(_a_) “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of necessity,”
&c.
His deferring the reading of my defence of necessity, he will not, he
saith, should be interpreted for disrespect. ’Tis well; though I cannot
imagine why he should fear to be thought to disrespect me. “He was
diverted,” he saith, “by trifles called business.” It seems then he
acknowledgeth that the will can be diverted by business. Which, though
said on the _by_, is contrary I think to the main, that the will is
free; for free it is not, if anything but itself can divert it.
(_b_) “The very first words of T. H.’s defence, trip up the heels of his
whole cause, &c.”
How so? “I had once,” saith he, “resolved. To resolve presupposeth
deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is
inevitably determined without ourselves?” There is no man doubts but a
man may deliberate of what himself shall do, whether the thing be
impossible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility; though he
cannot deliberate of what another shall do to him. Therefore his
examples of the man condemned, of the man that breatheth, and of him
that groweth, because the question is not what they shall do, but what
they shall suffer, are impertinent. This is so evident, that I wonder
how he that was before so witty as to say, my first words tripped up the
heels of my cause, and that having line enough I would confute myself,
could presently be so dull as not to see his argument was too weak to
support so triumphant a language. And whereas he seemeth to be offended
with paradoxes, let him thank the Schoolmen, whose senseless writings
have made the greatest number of important truths seem paradox.
(_c_) This argument that followeth is no better. “To resolve,” saith he,
“implies a man’s dominion over his actions, and his actual determination
of himself,” &c.
If he understand what it is _to resolve_, he knows that it signifies no
more than after deliberation _to will_. He thinks, therefore, _to will_
is to have dominion over his own actions, and actually to determine his
own will. But no man can determine his own will, for the will is
appetite; nor can a man more determine his will than any other appetite,
that is, more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when
not. When a man is hungry, it is in his choice to eat or not eat; this
is the liberty of the man; but to be hungry or not hungry, which is that
which I hold to proceed from necessity, is not in his choice. Besides
these words, “dominion over his own actions,” and “determination of
himself,” so far as they are significant, make against him. For over
whatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not free, and
therefore a man’s actions are not free; and if a man determine himself,
the question will still remain, what determined him to determine himself
in that manner.
(_d_) “I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, considered
his reasons,” &c.
This and that which followeth, is talking to himself at random, till he
come to allege that which he calleth an old rule, which is this: (_e_)
“Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. This is no
absolute necessity, but only upon supposition that a man hath determined
his own liberty,” &c.
If the bishop think that I hold no other necessity than that which is
expressed in that old foolish rule, he neither understandeth me, nor
what the word _necessary_ signifieth. _Necessary_ is that which is
impossible to be otherwise, or that which cannot possibly otherwise come
to pass. Therefore _necessary_, _possible_, and _impossible_ have no
signification in reference to time past or time present, but only time
to come. His _necessary_, and his _in sensu composito_, signify nothing;
my _necessary_ is a necessary from all eternity; and yet not
inconsistent with true liberty, which doth not consist in determining
itself, but in doing what the will is determined unto. This “dominion
over itself,” and this _sensus compositus_, and this, “determining
itself,” and this, “necessarily is when it is,” are confused and empty
words.
(_f_) “If the chain of necessity be no stronger but that it may be
snapped so easily asunder, &c. by the signification of your lordship’s
desire, and my modest entreaty, then we may safely conclude that human
affairs,” &c.
Whether my Lord’s desire and the Bishop’s modest entreaty were enough to
produce a _will_ in me to write an answer to his treatise, without other
concurrent causes, I am not sure. Obedience to his Lordship did much,
and my civility to the Bishop did somewhat, and perhaps there were other
imaginations of mine own that contributed their part. But this I am sure
of, that altogether they were sufficient to frame my will thereto; and
whatsoever is sufficient to produce any thing, produceth it as
necessarily as the fire necessarily burneth the fuel that is cast into
it. And though the Bishop’s modest entreaty had been no part of the
cause of my yielding to it, yet certainly it would have been cause
enough to some civil man, to have requited me with fairer language than
he hath done throughout this reply.