He intendeth here to make good the distinctions of liberty of
_exercise_, and liberty of _contradiction_; liberty of _contrariety_,
and liberty of _specification and exercise_. And he begins thus:
(_a_) “It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, or of
various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to
be distinguished,” &c.
I know not what art it is that giveth this rule. I am sure it is not the
art of reason, which men call logic. For reason teacheth, and the
example of those who only reason methodically, (which are the
mathematicians), that a man, when he will demonstrate the truth of what
he is to say, must in the first place determine what he will have to be
understood by his words; which determination is called definition;
whereby the significations of his words are so clearly set down, that
there can creep in no ambiguity. And therefore there will be no need of
distinctions; and consequently his rule of art, is a rash precept of
some ignorant man, whom he and others have followed.
The Bishop tells us that liberty is sometimes opposed to sin, to
oppression, to servitude; which is to tell us, that they whom he hath
read in this point, are inconsistent in the meaning of their own words;
and, therefore, they are little beholden to him. And this diversity of
significations he calls distinctions. Do men that by the same word in
one place mean one thing, and in another another, and never tell us so,
distinguish? I think they rather confound. And yet he says, that “these
distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which
cometh nearer the essence of it, than T. H.’s roving definition;” which
definition of mine was this: “liberty is when there is no external
impediment.” So that in his opinion a man shall sooner understand
liberty by reading these words, (Romans vi. 22): _Being made free from
sin_; or these words, (Isaiah lviii. 6): _To let the oppressed go free_;
or by these words, (Leviticus xxv. 10): _You shall proclaim liberty
throughout the land_, than by these words of mine: “liberty is the
absence of external impediments to motion.” Also he will face me down,
that I understand what he means by his distinctions of liberty of
_contrariety_, of _contradiction_, of _exercise only_, of _exercise and
specification jointly_. If he mean I understand his meaning, in one
sense it is true. For by them he means to shift off the discredit of
being able to say nothing to the question; as they do that, pretending
to know the cause of every thing, give for the cause of why the
load-stone draweth to it iron, sympathy, and occult quality; making
_they cannot tell_, (turned now into occult), to stand for the real
cause of that most admirable effect. But that those words signify
distinction, I constantly deny. It is not enough for a distinction to be
forked; it ought to signify a distinct conception. There is great
difference between duade distinctions and cloven feet.
(_b_) “It is strange to see with what confidence now-a-days particular
men slight all the Schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of
former ages,” &c.
This word, _particular men_, is put here, in my opinion, with little
judgment, especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned. Does the
Bishop think that he himself is, or that there is any universal man? It
may be he means a private man. Does he then think there is any man not
private, besides him that is endued with sovereign power? But it is most
likely he calls me a particular man, because I have not had the
authority he has had, to teach what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am
no more particular than he; and may with as good a grace despise the
Schoolmen and some of the old Philosophers, as he can despise me, unless
he can shew that it is more likely that he should be better able to look
into these questions sufficiently, which require meditation and
reflection upon a man’s own thoughts, he that hath been obliged most of
his time to preach unto the people, and to that end to read those
authors that can best furnish him with what he has to say, and to study
for the rhetoric of his expressions, and of the spare time (which to a
good pastor is very little) hath spent no little part in seeking
preferment and increasing of riches; than I, that have done almost
nothing else, nor have had much else to do but to meditate upon this and
other natural questions. It troubles him much that I style
School-learning jargon. I do not call all School-learning so, but such
as is so; that is, that which they say in defending of untruths, and
especially in the maintenance of free-will, when they talk of _liberty
of exercise, specification, contrariety, contradiction, acts elicite and
exercite_ and the like; which, though he go over again in this place,
endeavouring to explain them, are still both here and there but jargon,
or that (if he like it better) which the Scripture in the first chaos
calleth _Tohu_ and _Bohu_.
But because he takes it so heinously, that a private man should so
hardly censure School-divinity, I would be glad to know with what
patience he can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon speaking of the
same? Martin Luther, that was the first beginner of our deliverance from
the servitude of the Romish clergy, had these three articles censured by
the University of Paris. The first of which was: “School-theology is a
false interpretation of the Scripture, and Sacraments, which hath
banished from us true and sincere theology.” The second is: “At what
time School-theology, that is, mock-theology, came up, at the same time
the theology of Christ’s Cross went down.” The third is: “It is now
almost three hundred years since the Church has endured the
licentiousness of School-Doctors in corrupting of the Scriptures.”
Moreover, the same Luther in another place of his work saith thus;
“School-theology is nothing else but ignorance of the truth, and a block
to stumble at laid before the Scriptures.” And of Thomas Aquinas in
particular he saith, that “it was he that did set up the kingdom of
Aristotle, the destroyer of godly doctrine.” And of the philosophy
whereof St. Paul biddeth us beware, he saith it is School-theology. And
Melancthon, a divine once much esteemed in our Church, saith of it thus:
“It is known that that profane scholastic learning, which they will have
to be called Divinity, began at Paris; which being admitted, nothing is
left sound in the Church, the Gospel is obscured, faith extinguished,
the doctrine of works received, and instead of Christ’s people, we are
become not so much as the people of the law, but the people of
Aristotle’s ethics These were no raw divines, such as he saith preached
to their equally ignorant auditors. I could add to these the slighting
of School-divinity by Calvin and other learned Protestant Doctors; yet
were they all but private men, who, it seems to the Bishop, had forgot
themselves as well as I.