_T. H._ The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy,
namely, that there is no such thing as an agent, which, when all things
requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it,
or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from
necessity; is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged.
For if it be an agent, it can work; and if it work, there is nothing
wanting of what is requisite to produce the action; and consequently the
cause of the action is sufficient; and if sufficient, then also
necessary, as hath been proved before.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “I wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole weight of
this controversy doth rest upon this proposition: ‘that there is no such
thing as an agent, which, when all things requisite to action are
present, can nevertheless forbear to act’; and yet bring nothing but
such poor bullrushes to support it. (_a_) ‘If it be an agent’, saith he,
‘it can work’; what of this? _A posse ad esse non valet argumentum_:
from _can work_ to _will work_, is a weak inference. And from _will
work_ to _doth work upon absolute necessity_, is another gross
inconsequence. He proceeds thus: ‘if it work, there is nothing wanting
of what is requisite to produce the action’. True, there wants nothing
to produce that which is produced; but there may want much to produce
that which was intended. One horse may pull his heart out, and yet not
draw the coach whither it should be, if he want the help or concurrence
of his fellows. ‘And consequently’, saith he, ‘the cause of the action
is sufficient’. Yes, sufficient to do what it doth, though perhaps with
much prejudice to itself; but not always sufficient to do what it should
do, or what it would do. As he that begets a monster, should beget a
man, and would beget a man if he could. The last link of his argument
follows: (_b_) ‘and if sufficient, then also necessary’. Stay there; by
his leave, there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and
efficiency; otherwise God himself should not be all-sufficient. Thus his
argument is vanished. But I will deal more favourably with him, and
grant him all that which he labours so much in vain to prove, that every
effect in the world hath sufficient causes; yea more, that supposing the
determination of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the
world is necessary. (_c_) But all this will not advantage his cause the
black of a bean: for still it amounts but to an hypothetical necessity,
and differs as much from that absolute necessity, which he maintains, as
a gentleman who travels for his pleasure, differs from a banished man,
or a free subject from a slave.”