[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]
_J. D._ “And so to fall in hand with the question without any further
proems or prefaces, by _liberty_, I do neither understand a liberty from
sin, nor a liberty from misery, nor a liberty from servitude, nor a
liberty from violence, but I understand a liberty from necessity, or
rather from necessitation; that is, an universal immunity from all
inevitability and determination to one; whether it be of _exercise_
only, which the Schools call a liberty of _contradiction_, and is found
in God and in the good and bad angels, that is, not a liberty to do both
good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this
or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of _specification
and exercise_ also, which the Schools call liberty of _contrariety_, and
is found in men endowed with reason and understanding, that is, a
liberty to do and not to do good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast
being cleared,” &c.
_T. H._ In the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and
says, he means not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from
violence, but from necessity, necessitation, inevitability, and
determination to one. It had been better to define liberty, than thus to
distinguish; for I understand never the more what he means by liberty.
And though he says he means liberty from necessitation, yet I understand
not how such a liberty can be, and it is a taking of the question
without proof. For what else is the question between us, but whether
such a liberty be possible or not? There are in the same place other
distinctions, as a liberty of exercise only, which he calls a liberty of
contradiction, namely, of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing
this or that good, or this or that evil, respectively: and a liberty of
specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of
contrariety, namely, a liberty not only to do or not to do good or evil,
but also to do or not to do this or that good or evil. And with these
distinctions, he says, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he
darkeneth his meaning, not only with the jargon of exercise only,
specification also, contradiction, contrariety, but also with pretending
distinction where none is. For how is it possible for the liberty of
doing or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist, as he saith it
doth in God and Angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or
evil?
_J. D._ (_a_) “It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of
various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to
be distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities, but either
sophisters or bunglers. _Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus_, deceitful
men do not love to descend to particulars; and when bad archers shoot,
the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes opposed to
the slavery of sin and vicious habits, as (Romans vi. 22): _Now being
made free from sin_. Sometimes to misery and oppression, (Isaiah lviii.
6): _To let the oppressed go free_. Sometimes to servitude, as
(Leviticus xxv. 10): _In the year of jubilee ye shall proclaim liberty
throughout the land_. Sometimes to violence, as (Psalms cv. 20): _The
prince of his people let him go free_. Yet none of all these is the
liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity, that is, a
determination to one, or rather from necessitation, that is, a necessity
imposed by another, or an extrinsical determination. These distinctions
do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which comes nearer the
essence of it, than T. H.’s roving definition, as we shall see in due
place. And though he say that ‘he understands never the more what I mean
by liberty,’ yet it is plain, by his own ingenuous confession, both that
he doth understand it, and that this is the very question where the
water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from all
necessitation and extrinsical determination to one. Which being but the
stating of the question, he calls it amiss ‘the taking of the question.’
It were too much weakness to beg this question, which is so copious and
demonstrable. (_b_) It is strange to see with what confidence,
now-a-days, particular men slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers,
and classic authors of former ages, as if they were not worthy to
unloose the shoe-strings of some modern author, or did sit in darkness
and in the shadow of death, until some third Cato dropped down from
heaven, to whom all men must repair, as to the altar of Prometheus, to
light their torches. I did never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the
pulpit declare against School Divinity to his equally ignorant auditors.
It is but as the fox in the fable, who, having lost his own tail by a
mischance, would have persuaded all his followers to cut off theirs, and
throw them away as unprofitable burthens. But it troubles me to see a
scholar, one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of
nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to
forget himself as to style School-learning no better than a plain
jargon, that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian language, like the
chattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did sometimes too much cut
truth into shreds, or delight in abstruse expressions, yet certainly
this distinction of liberty into liberty of _contrariety_ and liberty of
_contradiction_, or which is all one, of _exercise only_, or _exercise
and specification jointly_, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is
so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that
writer of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon
this subject, but he useth it.
“Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of things. Therefore to
be able to choose both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, or of
specification. To choose this, and not to choose this, are
contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power.
Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to
choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a
liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now a man is not only
able to do or forbear to do good only, or evil only, but he is able both
to do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not only a
liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only
a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of
contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the
good angels can do or not do this or that good; but they cannot do and
not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or
contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It
appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the
extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty
of God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal the
liberty of man comes short in the intention of the power. Man is not so
free in respect of good only, as God or the good angels, because (not to
speak of God, whose liberty is quite of another nature) the
understandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over
their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract
them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is
cleared from all darkness.
“And where T. H. demands, how it is possible for the liberty of doing or
not doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels,
without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil? the answer is
obvious and easy, _referendo singula singulis_, rendering every act to
its right object respectively. God and good angels have a power to do or
not to do this or that good, bad angels have a power to do or not to do
this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively
to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God
and good and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do
good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.”