VEREENIGING AND PEACE.
MINUTES
_of the meeting of the Special Delegates at Vereeniging,
South African Republic, on Thursday, May 29, 1902,
and following days_.
The Meeting commenced at 9 a.m., and, at the request of the Chairman,
was opened with Prayer by the Rev. J. D. Kestell.
Having declared the Meeting open, the Chairman requested the
Commission, which had been delegated to negotiate with Lord Kitchener
and Lord Milner, to report on what they had done.
The acting State President S. W. Burger, on rising to do so, first
requested the Secretary of the Meeting (Mr. D. E. van Velden) to read
the following report of the COMMISSION:--
_Pretoria, May 28, 1902._
_To the Governments of the Orange Free State and South African
Republic._
GENTLEMEN,
In accordance with the instructions received by us from the two
Governments, we proceeded to Pretoria to negotiate with the British
Representatives on the question of peace, and have the honour to
report as follows:--
Our meetings with the British Authorities lasted from Monday, May 19,
till Wednesday, May 28, and the delay was principally due to the long
time required for cable correspondence with the British Government.
At first we made a proposal[5] in which we tried to establish a
restricted independence by the surrender of a portion of our territory
as a basis of negotiation. Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, however,
decidedly refused to negotiate on that basis, and informed us that if
that proposal were cabled to the British Government, it would be
detrimental to the negotiations.
[Footnote 5: See p. 98.]
At the same time we were informed that, as had already been intimated
to both Governments, the British Government were prepared to negotiate
only on the basis of the Middelburg proposals, subject to alterations
as to details.
In order to prepare this proposal in a final form, Lord Milner
requested the assistance of some members of our Committee, to which we
acceded, with the understanding that the assistance of these members
of the Commission would be rendered without prejudice.
As the result of the labours of this Sub-Committee, Lord Milner
submitted a draft proposal, in which we insisted in the incorporation
of a new clause, which was embodied therein (Clause No. 11). The draft
proposal which is attached to this[6] was then cabled to the British
Government, and was altered by them and communicated to us in a final
form. This final proposal is attached hereto.[7]
[Footnote 6: See p. 116.]
[Footnote 7: See p. 133.]
We were informed on behalf of the British Government that this
proposal could not be further altered, but must be accepted or
rejected in its entirety by the Delegates of both Republics. At the
same time, we were informed that this acceptance or rejection must
take place within a definite time.
We thereupon informed Lord Kitchener that this final decision would be
communicated to him by next Saturday evening at the latest.
During the formal negotiations some informal discussions also took
place with reference to the British subjects in the Cape Colony and
Natal who had fought on our side. As the result of these informal
discussions, we received a communication from the British Government
which we attach hereto.[8]
[Footnote 8: See p. 136.]
We have, &c.,
(Signed)
LOUIS BOTHA,
C. R. DE WET,
J. H. DE LA REY,
J. B. M. HERTZOG,
J. C. SMUTS.
Acting President S. W. BURGER said: If some point or other in the
documents that have just been read to you is not clear, one or other
of the members of the Commission will give the necessary explanations.
You will observe that the Commission tried to negotiate more or less
in the spirit of this meeting. The Representatives of the British
Government declared that they could not negotiate on any other basis
than the surrender of the independence. We have now before us a
document upon which the British Government thinks peace can be
concluded. The question before us now is: how must we set to work? I
think there are three courses open to us upon which we must decide
before Saturday evening. The three courses are:--
(1) To continue the struggle. Is this possible for us under the
circumstances in which we find ourselves; what are the prospects; and
what will the consequences be? This we must consider.
(2) Accept the proposal of the British Government and conclude peace
thereon.
(3) Surrender unconditionally.
On these questions the Meeting must now decide.
On the proposal of General S. P. du Toit, seconded by Commandant
Mentz, it was resolved that minutes of the discussions be kept as
briefly as possible, and also that all proposals and resolutions be
recorded.
Mr. J. DE CLERCQ (Middelburg): I would like to have some elucidation
of Clause 2. Whom does it include?
General SMUTS: The words are: "in the veld." It is thus plain that
other persons are not included in it.
Mr. DE CLERCQ: What, then, becomes of persons who have been banished?
General SMUTS: Clause 3 provides for persons who, according to the
British, have been banished.
Commandant JACOBSZ: Clause 2 deals with "burghers." I should like to
know whether officers are also included.
General SMUTS: "Burghers" includes officers also. "Rebels" is the term
in contra-distinction to "burghers."
General S. P. DU TOIT: In clause 4, I read: "The benefit of this
clause will not extend to certain acts." May I know what acts are here
referred to?
General BOTHA: As communicated by Lord Kitchener to the Commission,
three persons are excluded from the benefit of Clause 4 of the peace
proposals. They are namely: Mr. van Aswegen for the shooting of
Captain Mears; Mr. Cilliers for the shooting of Capt. Boyle; and a
certain Muller for the alleged murder of a certain Rademeyer in the
district of Vrede. These three persons will have to stand their trial
on the conclusion of peace.
Chief Commandant DE WET: Lord Kitchener arranged this matter
informally with General Botha without reference to me, as I think he
should have done, because two of the cases mentioned are of Free
Staters. It is not down in black and white, that the three persons
mentioned will be the only exceptions, and if more exceptions are made
later I do not wish to be held responsible.
General BOTHA: I should like further to explain this matter. This
point in Clause 4 was raised by the British representatives. Lord
Kitchener asked to see me personally and informally, and at the
suggestion of General de la Rey I went to him. Lord Kitchener then
informed me that certain three alleged murders in the course of the
war had attracted much attention in England, and that the British
Government, on account of the feelings of the English people, did not
see their way open to leave these three cases untried. The three cases
already mentioned here were then communicated to me by Lord Kitchener.
On a later occasion I took General Smuts with me, and Lord Kitchener
repeated in the presence of both of us that only these three persons
would be excluded from the benefit of Clause 4.
General HERTZOG: I am quite prepared to accept Lord Kitchener's word
given to Generals Botha and Smuts.
General BRAND: Why are the names of these cases not inserted in the
peace proposal?
General HERTZOG: They could not be inserted because as laid down by
the British Government it could not be altered.
General DE LA REY: Only the three persons mentioned are excluded from
the benefit of Clause 4, and because we were afraid that there might
be more cases General Botha went and satisfied himself.
Chief Commandant DE WET: I did not wish to remain silent on this
point, because there was only the word of Lord Kitchener and no other
guarantee that other persons will not be prosecuted. I, of course,
entirely believe what Generals Botha and Smuts have stated.
General HERTZOG: I am fully satisfied on this point.
Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK (Vryheid) asked with reference to Clause 1 whether
having regard to the large number of Kaffirs in many districts it
would not be dangerous for the burghers to part with all their arms.
General BOTHA replied that the Commission had seen Lord Kitchener
informally on this point, and pointed out this danger to him, and he
had then agreed that in the districts on the boundaries where there
were many Kaffirs, the landed proprietors and their sons could retain
their arms under a licence, and that if there was a laying down of
arms, he would send persons immediately to return the arms to these
landed proprietors under a licence.
General DE LA REY: On this point I spoke out freely to Lord Kitchener.
I said that I would never agree that burghers in the frontier
districts should be entirely disarmed, and thus made lower than the
Kaffirs. Lord Kitchener then said that he would take the arms from
landed proprietors with one hand and return them immediately with the
other.
Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: Clause 2 says: "The prisoners of war will gradually
be brought back to their homes." Has a time been fixed, or will it be
done in the course of years? I have heard that the British have an
objection to sending back 30,000 persons.
General SMUTS: The Committee tried to get a time fixed within which
all prisoners of war must be brought back, but the British had a great
objection to binding themselves, because it would depend upon the
number of transport ships they would be able to obtain to convey the
30,000 prisoners of war back, and also because it would not be
advisable on account of the scarcity of food in the two Republics to
bring back so many people at once.
The meeting then adjourned till two o'clock in the afternoon, when the
proceedings were resumed.
Mr. L. JACOBSZ: Does Clause 2 provide for the return of the deputation
and other persons in Europe?
General SMUTS: The members of our deputation and other burghers in
Europe, if they wish to return, also fall under this Clause.
Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: What property is referred to in Clause 3?
General SMUTS: The word "property" includes every form of property.
Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Kroonstad): What course will be pursued with
reference to the farms which have been sold?
Mr. J. L. GROBLER (Carolina): How many farms have been sold?
General SMUTS: Twenty farms, as stated unofficially.
Mr. J. L. GROBLER: Where?
General SMUTS: In the Orange Free State.
General HERTZOG: The Commission spoke informally to Lord Milner about
the farms which have already been sold or confiscated by the British.
He replied that they could not be returned to the former owners, but
that the purchase-price would be refunded to them. About twenty farms
had been thus sold, all situate in the Orange Free State.
Landdrost STOFBERG: Does Clause 5 signify that the medium of
instruction will be Dutch?
General SMUTS: There is nothing against it in this Clause. According
to this Clause the Dutch language will be taught, but it is not
stipulated that Dutch will be the medium of instruction. My own
impression is that the language in the schools will be English, but if
the parents desire it, Dutch.
Landdrost STOFBERG: It means therefore that the language medium will
be English, but that Dutch will also be allowed.
General HERTZOG: Lord Milner declared that he wanted only one language
in South Africa, and that was English. English will be the medium.
Landdrost STOFBERG: A foreign language therefore?
General DU TOIT: What will be the Constitution of the Civil
Government?
General BOTHA: It will be that of a Crown Colony.
General KEMP: Is no time fixed within which Civil Government must be
introduced?
General BOTHA: No.
General DU TOIT: In Clause 9 mention is made of war taxes. Will there
be no other taxes?
General BOTHA: The British Government says that they will not defray
their expenses out of a tax on the farms.
Commandant ALBERTS: No war tax--therefore there will be other taxes?
General SMUTS: Yes, certainly, but they will be imposed on all
inhabitants.
Mr. P. R. VILJOEN: If anyone has a Government note or receipt must he
prove how he obtained it?
General SMUTS: Clause 10 is directed against speculators who have
bought up notes.
Commandant JACOBSZ: What course will be pursued in cases where notes
have passed from hand to hand?
General BOTHA: The Clause is directed only against speculators.
Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: Do the words: "to assist those who are not able to
assist themselves," mean that widows, orphans and maimed will be
assisted?
General BOTHA: Yes.
Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: A pension, for instance?
General BOTHA: No pension.
Commandant FLEMMING: Was nothing said about receipts issued by the
British themselves?
General DE WET: Lord Kitchener said that they would not be paid out
till after the war, but not to speculators.
Commandant FLEMMING: There is therefore hope for British receipts?
General DE WET: Yes.
Mr. NAUDE: Is a man a burgher who became such after the commencement
of the war?
Advocate L. J. JACOBSZ: No one is a burgher who became such after the
war had begun.
Mr. BIRKENSTOCK asked a question with reference to creditors.
General BOTHA: In reply to Mr. Birkenstock I may say that we discussed
that question formally, but the British representatives would not bind
themselves with reference to the new Government's future policy, but
asked us to trust that new Government to protect debtors.
General DU TOIT: Does Natal hold another view regarding the rebels?
General DE WET: Yes.
General DU TOIT: If the rebels remain outside the boundaries of their
Colonies will they then be free?
General SMUTS: Yes, if they remain outside the Cape Colony and Natal.
Commandant OPPERMAN: Will their property be confiscated?
General SMUTS: In the Cape Colony there is no law providing for
confiscation.
General BOTHA: Lord Kitchener said to me that at the coronation of the
King he would recommend a general amnesty.
The Chairman at this stage asked the meeting to confine itself to the
following questions:--
(1) Whether it would accept the document at present before them.
(2) Whether it would decide to continue the war.
(3) Or, whether it would decide to surrender unconditionally.
Mr. J. DE CLERCQ (Middelburg) said: I have already expressed my
opinion on the question as to whether we shall continue the war. If we
cannot proceed, then the question is whether we shall accept the
proposals of the British Government, or whether we shall surrender
unconditionally. It cannot be denied that these proposals are not so
good as we wished, but the question is whether in the circumstances we
can get anything better. If we surrender unconditionally and return to
the burghers and they ask us: "What have you obtained for us on
surrendering?" and we reply: "We have done nothing except surrendering
you and ourselves unconditionally to the enemy," then we shall be in
difficulties, and how shall we be able to justify ourselves? The
burghers expect that we shall obtain the best terms possible for them,
and I say that it is a greater honour for a people to negotiate than
to surrender themselves unconditionally. If we get terms we shall be
better able to satisfy the people than if we can only inform them
that we have handed them over to the mercy of the enemy. I do not
believe that anyone will be able to convince me that unconditional
surrender will be better for the burghers. Unless I can be convinced
of the contrary, I think it will be best to accept the proposal of the
British Government.
General NIEUWOUDT: I think that the matter is now plain, and propose
that we immediately proceed to vote whether we shall continue the war
or not. If the majority is not in favour of continuing the struggle,
then we can discuss the question whether we shall accept terms or
surrender ourselves unconditionally.
This proposal was seconded by General Froneman.
Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK: We must not act with undue haste in this important
matter. Every Republican knows what the sentiment of freedom is, for
which everything has already been sacrificed, and therefore it is not
so easy to approve of, or to reject, a document such as the one now
before us. I cannot agree with General Nieuwoudt that we should
immediately decide as to whether we shall or shall not continue the
war. We must consider the question of our independence as something
sacred. We should consider whether we can continue the war, or whether
we cannot continue it, and whether by proceeding we can obtain better
terms. Are we now able to continue the war? Are there not at least two
or three districts that cannot proceed with the struggle? Co-operation
is the all-important matter for us. To think that a portion of the
country can continue the war alone is certainly wrong. Let us calmly
consider whether our strength and resources are such that we can
maintain the struggle for a year. If we cannot do so, let us rather
accept terms, for half a loaf is better than no bread. With my heart I
cannot part with our independence, and it is hard for me to make our
people so unhappy, but for the sake of the people and of the widows
and orphans we must make the best we can of the matter.
Commandant JACOBSZ also could not agree with the proposal of General
Nieuwoudt, because the matter was far too weighty to be disposed of so
hastily.
Mr. P. R. VILJOEN (Heidelberg): The document that lies before us is
painful. We are so tied up by it, so "knee-haltered," that it appears
to me that we shall never get loose again. But I must admit that if we
continue the war we may later be hobbled instead of "knee-haltered." I
have already been informed that all my properties have been
confiscated. If this had happened to my properties only I would not
mention it, but I fear there are more people whose properties are
threatened in the same way. I think we must instruct the Governments
to conclude peace on the best terms.
General S. P. DU TOIT (Wolmaransstad): We are passing through critical
moments. We must respect each other's opinion because everyone thinks
that he has grounds for his views, and here especially it is expected
that everyone will express his opinion honestly and freely. If that is
done we shall be able to decide what course to pursue. We must not be
over-hasty, because we are on the eve of a most important decision,
and if a delegate declares that he is not able to prosecute the war
any further we must not consider him cowardly or unfaithful. His
Honour the Acting State President S. W. BURGER, said: There are three
questions before us, but I think that we must for the present put
aside the question of unconditional surrender, and only discuss the
document before us or the continuance of the war. When I left my
commandos it was my opinion, and that of my burghers, that unless we
retain our independence we must continue to fight, and my instructions
were to that effect. But my burghers gave me those instructions
because they were not acquainted with the true conditions of the
country, as I have learnt them here now. We received but few reliable
reports from other parts. We fixed our eyes on God and on the leading
commandos in the Eastern portions of the country. If the burghers had
known that those leading commandos cannot continue the war they would
have thought differently. We cannot deny that there are commandos
which, if the war must proceed, must take some great step or other. We
always expect that when it comes to voting the minority must submit to
the majority. This is the general principle, and also the best in
times of peace. But we are here under other circumstances. If it were
decided here by a majority of say, twenty, to continue the war, then I
ask: why do the others vote in the minority? Is it because they are
afraid, or tired out, or do not wish to co-operate? No; it is because
they cannot proceed any further. And can the majority then go on
alone? No, they are too weak for that. If we cannot all continue to
co-operate, it means that we cannot continue with the struggle. And
therefore I say that here to-day the majority must bow to the
minority. We must speak out freely, for no one of us here stands now
under the orders of General Botha or of General de la Rey. Everyone
stands here with his own vote, and is himself responsible. I am of
opinion that if we continue the war our people will die a national
death, and also run a great risk of dying a moral death. On what
grounds can we hope to prosecute the war to a successful issue? If
such grounds can be pointed out to me, I shall very willingly decide
to go on manfully, but as far as I can see there is no hope for us. I
feel that we cannot continue, and if I had to continue now I would do
so in a very disheartened manner. If I return to my commando and
inform them that the British proposal has been rejected, they will ask
me on what grounds have we done so, and what reasons have we for
hoping for better results. Then I must be able to state our grounds,
and I cannot say that I have read this or that in a cutting from a
newspaper, or that the opinion or this one or that one is so or so, or
that there is hope that war will break out in Europe. If I were to do
that they will say: "You have built on sand." I do not see my way open
to do that, and if it were done, what I fear with heart and soul will
come to pass, namely, that small parties of burghers will make terms
for themselves with the enemy, and surrender, and where shall we then
stand? Almost all the burghers of some districts have already been
captured, and our position becomes daily worse, and it depends upon us
whether our people will be preserved, or whether we shall later be so
reduced that there will be an unconditional surrender. What will then
become of us and of our officers? Will they not be banished? I am not
thinking of myself. If I knew that by being banished I could save my
people, I, and many with me, would willingly sacrifice ourselves. It
is plain to me that if we decide to continue, unconditional surrender
will follow of itself, and the Lord preserve us from that. Our people
will then simply die as such, because there will be no one to help
them. I will never lay down my arms if the majority decides to
prosecute the struggle. No. I will occupy myself somewhere, and
operate here or there with other Generals. But we cannot take such a
decision unless we have good grounds. Mention is made of faith. Yes,
and we had faith, but in my opinion faith must have its grounds. When
Abraham went to sacrifice Isaac he knew that, even if Isaac were
killed, God's promise would nevertheless be carried out. If we believe
that God will ultimately deliver us, we must use our brains.
I do not see a chance of continuing the war, but must associate myself
with those who say: "I have done what I could for my people and
myself, and now I can do no more." I see no other course open to us
than to accept the proposal before us.
Commandant RHEEDER (Rouxville): The British refuse to allow our
Deputation to come out to see us. Many ask on what grounds we can
continue the war, and to them I reply that this refusal is one of the
grounds, because, on the face of it, it is obvious that something good
is brewing for us. Let us take everything into consideration. If we
accept these terms we have a dismal future. And what can we expect
from the coming generation, who cannot now understand what is being
done? Later they will read that there were still so many burghers in
the field, and that the conditions were such and such, and then they
will read that a free people surrendered. If the next generation
should say: "There were so many burghers in the field, and yet we are
not free; where is our country?" we shall have to reply: "We laid down
our arms when we should have fought." We shall have to say that we did
that because our faith deserted us, because we feared the enemy's
strength. I think that we have better prospects now of good results
from the continuance of our struggle than when we commenced. When we
are forced as a People to lay down our arms, then I shall be satisfied
to bow to the will of the Lord, but I cannot be satisfied to proceed
to surrender as a divided people. Our families are prepared to suffer
for another year to retain our freedom, and how shall we meet them if
we now make peace on these terms? Our State President is so
indispensable to us, and now the Lord lays His hand upon him, but this
trial is a proof to me that the Lord is still with us. If a commando
cannot remain in its district, it can go somewhere else where it can
exist. We must not give up the struggle until we get back our
independence.
Acting State President S. W. BURGER remarked: Commandant Rheeder says
that we must go on with the struggle, but he has not pointed out the
way to us, nor mentioned any ground upon which we can continue.
Commandant RHEEDER: The time for surrender is past. If we wished to
surrender, we should have done so while the burghers still had all
their possessions. Now they have nothing more, but we have still space
enough, and, therefore, we must fight until we have our country back.
Commandant P. L. UIJS (Pretoria): So much is said about our Deputation
and about what they have perhaps done for us or can still do, but we
must remember that they are in continuous communication with the
Netherlands Government, and I am convinced that the correspondence
between the Netherlands Minister and Lord Lansdowne was sent to our
Government with the cognisance of the Deputation. I think that we must
banish from our minds the hope of obtaining any benefit through the
mediation of our Deputation. The correspondence in question between
the Netherlands and British Governments probably took place with their
co-operation.
The Meeting was adjourned till 7.15 that evening.
At 7.15 the Meeting resumed, and was opened with Prayer.
Commandant CRONJE (Winburg) said: I only wish to say a few words. It
has been rightly stated that we are passing through a serious
stage--in my opinion the most important stage--in the history of the
South African people. The Delegates represent the South African
people, and we must now decide for that people. It is asked: "What are
our prospects?" but I ask, "What were our prospects when we commenced
the war? Were there grounds then?" It was indeed believed that right
was might, and trust was put in God. And God helped us. If we want
grounds, we must look back. When the enemy entered our country,
everything was dark and gloomy. There was a time when more than 4,000
men surrendered. They said: "Our struggle is hopeless." Those who
would not surrender with the 4,000, but continued the struggle, were
called mad. Two years ago the difficulty was raised that there was no
more food. A year ago the same difficulty was raised, with the
addition that the enemy was too strong, and that we would have to give
in. And yet the fight was continued. We, as representatives of a free
people, must not act hastily to repent a few days later of a step we
have taken and upon which we cannot go back. I never had hopes of
intervention, and it was never said by the Government or by the
Generals that they had hopes of intervention. I have always said that
we must put our trust in God. When I return from here I shall be able
to say to my burghers that the ground upon which we are going on with
the struggle still is: Trust in God. We have no right to give up the
struggle now. In some parts of the Free State, also, there was no
food, and yet deliverance was always at hand. We have sent our
Deputation to Europe, and President Kruger is there now, too. I ask:
"Have we, then, no more faith in them?" If they find that there is no
chance for help for us in Europe, will they not inform us to that
effect soon enough? I ask you, who would acquaint us thereof sooner
than they? And we must note that the enemy will not allow us to have
any communication with our Deputation, or that one of the members
should come out here. It is said that by continuing the struggle we
shall exterminate our people, but I say that by accepting this
proposal we shall utterly destroy our people. We have nothing more to
lose now, but everything to gain. We may be able to retain our
independence yet, which is so dear to us. In the verbal message from
our Deputation they say we must not treat with the enemy without
giving them notice. And when President Kruger left, it was his request
also that we should not negotiate without his cognisance. I say we
have no right to conclude peace on this basis. By doing so we shall
deliver a death-blow to the Africander race. I think that there is
something brewing in Europe. Five years ago there was an Armenian
question, and it took five years before the Powers stepped in and made
them conclude peace. I wish to ask you not to take a step which you
may regret later. Let us ponder before we part with our freedom. I
must also point out that our comrades in the Cape Colony are not
safeguarded by the terms offered. They will have to leave their
country, and they have lost all they have. Those who remain with us
will have to be supported by the British, their enemies. Then the
farms of some burghers have been sold, for which they will receive
nothing. With reference to the L3,000,000 offered for compensation,
that is not even sufficient to cover a fifth or even a tenth part of
our losses. For these and many other reasons the British proposals are
quite unacceptable to me, and we cannot and may not do anything else
but vigorously continue the struggle.
General FRONEMAN (Ladybrand): What I wish to say breathes the same
spirit as the words of the last speaker. My country is dear to me, and
I cannot think of parting with it. An answer is insisted upon to the
question: "What grounds have we for continuing the war?" But I ask in
turn: "What grounds had we when we commenced the war?" I have taken
part in the struggle since it began, and have never had more grounds
for continuing it than now. My division was also entirely exhausted,
but the Lord has made provision again. I was present when 4,000
burghers gave up the struggle in despair, and I was also present at
the surrender of General Cronje, and all I can say is that we
commenced the war with prayer and with faith in God. We have suffered,
but it was the Lord Who allowed this war to come over us. We prayed
that the war might be warded off, but God disposed otherwise. One of
our Generals has rightly said that the Lord would reveal Himself only
after all human resources have been exhausted. Although we only number
hundreds where the enemy has millions, we must nevertheless stand firm
in our trust in God. If we accept this proposal, our name as
"Republicans" is lost for ever and always. We, two small Republics,
are offering resistance only to defend the possession which we have
received from our forefathers, and I can never think of giving up our
dearly bought rights. Even if I were the only one, I would never give
my vote for that. I have consulted my burghers and also their wives,
and they said to me: "Bring us peace." I then asked what kind of peace
they desired, and their reply was that our independence was not to be
sacrificed. I thus have a clear instruction, and before I can part
with our independence, I shall first have to return to my burghers to
consult them.
Field Cornet B. H. BREYTENBACH (Utrecht) said: On the question whether
the war must be continued a reply of "yes" or "no" must be given. The
general condition of our country has been laid before us by the
Delegates, and the Meeting now stands before the stubborn fact that
the war cannot be continued. Hitherto not one of the facts which
indicate that we cannot prosecute the war has been removed or
controverted. The facts still stand, and I thus ask on what grounds
can we decide to go on with the war? I am not going to proceed blindly
or in the dark. We, as responsible persons, cannot step blindly over
facts. If we are going to continue, we must have good grounds for
believing that the future will bring us light. If not, my instruction
is to vote for a settlement for peace. It would, in my opinion, be
criminal of me to vote for the continuance of the war, if our
circumstances remain as laid before us here. Our attention is directed
to the grounds we had when we commenced the war, and we are asked what
our hopes and prospects were then. I say, whatever they may have been,
what have we gained? We must now declare that there is no progress in
our cause. On the contrary, are we not gradually going backwards? I
say "Yes," and we may not go on unless the facts and difficulties laid
before this meeting are removed. It is plain that at least 11, and
perhaps 14, commandos cannot continue the struggle, and if we decide
to continue, it speaks for itself what the consequences will be. What
will it profit us to resolve to go on if we have no people to fight?
Who can take the people by the throat and say to them: "Do this or
that"?--especially if we ourselves see the true state of affairs. If
we decide to continue, the war will in any case cease of itself in the
course of a few months, and the end will be far more fatal and pitiful
than if we make peace now.
Commandant W. J. VILJOEN (Witwatersrand): Some are in favour of
continuing the war, others are against it. I do not stand here with a
ready-made opinion, but with a mind that is open to be convinced by
facts. Those who are for peace have given facts and grounds upon which
they base their opinions. The others only speak of faith. A year ago
we decided to continue the war on faith, and now, having fought for
another year, we are convinced that we must make peace. If it is
desired to proceed, the way must be indicated and the grounds stated
which can convince us that we act wisely. Otherwise we must make peace
now.
General DE LA REY: It is my custom to speak briefly. I do not use
three words where one is sufficient. I went to meet the people with
definite instructions neither to approve of nor to reject what might
be said at the meetings, and I have adhered to them. There are now
here 8 representatives from my districts, with one from the Cape
Colony, and they represent almost the half of the South African
Republic. I need not say anything about the spirit of my burghers, but
everyone can understand that after the recent victories they are
courageous, as all the Delegates can testify.
With reference to our cause, I do not wish to shut my ears and eyes to
facts. If there is deliverance for the Africander people, then I am
with them, and if a grave must be dug for that people, then I go into
it with them. You can talk and decide here as you choose, but I tell
you that this meeting is the end of the war. But the end may come in
an honourable or in a dishonourable way. If we decide to continue the
war without grounds before us, the end will be a dishonourable one.
You speak of faith. What is faith? Faith is: "Lord, _Thy_ will be
done--not _my_ will to be the victor." I must kill my will, and I must
act and think as He directs and leads me. That is what I understand by
the faith in which God's children must live.
There are three courses open to us this evening, and one of these must
be chosen by the Delegates. Which course must be chosen? You may
accept the proposal of the British, or you may decide on unconditional
surrender. If you do the latter, know, then, that the matter is not
disposed of, for then the question arises: "What will become of our
people?" After those people have fought so faithfully, after all the
sacrifices they have made, to hand them over now unconditionally into
the hands of the enemy? That must not be! Do consider clearly where
the decision you may take will lead you to. If it was desired to
surrender unconditionally, the time for that would have been while the
people still had all their possessions with which they could help
themselves, but not now that the people have been deprived of
everything. There is not one in a hundred who can help himself now. It
is therefore hard for me to think of unconditional surrender.
There is another course which can be followed: to go on with the
struggle. But I am convinced that if we do that, one district after
the other will lay down their arms--will have to lay down their
arms--and the war will thus terminate in a dishonourable manner. If
you can indicate a way to me, or show me grounds upon which we can
hope for good results, I am prepared to go and fight again.
I have a responsibility, a very great responsibility, resting upon me.
The proposal before us, the terms which the British wish to grant us,
are not of great value, but yet they stipulate a few things. The
prisoners of war must be brought back, the Government must provide the
families with food and other necessaries, until they can care for
themselves. The terms also provide that many hundreds will not be
considered as criminals and be convicted as such. If any one can say:
"We can go on," I and my officers can do so, but I shall never allow
such words to pass over my lips, because I may not decide for one part
of the country only. I must consider our condition as a whole. We have
had some successful encounters, but I put myself the question: "What
have I actually effected by these victories?" Since they have been
fought, the enemy has sent down about 40,000 mounted troops against
me, which have deprived me of all my cattle. During the last three
months I have lost more than 600 men, killed, wounded, or captured. It
is plain to me that the enemy wish to attain their object at whatever
cost.
Many speak of hope from the Deputation in Europe. About a year ago the
Deputation wrote us that they expected our deliverance only from our
own perseverance, and now a year later we must not continue saying
that we have hope from the Deputation, who themselves had no hope of
intervention. If they have not been able to do anything in two years,
they will never be able to effect anything.
When I speak thus you must not think that I do so from cowardice,
because I can assure you that I fear no man or power in the whole
world. Neither do I wish to take it amiss in anyone here who thinks or
speaks differently. There are some who have come with a definite
instruction to hold out for independence only. But I am now well
informed on the condition of affairs over the whole country, and I
challenge any Delegate to go with me on a platform before the people.
I am convinced that, out of the three courses open to us, the people
will approve of the course which I am going to choose, because I shall
prove to them that in following that course I have done or obtained
something for them at the last moment. And is that not better than to
say to the people: "You must continue fighting, but the future is dark
and without hope, and I cannot point out to you even a small ray of
light"? By deciding differently, we shall force our people who were so
faithful to become "handsuppers," and in that way the war will come to
a dishonourable end. Therefore, Delegates, reflect on what you are
about to do.
Landdrost BOSMAN (Wakkerstroom): I am thankful that General de la Rey
has spoken out so frankly. It will give more than one of us light on
what we have to decide. As several speakers have already remarked, the
matter before us is very important and difficult, because not only
does the future of our people rest upon us, but that future depends
upon what we shall decide.
I must say frankly that I am against the continuance of the war, and
my reasons are briefly these: It is stated that we did not commence
the war with the hope of intervention, but with faith in the Lord. I
cannot quite agree with that, and I say that we did begin the war with
the hope of intervention, and now we find that that hope will not be
realised. If we did not cherish that hope, why did we send the
Deputation to Europe? And why, while we were still in Natal, was it
stated in war reports that the Deputation were doing good work? That
was said to encourage the Burghers. Many took up arms in that hope.
Who was the cause of that hope originating amongst the people I do not
know, but many Volksraad members spoke as if our independence had been
guaranteed by European Powers. The truth of what I say was proved when
the meetings to elect delegates for this meeting were held. I was
present at several of those meetings, and at each one of them the
burghers insisted that we should try to get into communication with
our Deputation. Why should they have done that if there was no hope of
intervention? That hope dwindled away when we noticed that there was
no ground for it. It is thus plain that we did not commence the war
with faith in God alone. A further proof of this is that we hoped and
expected much from what our comrades in the Cape Colony would
accomplish. That hope has also vanished, now that General Smuts has
declared that we must not expect much from the Cape Colony, and that
there will be no general rising there.
Another reason why I am in favour of peace is because our commandos
have been much weakened. From 50,000 men our number has fallen to
15,000, and that number is fast decreasing. Another reason is the
scarcity of foodstuffs. Last year this scarcity was also spoken of,
but that was nonsense. Now it is only too true. You can now ride from
Vereeniging to Piet Relief, and only here and there will you come
across a few cattle. I may say that you will see scarcely any cattle.
Then we must think of the suffering of the women and children still
with us, and especially of those in the Concentration Camps.
If we decide to continue, many of the 15,000 men still under arms will
be lost to us, and our numbers will decrease month by month. Many say
we may not so trample on the blood already shed as to make peace by
surrendering our independence, but that for the sake of that blood we
must continue the struggle. This is a serious matter, and I hope that
I shall never be guilty of trampling on such costly blood. But there
is something more costly than the blood which has already been shed,
and about which we can do nothing now, and that is the blood of
burghers and of women and children which will still have to be shed if
we decide to continue. And that blood will be given for a cause,
which, so far as human beings can see, is hopeless. That is a much
more serious matter to me. If we continue the war, we become the cause
of still more widows and orphans who will have no one to care for
them.
I did not intend to speak on the religious side of the question, but
it has been touched upon, and for that reason I also wish to say
something upon it. It is difficult for us to find out what course God
wishes us to pursue in this matter. We do not know whether it is God's
decree that we must retain our independence or not. It may be God's
will that we should give it up. What we know for certain is that God
desires us to do right. Everyone who does right is on the right road.
There is no doubt about that. I am convinced that if I vote for the
continuance of the struggle under the existing circumstances, and in
that way cause more suffering, then I am not on the right road, and
thus not on God's way. On the other hand, when I see no hope or
prospect of prosecuting the war with good results, and I vote for
giving up the struggle, then I am on the right road, and thus also on
God's road.
There is another course open to us--namely, unconditional
surrender--but I cannot vote for that. If we do that, then one of the
first things that the enemy will do after the restoration of peace
will be to represent to our people that their leaders did not do what
they could have done, and I am of opinion that thereby mistrust and
suspicion will be raised in the minds of many of our burghers.
Therefore, after all that we have suffered and done, I think that,
however hard it may be, we can now do nothing else but choose what is
best and most acceptable to us. Our feelings and love for our country
and people rise up against that, but if we allow ourselves to be led
by our feelings, and by our love, without using our reason, we shall
find ourselves on the wrong road. Everything will work together for
our good.
I conclude by warning all that we can only too easily mistake a
will-o'-the-wisp for a star, and that we should thus decide very
honestly and carefully.
Commandant H. S. GROBLER (Bethel): There are three courses open to us,
and if ever an important choice had to be made, it is now. As far as I
am concerned, I must say that it is in my opinion impossible for us to
continue the war. My district must be abandoned, and if I, as an
officer, cannot state other reasons to my burghers upon which we can
go on, how can I expect them to continue? There are about 12 districts
in the South African Republic which must be evacuated if the war is to
go on. That means that we shall have to resort to our furthermost
boundaries and leave the enemy in possession of the heart of our
country. But by fleeing about we shall not be able to retain our
independence. We must fight for that. It is asked what prospects we
had when we commenced the war, and it is answered: Faith. Yes, we must
have faith, but the means must be there too. Then we had burghers,
cannon, food, and war material, but now we lack all those means. It
appears to me that the time for fighting is past, and that we must
think about the people. I am a born son of the soil, and have once
before fought for my independence, so that it is very hard for me now
to think of giving it up; but with the facts before us, I shall have
to vote for the acceptance of the British proposals. Our families are
in a pitiable condition, and the enemy uses those families to force us
to surrender. The burghers who have sent us to this meeting are in an
equally pitiable condition. What will it avail us to resolve to
continue the struggle if the burghers cannot hold out any longer? We
must also not lose sight of the fact that, by accepting this proposal,
we get our prisoners of war back. What would otherwise become of them?
And we burghers in the field are threatened with the sale of our
properties, which hangs as a sword over our heads. If that threat were
carried into execution, what would become of us? Further, our burghers
and families in the Concentration Camps are dying a moral death. These
are all facts which force me to accept the proposal before us. If we
can prosecute the war vigorously and with a chance of success, I shall
be the first to say: let us do so for the sake of our burghers, our
families, and ourselves.
Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Ficksburg): It is impossible for me to vote
for the acceptance of this proposal. The last word of my burghers to
me was: "Do not part with our independence; we are prepared to die for
that," and that is our opinion still. Grounds are asked for the
continuance of the struggle, and it is difficult for me to state such
grounds, but I can point out that there is a difference between this
proposal and the Middelburg proposal of a year ago, and that is a
proof to me that the enemy is now more prepared to meet us, and the
longer we hold out, the better terms we shall get, until we obtain
what we want. Let us thus not be too hurried, but stand firm as men
and hold on. I am convinced that if we hold out for our independence
we shall soon be in a better position, and that the enemy will again
approach us for the purpose of opening negotiations.
General J. G. CILLIERS (Lichtenburg): I have already informed the
meeting what my instructions were from the burghers with reference to
our independence. Naturally, I do not feel myself bound by those
instructions, because I am here to make the best of the circumstances
for my people, and I am sure that I have the confidence of my
burghers.
The other evening it was asked whether we are justified in continuing
the struggle. I then answered: Yes, if we considered the justness of
our cause, we are indeed justified. But when we consider our cause
further and take our general position into consideration, then the
question arises whether we are not perpetrating a murder on our people
if we continue the war. The position in both the Republics has been
made clear to us, and that condition is very pitiful. As far as my
district and burghers are concerned, we with some other districts are
still in a position to continue the war, but must I not consider the
situation in other districts? And shall we accuse those men who have
up till now stood faithfully with us of cowardice because they cannot
go on any longer? No, we may not do that. I, of course, long for peace
with the retention of our independence, but we cannot get that, and
nobody can get that for us. We have delegated a Commission who enjoy
our fullest confidence, and they have tried to get all that they
possibly could from the British Government, and there lie the terms
now upon which we can conclude peace. Who of us is in a position
to-night to say we can continue the struggle and thereby obtain
something better for our people than these terms now before us? It is
thought that the Deputation are doing good work because the enemy will
not allow us to get into communication with them, but the last we
heard from our Deputation was to the effect that our salvation lay in
our having to fight to the utmost, and till our last cartridge has
been fired. If, now, we were to go so far as to sacrifice the last man
and to fire our last cartridge, what have we then? Is such a message
from the Deputation encouraging to you? To me it is by no means
encouraging.
Further, some argue about Faith, and it is said that we commenced the
war in faith. To that I wish to say that we must not believe one thing
and not the other. We must not believe that if we persevere we shall
obtain the victory. We must also believe that it is possibly God's
will that we must for a time bow to the power of the enemy. Our
Commission to the Representatives of the British Government have done
their best to obtain as much as possible for the people, and I see no
other way than to accept the proposal before us. It is indeed true
that the voices of our families call to us: "Do not give up the
struggle on our account." But they also say: "Do not go on if the
future becomes dark to you." If my burghers had known what I know now
they would have given me a different instruction. Must we demand more
sacrifices from the burghers and families if we see no light for the
future? However hard it may be, we cannot fight against
impossibilities. We must only consider what is best for our people and
take care that we give no one the opportunity to say: "You could have
saved us, but you have left us in the lurch." Just because our cause
is dark and difficult, we must use our minds and keep only the welfare
of our people in view. I can only agree to accept the proposals that
lie before us.
Chief Commandant DE WET then said: I feel myself compelled to express
my feelings too. The last speaker declared that the last word we had
from our Deputation was that we must fight till the last man was dead
and the last cartridge fired. I must say that I never heard of such a
message. What I know is that the Deputation let us know last year that
they saw no hope of intervention, but that we should hold out till the
last means of resistance had been exhausted. But I did not understand
from that that we must continue till the last man was dead and the
last cartridge fired.
I wish to express my feelings briefly but candidly, and I must go back
to the beginning of the war. I must say that when we began the war I
had not so much hope of intervention as now. In saying this, I do not
wish to intimate that I now have hope of intervention, but that we did
not then know whether we had the slightest sympathy in England or in
Europe. And now we have found out that we have indeed sympathy, and
although no one intervenes on our behalf, our cause is nevertheless
strongly supported, so that even English newspapers give reports of
"pro-Boer" meetings over the whole world. This information we obtain
from Europe through a man sent hither by the Deputation, and I have no
reason to say or to think that our informant is not trust-worthy. He
brought the last letter from the Deputation, and thus certainly enjoys
their confidence. This man is acquainted with public feeling in Europe
towards the two Republics, and informs us that our cause is daily
gaining ground in Europe and even in England. The question may now be
asked: Why have the Deputation not sent us a report on these
conditions? The reason is clear as daylight to me. We sent the
Deputation to seek help for us. They went to ascertain from the other
Powers what could be done for us, and thus came to know what the
policy of those Powers was. Will they now be able to lay bare that
policy to us? No, certainly not, because there is a great danger that
their letters will fall into the hands of the enemy. Even though the
Members of the Deputation were here themselves, I doubt whether they
would be free to explain to us the future policy of the European
Powers. It is therefore significant to me that the Deputation is
silent, and this should not discourage, but rather encourage us.
If there is any man who feels the pitiful condition of our country,
then I am that man. And I believe every word that has been said here
about the conditions in the various divisions. It is asked: What
prospect have we of continuing the fight with success? To reply to
that I must go back to the beginning of the war, and ask what hope and
prospects had we then? My reply is: Only Faith, nothing more. And that
Faith we still have. How weak we were in comparison with that Power,
our enemy, with its three-quarters of a million of soldiers, of which
it has sent some 250,000 to fight us! How could we have entered into
such a struggle if we had not done so in Faith? We could only
speculate on help from Natal and the Cape Colony. Some said that Natal
and the Cape Colony would stand by us, but now we miss the persons who
said that. They are lost to us, but we have not lost them on the
battlefield, for they sit amongst the enemy, and many of them are even
in arms against us. However, I never built on that help, although I
hoped from what history teaches us that we should not stand alone to
defend our rights by force of arms.
I feel why some, taking into consideration our position, seek for
tangible grounds upon which we can justify a continuance of the
struggle; but then the question arises again: What tangible grounds
had we when we began? Has the way become darker or lighter to us? It
is still all Faith, and we know what a small people can by Faith
triumph over the most powerful enemy. And if we, a small people,
overcome by Faith, we shall not be the only people that has done so.
Those who say that the struggle must be given up want tangible grounds
from us for the continuance of it, but what grounds had we at the
commencement? Has it become darker now? On the contrary, the history
of the last 22 months has given me strength. A year ago General Botha
wrote to me, and correctly too, that the scarcity of ammunition gave
him anxiety. We also had that anxiety, because our ammunition was
exhausted as well. There was a time when I feared and trembled when a
burgher came to me with an empty bandolier and asked me for
ammunition. But what happened? Since September last ammunition in
large and small quantities has miraculously poured in, so that, to use
an expression of the late General Joubert's, I was agreeably surprised
(_Ik met een blijde schaamte moest staan_). And what happened with
ammunition occurred also with horses. We always obtained a supply from
the enemy. I do not take it amiss in those who want grounds for our
Faith. I have mentioned some grounds, but those are only a thousandth
part of what might be mentioned. I may add this further reason. The
enemy has approached us. I agree that this proposal is an improvement
on the Middelburg proposal of last year. The enemy have made further
advances. How have they not approached us since the commencement of
the war, when they forced themselves into our country? When our
Governments negotiated with Lord Salisbury at the beginning of the war
in April, 1900, the British Government would hear of nothing but
unconditional surrender. To-day England is negotiating with us. Before
we accept this proposal, let us once more take up this struggle, and
do our duty--do what our hands find to do, and I have no doubt that
the enemy will afterwards approach us again with more favourable
proposals, if they do not leave us our entire independence. The
Deputation said to us: "Persevere," but I do not think that they can
lay bare to us on what grounds this advice was based. Remember, too,
that in the first (Boer) war the South African Republic stood alone
against the powerful England, without any assistance. There were
wavering ones then also--the so-called loyalists. It was then also a
struggle in Faith only, and what was the result? They fought in Faith
only and won. Is our Faith, then, going to be so much weaker than that
of our forefathers?
It is asked: What about our families? Certainly we must care for them,
but only as far, and as well, as we can. More we cannot do. It has
been said that we must let the men lay down their arms to save the
families, but it is a hard matter to say to a Boer: "Take your family,
go to the enemy, and lay down your arms." However, we could do that
rather than to see an entire people fall.
We can learn much from the history of America. It has been said that
our circumstances cannot be compared with those of the Americans, and
yet a comparison is not out of place. Even the powerful England had to
give in to them. It may be said that America is much larger than the
two Republics, but we are not bound to the territories of the two
Republics. The Orange Free State offers many difficulties on account
of her situation. The railway passes through the entire country, and
on the borders we have the Basutos, a powerful nation. We have no
Bushveld like the South African Republic, and have thus to find our
way through the British forces.
The matter is a very grave one for us, but we cannot part with our
arms. Everything else is of minor importance to me, but if we give up
our arms we are no longer men. Let us persevere. Three or six or
twelve months hence or later, a time may dawn when we may be able to
do everything with our arms. But if we give up our arms and such a
time dawns, we shall all stand as women.
Now, I wish to ask you: Why has Lord Kitchener refused to allow our
deputation to come out? And why did he say that we could see from the
papers that there was nothing brewing in Europe? Which papers,
however, did he refer to? _The Star_, _The Cape Times_, _The Natal
Witness_, and other Jingo papers, which, you must moreover bear in
mind, are all censored. If we can accept his word that the deputation
can bring us no favourable news it would have been to the interest of
England to let the deputation come out, or to allow all newspapers
through. But there is no question of allowing certain European and
even certain English newspapers through. If we therefore give up the
struggle now, we do so in the dark. We do not know what is going on in
the outside world. We cannot say that the enemy are making their terms
more and more onerous, because that is not so. They are conceding.
Considering all this, and also the fact that the tension in England
can be looked upon as an indirect intervention, I believe that we
should continue with the bitter struggle. By standing manfully we
shall get our just rights. When the time arrives that we cannot go on
any further, we can again open negotiations. Let us keep up this
bitter struggle and say as one man: We persevere--it does not matter
how long--but until we obtain the establishment of our independence!
General C. F. BEYERS (Waterberg) said: The matter presents itself to
me thus: Which must I follow: my conscience or my reason? To that I
have only one reply--I must follow my conscience, because if I fall,
and I have followed my reason and not my conscience, I do not know
whither I go. But if I follow my conscience I am at any time prepared
for my death. History, as you all know, tells us about many men who
have been martyrs, and who have been burnt for the sake of their
faith, but it seems to me that only in books do we read of such great
things, and that they do not occur any more in our time. I respect
everyone's opinion on our great cause, which is most important and
serious, but we must not forget to observe how much welfare and
salvation was born out of all the great sufferings of the heroes of
old, although when the martyrs died it seemed as if everything was
lost with them. But observe how much welfare and salvation arose from
the circumstance that those men laid down their lives for what they
considered right. Are we not convinced that our cause is right? If we
did not have this conviction at the beginning of the war we would not
have taken up arms. Then we were all prepared to give our lives for
our cause, but now that the hour of death has arrived we recoil. I
cannot express myself differently.
Our national existence is spoken of, but the Lord will care for that.
That is not a matter for us. Our cause was right, and will remain
right, and might shall not triumph over right. For that reason I wish
to persevere in the struggle. I wish to see that right triumphs, even
though that triumph is realised only after my death.
It is said that we shall never get such an opportunity again for
negotiating. General de Wet has touched upon this matter, and I agree
with him, and others, that we shall always be able to negotiate again.
This is proved by what has already taken place, and I may further
point out that there was a time when General Botha wished to see Lord
Roberts, and when the latter replied that it was not necessary. And
now the British are negotiating with us; in fact, they opened up these
negotiations.
I am open to conviction, but if I had to vote how I should be able to
vote only for the continuance of the war. Facts are stated, but none
of the difficulties mentioned are to my mind insurmountable. The
difficulty about the women and families we can surmount. Similarly the
difficulty about food, horses, ammunition, &c. But there is one matter
that troubles me, and that is the spirit that seems to be animating
our people. From the speeches it appears that there is a large
portion of our people who will go over to the enemy, and surrender;
and when such a spirit animates the burghers it is impossible to take
them by the neck and say: Go and fight. What I want is that if the
majority decide to continue the war, that decision must be taken with
enthusiasm. The great danger, however, that I foresee is that such a
decision will lack enthusiasm. I will even go so far as to say that
some of our brothers in the Free State, although they declare that it
is a matter of faith, and in spite of what General de Wet and others
may say, are also animated by a spirit which will drive them to go
over to the enemy, however good and brave they may be.
General de la Rey challenges anyone to come on a platform with him and
to put the true condition of the country before the people and to
induce them to reject this proposal of the enemy. That is so. The
spirit of which I speak is infectious, and if burghers on Commando
learn that the spirit of their fellow-burghers elsewhere is in favour
of giving up the struggle, many will become disheartened. When once a
spirit gets hold of a people it works marvels, and this fact we must
take into consideration. I know it will be of no use to continue the
war if everybody around me lays down his arms. It would be ridiculous
for me to go on. We must be very sensible in this matter, and have no
disunion. You know repentance always comes too late.
I repeat, my conscience is Number 1 with me, and as long as that
remains so I must vote against this proposal.
After Prayer the meeting was adjourned to the following day.
FRIDAY, MAY 30TH, 1902.
At nine o'clock the meeting resumed after a Prayer by the Rev. J. D.
Kestell.
Acting State President S. W. BURGER said: Before we begin I consider
it my duty to inform the Delegates and the members of both
Governments, that President Steyn had to tender his resignation as
President of the Orange Free State yesterday, on account of illness,
and that he was forced to give the enemy his parole to enable him to
obtain medical treatment. General de Wet has been appointed in his
place as Acting State President, and, on behalf of the members of my
Government, on behalf of you all, and on behalf of myself, I wish to
assure him of our deep sympathy, and to express our heartfelt regret
at the loss of a man who has hitherto been the support and the rock of
our good cause. His retirement is a great loss to us all.
Chief Commandant de Wet thanked the Acting State President of the
South African Republic for his sympathetic references, and assured the
meeting that as far as his poor powers enabled him he would do
everything in his power for the Africanders.
Mr. J. NAUDE (Detached Commando under General Kemp) desired some
information about the rebels, and an explanation of the document in
which the British set forth how they would treat the rebels, if their
peace proposals were accepted.
General Smuts furnished the desired information.
Mr. NAUDE further asked whether it rested with the Delegates to decide
to surrender the independence, or whether they could only carry out
their instructions.
General BOTHA replied, that from the documents before the meeting it
was very clear in the opinion of the Governments, as expressed to Lord
Kitchener and to Lord Milner at their first meeting, that only the
people or their special Delegates had the power to decide on the
independence. They had gone to the people, and the people were now
represented by the Delegates here in this meeting.
Mr. NAUDE said: I thus understand that, when the members of the
Governments left Pretoria to have the special Delegates elected they
knew that the persons elected would have to decide whether the
independence would have to be given up or not. I find myself now in a
difficulty, and I must say that some Delegates have (by an oversight,
perhaps) been misled. I have been chosen with a definite instruction,
and with all respect for the explanation of our legal advisers, who
say that we can speak and act here according to circumstances, I must
say that I have come here with a definite instruction from my burghers
to instruct the Governments not to sacrifice the independence.
Further, the burghers gave the Government the right to negotiate, but
then it was to be stipulated in the negotiations that they could
retain their arms, that the rights of the Dutch language should be
guaranteed, which rights are of such great significance to the people,
and a means by which they could again become a people. But in the
terms offered these questions are entirely ignored. I also notice that
provision is made for those burghers who have property, but very
little provision is made for the poor man. And the burghers whom I
represent are not rich. They are not landowners. Three million pounds
are indeed offered, but how much is that among so many? Nor is it
stipulated that the Government notes which have been issued must be
paid, so that the poor will get very little. I cannot therefore vote
for the acceptance of the proposals before us.
As regards our prospects, I wish to bring to your recollection the
address which the Commandant General delivered to the burghers at the
Warmbaths towards the end of 1900. The situation was very gloomy then.
He said: "We have nothing more to lose and everything to gain. Let us
thus go on." No ground for perseverance were then given or asked. And
to say now that we are not going a step further without grounds and
facts before us is in conflict with what we have hitherto done. We
have seen how in the past relief was always at hand. When Pretoria
fell the outlook was darker than now, but there was then a spirit
which animated the people. There was faith and a trust that we must
persevere. And there is no one now who has been put to shame because
he maintained the struggle. I can state no definite grounds upon which
we can build, but when I consider the past, I can say to my burghers
that we can still continue the struggle, and we will do that too.
There is nothing more for us to lose, whereas we have the opportunity
of persevering with our arms in our hands till better days dawn.
General DE LA REY: I must remark that I never misled anyone at any
meeting. Every document that was handed to me by the Government I
caused to be read out at every meeting, and on that the people had to
decide. The last speaker asks whether the responsibility rests on him
to-day to decide on the question of independence. My answer is: "Yes,
and not only on him, but on every one of you." The responsibility
rests upon you generally. You do not represent a certain village or
district, but the whole country, and it is the duty of everyone to
decide according to the general condition of circumstances all over
the country.
Mr. NAUDE: I am not indifferent in this matter, and I do not wish to
shirk my responsibility; on the contrary, I will gladly bear it. But I
am not here in the same position as a member of the Volksraad, who is
entrusted to deal with all matters. I have a definite commission to
submit the views of my burghers, and do not feel myself justified to
take upon myself the responsibility of deciding upon the surrender of
our independence.
General HERTZOG: Although I am not a delegate, I wish to state which
course I would pursue if I were one. The Delegate is here for the
people, and what he should ask himself is: Suppose that that portion
of the people which has delegated me was fully acquainted with the
situation in both Republics, how would that portion decide? That
appears to me to be the point upon which the Delegates must decide.
As regards the great question before us, I wish to be fair and view it
as clearly as possible from both sides. The one party says: "Stop the
war," and they continually ask on what grounds can the struggle be
continued? But I think it is for you, who say: "Stop the war," to
state your grounds. Those who wish to go on say: "We are at war; show
us why we are to stop." It is also asked what prospects have we if we
go on. This would have been a very good question when we commenced the
war. It is argued: We have grown weaker. On that I ask: "Has the
enemy not grown weaker too?" That is clearly the case, especially
financially. England has already spent over 200 million pounds, and
she can spend another 100 million. Yes, if the people wish it. But how
long will the people wish it? Have we not the right to assume that
England is already in difficulties financially? No one who is
acquainted with English history can do otherwise than feel the
significance of an imposition of a tax on wheat. That is not done
unless matters are serious. In 1831 there was a revolution over this
tax. It presses very severely on the people, and the people are
beginning to feel that they are incurring debt for which they will
have to suffer later.
With reference to the Deputation it is said: "They have been away two
years now, and have effected nothing yet; how can we still hope that
they will be able to effect something for our good?" But I say just
because they have already been two years in Europe, we are nearer the
time when a great war must break out. It is a known fact that the
nations are arming themselves more and more and building ships of war,
which is all done in preparation for the day when war will break out
in Europe. A year ago the Deputation sent us a telegram which amounted
to this: "Keep on." Why will the enemy not allow us to hear from our
Deputation? It would have taken the members of the Deputation only a
fortnight to come out and be with us. It is said that it would
constitute an irregular military procedure. But is this meeting not
also an irregular military procedure? I am thus forced to the
conclusion that there is something behind this refusal. We know who
the three members of the Deputation are. Mr. Fischer is a man who
fought against the war up to the last. He even went to the South
African Republic for that object. So is Mr. Wessels. They are both men
in whom you can place your full confidence; and have all their
interests, and large interests, in this country. Mr. Wolmarans I do
not know personally, but it is generally known that he is a man upon
whom you can depend. I am convinced of it, that these men will give
the fullest attention to our interests. If they saw that we were being
ruined by holding out, they would inform us to that effect. But they
let us continue. What their reasons are for doing so I do not know,
but I depend upon them.
I am open to conviction, and if I can be convinced that our struggle
is hopeless, I shall side with those who wish to give it up. There is
another aspect to the question; but let me first say that it grieves
me that on every public meeting the question of religion is touched
upon. It is continually said that this or that is God's finger. Now,
although I also have my belief, I say that neither you nor I know in
the least what is the finger of God! God has given each one of us
reason and a conscience, and if these lead us we need not follow
anything else.