The Bishop argued thus: “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all
things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are those
interrogations we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken
with all due respect), but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations?” Here
putting together two repugnant suppositions, either craftily or (be it
spoken with all due respect) ignorantly, he would have men believe,
because I hold necessity, that I deny liberty, I hold as much that there
is true liberty as he doth, and more, for I hold it as from necessity,
and that there must of necessity be liberty; but he holds it not from
necessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. His
expostulations were, first, _Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I
commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ Secondly, _Why hast thou
done this?_ Thirdly, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance
cast down?_ Fourthly, _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ These
arguments requiring the same answer which some other do, I thought fit
to remit them to their fellows. But the Bishop will not allow me that.
For he saith,
(_a_) “Certainly, distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, &c.
did require distinct answers.”
I am therefore to give an account of the meaning of the aforesaid
objurgations and expostulations; not of the end for which God said,
_Hast thou eaten of the tree, &c._, but how those words may be taken
without repugnance to the doctrine of necessity. These words, _Hast thou
eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat_,
convince Adam that, notwithstanding God had placed in the garden a means
to keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his
will to obedience of God’s commandment concerning the tree of knowledge
of good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own will as to
do it. Whereby is signified, that a mortal man, though invited by the
promise of immortality, cannot govern his own will, though his will
govern his actions; which dependence of the actions on the will, is that
which properly and truly is called _liberty_. And the like may be said
of the words to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ and of those to Cain,
_Why art thou wroth? &c._ and to Israel, _Why will ye die, O house of
Israel?_ But the Bishop here will say _die_ signifieth not _die_, but
live eternally in torments; for by such interpretations any man may
answer anything. And whereas he asketh, “Doth God reprehend him for
doing that which he hath antecedently determined him that he must do?” I
answer, no; but he convinceth and instructeth him, that though
immortality was so easy to obtain, as it might be had for the abstinence
from the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it but by
pardon, and by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ: nor is there here any
punishment, but only a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original
mortality, where death was no punishment but a gift of God. In which
mortality he lived near a thousand years, and had a numerous issue, and
lived without misery, and I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the
immortality which then he lost. Nor in all this is there any plotting
secretly, or any mockery or derision, which the Bishop would make men
believe there is. And whereas he saith, that “they who talk here of a
twofold will of God, secret and revealed, and the one opposite to the
other, understand not what they say:” the Protestant doctors, both of
our and other Churches, did use to distinguish between the secret and
revealed will of God; the former they called _voluntas bene placiti_,
which signifieth absolutely his will, the other _voluntas signi_, that
is, the signification of his will, in the same sense that I call the one
his _will_, the other his _commandment_, which may sometimes differ. For
God’s commandment to Abraham was, that he should sacrifice Isaac, but
his will was, that he should not do it. God’s denunciation to Nineveh
was, that it should be destroyed within forty days, but his will was,
that it should not.
(_b_) “I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad, as
the words intimate, and as I apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to
Him that is truth itself,” &c.
What damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is this? God, I said, might
command a thing openly, and yet hinder the doing of it, without
injustice; but if a man should command a thing to be done, and then plot
secretly the hinderance of the same, and punish for the not doing it, it
were injustice. This it is which the Bishop apprehends as an imputation
of falsehood to God Almighty. And perhaps if the death of a sinner were,
as he thinks, an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far as
Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; not accusing him of
injustice, because whatsoever he doth is therefore just because done by
him; but of little tenderness and love to mankind. And this
expostulation will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of
all things be granted or denied. For it is manifest that God could have
made man impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or forgive him
if he please; and therefore, if he please not, the expostulation is as
reasonable in the cases of _liberty_ as of _necessity_.