[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Thirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the minds of
men, that there is no true liberty, and that all things come to pass
inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety. Who will
bewail his sins with tears? What will become of that grief, that zeal,
that indignation, that holy revenge, which the Apostle speaks of, if men
be once thoroughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did? A
man may grieve for that which he could not help; but he will never be
brought to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own
error, but from antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous
to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and
limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond, nor
come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which
are inevitable, or to confer those favours which are impossible? We
indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us: but this we know,
that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot
alter that which must be. In a word, the only reason why those persons,
who tread in this path of fatal destiny, do sometimes pray, or repent,
or serve God, is because the light of nature, and the strength of
reason, and the evidence of Scripture, do for that present transport
them from their ill-chosen grounds, and expel those stoical fancies out
of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither pray, nor repent, nor serve
God to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as
commonwealth, religion as well as policy.”
_T. H._ His third argument consisteth in other inconveniences which he
saith will follow, namely, impiety and negligence of religious duties,
repentance and zeal to God’s service. To which I answer, as to the rest,
that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the far greatest
part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men
whom either the study of acquiring wealth or preferments, or whom the
appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the
rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth
of things, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help
their piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer, I would
not have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your Lordship and he
will keep it private. Nevertheless, in very truth, the necessity of
events does not of itself draw with it any impiety at all. For piety
consisteth only in two things; one, that we honour God in our hearts,
which is, that we think of his power as highly as we can: for to honour
any thing, is nothing else but to think it to be of great power. The
other, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and actions,
which is called _cultus_ or worship of God. He therefore, that thinketh
that all things proceed from God’s eternal will, and consequently are
necessary, does he not think God omnipotent? does he not esteem of his
power as highly as is possible; which is to honour God as much as can be
in his heart? Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external
acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? Yet
is this external acknowledgment the same thing which we call worship. So
this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally and internally,
and therefore is far from destroying it. And for repentance, which is
nothing but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being
out of the way, though the cause that made him go astray were necessary,
yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again, though the
cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remain still
the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away
neither of those parts of repentance, grief for the error, nor joy for
the returning. And for prayer, whereas he saith that the necessity of
things destroys prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the
causes that move God’s will, his will being unchangeable, yet since we
find in God’s word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask
them, the motive to prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God, no
less than the blessings. And the prayer is decreed together in the same
decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is manifest, that
thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing passed; and that which is
passed, is sure and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks are in use
as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we should expect no new
benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but
thanksgiving for his blessings in general; and though it precede the
particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a
signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner as He,
not as we will. And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, “thy
will, not our will be done”; and by example teaches us the same; for he
prayed thus: _Father, if it be thy will, let this cup pass_, &c. The end
of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God
Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by Him only.
_J. D._ “I hope T. H. will be persuaded in time, that it is not the
coveteousness, or ambition, or sensuality, or sloth, or prejudice of his
readers, which render this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous, but
that it is, in its own nature, destructive to true godliness; (_a_) and
though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I
will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. (_b_) First,
he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the estimation of
the judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the devils should
have as much inward piety as the best Christians? For they esteem God’s
power to be infinite, and tremble. Though inward piety do suppose the
act of the understanding, yet it consisteth properly in the act of the
will, being that branch of justice which gives to God the honour which
is due unto him. Is there no love due to God, no faith, no hope? (_c_)
Secondly, he errs in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to God, but
only the glory of his power or omnipotence. What shall become of all
other the Divine attributes, and particularly of his goodness, of his
truth, of his justice, of his mercy, which beget a more true and sincere
honour in the heart than greatness itself? _Magnos facile laudamus,
bonos lubenter._ (_d_) Thirdly, this opinion of absolute necessity
destroys the truth of God, making him to command one thing openly, and
to necessitate another privately; to chide a man for doing that which he
hath determined him to do; to profess one thing, and to intend another.
It destroys the goodness of God, making him to be a hater of mankind,
and to delight in the torments of his creatures; whereas the very dogs
licked the sores of Lazarus, in pity and commiseration of him. It
destroys the justice of God, making him to punish the creatures for that
which was his own act, which they had no more power to shun, than the
fire hath power not to burn. It destroys the very power of God, making
him to be the true author of all the defects and evils which are in the
world. These are the fruits of impotence, not of omnipotence. He who is
the effective cause of sin, either in himself or in the creature, is not
almighty. There needs no other devil in the world to raise jealousies
and suspicions between God and his creatures, or to poison mankind with
an apprehension that God doth not love them, but only this opinion,
which was the office of the serpent (Gen. iii. 5). Fourthly, for the
outward worship of God; (_e_) how shall a man praise God for his
goodness, who believes him to be a greater tyrant than ever was in the
world; who creates millions to burn eternally, without their fault, to
express his power? How shall a man hear the word of God with that
reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, who believeth
that God causeth his gospel to be preached to the much greater part of
Christians, not with any intention that they should be converted and
saved, but merely to harden their hearts, and to make them inexcusable?
How shall a man receive the blessed sacrament with comfort and
confidence, as a seal of God’s love in Christ, who believeth that so
many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the
passions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil? How shall
he prepare himself with care and conscience, who apprehendeth that
eating and drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but,
because God would damn a man, therefor he necessitates him to eat and
drink unworthily? How shall a man make a free vow to God without gross
ridiculous hypocrisy, who thinks he is able to perform nothing but as he
is extrinsically necessitated? Fifthly, for repentance, how shall a man
condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a
watch which is wound up by God, and that he can go neither longer nor
shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he is ordered by God?
If God sets him right, he goes right; if God sets him wrong, he goes
wrong. How can a man be said to return into the right way, who never was
in any other way but that which God himself had chalked out for him?
What is his purpose to amend, who is destitute of all power, but as if a
man should purpose to fly without wings, or a beggar who hath not a
groat in his purse, purpose to build hospitals?
“We use to say, admit one absurdity, and a thousand will follow. To
maintain this unreasonable opinion of absolute necessity, he is
necessitated (but it is hypothetically, he might change his opinion if
he would) to deal with all ancient writers as the Goths did with the
Romans, who destroyed all their magnificent works, that there might
remain no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth.
Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions, nor one of
their definitions, nay, not one of their terms of art standing. (_f_)
Observe what a description he hath given us here of repentance: ‘it is a
glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the
way’. It amazed me to find _gladness_ to be the first word in the
description of repentance. His repentance is not that repentance, nor
his piety that piety, nor his prayer that kind of prayer, which the
Church of God in all ages hath acknowledged. Fasting, and sackcloth, and
ashes, and tears, and _humicubations_, used to be companions of
repentance. Joy may be a consequent of it, not a part of it. (_g_) It is
a _returning_: but whose act is this returning? Is it God’s alone, or
doth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of God? If it
be God’s alone, then it is his repentance, not man’s repentance. What
need the penitent person trouble himself about it? God will take care of
his own work. The Scriptures teach us otherwise, that God expects our
concurrence (Revel. iii. 19, 20): _Be zealous and repent: behold I stand
at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I
will come in to him_. It is a ‘glad returning into the right way’. Why
dare any man call that a wrong way, which God himself hath determined?
He that willeth and doth that which God would have him to will and to
do, is never out of his right way. It follows in his description, _after
the grief_, &c. It is true, a man may grieve for that which is
necessarily imposed upon him; but he cannot grieve for it as a fault of
his own, if it never was in his power to shun it. Suppose a
writingmaster shall hold his scholar’s hand in his, and write with it;
the scholar’s part is only to hold still his hand, whether the master
write well or ill; the scholar hath no ground either of joy or sorrow,
as for himself; no man will interpret it to be his act, but his
master’s. It is no fault to be out of the right way, if a man had not
liberty to have kept himself in the way.
“And so from _repentance_ he skips quite over _new obedience_ to come to
_prayer_, which is the last religious duty insisted upon by me here. But
according to his use, without either answering or mentioning what I say;
which would have showed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, not
contemplative prayer in general, as it includes thanksgiving, but that
most proper kind of prayer which we call _petition_, which used to be
thus defined, to be an act of religion by which we desire of God
something which we have not, and hope that we shall obtain it by him;
quite contrary to this, T. H. tells us, (_h_) that prayer ‘is not a
cause nor a means of God’s blessing, but only a signification that we
expect it from him’. If he had told us only, that prayer is not a
meritorious cause of God’s blessings, as the poor man by begging an alms
doth not deserve it, I should have gone along with him. But to tell us,
that it is not so much as a means to procure God’s blessing, and yet
with the same breath, that ‘God will not give his blessings but to those
who pray’, who shall reconcile him to himself? The Scriptures teach us
otherwise, (John xvi. 23): _Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my
name, he will give it you_: (Matth. vii. 7): _Ask, and it shall be given
you, seek, and ye shal find, knock, and it shall be opened unto you_.
St. Paul tells the Corinthians (2 Cor. i. 11), that he was _helped by
their prayers_: that is not all; that _the gift was bestowed upon him by
their means_. So prayer is a means. And St. James saith (chap. v. 16):
_The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much_. If it
be _effectual_, then it is a cause. To show this efficacy of prayer, our
Saviour useth the comparison of a father towards his child, of a
neighbour towards his neighbour; yea, of an unjust judge, to shame those
who think that God hath not more compassion than a wicked man. This was
signified by Jacob’s wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer is like
the tradesman’s tools, wherewithal he gets his living for himself and
his family. But, saith he, ‘God’s will is unchangeable’. What then? He
might as well use this against study, physic, and all second causes, as
against prayer. He shows even in this, how little they attribute to the
endeavours of men. There is a great difference between these two:
_mutare voluntatem_, to change the will; (which God never doth, in whom
there is not the least shadow of turning by change; his will to love and
hate was the same from eternity, which it now is and ever shall be; his
love and hatred are immovable, but we are removed; _non tellus cymbam,
tellurem cymba reliquit_); and _velle mutationem_, to will a change;
which God often doth. To change the will, argues a change in the agent;
but to will a change, only argues a change in the object. It is no
inconstancy in a man to love or to hate as the object is changed.
_Præsta mihi omnia eadem, et idem sum._ Prayer works not upon God, but
us; it renders not him more propitious in himself, but us more capable
of mercy. He saith this, ‘that God doth not bless us, except we pray, is
a motive to prayer’. Why talks he of motives, who acknowledgeth no
liberty, nor admits any cause but absolutely necessary? He saith,
‘prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessing which we pray for,
and contained in the same decree with the blessing’. It is true, the
spirit of prayer is the gift of God. Will he conclude from thence, that
the good employment of one talent, or of one gift of God, may not
procure another? Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise: _Come thou good and
faithful servant, thou hast been faithful in little, I will make thee
ruler over much_. Too much light is an enemy to the sight, and too much
law is an enemy to justice. I could wish we wrangled less about God’s
decrees, until we understood them better. But, saith he, ‘thanksgiving
is no cause of the blessing past, and prayer is but a thanksgiving’. He
might even as well tell me, that when a beggar craves an alms, and when
he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanksgiving is a kind of
prayer, but every prayer, and namely petition, is not a thanksgiving. In
the last place he urgeth, that ‘in our prayers we are bound to submit
our wills to God’s will.’ Who ever made any doubt of this? We must
submit to the preceptive will of God, or his commandments; we must
submit to the effective will of God, when he declares his good pleasure
by the event or otherwise. But we deny, and deny again, either that God
wills things _ad extra_, without himself, necessarily, or that it is his
pleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times;
which is the question, and that which he allegeth to the contrary comes
not near it.