of hostilities, and the surrender of all rifles,
ammunition, cannon, and other munitions of war in the hands of the
burghers, or in Government _depots_ or elsewhere, His Majesty's
Government is prepared to adopt the following measures:--
His Majesty's Government will at once grant an amnesty in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony for all _bona fide_ acts of war
committed during the recent hostilities. British Subjects belonging to
Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be compelled to return to
those Colonies, will, if they do so, be liable to be dealt with by the
laws of those Colonies specially passed to meet the circumstances
arising out of the present war. As you are doubtless aware, the
special law in the Cape Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary
penalties for High Treason in the present case.
All prisoners of war now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere, being
burghers or Colonists, will, on the completion of the surrender, be
brought back to their country as quickly as arrangements can be made
for their transport.
At the earliest practicable date military administration will cease,
and will be replaced by civil administration in the form of Crown
Colony Government. There will, therefore, be, in the first instance,
in each of the new Colonies, a Governor and an Executive Council,
composed of the principal officials, with a Legislative Council
consisting of a certain number of official members to whom a nominated
unofficial element will be added. But it is the desire of His
Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to introduce a
representative element, and ultimately to concede to the new Colonies
the privilege of self-government. Moreover, on the cessation of
hostilities, a High Court will be established in each of the new
Colonies to administrate the laws of the land, and this Court will be
independent of the Executive.
Church property, public trusts, and orphan funds will be respected.
Both the English and Dutch languages will be used and taught in public
schools when the parents of the children desire it, and allowed in
Courts of Law.
As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, His Majesty's
Government cannot undertake any liability. It is, however, prepared,
as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not exceeding one million
pounds sterling to repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River
Colony for goods requisitioned from them by the Republican
Governments, or subsequent to annexation, by Commandants in the field
being in a position to inforce such requisitions. But such claims will
have to be established to the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial
Commission, appointed by the Government, to investigate and assess
them, and, if exceeding in the aggregate one million pounds, they will
be liable to reduction _pro rata_.
I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Government will take
into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting by loan the
occupants of farms, who will take the oath of allegiance, to repair
any injuries sustained by destruction of buildings or loss of stock
during the war, and that no special war tax will be imposed upon
farms to defray the expense of the war.
When Burghers require the protection of firearms, such will be allowed
to them by licence, and on due registration, provided they take the
oath of allegiance. Licences will also be issued for sporting rifles,
guns, &c., but military firearms will only be allowed for purposes of
protection.
As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the Transvaal
and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's
Government to give such franchise before representative Government is
granted to those Colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as
to secure the just predominance of the white race. The legal position
of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold
in the Cape Colony.
In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that, if the terms now
offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for consideration,
they must be regarded as cancelled.
I have, &c.,
KITCHENER, GENERAL,
_Commander-in-Chief, British Forces, South Africa_.
To his Honour COMMANDANT-GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.