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_J. D._ “Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty against
necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have obtained the cause,
and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I ought not
to be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out
of an inevitable necessity.”
_T. H._ Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer J. D.’s
objections to my book _De Cive_ in the first place, as that which
concerns me most; and afterwards to examine this Discourse of Liberty
and Necessity, which, because I never had uttered my opinion of it,
concerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordship’s and J.
D.’s desire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to
do. And here I present and submit it to your Lordship’s judgment.
_J. D._ “The first day that I did read over T. H.’s defence of the
necessity of all things, was April 20th, 1646. Which proceeded not out
of any disrespect to him; for if all his discourses had been geometrical
demonstrations, able not only to persuade, but also to compel assent,
all had been one to me, first my journey, and afterwards some other
trifles which we call business, having diverted me until then. And then
my occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend awakening
me, I set myself to a serious examination of it. We commonly see those
who delight in paradoxes, if they have line enough, confute themselves;
and their speculatives and their practices familiarly interfere one with
another. (_b_) The very first words of T. H.’s defence trip up the heels
of his whole cause; ‘I had once resolved.’ To _resolve_ presupposeth
deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is
inevitably determined by causes without ourselves, before we do
deliberate? Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed
or not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and
ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he
should increase in stature. Secondly, (_c_) to _resolve_ implies a man’s
dominion over his own actions, and his actual determination of himself.
But he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this
dominion over himself; and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the
second extrinsical causes, in which he makes all his actions to be
determined. One may as well call again yesterday, as _resolve_ or newly
determine that which is determined to his hand already. (_d_) I have
perused this treatise, weighed T. H.’s answers, considered his reasons,
and conclude that he hath missed, and misled the question, that the
answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, that the
opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some
groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in
himself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore,
by his favour, I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps
another man reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be
pertinent and well-founded. How comes this to pass? The treatise is the
same, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolution is contrary.
Do the second causes play fast and loose? Do they necessitate me to
condemn, and necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The
difference must be in ourselves, either in our intellectuals, because
the one sees clearer than the other; or in our affections, which betray
our understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the one more
than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference is in ourselves. The
outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to
the other resolution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective
deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary
resolutions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total
and adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect. If it be
so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for such a
necessity as no man ever denied or doubted of. When all the causes have
actually determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though
there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they
are together in time. And the old rule is, (_e_) ‘whatsoever is, when it
is, is necessarily so as it is.’ This is no absolute necessity, but only
upon supposition, that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we
question whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question
whether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary
_in sensu composito_, after we have resolved and finally determined what
to do; but whether they were necessary before they were determined by
ourselves, by or in the precedent causes before ourselves, or in the
exterior causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true
liberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to
be determined by another without itself.
“T. H. saith further ‘that upon your Lordship’s desire and mine, he was
contented to begin with this discourse of Liberty and Necessity,’ that
is, to change his former resolution. (_f_) If the chain of necessity be
no stronger, but that it may be snapped so easily insunder; if his will
was no otherwise determined without himself, but only by the
signification of your Lordship’s desire and my modest entreaty, then we
may easily conclude that human affairs are not always governed by
absolute necessity; that a man is lord of his own actions, if not in
chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord paramount of heaven and
earth; and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the
outward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral
persuasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which
otherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He
that can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things, and
a physical or natural determination of all causes, shall be great Apollo
to me.
“Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered his opinion of this
question, I suppose he intends in writing; my conversation with him hath
not been frequent, yet I remember well that when this question was
agitated between us two in your Lordship’s chamber by your command, he
did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute necessity of
all events, and for the ground of this necessity, the flux or
concatenation of the second causes.”