(_a_) “His former proof, that all sufficient causes are necessary
causes, is answered before (No. XXXI).” When he shall have read my
animadversions upon that answer of his, he will think otherwise,
whatsoever he will confess.
(_b_) “And his two instances of casting ambs-ace, and of raining
to-morrow, are altogether impertinent to the question, for two reasons.”
His first reason is, “because”, saith he, “our present controversy is
concerning free actions, which proceed from the liberty of man’s will;
and both his instances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the
indetermination, or contingent concurrence of natural causes”. He knows
that this part of my discourse, which beginneth at No. XXV, is no
dispute with him at all, but a bare setting down of my opinion
concerning the natural necessity of all things; which is opposite, not
only to the liberty of will, but also to all contingence that is not
necessary. And therefore these instances were not impertinent to my
purpose; and if they be impertinent to his opinion of the liberty of
man’s will, he does impertinently to meddle with them. And yet for all
he pretends here, that the question is only about liberty of the will;
yet in his first discourse (No. XVI), he maintains that “the order,
beauty, and perfection of the world doth require that in the universe
should be agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some
contingent”. And my purpose here is to show by those instances, that
those things which we esteem most contingent are nevertheless necessary.
Besides, the controversy is not whether free actions which proceed from
the liberty of man’s will, be necessary or not; for I know no action
which proceedeth from the liberty of man’s will. But the question is,
whether those actions which proceed from the man’s will, be necessary.
The man’s will is something, but the liberty of his will is nothing.
Again, the question is not whether contingent actions which proceed from
the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes, (for
there is nothing that can proceed from indetermination), but whether
contingent actions be necessary before they be done; or whether the
concurrence of natural causes, when they happen to concur, were not
necessitated so to happen; or whether whatsoever chanceth, be not
necessitated so to chance. And that they are so necessitated, I have
proved already with such arguments as the Bishop, for aught I see,
cannot answer. For to say, as he doth, that “there are free actions
which proceed merely from election, without any outward necessitation,
is a truth so evident as that there is a sun in the heavens”, is no
proof. It is indeed as clear as the sun, that there are free actions
proceeding from election; but that there is election without any outward
necessitation, is dark enough.
(_c_) “Secondly, for mixed actions, which proceed from the concurrence
of free and natural agents, though they be not free, yet they are not
necessary, &c.” For proof of this he instanceth in a tile, that falling
from a house breaks a man’s head, neither necessarily nor freely, and
therefore contingently. Not necessarily, “for”, saith he, “he did freely
choose to go that way without any necessitation”. Which is as much as
taking the question itself for a proof. For what is else the question,
but whether a man be necessitated to choose what he chooseth? “Again”,
saith he, “it was not free, because he did not deliberate whether his
head should be broken or not”; and concludes “therefore it was
contingent; and by undoubted consequence, there are contingent actions
in the world which are not free”. This is true, and denied by none; but
he should have proved, that such contingent actions are not antecedently
necessary by a concurrence of natural causes; though a little before he
granteth they are. For whatsoever is produced by a concurrence of
natural causes, was antecedently determined in the cause of such
concurrence, though, as he calls it, contingent concurrence; not
perceiving that concurrence and contingent concurrence are all one, and
suppose a continued connection and succession of causes which make the
effect necessarily future. So that hitherto he hath proved no other
contingence than that which is necessary.
(_d_) “Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, &c, to think each
animal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity,
I see no ground for it.” It maketh nothing against the truth, that he
sees no ground for it. I have pointed out the ground in my former
discourse, and am not bound to find him eyes. He himself immediately
citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it, where Christ saith, _one of
these sparrows doth not fall to the ground without your heavenly
Father_; which place, if there were no more, were a sufficient ground
for the assertion of the necessity of all those changes of animal motion
in birds and other living creatures, which seem to us so uncertain. But
when a man is dizzy with _influence of power_, _elicit acts_,
_permissive will_, _hypothetical necessity_, and the like unintelligible
terms, the ground goes from him. By and by after he confesseth that
“many things are called contingent in respect of us, because we know not
the cause of them, which really and in themselves are not contingent,
but necessary”; and errs therein the other way; for he says in effect,
that many things are, which are not; for it is all one to say, they are
not contingent, and they are not. He should have said, there be many
things, the necessity of whose contingence we cannot or do not know.
(_e_) “But whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes
from the beginning, so as they must all have concurred as they have
done, &c, would require a further examination, if it were pertinent to
this question of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose
to have showed, &c.” If there be a necessary connexion of all natural
causes from the beginning, then there is no doubt but that all things
happen necessarily, which is that that I have all this while maintained.
But whether there be or no, he says, it requires a further examination.
Hitherto therefore he knows not whether it be true or no, and
consequently all his arguments hitherto have been of no effect, nor hath
he showed anything to prove, what he purposed, that elective actions are
not necessitated. And whereas a little before he says, that to my
arguments to prove that sufficient causes are necessary, he hath already
answered; it seemeth he distrusteth his own answer, and answers again to
the two instances of _casting ambs-ace_, and _raining or not raining
to-morrow_; but brings no other argument to prove the cast thrown not to
be necessarily thrown, but this, that he does not deliberate whether he
shall throw that cast or not. Which argument may perhaps prove that the
casting of it proceedeth not from free will, but proves not anything
against the antecedent necessity of it. And to prove that it is not
necessary that it should rain or not rain to-morrow; after telling us
that the Ethiopian rains cause the inundation of Nilus: that in some
eastern countries they have rain only twice a year, which the Scripture,
he saith, calleth _the former and the latter rain_; (I thought he had
known it by the experience of some travellers, but I see he only
gathereth it from that phrase in Scripture of _former and latter rain_);
I say, after he has told us this, to prove that it is not necessary it
should rain or not rain to-morrow he saith that “in our climate the
natural causes, celestial and sublunary, do not produce rain so
necessarily at set times, as in the eastern countries; neither can we
say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to-morrow, or it will not
rain to-morrow”. By this argument a man may take the height of the
Bishop’s logic. “In our climate the natural causes do not produce rain
so necessarily at set times, as in some eastern countries. Therefore
they do not produce rain necessarily in our climate, then when they do
produce it”. And again, “we cannot say so certainly and infallibly, it
will rain to-morrow or it will not rain to-morrow; therefore it is not
necessary either that it should rain, or that it should not rain
to-morrow”: as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof we know
not. Another reason, he saith, why my instances are impertinent, is
because “they extend only to an hypothetical necessity”, that is, that
the necessity is not in the antecedent causes; and thereupon challengeth
me for the credit of my cause to name some reason, “how the caster was
necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force to the
cast, and neither more nor less; or what necessity there was why the
caster must throw into that table rather than the other, or that the
dice must fall just upon that part of the table, before the cast was
thrown”. Here again, from our ignorance of the particular causes that
concurring make the necessity he inferreth, that there was no such
necessity at all; which indeed is that which hath in all this question
deceived him, and all other men that attribute events to fortune. But I
suppose he will not deny that event to be necessary, where all the
causes of the cast, and their concurrence, and the cause of that
concurrence are foreknown, and might be told him, though I cannot tell
him. Seeing therefore God foreknows them all, the cast was necessary;
and that from antecedent causes from eternity; which is no hypothetical
necessity.
And whereas to my argument to prove, that ‘raining to-morrow if it shall
then rain, and not raining to-morrow if it shall then not rain’, was
therefore necessary, because ‘otherwise this disjunctive proposition, it
shall rain or not rain to-morrow, is not necessary’, he answereth that
“a conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the
proposition be true; as, if the sun shine it is day, is a true
proposition at midnight”: what has a conjunct proposition to do with
this in question, which is disjunctive? Or what be the parts of this
proposition, _if the sun shine, it is day_? It is not made of two
propositions, as a disjunctive is; but is one simple proposition,
namely, this, _the shining of the sun is day_. Either he has no logic at
all, or thinks they have no reason at all that are his readers. But he
has a trick, he saith, to abate the edge of the disjunction, by varying
ther proposition thus, “I know that _it will rain to-morrow_, or _that
it will not rain to-morrow_, is a true proposition”; and yet saith he,
“it is neither true that I know it will rain to-morrow, neither is it
true that I know it will not rain to-morrow”. What childish deceit, or
childish ignorance is this; when he is to prove that neither of the
members is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition, to bring for
instance a proposition not disjunctive? It had been disjunctive if it
had gone thus, _I know that it will rain to-morrow, or I know that it
will not rain to-morrow_; but then he had certainly known determinately
one of the two.
(_f_) “And therefore to say, either this or that will infallibly be, but
it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be, is no such
senseless assertion that it deserved a _tytyrice tupatulice_”. But it is
a senseless assertion, whatsoever it deserve, to say that this
proposition, it shall rain or not rain, is true _indeterminedly_, and
neither of them true _determinedly_; and little better, as he hath now
qualified it, “that it will infallibly be, though it be not yet
determined whether it shall be or no”.
(_g_) “If all this will not satisfy him, I will give him one of his own
kinds of proof, that is, an instance. That which necessitates all
things, according to T. H. is the decree of God, &c.” His instance is,
“that God himself made this necessitating decree, and therefore this
decree, being an act _ad extra_, was freely made by God, without any
necessitation”. I do believe the Bishop himself believeth that all the
decrees of God have been from all eternity, and therefore he will not
stand to this, that God’s decrees were ever made; for whatsoever hath
been made, hath had a beginning. Besides, God’s decree is his will; and
the Bishop hath said formerly, that the will of God is God, the justice
of God, God, &c. If therefore God made a decree, according to the
Bishop’s opinion God made himself. By which we may see, what fine stuff
it is that proceedeth from disputing of incomprehensibles. Again he
says, “if it had been the good pleasure of God, he might have made some
causes free from necessity; seeing that it neither argues any
imperfection, nor implies any contradiction”. If God had made either
causes or effects free from necessity, he had made them free from his
own prescience; which had been imperfection. Perhaps he will say, that
in these words of his, _the decree, being an act ad extra, was freely
made by God_, I take no notice of that _act ad extra_, as being too hot
for my fingers. Therefore now I take notice of it, and say that it is
neither Latin, nor English, nor sense.