_T. H._ For if there came into the husband’s mind greater good by
establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow
necessarily. And if the evil that will follow thereon in the husband’s
opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow. And yet in
this following of one’s hopes and fears consisteth the nature of
election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose
this. And consequently choosing and necessity are joined together.
[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ (_a_) “There is nothing said with more show of reason in this
cause by the patrons of necessity and adversaries of true liberty than
this, that the will doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last
dictate of the understanding, or the last judgment of right reason. And
in this, and this only, I confess T. H. hath good seconds. Yet the
common and approved opinion is contrary, and justly.
“For first, this very act of the understanding is an effect of the will,
and a testimony of its power and liberty. It is the will, which
affecting some particular good, doth engage and command the
understanding to consult and deliberate what means are convenient for
attaining that end. And though the will itself be blind, yet its object
is good in general, which is the end of all human actions. Therefore it
belongs to the will, as to the general of an army, to move the other
powers of the soul to their acts, and among the rest the understanding
also, by applying it and reducing its power into act. So as whatsoever
obligation the understanding doth put upon the will, is by the consent
of the will, and derived from the power of the will, which was not
necessitated to move the understanding to consult. So the will is the
lady and mistress of human actions; the understanding is her trusty
counsellor, which gives no advice but when it is required by the will.
And if the first consultation or deliberation be not sufficient, the
will may move a review, and require the understanding to inform itself
better and take advice of others, from whence many times the judgment of
the understanding doth receive alteration.
“Secondly, for the manner how the understanding doth determine the will,
it is not naturally but morally. The will is moved by the understanding,
not as by an efficient having a causal influence into the effect, but
only by proposing and representing the object. And therefore, as it were
ridiculous to say that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing,
so it is to say that the proposing of the object by the understanding to
the will is the cause of willing; and therefore the understanding hath
no place in that concourse of causes, which according to T. H. do
necessitate the will.
“Thirdly, the judgment of the understanding is not always _practice
practicum_, nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine
the will to one. Sometimes, the understanding proposeth two or three
means equally available to the attaining of one and the same end.
Sometimes, it dictateth that this or that particular good is eligible or
fit to be chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it
must be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means, but not the
only means to attain the desired end. In these cases no man can doubt
but that the will may choose, or not choose, this or that indifferently.
Yea, though the understanding shall judge one of these means to be more
expedient than another, yet forasmuch as in the less expedient there is
found the reason of good, the will in respect of that dominion which it
hath over itself, may accept that which the understanding judgeth to be
less expedient, and refuse that which it judgeth to be more expedient.
“Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so efficaciously,
but that it may be, and often is deterred from the prosecution of it by
the difficulty of the means; and notwithstanding the judgment of the
understanding, the will may still suspend its own act.
“Fifthly, supposing, but not granting, that the will did necessarily
follow the last dictate of the understanding, yet this proves no
antecedent necessity, but coexistent with the act; no extrinsical
necessity, the will and the understanding being but two faculties of the
same soul; no absolute necessity, but merely upon supposition. And
therefore the same authors who maintain that the judgment of the
understanding doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more
earnestly oppugn T. H.’s absolute necessity of all occurrences. Suppose
the will shall apply the understanding to deliberate and not require a
review. Suppose the dictate of the understanding shall be absolute, not
this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but
this positively; nor this freely, but this necessarily. And suppose the
will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act. Then here is
a necessity indeed, but neither absolute nor extrinsical, nor
antecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a
necessity upon supposition, which we do readily grant. So far T. H. is
wide from the truth, whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension
of a greater good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute
necessity.
(_b_) “Lastly, whereas he saith, that ‘the nature of election doth
consist in following our hopes and fears,’ I cannot but observe that
there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he useth in
the right sense; I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of
singularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers, nor out of a
desire to take in sunder the whole frame of learning and new mould it
after his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would give us
a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense. But because this
is but touched here sparingly, and upon the by, I will forbear it until
I meet with it again in its proper place. And for the present it shall
suffice to say, that hopes and fears are common to brute beasts, but
election is a rational act, and is proper only to man, who is _sanctius
his animal, mentisque capacius altæ_.
_T. H._ The second place of Scripture is Joshua xxiv. 15; the third is 2
Samuel xxiv. 12; whereby it is clearly proved, that there is election in
man, but not proved that such election was not necessitated by the
hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which
depend not on the will nor are subject to election. And therefore one
answer serves all such places, if they were a thousand.
_J. D._ “This answer being the very same with the former, word for word,
which hath already sufficiently been shaken in pieces, doth require no
new reply.