_T. H._ Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is to say,
in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that
which we call the will, and is immediately before the doing of the
action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other
appetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his
deliberation, are usually called intentions and inclinations, but not
wills; there being but one will, which also in this case may be called
last will, though the intention change often.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ (_a_) “Still here is nothing but confusion; he confounds the
faculty of the will with the act of volition; he makes the will to be
the last part of deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most
proper and elicit act of the will, or a willing of the end, as it is to
be attained by certain means, to be no willing at all, but only some
antecedaneous _inclination_ or propension. He might as well say, that
the uncertain agitation of the needle hither and thither to find out the
pole, and the resting or fixing of itself directly towards the pole,
were both the same thing. But the grossest mistake is, that he will
acknowledge no act of man’s will, to be his will, but only the last act,
which he calls the last will. If the first were no will, how comes this
to be the last will? According to his doctrine, the will of a man should
be as unchangeable as the will of God, at least so long as there is a
possibility to effect it. (_b_) According to this doctrine,
concupiscence with consent should be no sin; for that which is not truly
willed is not a sin; or rather should not be at all, unless either the
act followed, or were rendered impossible by some intervening
circumstances. According to this doctrine no man can say, this is my
will, because he knows not yet whether it shall be his last appeal. The
truth is, there be many acts of the will, both in respect of the means
and of the end. But that act which makes a man’s actions to be truly
free, is election; which is the deliberate choosing or refusing of this
or that means, or the acceptation of one means before another, where
divers are represented by the understanding.