[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to
pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those interrogations,
and objurgations, and reprehensions, and expostulations, which we find
so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect),
but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations? _Hast thou eaten of the
tree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat?_ (Gen. iii. 11.)
And (verse 13) he saith to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ And (Gen. iv.
6) to Cain, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down?_
And, (Ezech. xviii. 31): _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ Doth God
command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by himself or by the second
causes necessitate him to eat? Doth he reprehend him for doing that,
which he hath antecedently determined that he must do? Doth he propose
things under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and
derision? Doth a loving master chide his servant because he doth not
come at his call, and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and
fettered, so as he cannot move, by the master’s own order, without the
servant’s default or consent? They who talk here of a twofold will of
God, _secret_ and _revealed_, and the one opposite to the other,
understand not what they say. These two wills concern several persons.
The secret will of God, is what he will do himself; the revealed will of
God, is what he would have us to do; it may be the secret will of God to
take away the life of the father, yet it is God’s revealed will that his
son should wish his life and pray for his life. Here is no
contradiction, where the agents are distinct. But for the same person to
command one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do
another thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined
inevitably and irresistibly that he must do; this were (I am afraid to
utter what they are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation.
God’s chiding proves man’s liberty.”
_T. H._ To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but one answer.
_J. D._ (_a_) “Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are,
the one drawn from the truth of God, the other from the justice of God,
the one from his objurgations and reprehensions, the other from his
judgments after life, did require distinct answers. But the plain truth
is, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in
this whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to
this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is
contained, No. XII: ‘That which he does is made just by his doing; just,
I say, in him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that
shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the
same, if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is
unjust.’ (_b_) I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so
bad as the words intimate and as I apprehend, that is, to impute
falsehood to Him that is truth itself, and to justify feigning and
dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of his
power and the absoluteness of his dominion. And therefore, by his leave,
I must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer
to this argument also. He tells us, that he was not surprised. Whether
he were or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, that either
he is not provided, or that his cause admits no choice of answers. The
Jews dealt ingeniously, when they met with a difficult knot which they
could not untie, to put it upon Elias: _Elias will answer it when he
comes_.