(_a_) “And though his answer consist more of oppositions than of
solutions, yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter
unweighed.”
It is a promise of great exactness, and like to that which is in his
Epistle to the Reader: “Here is all that passed between us upon this
subject, without any addition or the least variation from the original,”
&c.: which promises were both needless, and made out of gallantry; and
therefore he is the less pardonable in case they be not very rigidly
observed. I would therefore have the reader to consider, whether these
words of mine: “our Saviour bids us pray, _thy will_, not _our_ will,
_be done_, and by example teaches us the same; for he prayed thus:
_Father, if it be thy will let this cup pass_,” &c.: which seem at least
to imply that our prayers cannot change the will of God, nor divert him
from his eternal decree: have been weighed by him to a grain, according
to his promise. Nor hath he kept his other promise any better; for (No.
VIII.) replying to these words of mine, “if he had so little to do as to
be a spectator of the actions of bees and spiders, he would have
confessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in
them,” &c., he saith, “yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and
seeing their rare works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced
atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies”. This passage is
added to that which passed between us upon this subject; for it is not
in the copy which I have had by me, as himself confesseth, these eight
years; nor is it in the body of the copy he sent to the press, but only
in the margin, that is to say, added out of anger against me, whom he
would have men think to be one of the bold-faced atheists of this age.
In the rest of this reply he endeavoureth to prove, that it followeth
from my opinion, that there is no use of piety. My opinion is no more
than this, that a man cannot so determine to-day, the will which he
shall have to the doing of any action to-morrow, as that it may not be
changed by some external accident or other, as there shall appear more
or less advantage to make him persevere in the will to the same action,
or to will it no more. When a man intendeth to pay a debt at a certain
time, if he see that the detaining of the money for a little longer may
advantage himself, and seeth no other disadvantage equivalent likely to
follow upon the detention, he hath his will changed by the advantage,
and therefore had not determined his will himself; but when he foreseeth
discredit or perhaps imprisonment, then his will remaineth the same, and
is determined by the thoughts he hath of his creditor, who is therefore
an external cause of the determination of the debtor’s will. This is so
evident to all men living, though they never studied school-divinity,
that it will be very strange if he draw from it the great impiety he
pretends to do. Again, my opinion is only this: that whatsoever God
foreknows shall come to pass, it cannot possibly be that that shall not
come to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to pass, that is
said by all men to come to pass necessarily; therefore all events that
God foreknows shall come to pass, shall come to pass necessarily. If
therefore the Bishop draw impiety from this, he falleth into the impiety
of denying God’s prescience. Let us see now how he reasoneth.
(_b_) “First, he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the
estimation of the judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the
devils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians; for they
esteem God’s power to be infinite, and tremble?”
I said, that two things concurred to _piety_; one, to esteem his power
as highly as is possible; the other, that we signify that estimation by
our words and actions, that is to say, that we worship him. This latter
part of piety he leaveth out; and then, it is much more easy to conclude
as he doth, that the devils may have inward piety. But neither so doth
the conclusion follow. For goodness is one of God’s powers, namely, that
power by which he worketh in men the hope they have in him; and is
relative; and therefore, unless the devil think that God will be good to
him, he cannot esteem him for his goodness. It does not therefore follow
from any opinion of mine, that the devil may have as much inward piety
as a Christian. But how does the Bishop know how the devils esteem God’s
power; and what devils does he mean? There are in the Scripture two
sorts of things, which are in English translated devils. One, is that
which is called Satan, Diabolus, and Abaddon, which signifies in
English, an _enemy_, an _accuser_, and a _destroyer_ of the Church of
God. In which sense, the devils are but wicked men. How then is he sure
that they esteem God’s power to be infinite? For, _trembling_ infers no
more than that they apprehend it to be greater than their own. The other
sort of devils are called in the Scripture _dæmonia_, which are the
feigned Gods of the heathen, and are neither bodies nor spiritual
substances, but mere fancies, and fictions of terrified hearts, feigned
by the Greeks and other heathen people, and which St. Paul calleth
_nothings_; for an idol, saith he, is nothing. Does the Bishop mean,
that these nothings esteem God’s power to be infinite and tremble? There
is nothing that has a real being, but God, and the world, and the parts
of the world; nor has anything a feigned being, but the fictions of
men’s brains. The world and the parts thereof are corporeal, endued with
the dimensions of quantity, and with figure. I should be glad to know,
in what classes of entities which is a word that schoolmen use, the
Bishop ranketh these devils, that so much esteem God’s power, and yet
not love him nor hope in him, if he place them not in the rank of those
men who are enemies to the people of God, as the Jews did.
(_c_) “Secondly, he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to
God, but only the glory of his power or omnipotence. What shall become
of all other the Divine attributes, and particularly of his goodness, of
his truth, of his justice, of his mercy,” &c.
He speaketh of God’s goodness and mercy, as if they were no part of his
power. Is not goodness, in him that is good, the power to make himself
beloved, and is not mercy goodness? Are not, therefore, these attributes
contained in the attribute of his omnipotence? And justice in God, is it
anything else, but the power he hath, and exerciseth in distributing
blessings and afflictions? Justice is not in God as in man, the
observation of the laws made by his superiors. Nor is wisdom in God, a
logical examination of the means by the end, as it is in men; but an
incomprehensible attribute given to an incomprehensible nature, for to
honour him. It is the Bishop that errs, in thinking nothing to be power
but riches and high place, wherein to domineer and please himself, and
vex those that submit not to his opinions.
(_d_) “Thirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity destroys the truth of
God, making him to command one thing openly, and to necessitate another
privately, &c. It destroys the goodness of God, making him to be a hater
of mankind, &c. It destroys the justice of God, making him to punish the
creatures for that which was his own act, &c. It destroys the very power
of God, making him to be the true author of all the defects and evils
which are in the world.”
If the opinion of absolute necessity do all this, then the opinion of
God’s prescience does the same; for God foreknoweth nothing, that can
possibly not come to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to
pass, cometh to pass of necessity. But how doth necessity destroy the
truth of God, by commanding and hindering what he commandeth? Truth
consisteth in affirmation and negation, not in commanding and hindering;
it does not therefore follow, if all things be necessary that come to
pass, that therefore God hath spoken an untruth; nor that he professeth
one thing, and intendeth another. The Scripture, which is his word, is
not the profession of what he intendeth, but an indication of what those
men shall necessarily intend, whom he hath chosen to salvation, and whom
he hath determined to destruction. But on the other side, from the
negation of necessity, there followeth necessarily the negation of God’s
prescience; which is in the Bishop, if not ignorance, impiety. Or how
“destroyeth it the goodness of God, or maketh him to be a hater of
mankind, and to delight in the torments of his creatures, whereas the
very dogs licked the sores of Lazarus in pity and commiseration of him”?
I cannot imagine, when living creatures of all sorts are often in
torments as well as men, that God can be displeased with it: without his
will, they neither are nor could be at all tormented. Nor yet is he
delighted with it; but health, sickness, ease, torments, life and death,
are without all passion in him dispensed by him; and he putteth an end
to them then when they end, and a beginning when they begin, according
to his eternal purpose, which cannot be resisted. That the necessity
argueth a delight of God in the torments of his creatures, is even as
true, as that it was pity and commiseration in the dogs that made them
lick the sores of Lazarus. Or how doth the opinion of necessity “destroy
the justice of God, or make him to punish the creatures for that which
was his own act”? If all afflictions be punishments, for whose act are
all other creatures punished which cannot sin? Why may not God make the
affliction, both of those men that he hath elected, and also of those
whom he hath reprobated, the necessary causes of the conversion of those
he hath elected; their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements,
and the afflictions of the rest as examples? But he may perhaps think it
no injustice to punish the creatures that cannot sin with temporary
punishments, when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same
creatures eternally. This may be somewhat to meekness and cruelty, but
nothing at all to justice and injustice: for in punishing the innocent,
the injustice is equal, though the punishments be unequal. And what
cruelty can be greater than that which may be inferred from this opinion
of the Bishop; that God doth torment eternally, and with the extremest
degree of torment, all those men which have sinned, that is to say, all
mankind from the creation to the end of the world which have not
believed in Jesus Christ, whereof very few, in respect of the multitude
of others, have so much as heard of his name; and this, when faith in
Christ is the gift of God himself, and the hearts of all men in his
hands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to
believe? He hath no reason therefore, for his part, to tax any opinion,
for ascribing to God either cruelty or injustice. Or how doth it
“destroy the power of God, or make him to be the author of all the
defects and evils which are in the world”? First, he seemeth not to
understand what _author_ signifies. _Author_, is he which owneth an
action, or giveth a warrant to do it. Do I say, that any man hath in the
Scripture, which is all the warrant we have from God for any action
whatsoever, a warrant to commit theft, murder, or any other sin? Does
the opinion of necessity infer that there is such a warrant in the
Scripture? Perhaps he will say, no, but that this opinion makes him the
cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all
actions? And are not sins of commission actions? Is murder no action?
And does not God himself say, _non est malum in civitate quod ego non
feci_; and was murder not one of those evils? Whether it were or not, I
say no more but that God is the cause, not the author, of all actions
and motions. Whether sin be the action, or the defect, or the
irregularity, I mean not to dispute. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that
the distinction of _causes_ into _efficient_ and _deficient_ is _bohu_,
and signifies nothing.
(_e_) “How shall a man praise God for his goodness, who believes him to
be a greater tyrant than ever was in the world; who creates millions to
burn eternally without their fault, to express his power?”
If _tyrant_ signify, as it did when it came first in use, a king, it is
no dishonour to believe that God is a greater tyrant than ever was in
the world; for he is the King of all kings, emperors, and commonwealths.
But if we take the word, as it is now used, to signify those kings only,
which they that call them tyrants, are displeased with, that is, that
govern not as they would have them, the Bishop is nearer the calling him
a tyrant, than I am; making that to be tyranny, which is but the
exercise of an absolute power; for he holdeth, though he see it not, by
consequence, in withdrawing the will of man from God’s dominion, that
every man is a king of himself. And if a man cannot praise God for his
goodness, who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault;
how can the Bishop praise God for his goodness, who thinks he hath
created millions of millions to burn eternally, when he could have kept
them so easily from committing any fault? And to his “how shall a man
hear the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which
is requisite, who believeth that God causeth his gospel to be preached
to the much greater part of Christians, not with any intention that they
should be converted and saved,” &c.; I answer, that those men who so
believe, have faith in Jesus Christ, or they have not faith in him. If
they have, then shall they, by that faith, hear the word of God with
that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite to
salvation. And for them that have no faith, I do not think he asketh how
they shall hear the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and
faith, which is requisite; for he knows they shall not, until such time
as God shall have given them faith. Also he mistakes, if he think that I
or any other Christian believe, that God intendeth, by hardening any
man’s heart, to make that man inexcusable, but to make his elect the
more careful.
Likewise to his question, “how shall a man receive the sacrament with
comfort, who believeth that so many millions are positively excluded
from the benefit of Christ’s passion, before they had done either good
or evil”; I answer as before, _by faith_, if he be of God’s elect; if
not, he shall not receive the sacrament with comfort. I may answer also,
that the faithful man shall receive the sacrament with comfort, by the
same way that the bishop receiveth it with comfort. For he also
believeth that many millions are excluded from the benefit of Christ’s
passion, (whether positively or not positively is nothing to the
purpose, nor doth positively signify any thing in this place); and that,
so long before they had either done good or evil, as it was known to God
before they were born that they were so excluded.
To his “how shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who
apprehendeth that eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of
damnation, but because God would damn a man, therefore he necessitates
him”: I answer, that he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, does not
believe that God necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily, because
he would damn him; for neither does he think he eats and drinks
unworthily, nor that God intends to damn him; for he believeth no such
damnation, nor intendeth any preparation. The belief of damnation is an
article of Christian faith; so is also preparation to the sacrament. It
is therefore a vain question, how he that hath no faith shall prepare
himself with care and conscience to the receiving of the sacrament. But
to the question, how they shall prepare themselves, that shall at all
prepare themselves; I answer, it shall be by faith, when God shall give
it them.
To his “how shall a man make a free vow to God, who thinks himself able
to perform nothing, but as he is extrinsically necessitated”: I answer,
that if he make a vow, it is a free vow, or else it is no vow; and yet
he may know, when he hath made that vow, though not before, that it was
extrinsically necessitated; for the necessity of vowing before he vowed,
hindered not the _freedom_ of his vow, but made it.
Lastly, to “how shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who
thinks himself to be like a watch which is wound up by God,” &c.: I
answer, though he think himself necessitated to what he shall do, yet,
if he do not think himself necessitated and wound up to impenitence,
there will follow upon his opinion of necessity no impediment to his
repentance. The Bishop disputeth not against me, but against somebody
that holds a man may repent, that believes at the same time he cannot
repent.
(_f_) “Observe what a description he has given us here of repentance:
‘It is a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out
of the way.’ It amazed me to find _gladness_ to be the first word in the
description of repentance.”
I could never be of opinion that Christian repentance could be ascribed
to them, that had as yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead
a new life. He that grieves for the evil that hath happened to him for
his sins, but hath not a resolution to obey God’s commandments better
for the time to come, grieveth for his sufferings, but not for his
doings; which no divine, I think, will call Christian repentance. But he
that resolveth upon amendment of life, knoweth that there is forgiveness
for him in Christ Jesus; whereof a Christian cannot possibly be but
glad. Before this gladness there was a grief preparative to repentance,
but the repentance itself was not Christian repentance till this
conversion, till this glad conversion. Therefore I see no reason why it
should amaze him to find gladness to be the first word in the
description of repentance, saving that the light amazeth such as have
been long in darkness. And “for the fasting, sackcloth, and ashes”, they
were never parts of repentance perfected, but signs of the beginning of
it. They are external things; repentance is internal. This doctrine
pertaineth to the establishing of Romish penance; and being found to
conduce to the power of the clergy, was by them wished to be restored.
(_g_) “It is a returning; but whose act is this returning? If it be
God’s alone, then it is his repentance, not man’s repentance; what need
the penitent person trouble himself about it?”
This is ill argued; for why is it God’s repentance, when he gives man
repentance, more than it is God’s faith, when he gives man faith. But he
labours to bring in a concurrence of man’s will with God’s will; and a
power in God to give repentance, if man will take it; but not the power
to make him take it. This concurrence he thinks is proved by Revel. iii.
19, 20: “Be zealous, and repent. Behold, I stand at the door, and knock.
If any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him”.
Here is nothing of concurrence, nor of anything equivalent to it, nor
mention at all of the will or purpose, but of the calling or voice by
the minister. And as God giveth to the minister a power of persuading,
so he giveth also many times a concurrence of the auditor with the
minister in being persuaded. Here is therefore somewhat equivalent to a
concurrence with the minister, that is, of man with man; but nothing of
the concurrence of man, whose will God frameth as he pleaseth, with God
that frameth it. And I wonder how any man can conceive, when God giveth
a man a will to do anything whatsoever, how that will, when it is not,
can concur with God’s will to make itself be.
The next thing he excepteth against is this, that I hold, (_h_) “that
prayer is not a cause, nor a means of God’s blessing, but only a
signification that we expect it from him.”
First, instead of my words, “a signification that we expect nothing but
from him,” he hath put “a signification that we expect it from him”.
There is much difference between my words and his, in the sense and
meaning; for in the one, there is honour ascribed to God, and humility
in him that prayeth; but in the other, presumption in him that prayeth,
and a detraction from the honour of God. When I say, prayer is not a
cause nor a means, I take _cause_ and _means_ in one and the same sense;
affirming that God is not moved by any thing that we do, but has always
one and the same eternal purpose, to do the same things that from
eternity he hath foreknown shall be done; and methinks there can be no
doubt made thereof. But the Bishop allegeth (2 Cor. i. 11): that “St.
Paul was helped by their prayers, and that the gift was bestowed upon
them by their means;” and (James v. 16): “The effectual and fervent
prayer of a righteous man availeth much”. In which places, the words
_means_, _effectual_, _availeth_, do not signify any causation; for no
man nor creature living can work any effect upon God, in whom there is
nothing, that hath not been in him eternally heretofore, nor that shall
not be in him eternally hereafter; but do signify the order in which God
hath placed men’s prayers and his own blessings. And not much after, the
Bishop himself saith, “prayer works not upon God, but us”. Therefore, it
is no cause of God’s will, in giving us his blessings, but is properly a
sign, not a procuration of his favour.
The next thing he replieth to is, that I make prayer to be a kind of
thanksgiving; to which he replies, “he might even as well tell me, that
when a beggar craves an alms, and when he gives thanks for it, it is all
one.” Why so? Does not a beggar move a man by his prayer, and sometime
worketh in him a compassion not without pain, and as the Scripture calls
it, a yearning of the bowels; which is not so in God, when we pray to
him? Our prayer to God is a duty; it is not so to man. Therefore, though
our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not necessary
it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty.
To the rest of his reply, in this No. XV, there needs no further answer.