(_a_) “Now again he tells us, that election is not opposite to either
necessitation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone
thrown upwards moves naturally, or that a woman can be ravished with her
own will. Consent takes away the rape,” &c. If that which I have told
him again, be false, why shows he not why it is false? Here is not one
word of argument against it. To say, I might have said as well that a
stone thrown upwards moves naturally, is no refutation, but a denial. I
will not dispute with him, whether a stone thrown up move naturally or
not. I shall only say to those readers whose judgments are not defaced
with the abuse of words, that as a stone moveth not upwards of itself,
but by the power of the external agent who giveth it a beginning of that
motion; so also when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the
power of some other agent, which, though it be imperceptible to the eye,
is not imperceptible to reason. But because this is not proper discourse
for the Bishop, and because I have elsewhere discoursed thereof
expressly, I shall say nothing of it here. And whereas he says, ‘consent
takes away the rape’; it may perhaps be true, and I think it is; but
here it not only inferreth nothing, but was also needless, and therefore
in a public writing is an indecent instance, though sometimes not
unnecessary in a spiritual court. In the next place, he wonders how “a
man is compelled, and yet free to do what he will”; that is to say, how
a man is made to will, and yet free to do what he will. If he had said,
he wondered how a man can be compelled to will, and yet be free to do
that which he would have done if he had not been compelled, it had been
somewhat; as it is, it is nothing. Again he says, “he who submits to an
enemy for saving his life, doth either only counterfeit, or else his
will is changed,” &c.: all which is true. But when he says he doth
counterfeit, he doth not insinuate that he may counterfeit lawfully; for
that would prejudice him hereafter, in case he should have need of
quarter. But how this maketh for him, or against me, I perceive not.
“There is a vast difference,” saith he, “between compelling and changing
the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by
varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise;
but compelled it cannot be,” &c. I say the same; the will cannot be
compelled; but the man may be, and is then compelled, when his will is
changed by the fear of force, punishment, or other hurt from God or man.
And when his will is changed, there is a new will formed, (whether it be
by God or man), and that necessarily; and consequently the actions that
flow from that will, are both voluntary, free, and necessary,
notwithstanding that he was compelled to do them. Which maketh not for
the Bishop, but for me.
(_b_) “Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixed actions, that is
partly voluntary, partly involuntary, &c. So supposing a man were not in
that distress, they are involuntary.” That some actions are partly
voluntary, partly involuntary, is not a new, but a false opinion. For
one and the same action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. If
therefore parts of an action be actions, he says no more but that some
actions are voluntary, some involuntary; or that one multitude of
actions may be partly voluntary, partly involuntary. But that one action
should be partly voluntary, partly involuntary, is absurd. And it is the
absurdity of those authors which he unwarily gave credit to. But to say,
supposing the man had not been in distress, that then the action had
been involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a man’s goods into the
sea, supposing he had not been in a storm, had been an involuntary
action; which is also an absurdity; for he would not have done it, and
therefore it had been no action at all. And this absurdity is his own.
(_c_) “His other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose
whether he will be haled thither upon the ground or walk upon his feet,
is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it
pleaseth them who have him in their power.” It is enough for the use I
make of that instance, that a man when in the necessity of going to
prison, though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being prisoner in the
jail, may nevertheless deliberate sometimes, whether he shall walk or be
haled thither.
(_d_) “Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that
other passions do necessitate as much as fear. But he errs doubly,” &c.
First, he says, I err in this, that I say that fear determines the
rational will naturally and necessarily. And first, I answer, that I
never used that term of rational will. There is nothing rational but
God, angels, and men. The will is none of these. I would not have
excepted against this expression, but that every where he speaketh of
the will and other faculties as of men, or spirits in men’s bellies.
Secondly, he offereth nothing to prove the contrary. For that which
followeth: “the last and greatest of five terrible things is death; yet
the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to a dishonest
action; the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three
children to worship an idol, nor the fear of the lions necessitate
Daniel to omit his duty to God,” &c.: I grant him that the greatest of
five (or of fifteen, for he had no more reason for five than fifteen)
terrible things doth not always necessitate a man to do a dishonest
action, and that the fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the
three children, nor the lions Daniel, to omit their duty; for somewhat
else, namely, their confidence in God, did necessitate them to do their
duty. That the fear of God’s wrath doth expel corporeal fear, is well
said, and according to the text he citeth: and proveth strongly, that
fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man a courage to endure
the lesser evil.
(_e_) “_Da veniam imperator; tu carcerem, ille gehennam
minatur_:--Excuse me, O Emperor; thou threatenest men with prison, but
God threatens me with hell.” This sentence, and that which he saith No.
XVII, that neither the civil judge is the proper judge, nor the law of
the land is the proper rule of sin, and divers other sayings of his to
the same effect, make it impossible for any nation in the world to
preserve themselves from civil wars. For all men living equally
acknowledging, that the High and Omnipotent God is to be obeyed before
the greatest emperors; every one may pretend the commandment of God to
justify his disobedience. And if one man pretendeth that God commands
one thing, and another man that he commands the contrary, what equity is
there to allow the pretence of one more than of another? Or what peace
can there be, if they be all allowed alike? There will therefore
necessarily arise discord and civil war, unless there be a judge agreed
upon, with authority given to him by every one of them, to show them and
interpret to them the Word of God; which interpreter is always the
emperor, king, or other sovereign person, who therefore ought to be
obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that to shew us and interpret to us the
Word of God, belongeth to the clergy; wherein I cannot consent unto him.
Excuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me with that you cannot do; but the
emperor threateneth me with death, and is able to do what he
threateneth.
(_f_) “Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great
difference, as to this case of justifying or not justifying an action,
between force and fear, &c. Force doth not only lessen the sin, but
takes it quite away, &c.” I know not to what point of my answer this
reply of his is to be applied. I had said, the actions of men compelled
are, nevertheless, voluntary. It seems that he calleth _compulsion_
force; but I call it a fear of force, or of damage to be done by force,
by which fear a man’s will is framed to somewhat to which he had no will
before. Force taketh away the sin, because the action is not his that is
forced, but his that forceth. It is not always so in compulsion;
because, in this case, a man electeth the _less evil_ under the notion
of _good_. But his instances of the betrothed damsel that was forced,
and of Tamar, may, for anything there appeareth in the text, be
instances of compulsion, and yet the damsel and Tamar be both innocent.
In that which immediately followeth, concerning how far fear may
extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answered. I perceive in it he
hath some glimmering of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It is
true, that just fear dispenseth not with the precepts of God or nature;
for they are not dispensable; but it extenuateth the fault, not by
diminishing anything in the action, but by being no transgression. For
if the fear be allowed, the action it produceth is allowed also. Nor
doth it dispense in any case with the law positive, but by making the
action itself lawful; for the breaking of a law is always sin. And it is
certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive
precepts, though with the loss of their lives, unless the right that a
man hath to preserve himself make it, in case of a just fear, to be no
law. “The omission of circumcision was no sin,” he says, “whilst the
Israelites were travelling through the wilderness.” It is very true, but
this has nothing to do with compulsion. And the cause why it was no sin,
was this: they were ready to obey it, whensoever God should give them
leisure and rest from travel, whereby they might be cured; or at least
when God, that daily spake to their conductor in the desert, should
appoint him to renew that sacrament.
(_g_) “I will propose a case to him,” &c. The case is this. A servant is
robbed of his master’s money by the highway, but is acquitted because he
was forced. Another servant spends his master’s money in a tavern. Why
is he not acquitted also, seeing he was necessitated? “Would,” saith he,
“T. H. admit of this excuse?” I answer, no: but I would do that to him,
which should necessitate him to behave himself better another time, or
at least necessitate another to behave himself better by his example.
(_h_) “He talks much of _the motives to do, and the motives to forbear_,
how they work upon and determine a man; as if a reasonable man were no
more than a tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the rackets of the
second causes,” &c. May not great things be produced by second causes,
as well as little; and a foot-ball as well as a tennis-ball? But the
Bishop can never be driven from this, that the will hath power to move
itself; but says it is all one to say, that “an agent can determine
itself,” and that “the will is determined by motives extrinsical”. He
adds, that “if there be no necessitation before the judgment of right
reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent nor
extrinsical necessitation at all”. I say indeed, the effect is not
produced before the last dictate of the understanding; but I say not,
that the necessity was not before; he knows I say, it is from eternity.
When a cannon is planted against a wall, though the battery be not made
till the bullet arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while the
bullet was going to it, if the wall stood still: and if it slipped away,
the hitting of somewhat else was necessary, and that antecedently.
(_i_) “All the world knows, that when the agent is determined by
himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause.” Yes, when
the agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined
likewise in its cause; and so anything else is what he will have it. But
nothing is determined by itself, nor is there any man in the world that
hath any conception answerable to those words. But “motives,” he says,
“determine not naturally, but morally”. This also is insignificant; for
all motion is natural or supernatural. Moral motion is a mere word,
without any imagination of the mind correspondent to it. I have heard
men talk of a motion in a court of justice; perhaps this is it which he
means by moral motion. But certainly, when the tongue of the judge and
the hands of the clerks are thereby moved, the motion is natural, and
proceeds from natural causes; which causes also were natural motions of
the tongue of the advocate. And whereas he adds, that if this were true,
then “not only motives, but reason itself and deliberation were vain”;
it hath been sufficiently answered before, that therefore they are not
vain, because by them is produced the effect. I must also note, that
oftentimes in citing my opinion he puts in instead of mine, those terms
of his own, which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity; as
here he makes me to say, that which I did never say, “special influence
of extrinsical causes”.
(_k_) “He saith, that ‘the ignorance of the true causes and their power,
is the reason why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we
seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity.’ No
such thing, but just the contrary.” If he understand the authors which
he readeth upon this point, no better than he understands what I have
here written, it is no wonder he understandeth not the truth of the
question. I said not, that when we consider the causes of things, but
when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge
necessity. “No such thing,” says the Bishop, “but just the contrary; the
more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the
liberty,” &c. Is there any doubt, if a man could foreknow, as God
foreknows, that which is hereafter to come to pass, but that he would
also see and know the causes which shall bring it to pass, and how they
work, and make the effect necessary? For necessary it is, whatsoever God
foreknoweth. But we that foresee them not, may consider as much as we
will, and understand as clearly as we will, but are never the nearer to
the knowledge of their necessity; and that, I said, was the cause why we
impute those events to liberty, and not to causes.
(_l_) “Lastly, he tells us, that _the will doth choose of necessity, as
well as the fire burns of necessity_. If he intend no more but this,
that election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burning is
of the fire &c., he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for the
question is not now of the elective power, _in actu primo_, &c.” Here
again he makes me to speak nonsense. I said, “the man chooseth of
necessity”; he says I say, “the will chooseth of necessity”. And why:
but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, and say as he does
here, that “election is the act of the will”. No: election is the act of
a man, as power to elect is the power of a man. Election and will are
all one act of a man; and the power to elect, and the power to will, one
and the same power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded by the use of
calling by the name of will, the power of willing in the future; as they
also were confounded, that first brought in this senseless term of
_actus primus_. My meaning is, that the election I shall have of
anything hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire, that now is
and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it
hereafter: or to use his own terms, the will hath no more power to
suspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its
burning: or rather more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend
his will, than the fire to suspend its burning. Which is contrary to
that which he would have, namely, that a man should have power to refuse
what he wills, and to suspend his own appetite. For to refuse what one
willeth, implieth a contradiction; the which also is made much more
absurd by his expression. For he saith, the will hath power to refuse
what it wills, and to suspend its own appetite: whereas _the will_, and
_the willing_, and _the appetite_ is the same thing. He adds that “even
the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all
particular circumstances, is not so necessary an action as T. H.
imagineth”. He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine. For I
imagine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence, I
may truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; and of that which shall
not burn then, (for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter
thrown into it, as in the case of the three children), that it is
necessary it shall not burn.
(_m_) “Two things are required to make an effect necessary: first that
it be produced by a necessary cause, &c.: secondly, that it be
necessarily produced, &c.” To this I say nothing, but that I understand
not how a cause can be necessary, and the effect not be necessarily
produced.
(_n_) “My second reason against this distinction of liberty from
compulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and demonstrates
clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity, is to
compel the will, so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that
he who doth necessitate the will to evil after that manner, is the true
cause of evil, &c.” By this second reason, which he says _is new, and
demonstrates_, &c, I cannot find what reason he means. For there are but
two, whereof the latter is in these words: “Secondly, to rip up the
bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the
Schools; there is a double act of the will; the one more remote, called
_imperatus_, &c.; the other act is nearer, called _actus elicitus_,” &c.
But I doubt whether this be it he means, or no. For this being the
resolution of the Schools, is not new; and being a distinction only, is
no demonstration; though perhaps he may use the word demonstration, as
every unlearned man now-a-days does, to signify any argument of his own.
As for the distinction itself, because the terms are Latin, and never
used by any author of the Latin tongue, to shew their impertinence I
expounded them in English, and left them to the reader’s judgment to
find the absurdity of them himself. And the Bishop in this part of his
reply endeavours to defend them. And first, he calls it a trivial and
grammatical objection, to say they are _improper_ and _obscure_. Is
there anything less beseeming a _divine_ or a _philosopher_, than to
speak _improperly_ and _obscurely_, where the truth is in question?
Perhaps it may be tolerable in one that divineth, but not in him that
pretendeth to demonstrate. It is not the universal current of divines
and philosophers, that giveth words their authority, but the generality
of them who acknowledge that they understand them. _Tyrant_ and
_præmunire_, though their signification be changed, yet they are
understood; and so are the names of the days, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday.
And when English readers not engaged in School divinity, shall find
_imperate_ and _elicit acts_ as intelligible as those, I will confess I
had no reason to find fault.
But my braving against that famous and most necessary distinction,
between the elicit and imperate acts of the will, he says was only to
hide from the eyes of the reader a tergiversation in not answering this
argument of his; ‘he who doth necessitate the will to evil, is the true
cause of evil; but God is not the cause of evil; therefore he does not
necessitate the will to evil’. This argument is not to be found in this
No. XX., to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the will was
compelled. But he, taking all necessitation for compulsion, doth now in
this place, from necessitation simply, bring in this inference
concerning the cause of evil, and thinks he shall force me to say that
God is the cause of sin. I shall say only what is said in the Scripture,
_non est malum, quod ego non feci_. I shall say what Micaiah saith to
Ahab, (1 Kings xxii. 23): _Behold, the Lord hath put a lying spirit into
the mouth of all these thy prophets_. I shall say that that is true,
which the prophet David saith (2 Sam. xvi. 10): _Let him curse; because
the Lord hath said unto him, curse David_. But that which God himself
saith of himself (1 Kings xii. 15): _The king hearkened not to the
people, for the cause was from the Lord_: I will not say, least the
Bishop exclaim against me; but leave it to be interpreted by those that
have authority to interpret the Scriptures. I say further, that to cause
sin is not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not subject to some
higher power; but to use so unseemly a phrase, as to say that God is the
cause of sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth, I
can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his. Luther says,
_we act necessarily; necessarily by necessity of immutability, not by
necessity of constraint_: that is in plain English, necessarily, but not
against our wills. Zanchius says, (_Tract. Theol._ cap. VI. Thes. I.):
_The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, that there is no
necessity of our sinning; but in this, that there is no constraint_.
Bucer (_Lib. de Concordia_): _Whereas the Catholics say, man has free
will, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom
from necessity_. Calvin (_Inst._ cap. II. sec. VI.): _And thus shall man
be said to have free will, not because he hath equal freedom to do good
and evil, but because he does the evil he does, not by constraint, but
willingly_. Monsr. du Moulin, in his _Buckler of the Faith_ (art. IX):
_The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the will.
Witness the devils, who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely
without constraint._ And the Synod of Dort: _Liberty is not opposite to
all kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed opposite to the
necessity of constraint: but standeth well enough with the necessity of
infallibility._ I could add more: for all the famous doctors of the
Reformed Churches, and with them St. Augustin, are of the same opinion.
None of these denied that God is the cause of all motion and action, or
that God is the cause of all laws; and yet they were never forced to
say, that God is the cause of sin.
(_o_) “‘They who invented this term of _actus imperatus_, understood
not’, he saith, ‘any thing what it signified.’ No? Why not? It seemeth
to me, they understood it better than those who except against it. They
knew there are _mental terms_, which are only conceived in the mind, as
well as _vocal terms_, which are expressed with the tongue, &c.” In this
place the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in
philosophy, which is this; that he thinketh, when he repeateth the words
of a proposition in his mind, that is, when he fancieth the words
without speaking them, that then he conceiveth the things which the
words signify: and this is the most general cause of false opinions. For
men can never be deceived in the conceptions of things, though they may
be, and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or
appellations, different from those which are commonly used and
constituted to signify their conceptions. And therefore they that study
to attain the certain knowledge of the truth, do use to set down
beforehand all the terms they are to express themselves by, and declare
in what sense they shall use them constantly. And by this means, the
reader having an idea of every thing there named, cannot conceive amiss.
But when a man from the hearing of a word hath no idea of the thing
signified, but only of the sound and of the letters whereof the word is
made, which is that he here calleth _mental terms_, it is impossible he
should conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; as he
doth here, when he says, “that when Tarquin delivered his commands to
his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, he did it by
_mental terms_”; as if to strike off the head of a poppy, were a mental
term. It is the sound and the letters, that maketh him think _elicitus_
and _imperatus_ somewhat. And it is the same thing that makes him say,
for think it he cannot, that to will or choose, is drawn, or allured, or
fetched out of the power to will. For drawing cannot be imagined but of
bodies; and therefore to will, to speak, to write, to dance, to leap, or
any way to be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be _drawn_, much
less to be drawn out of a power, that is to say, out of an ability; for
whatsoever is drawn out, is drawn out of one place into another. He that
can discourse in this manner in philosophy, cannot probably be thought
able to discourse rationally in any thing.
(_p_) “His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the
will into _elicit_ and _imperate_, is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith
he, ‘have been as easily said in English, _a voluntary action_?’ Yes it
might have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor as properly.” He
says, _actus imperatus_ is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the
command of the will. I say, when a man opens and shuts his eyes
according to his will, that it is a voluntary action; and I believe we
mean one and the same thing. Whether of us speak more properly or more
truly, let the reader judge.
(_q_) “But his mistakes are so thick, &c., I will do my duty to shew him
the right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled,
are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, &c.” This is nothing but Tohu
and Bohu.