the five propositions, and everything in Jansenius that bears any
resemblance to them, or is contrary to St. Augustine; for all that they
have done already. The point at issue is not, for example, if Jesus
Christ died for the elect only—they condemn that as much as you do; but,
is Jansenius of that opinion, or not? And here I declare, more strongly
than ever, that your quarrel affects me as little as it affects the
Church. For although I am no doctor, any more than you, father, I can
easily see, nevertheless, that it has no connection with the faith. The
only question is, to ascertain what is the sense of Jansenius. Did they
believe that his doctrine corresponded to the proper and literal sense
of these propositions, they would condemn it; and they refuse to do so,
because they are convinced it is quite the reverse; so that although
they should misunderstand it, still they would not be heretics, seeing
they understand it only in a Catholic sense.
To illustrate this by an example, I may refer to the conflicting
sentiments of St. Basil and St. Athanasius, regarding the writings of
St. Denis of Alexandria, which St. Basil, conceiving that he found in
them the sense of Arius against the equality of the Father and the Son,
condemned as heretical, but which St. Athanasius, on the other hand,
judging them to contain the genuine sense of the Church, maintained to
be perfectly orthodox. Think you, then, father, that St. Basil, who held
these writings to be Arian, had a right to brand St. Athanasius as a
heretic, because he defended them? And what ground would he have had for
so doing, seeing that it was not Arianism that his brother defended, but
the true faith which he considered these writings to contain? Had these
two saints agreed about the true sense of these writings, and had both
recognized this heresy in them, unquestionably St. Athanasius could not
have approved of them, without being guilty of heresy; but as they were
at variance respecting the sense of the passages, St. Athanasius was
orthodox in vindicating them, even though he may have understood them
wrong; because in that case it would have been merely an error in a
matter of fact, and because what he defended was really the Catholic
faith, which he supposed to be contained in these writings.
I apply this to you, father. Suppose you were agreed upon the sense of
Jansenius, and your adversaries were ready to admit with you that he
held, for example, _that grace cannot be resisted_; those who refused to
condemn him would be heretical. But as your dispute turns upon the
meaning of that author, and they believe that, according to his
doctrine, _grace may be resisted_, whatever heresy you may be pleased to
attribute to him, you have no ground to brand them as heretics, seeing
they condemn the sense which you put on Jansenius, and you dare not
condemn the sense which they put on him. If, therefore, you mean to
convict them, show that the sense which they ascribe to Jansenius is
heretical; for then they will be heretical themselves. But how could you
accomplish this, since it is certain, according to your own showing,
that the meaning which they give to his language has never been
condemned?
To elucidate the point still further, I shall assume as a principle,
what you yourselves acknowledge—_that the doctrine of efficacious grace
has never been condemned, and that the pope has not touched it by his
constitution_. And, in fact, when he proposed to pass judgment on the
five propositions, the question of efficacious grace was protected
against all censure. This is perfectly evident from the judgments of the
consulters,[327] to whom the pope committed them for examination. These
judgments I have in my possession, in common with many other persons in
Paris, and, among the rest, the Bishop of Montpelier,[328] who brought
them from Rome. It appears from this document, that they were divided in
their sentiments; that the chief persons among them, such as the Master
of the Sacred Palace, the Commissary of the Holy Office, the General of
the Augustinians, and others, conceiving that these propositions might
be understood in the sense of _efficacious grace_, were of opinion that
they ought not to be censured; whereas the rest, while they agreed that
the propositions would not have merited condemnation, had they borne
that sense, judged that they ought to be censured, because, as they
contended, this was very far from being their proper and natural sense.
The pope, accordingly, condemned them; and all parties have acquiesced
in his judgment.
It is certain, then, father, that efficacious grace has not been
condemned. Indeed, it is so powerfully supported by St. Augustine, by
St. Thomas, and all his school, by a great many popes and councils, and
by all tradition, that to tax it with heresy would be an act of impiety.
Now, all those whom you condemn as heretics declare that they find
nothing in Jansenius, but this doctrine of efficacious grace. And this
was the only point which they maintained at Rome. You have acknowledged
this yourself, when you declare that, “when pleading before the pope,
they did not say a single word about the propositions, but occupied the
whole time in talking about efficacious grace.”[329] So that whether
they be right or wrong in this supposition, it is undeniable, at least,
that what they suppose to be the sense is not heretical sense; and that,
consequently, they are no heretics: for, to state the matter in two
words, either Jansenius has merely taught the doctrine of efficacious
grace, and in this case he has no errors; or he has taught some other
thing, and in this case he has no defenders. The whole question turns on
ascertaining whether Jansenius has actually maintained something
different from efficacious grace; and should it be found that he has,
you will have the honor of having better understood him, but they will
not have the misfortune of having erred from the faith.
It is matter of thankfulness to God, then, father, that there is in
reality no heresy in the Church. The question relates entirely to a
point of fact, of which no heresy can be made; for the Church, with
divine authority, decides the points of _faith_, and cuts off from her
body all who refuse to receive them. But she does not act in the same
manner in regard to matters of _fact_. And the reason is, that our
salvation is attached to the faith which has been revealed to us, and
which is preserved in the Church by tradition, but that it has no
dependence on facts which have not been revealed by God. Thus we are
bound to believe that the commandments of God are not impracticable; but
we are under no obligation to know what Jansenius has said upon that
subject. In the determination of points of faith God guides the Church
by the aid of his unerring Spirit; whereas in matters of fact, he leaves
her to the direction of reason and the senses, which are the natural
judges of such matters. None but God was able to instruct the Church in
the faith; but to learn whether this or that proposition is contained in
Jansenius, all we require to do is to read his book. And from hence it
follows, that while it is heresy to resist the decisions of the faith,
because this amounts to an opposing of our own spirit to the Spirit of
God, it is no heresy, though it may be an act of presumption, to
disbelieve certain particular facts, because this is no more than
opposing reason—it may be enlightened reason—to an authority which is
great indeed, but in this matter not infallible.
What I have now advanced is admitted by all theologians, as appears from
the following axiom of Cardinal Bellarmine, a member of your Society:
“General and lawful councils are incapable of error in defining the
dogmas of faith; but they may err in questions of fact.” In another
place he says: “The pope, as pope, and even as the head of a universal
council, may err in particular controversies of fact, which depend
principally on the information and testimony of men.” Cardinal Baronius
speaks in the same manner: “Implicit submission is due to the decisions
of councils in points of faith; but, in so far as persons and their
writings are concerned, the censures which have been pronounced against
them have not been so rigorously observed, because there is none who may
not chance to be deceived in such matters.” I may add that, to prove
this point, the Archbishop of Toulouse[330] has deduced the following
rule from the letters of two great popes—St. Leon and Pelagius II.:
“That the proper object of councils is the faith; and whatsoever is
determined by them, independently of the faith, may be reviewed and
examined anew: whereas nothing ought to be re-examined that has been
decided in a matter of faith; because, as Tertullian observes, the rule
of faith alone is immovable and irrevocable.”
Hence it has been seen that, while general and lawful councils have
never contradicted one another in points of faith, because, as M. de
Toulouse has said, “it is not allowable to examine _de novo_ decisions
in matters of faith;” several instances have occurred in which these
same councils have disagreed in points of fact, where the discussion
turned upon the sense of an author; because, as the same prelate
observes, quoting the popes as his authorities, “everything determined
in councils, not referring to the faith, may be reviewed and examined
_de novo_.” An example of this contrariety was furnished by the fourth
and fifth councils, which differed in their interpretation of the same
authors. The same thing happened in the case of two popes, about a
proposition maintained by certain monks of Scythia. Pope Hormisdas,
understanding it in a bad sense, had condemned it; but Pope John II.,
his successor, upon re-examining the doctrine, understood it in a good
sense, approved it, and pronounced it to be orthodox. Would you say that
for this reason one of these popes was a heretic? And must you not,
consequently, acknowledge that, provided a person condemn the heretical
sense which a pope may have ascribed to a book, he is no heretic because
he declines condemning that book, while he understands it in a sense
which it is certain the pope has not condemned? If this cannot be
admitted, one of these popes must have fallen into error.
I have been anxious to familiarize you with these discrepancies among
Catholics regarding questions of fact, which involve the understanding
of the sense of a writer, showing you father against father, pope
against pope, and council against council, to lead you from these to
other examples of opposition, similar in their nature, but somewhat more
disproportioned in respect of the parties concerned. For, in the
instances I am now to adduce, you will see councils and popes ranged on
one side, and Jesuits on the other; and yet you have never charged your
brethren, for this opposition, even with presumption, much less with
heresy.
You are well aware, father, that the writings of Origen were condemned
by a great many popes and councils, and particularly by the fifth
general council, as chargeable with certain heresies, and, among others,
that of _the reconciliation of the devils at the day of judgment_. Do
you suppose that, after this, it became absolutely imperative, as a test
of Catholicism, to confess that Origen actually maintained these errors,
and that it is not enough to condemn them, without attributing them to
him? If this were true, what would become of your worthy Father Halloix,
who has asserted the purity of Origen’s faith, as well as many other
Catholics, who have attempted the same thing, such as Pico Mirandola,
and Genebrard, doctor of the Sorbonne? Is it not, moreover, a certain
fact, that the same fifth general council condemned the writings of
Theodoret against St. Cyril, describing them as impious, “contrary to
the true faith, and tainted with the Nestorian heresy?”[331] And yet
this has not prevented Father Sirmond,[332] a Jesuit, from defending
him, or from saying, in his life of that father, that “his writings are
entirely free from the heresy of Nestorius.”
It is evident, therefore, that as the Church, in condemning a book,
assumes that the error which she condemns is contained in that book, it
is a point of faith to hold that error as condemned; but it is not a
point of faith to hold that the book, in fact, contains the error which
the Church supposes it does. Enough has been said, I think, to prove
this; I shall, therefore, conclude my examples by referring to that of
Pope Honorius, the history of which is so well known. At the
commencement of the seventh century, the Church being troubled by the
heresy of the Monothelites,[333] that pope, with the view of terminating
the controversy, passed a decree which seemed favorable to these
heretics, at which many took offence. The affair, nevertheless, passed
over without making much disturbance during his pontificate; but fifty
years after, the Church being assembled in the sixth general council, in
which Pope Agathon presided by his legates, this decree was impeached,
and, after being read and examined, was condemned as containing the
heresy of the Monothelites, and under that character burnt, in open
court, along with the other writings of these heretics. Such was the
respect paid to this decision, and such the unanimity with which it was
received throughout the whole Church, that it was afterwards ratified by
two other general councils, and likewise by two popes, Leon II. and
Adrian II., the latter of whom lived two hundred years after it had
passed; and this universal and harmonious agreement remained undisturbed
for seven or eight centuries. Of late years, however, some authors, and
among the rest Cardinal Bellarmine, without seeming to dread the
imputation of heresy, have stoutly maintained, against all this array of
popes and councils, that the writings of Honorius are free from the
error which had been ascribed to them; “because,” says the cardinal,
“general councils being liable to err in questions of fact, we have the
best grounds for asserting that the sixth council was mistaken with
regard to the fact now under consideration; and that, misconceiving the
sense of the Letters of Honorius, it has placed this pope most unjustly
in the ranks of heretics.” Observe, then, I pray you, father, that a man
is not heretical for saying that Pope Honorius was not a heretic; even
though a great many popes and councils, after examining his writings,
should have declared that he was so.
I now come to the question before us, and shall allow you to state your
case as favorably as you can. What will you then say, father, in order
to stamp your opponents as heretics? That “Pope Innocent X. has declared
that the error of the five propositions is to be found in Jansenius?” I
grant you that; what inference do you draw from it? That “it is
heretical to deny that the error of the five propositions is to be found
in Jansenius?” How so, father? have we not here a question of fact,
exactly similar to the preceding examples? The pope has declared that
the error of the five propositions is contained in Jansenius, in the
same way as his predecessors decided that the errors of the Nestorians
and the Monothelites polluted the pages of Theodoret and Honorius. In
the latter case, your writers hesitate not to say, that while they
condemn the heresies, they do not allow that these authors actually
maintained them; and, in like manner, your opponents now say, that they
condemn the five propositions, but cannot admit that Jansenius has
taught them. Truly, the two cases are as like as they could well be; and
if there be any disparity between them, it is easy to see how far it
must go in favor of the present question, by a comparison of many
particular circumstances, which, as they are self-evident, I do not
specify. How comes it to pass, then, that when placed in precisely the
same predicament, your friends are Catholics and your opponents
heretics? On what strange principle of exception do you deprive the
latter of a liberty which you freely award to all the rest of the
faithful? What answer will you make to this, father? Will you say, “The
pope has confirmed his constitution by a brief.” To this I would reply,
that two general councils and two popes confirmed the condemnation of
the Letters of Honorius. But what argument do you found upon the
language of that brief, in which all that the pope says is, that “he has
condemned the doctrine of Jansenius in these five propositions?” What
does that add to the constitution, or what more can you infer from it?
Nothing certainly, except that as the sixth council condemned the
doctrine of Honorius, in the belief that it was the same with that of
the Monothelites, so the pope has said that he has condemned the
doctrine of Jansenius in these five propositions, because he was led to
suppose it was the same with that of the five propositions. And how
could he do otherwise than suppose it? Your Society published nothing
else; and you, yourself, father, who have asserted that the said
propositions were in that author “word for word,” happened to be in Rome
(for I know all your motions) at the time when the censure was passed.
Was he to distrust the sincerity or the competence of so many grave
ministers of religion? And how could he help being convinced of the
fact, after the assurance which you had given him that the propositions
were in that author “word for word?” It is evident, therefore, that in
the event of its being found that Jansenius has not supported these
doctrines, it would be wrong to say, as your writers have done in the
cases before mentioned, that the pope has deceived himself in this point
of fact, which it is painful and offensive to publish at any time; the
proper phrase is, that you have deceived the pope, which, as you are now
pretty well known, will create no scandal.
Determined, however, to have a heresy made out, let it cost what it may,
you have attempted, by the following manœuvre, to shift the question
from the point of fact, and make it bear upon a point of faith. “The
pope,” say you, “declares that he has condemned the doctrine of
Jansenius in these five propositions; therefore it is essential to the
faith to hold that the doctrine of Jansenius touching these five
propositions is heretical, _let it be what it may_.” Here is a strange
point of faith, that a doctrine is heretical _be what it may_. What! if
Jansenius should happen to maintain that “_we are capable of resisting
internal grace_,” and that “_it is false to say that Jesus Christ died
for the elect only_,” would this doctrine be condemned just because it
is his doctrine? Will the proposition, that “_man has a freedom of will
to do good or evil_,” be true when found in the pope’s constitution, and
false when discovered in Jansenius? By what fatality must he be reduced
to such a predicament, that truth, when admitted into his book, becomes
heresy? You must confess, then, that he is only heretical on the
supposition that he is friendly to the errors condemned, seeing that the
constitution of the pope is the rule which we must apply to Jansenius,
to judge if his character answer the description there given of him;
and, accordingly, the question, _Is his doctrine heretical?_ must be
resolved by another question of fact, _Does it correspond to the natural
sense of these propositions?_ as it must necessarily be heretical if it
does correspond to that sense, and must necessarily be orthodox if it be
of an opposite character. For, in one word, since, according to the pope
and the bishops, “the propositions are condemned _in their proper and
natural sense_,” they cannot possibly be condemned in the sense of
Jansenius, except on the understanding that the sense of Jansenius is
the same with the proper and natural sense of these propositions; and
this I maintain to be purely a question of fact.
The question, then, still rests upon the point of fact, and cannot
possibly be tortured into one affecting the faith. But though incapable
of twisting it into a matter of heresy, you have it in your power to
make it a pretext for persecution, and might, perhaps, succeed in this,
were there not good reason to hope that nobody will be found so blindly
devoted to your interests as to countenance such a disgraceful
proceeding, or inclined to compel people, as you wish to do, to sign a
declaration _that they condemn these propositions in the sense of
Jansenius_, without explaining what the sense of Jansenius is. Few
people are disposed to sign a blank confession of faith. Now this would
really be to sign one of that description, leaving you to fill up the
blank afterwards with whatsoever you pleased, as you would be at liberty
to interpret according to your own taste the unexplained sense of
Jansenius. Let it be explained, then, beforehand, otherwise we shall
have, I fear, another version of your proximate power, without any sense
at all—_abstrahendo ab omni sensu_.[334] This mode of proceeding, you
must be aware, does not take with the world. Men in general detest all
ambiguity, especially in the matter of religion, where it is highly
reasonable that one should know at least what one is asked to condemn.
And how is it possible for doctors, who are persuaded that Jansenius can
bear no other sense than that of efficacious grace, to consent to
declare that they condemn his doctrine without explaining it, since,
with their present convictions, which no means are used to alter, this
would be neither more nor less than to condemn efficacious grace, which
cannot be condemned without sin? Would it not, therefore, be a piece of
monstrous tyranny to place them in such an unhappy dilemma, that they
must either bring guilt upon their souls in the sight of God, by signing
that condemnation against their consciences, or be denounced as heretics
for refusing to sign it?[335]
But there is a mystery under all this. You Jesuits cannot move a step
without a stratagem. It remains for me to explain why you do not explain
the sense of Jansenius. The sole purpose of my writing is to discover
your designs, and, by discovering, to frustrate them. I must, therefore,
inform those who are not already aware of the fact, that your great
concern in this dispute being to uphold the _sufficient grace_ of your
Molina, you could not effect this without destroying the _efficacious
grace_ which stands directly opposed to it. Perceiving, however, that
the latter was now sanctioned at Rome, and by all the learned in the
Church, and unable to combat the doctrine on its own merits, you
resolved to attack it in a clandestine way, under the name of the
doctrine of Jansenius. You were resolved, accordingly, to get Jansenius
condemned without explanation; and, to gain your purpose, gave out that
his doctrine was not that of efficacious grace, so that every one might
think he was at liberty to condemn the one without denying the other.
Hence your efforts, in the present day, to impress this idea upon the
minds of such as have no acquaintance with that author; an object which
you yourself, father, have attempted, by means of the following
ingenious syllogism: “The pope has condemned the doctrine of Jansenius;
but the pope has not condemned efficacious grace: therefore, the
doctrine of efficacious grace must be different from that of
Jansenius.”[336] If this mode of reasoning were conclusive, it might be
demonstrated in the same way that Honorius and all his defenders are
heretics of the same kind. “The sixth council has condemned the doctrine
of Honorius; but the council has not condemned the doctrine of the
Church: therefore the doctrine of Honorius is different from that of the
Church; and therefore all who defend him are heretics.” It is obvious
that no conclusion can be drawn from this; for the pope has done no more
than condemned the doctrine of the five propositions, which was
represented to him as the doctrine of Jansenius.