CEDAR CREEK.
The ground whereon the Army of the Shenandoah now found itself was
the same on which Sheridan had left it, the troops were the same,
and the formations were in all important particulars the same as
when he had been present in command, strengthened, however, by
additional entrenchments. Twice before the army had occupied the
same line, and on both occasions Sheridan had emphatically condemned
it as a very bad one. Briefly, the position was formed by the last
great outward bend of Cedar Creek before its waters mingle with
those of the Shenandoah, the left flank resting lightly on the
river, the centre strongly across the valley road, and the extreme
right on the creek near the end of the bow.
Crook held a high and partly wooded height or range of heights on
the left or east (1) of the valley road, and nearly parallel with
it. Thoburn occupied the most advanced spur overlooking the mouth
of the creek, while on his left and rear Hayes and Kitching faced
toward the Shenandoah with their backs to the road. As the road
descended to cross Cedar Creek by the bridge (2) and ford, it
followed the course of a rivulet on its left, and three quarters
of a mile from Crook, on the opposite side of this ravine and of
the road, Emory was posted on a hill whose crest rose steeply a
hundred and fifty feet above the bed of the creek. Here Emory
planted nearly the whole of his artillery to command the bridge
and the neighboring ford and the approaches on the opposite bank,
but the slope and crest of this hill were completely and easily
commanded from the higher ground held by Thoburn and by Hayes.
From the valley road on the left, Emory's line stretched
crescent-wise, until its right rested upon a natural bastion formed
by the highest part of the hill, whence the descent is precipitous,
not only to the creek in front, but on the flank to the gorge of
Meadow Brook. This little stream rising some miles farther north near
Newtown, and flowing now between high banks and again through marshy
borders in a general direction nearly parallel to the road, empties
into Cedar Creek about three quarters of a mile above the bridge.
Just below the mouth of the brook Cedar Creek can be crossed by a
ford lying nearly in a direct prolongation of the line of the valley
road from the point where in descending it swerves to the east to
pass the bridge, and midway between the bridge and the Meadow Brook
ford is still another ford overlooked by Emory's right wing and
commanded by the guns of his artillery. Dwight's division formed
the right of Emory's line and Grover's the left. From right to
left the front line was composed of the brigades of Thomas, Molineux,
Birge, and Macauley, with Davis in reserve supporting Thomas, and
Shunk, likewise in reserve, supporting Macauley and Birge.(3)
The fronts of Emory and Crook overlooking the creek were strongly
entrenched, and Crook was engaged in extending his line of works
toward the left and rear of Thoburn to cover the front of Hayes,
but this fresh line was as yet unoccupied. Wright's corps, commanded
by Ricketts during the absence of Sheridan, while Wright himself
commanded the army, was held in reserve on the high ground known
as Red Hill overlooking Meadow Brook from the eastward, the divisions
encamped for convenience in a sort of irregular echelon, with
Ricketts's, under Keifer, in front, Upton's, commanded by Wheaton,
on the right and rear in close support, and Getty's on the left
and rear of both, and thus nearer to the valley road than either.
Behind the Sixth Corps, opposite Middletown, on the high ground on
both sides of Marsh Run, was Merritt, and far away on his right,
watching the approaches and the crossing by the back road, stood
Custer.
As the Sixth Corps held no part of the front, but formed a general
reserve, its position was not entrenched. Torbert, Emory, and
Crook each picketed and watched his own front, and there was not
a horseman between the infantry and the supposed position of the
enemy at or beyond Fisher's Hill.
Emory had for some days been distrustful of the excessive tranquillity,
and on the previous evening his uneasiness had rather been augmented
by a report that came to him from Thomas of a little group of men
in citizens' dress that had been seen during the day moving about
on the edge of Hupp's Hill, as if engaged in noting with more
intentness than is usual among civilians the arrangement of the
Union camps. This incident Emory reported to Wright for what it
might be worth, and Wright, on his part, being already doubtful of
the exactness of the information brought in by Harris, ordered
Emory and Torbert each to send out a strong reconnoitring party in
the early morning, to move in parallel columns on the valley road
and on the back road, with the significant caution that they were
to go far enough to find out whether Early was still at Fisher's
Hill or not.
After crossing the Shenandoah and reaching the foot of Three Top,
Gordon halted his men for a few hours' rest before the hard work
awaiting them. At one o'clock he silently took up the line of
march over the rugged trail toward McInturff's and Bowman's fords,
and at five o'clock seized both crossings, with the merest show of
resistance from Moore's outlying brigade, and pressed on to Cooley's
house, the white house he had noted from Three Top. This landmark,
as he knew, was barely thirteen hundred yards from the nearest
flank of his enemy. He passed nearly half that distance beyond
the house and, as pre-arranged, silently formed his three divisions
for the attack. Within five minutes he could be in Kitching's camp.
At the last moment, hearing that Crook was strengthening his
entrenchments, Early so far changed his plan as to part company
with Wharton at Strasburg, and then, bearing off to the right, to
conduct Kershaw to the banks of Cedar Creek at the ford that now
bears the name of Roberts. This is about twelve hundred yards
above the mouth of the creek; and there, at half-past three in the
morning, in the long shadows of the full moon,(4) Early stood with
Kershaw at his back and the sleeping ranks of Thoburn directly in
his front, and waited only for the appointed hour. At half-past
four, Early again set Kershaw in motion. The crossing of Cedar
Creek was unobserved and unopposed. Once on the north bank, Kershaw
deployed to the right and left, and stood to arms listening for
Gordon.
Wharton, who had already formed under cover of the tress, on the
edge of Hupp's Hill, crept down the slope to the front of the wood,
and there, likewise in shadow, hardly a thousand feet from the
bridge and the middle ford, he too watched for the signal.
To crown all, as the dawn drew near a light fog descended upon the
river bottom and covered all objects as with a veil.
Almost from the beginning it had been the custom of the Nineteenth
Army Corps, at all times when in the presence of the enemy, to
stand to arms at daybreak. Moreover as Molineux was to go out on
a reconnoissance by half-past five, his men had breakfasted and
were lying on their arms waiting for the order to march. Birge
and Macauley were to be ready to follow in support after a proper
interval, and Shunk was to cover the front of all three during
their absence. McMillan had also been notified to support the
movement of Grover's brigades. Emory himself was up and dressed,
the horses of his staff were saddled, and his own horses were being
saddled, when from the left a startling sound broke the stillness
of the morning air.
This was the roar of the one tremendous volley by which Kershaw
made known his presence before the sleeping camp of Thoburn. In
an instant, before a single shot could be fired in return, before
the muskets could be taken from the stacks, before the cannoneers
could reach their pieces, Kershaw's men, with loud and continuous
yells, swarmed over the parapet in Thoburn's front, seized the
guns, and sent his half-clad soldiers flying to the rear. Thus
Kershaw, who a moment before had been without artillery, suddenly
found himself in possession of the seven guns that had been planted
to secure Thoburn's ground. Then upon Emory and upon Hayes, as
well as against the flying fugitives, he turned the cannon thus
snatched from their own comrades.
At the first sound Molineux moved his men back into the rifle-pits
they had left an hour before, and Emory, ordering his corps to
stand to arms, rode at once to the left of his line at the valley
road to find out the meaning of this strange outbreak. Knowing
that Molineux was near and ready, Emory drew from him two regiments,
the 22d Iowa and the 3d Massachusetts, to support the artillery
planted on the left to command the bridge. Hardly had this been
done when the shells began to fall among the guns and to enfilade
the lines of the infantry. What could this mean but the thing that
had actually happened to Thoburn? Grover joined Emory, Crook came
from Belle Grove, and Wright from his camp beyond Meadow Brook.
The fugitives from Thoburn's unfortunate division went streaming by.
Then suddenly from the left and rear came the startling rattle of
the rifles that told of Gordon's attack on the exposed flank of
Hayes and Kitching. While all eyes were directed toward Kershaw,
Gordon, still further favored by the fog, the outcry, and the noise
of the cannonade, was not perceived by the troops of Hayes and
Kitching until the instant when his solid lines of battle, unheralded
by a single skirmisher of his own, and unannounced by those set to
watch against him, fell upon the ranks of Crook. He tried in vain
to form on the road. Startled from their sleep by the surprise of
their comrades on their right, and naturally shaken by the disordered
rush of the fugitives through their ranks, his men, old soldiers
and good soldiers as they were, gave way at the first onset, before
the fire of Gordon had become heavy and almost without stopping to
return it.
Then swiftly Gordon and Kershaw moved together against the uncovered
left and rear of Emory, while at the same time Early, who after
seeing Kershaw launched, had ridden back for Wharton and the
artillery, was bringing them into position for a front attack.
Besides the sounds that had aroused Emory and Crook, Wright, from
his more remote position, had listened to the rattle of Rosser's
carbines,(5) but after a moment of natural doubt had perceived that
the true attack was on the left, and accordingly he had ordered
Ricketts to advance with Getty and Keifer to the valley road toward
the sound of the battle. If this was to be of the least advantage,
the valley road must be somehow held by somebody until Ricketts
should come. Emory sent Thomas across the road into the ravine
and the wood beyond, and bade him stand fast at all hazards. But
the time was too short. Thomas, after a desperate resistance, was
forced back by the overwhelming masses of Kershaw, yet not until
this tried brigade had left a third of its number on the ground to
attest its valor. About the colors of the 8th Vermont the fight
was furious. Again and again the colors were down; three bearers
were slain; before the sun rose two men out of three had fallen,
that the precious emblems might be saved.(6) Thus were many
priceless minutes won. Then, as there was no longer anything to
hinder the advance of Kershaw on the left, and of Gordon on the
rear, while Wharton and the forty guns of Early's artillery were
beginning their work in front, from the left toward the right,
successively the brigades of the Nineteenth Corps began to give
way; yet as they drifted toward the right and rear, in that stress
the men held well to their colors, and although there may and must
have been many that fell out, not a brigade or a regiment lost its
organization for a moment.
When the pressure reached Molineux and Davis on the reverse side
of the entrenchments, both brigades began moving off, under Emory's
orders, by the right flank to take position near Belle Grove on
the right of Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps, which had come
up and was trying to extend its line diagonally to reach the valley
road. To cover this position and to hold off the onward rush of
Gordon, Emory had already posted the 114th and the 153d New York
on the commanding knoll five hundred yards to the southward
overlooking the road. When driven off these regiments rejoined
their brigade before Belle Grove. Thither also came the detached
regiments of Molineux, and there Neafie joined them with the 3d
brigade, after a strong stand at their breastworks, wherein Macauley
fell severely wounded, and the 156th and 176th had hard fighting
hand-to-hand to keep their colors, at the cost of the staves.
Birge retired along the line of works to the open ground beyond
Meadow Brook, where Shunk joined him.
In quitting their posts at the breastworks Haley, having lost
forty-nine horses killed in harness, had to abandon three guns of
his 1st Maine battery, and Taft lost three pieces of his 5th New
York battery at the difficult crossing of Meadow Brook. There, too,
from the same cause, three guns of the 17th Indiana and two of the
Rhode Island battery were abandoned. The losses of the infantry
were to be counted in thousands. Grover was slightly wounded;
Macauley, as has been said, severely. Emory had lost both his
horses, and was for a time commanding the corps afoot. Birge rode
a mule. Thus the Nineteenth Corps lost eleven guns. Crook had
already lost seven, and the Sixth Corps was presently to lose six.
With Gordon on his flank and rear, every moment drawing nearer to
the mastery of the valley road, Wright had to think, and to think
quickly, of the safety and the success of the army he commanded.
For it there was no longer a position south of Middletown. What
security was there that Custer and Powell would be able all day
long to hold off, as in the event they did, the flank and rear
attacks of Rosser and of Lomax? What if the Longstreet message
were true and yet a third surprise in store? Time, time was needed,
whether to bring up the troops or to change front, to march to the
rear past the faces of the advancing enemy, to hold him in check,
and to re-form. Whatever was to be done was to be done quickly;
and Wright, throwing prudence into the balance, made up his mind
for a retreat to a fresh position, where his line of communications
would be preserved and its flanks protected. Middletown and the
cavalry camp pointed out the ground. Accordingly he gave the word
to Getty, Ricketts being wounded, to retire on Middletown, guiding
on the valley road, and to Emory to form on Getty's right--that
is, on the left of the Sixth Corps in retreat. The battle had been
raging for nearly an hour when Wright gave this order to abandon
Belle Grove. The retreat threw upon Getty's division, now under
Grant, the severe task of covering the exposed right flank of the
army in retreat, while the left was gradually swinging into the
direction of the new line. Getty, having handsomely performed this
service, crossed Meadow Brook abreast with Middletown and took
position on the high and partly wooded ground that rises beyond
the brook to the west of the village and on a line with Merritt's
camp. Here, on the southern edge of the village cemetery and on
the crest behind it, Getty planted his artillery, posted Grant to
hold the immediate front, and somewhat in his rear, under the trees,
following the contour of the hill, as it rises toward the west, he
placed Wheaton and Keifer.
To reach his position on the left of Getty in retreat, Emory had
to gain ground to the westward, to descend the hill from Belle
Grove, to cross Meadow Brook, and climbing the opposite slope to
face about and re-form his line in good order on the crest of Red
Hill. Here, before Dr. Shipley's house, nearly across the ground
where the men of Wheaton and of Getty had slept the night before,
for the best part of an hour Emory stood at bay. Kershaw followed
over the Belle Grove Hill, across Meadow Brook, up the slope of
Red Hill, and formed line facing north; but then, seeing the fighting
part of Emory's infantry before him and the formidable array of
Merritt's cavalry in close support, he refrained from renewing the
attack until Early could send Gordon to his aid. Thus the bold
stand at Red Hill gave the time the situation craved, and while
Kershaw waited, Emory, following his orders from Wright, crossed
over to the cemetery (7) and placed himself on the west of Getty.
Thomas rejoined McMillan. Torbert meanwhile had moved over with
Merritt to the left flank. Thus around the cemetery, about
half-past seven, the unshaken strength of the Army of the
Shenandoah was gathered, every eye looking once more toward the
south.
While awaiting the general attack for which Early was plainly
preparing, Wright deployed his lines, according to the ground, from
the south wall of the cemetery overlooking Meadow Brook on the
left, in a rough echelon of divisions to Marsh Brook on the right,
in order of Grant, Keifer, Wheaton, Grover, McMillan. Between the
arms of Marsh Brook, in front and behind the Old Forge road, on
open ground nearly as high as Getty's, Emory formed his corps in
echelon of brigades. Here, not doubting that the decisive combat
of the day was to be fought, Emory began fortifying his front with
the help of loose rails and stones.
To protect himself against the menacing movement of the cavalry on
his right in front of Middletown, Early posted Ramseur with two
batteries directly across the valley road, and when he saw Getty's
stand near the cemetery, he brought Wharton directly down the road
and sent him to the attack, but this Getty easily threw off and
drove back Wharton in such confusion that before renewing the
attempt Early waited to complete a new line of battle almost
perpendicular to his first and therefore to the road. From the
right at Middletown to the left at Red Hill the new line was formed
by Pegram, Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon, with Wharton behind Pegram.
On the right of this line also Early massed the forty guns of his
artillery augmented by some of the twenty-four pieces taken from
the Union army.
And now the increasing heat of the sun dissolved the fog, and
revealed to the combatants the true situation of affairs. To Early
the position of the Union army, its salient, as it were, lying
directly before him where he stood, seemed so strong that he
hesitated to hazard another attack until the concentrated fire of
his artillery should have produced an impression, while to Wright,
not only was the menace of Early's artillery very obvious, but the
weakness of his own left flank, broken by Meadow Brook and adhering
lightly to the valley road, was still present.
The force of Early's first onset was spent; his one chance of
seizing and holding the valley road in the rear of the Union army
had slipped away, while his cavalry had utterly failed to accomplish
any part of the task confided to it. Time and strength had both
been lost to the Confederates by the uncontrollable plunder of the
camps and the sutlers' stores.
The Old Forge road is but a country lane that crosses the field
from the north end of Middletown. It afforded no position, its
chief value being as uniting the wings of the army, and Wright's
object in taking up this line was simply to gain time to develop
a better fighting line still farther to the rear. Now, seeing that
Getty had accomplished his purpose in holding on at the cemetery,
Wright ordered him to move slowly, in line of battle, toward the
north, guiding on the valley road, with Merritt's cavalry beyond
it following and covering the operation, while Emory, taking up
the movement in his turn, was to look to Wheaton for his guide.
Wright's order found Emory's men in the act of completing their
hasty defences, while Emory was moving about among them strongly
declaring his purpose not to go back another inch.
Getty began by withdrawing Grant, and when Grant had passed for
some distance beyond the left of Keifer, his right in retreat,
Keifer followed, while on his left, in retreat, Wheaton, and on
Wheaton's left Emory marched, as nearly as may be, shoulder to
shoulder in a solid line. Thus Keifer formed the centre of the
retreating line of battle, with Ball on his right and Emerson on
his left. Having to pass over rough ground and among trees, the
line was broken to the reversed front by the right of regiments,
the head of each guiding on its right-hand neighbor. Thus it
happened (8) that in passing through a thick wood, Keifer's division
was split in two, his brigades losing sight of one another, so that
on coming once more into the open field, Ball found himself alone
with no other troops in sight on either hand; but soon hearing the
sound of Getty's guns over the right shoulder, he faced about and
marched back to a stone wall upon a lane, where he found Getty
already in position. Emerson, however, moving more quickly through
the wood, because the ground was easier, continued his march toward
the north, continually bearing to the right as he went, in order
to regain the lost touch with Ball, while on the left Wheaton and
Emory, knowing nothing of the break, naturally and gradually
conformed to the movement of Emerson. Finally, when the left of
the line once more entered the woods, Emerson, gradually changing
the direction toward the right, drifted Wheaton away from Emory,
and when this was perceived by the commanders, each began to look
for his neighbor. It is also probable that when the separation
took place the interval was gradually widened by Emory's movement
with his right resting on a road that, while apparently following
the true line of direction, really carried him every moment a little
farther toward the left. However that may be, when almost at the
same instant Wheaton and Emory halted and faced about, they found
themselves about eight hundred yards apart, a thousand yards behind
the line that Getty had just taken up, on the westward prolongation
of which Keifer had joined him with the brigade of Ball.
The affair had now lasted five hours; the retreat was at an end;
a tactical accident had carried it half a mile farther than was
intended; as it was, from the extreme front of Emory at daybreak
to his extreme rear at eleven o'clock, the measured distance was
but four miles. Every step of the way had been traversed under
orders--under orders that had carried the Nineteenth Corps three
times across the field of battle, so that its march, from Belle
Grove to the Old Forge road, might be represented by the letter N.
When Early saw the Union line retreating, he moved forward to the
cross-road beyond the cemetery, and posted his troops behind the
stone walls. Wharton extended the line on the east side of the
turnpike, with three batteries massed between him and the road.
Pegram covered the turnpike, his left resting on Meadow Brook, and
beyond it Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon carried the line to the east
bank of Middle Marsh Brook. Early had now two courses open to him:
one was to extricate his army from its position, with its enemy
directly in front and Cedar Creek in rear, before the Union commander
could take the initiative; the other was to attack vigorously with
all his force before the Union infantry should be able to complete
the new line of battle now plainly in the act of formation. In
either case, although he could easily see than on both flanks the
line of his infantry far overlapped that of his antagonist, Early
must have perceived that he had to reckon with the whole mass of
the Union cavalry, unshaken and as yet untouched. Moreover, his
men had already done a long and hard day's work after a short night.
Depleted as were the ranks of the Union infantry by the heavy battle
losses of the early morning, and the still heavier losses by the
misconduct of the stragglers of all the corps except the cavalry,
it was not to be doubted that the men who stood by the colors on
the Old Forge road meant to abide to the end. As all old soldiers
know, the fighting line, granting that enough remain to make a
fighting line, is never so strong as the moment after the first
shock of battle has shaken out the men that always straggle on the
march and skulk on the field. When, therefore, the first compact
line faced about, it was with determination and with hope; yet
scarcely had the fires of resolution been relit and begun to kindle
to a glow than they were suddenly extinguished and all was plunged
in gloom by the unlooked-for order to retreat. Upon the whole army
a lethargy fell, and though every man expected and stood ready to
do his duty, it was with a certain listlessness amounting almost
to indifference that he waited for what was to come next. In the
sensations of most, hunger was perhaps uppermost, and while some
munched the bread and meat from their haversacks and other waited
to make coffee, many threw themselves upon the ground where they
stood and fell asleep.
Far down the road from among the crowd of fugitives, where no man
on that field cared to look, came a murmur like the breaking of
the surf on a far-off shore. Nearer it drew, grew louder, and
swelled to a tumult. Cheers! The cheers of the stragglers. As
the men instinctively turned toward the sound, they were seized
with amazement to see the tide of stragglers setting strongly toward
the south. Then out from among them, into the field by the roadside,
cantered a little man on a black horse, and from the ranks of his
own cavalry arose a cry of "Sheridan!" Through all the ranks the
message flashed, and, as if it had been charged by the electric
spark, set every man on his feet and made his heart once more beat
high within him.
This was Wednesday, and Sheridan, before finally setting out for
Washington, had told Wright to look for him on Tuesday. Rapidly
despatching, as has been seen, his business at the War Office,
Sheridan left Washington by the special train he had asked for at
noon on the 17th, accompanied by the engineers charged with the
duty of selecting the position that Halleck wished to fortify.
They slept that night at Martinsburg, and rode the next day, the
18th of October, to Winchester. There Sheridan learned that all
was well with his army and was also told of the reconnoissances
projected for the next morning. He determined to remain at Winchester
in order to go over the ground the next morning with the engineers.
Aroused about six o'clock by the report of heavy firing, he ascribed
it to the reconnoitring column, and thought but little of it until,
between half-past eight and nine, having finished his breakfast,
he became uneasy at the continued sound of the cannon. Then mounting
"Rienzi," accompanied by his staff and followed by his escort, he
rode out to join his army where he had left it, fourteen miles
away, on the banks of Cedar Creek. The fight of the morning had
come to an end an hour ago. Riding at an easy trot half a mile
out on the hill beyond Abraham's Creek,(9) he was shocked to see
the tattered and dishevelled head of the column of stragglers,
every man making the best of his way toward the Potomac, without
his arms, his equipments, or his knapsack, carrying, in short,
nothing but what he wore. Most of these must have been shaken out
of the ranks when Kershaw surprised the camp of Thoburn. If this
be so, they had travelled more than thirteen miles in little more
than three hours.
This appalling sight brought to Sheridan's mind the Longstreet
message, "Be ready when I join you, and we will crush Sheridan."
Should he stop his routed army at Winchester and fight there? No,
he must go to his men, restore their broken ranks, or share their
fate. How he rode on has been made famous in song and story, yet
never so well told as in the modest narrative, stamped in every
line with the impress of the soldier's truthful frankness, than in
the entertaining volumes that were the last work of the great
leader's life.(10)
Once arrived on the field, about half-past ten or perhaps eleven
o'clock, Sheridan lost no time in assuming personal command of the
army. Establishing his headquarters on the hill behind Getty, he
proceeded to complete the dispositions he found already in progress.
He saw at a glance that the line on which Wright had placed Getty
was well chosen; and though knowing nothing of the break that had
taken place during the accidental loss of direction by the left
wing of Getty's corps, and so wrongly inferring from what he saw
that Getty was a mere rear-guard, he yet adopted the position for
his fighting line, sent his staff officers with orders for the rest
of the troops to form on that line, and thus actually completed
the arrangements begun by Wright. It sufficed that Emerson, Wheaton,
and Emory should face about, as they were already about to do, and
should form on the prolongation of Getty's line. This they did
promptly and in perfect order. Wright resumed the command of the
Sixth Corps and Getty of his own division. Then feeling his left
quite strong enough under Merritt's care, Sheridan sent Custer,
for whom he had other designs, back to the right flank.
It was past noon before all this was accomplished. Then Sheridan,
content with the position and appearance of his own army, and
perceiving that Early was getting ready to attack him, acted on
the suggestion of Major George Forsyth, his aide-de-camp, and rode
the length of the line of battle in order to show himself to his
men. A tumult of cheers greeted him and followed him as, hat in
hand, he passed in front of regiment after regiment, speaking a
few words of encouragement to each. Sheridan possessed in a degree
unequalled the power of raising in the hearts of his soldiers the
sort of enthusiasm that, transmuting itself into action, causes
men to attempt impossibilities, and to disregard and overcome
obstacles. Almost from the moment of entering the valley he had
gained the confidence of the infantry, to whom he had been a
stranger. By the cavalry he had long been idolized. The feeling
of an army for its general is a thing not to be reasoned with or
explained away; once aroused, it belongs to him as exclusively as
the expression of his face, the manner of his gait, or the form of
his signature, and is not to be transferred to his successor or
delegated even to the ablest of his lieutenants, whatever the skill,
the merit, or the reputation of either. The mere presence of
Sheridan in the ranks of the Army of the Shenandoah that day brought
with it the assurance of victory.
Emory at first formed his corps in two lines, the First division
under Dwight, whom Sheridan had released from arrest, on the right,
and Grover on the left; but soon the whole corps was deployed in
one line in the order from right to left by brigades of McMillan,
Davis, Birge, Molineux, Neafie, Shunk.
When the line of the Old Forge road was abandoned by Wright, Early
moved forward and occupied it. Between one and two o'clock he
advanced Gordon and Kershaw to attack Wheaton and Emory. Seeing
that the weight of the attack was about to fall on the right,
Sheridan sent Wheaton to the support of Emory. However, Gordon's
onset proved so light that no assistance was needed, for, after
three or four volleys had been exchanged, the attack was easily
and completely thrown off. Kershaw's movement was even more feeble.
Several causes now delayed the counter attack of Sheridan. Crook
was endeavoring to re-form the stragglers on his colors behind
Merritt. Apprehension of the coming of Longstreet was only dissipated
by the information gained from prisoners during the afternoon, and
finally arose a false rumor of the appearance of a column of
Confederate cavalry in the rear toward Winchester; and this seemed
plausible enough until at last word came from Powell that he was
still holding off Lomax. Then Sheridan gave the signal for the
whole line to go forward against the enemy, beginning with Getty
on the left, as a pivot, while the whole right was to sweep onward,
and, driving the enemy before it, to swing toward the valley road
near the camps of the morning.
About four Getty started, and the movement being taken up in
succession toward the right, in a few minutes the whole line was
advancing steadily. From that moment to the end the men hardly
stopped an instant for anything. The resistance of the Confederates,
though at first steady, and here and there even spirited, was of
short duration. For a few moments, indeed, the attack seemed to
hang on the extreme right as McMillan, rushing on even more rapidly
than the order of the combat demanded, found himself suddenly
enveloped by the right wheel of the brigade of Evans, forming the
extreme left of the division of Gordon and of the Confederate army.
But while McMillan was thus attacked and his leading troops were
called to meet the danger, this, as suddenly as it had come, was
swept away by the swift onset of Davis directly upon the front and
flank of Evans. To do this Davis had not only to act instantly,
but also to change front under a double fire; yet he and his brigade
were equal to the emergency, and McMillan joining in, together they
not only threw off the attack of Evans, but bursting through the
re-entrant angle of Gordon's line, quickly swept Evans off the
field. Knowing this to be the critical point of his line, because
the wheeling flank, Sheridan was there. "Stay where you are," was
his order, "till you see my boy Custer over there."
Then upon the high ground appeared Custer at the head of his bold
troopers, making ready to swoop down upon the broken wing of Gordon.
Almost at the same instant, the whole right of the line rushed to
the charge, and while Custer rode down Gordon's left flank, Dwight,
with McMillan and Davis, began rolling up the whole Confederate
line. Meanwhile, on the left centre the Union attack likewise hung
for a moment, where Molineux, on the southerly slope of a wooded
hollow, saw himself confronted by Kershaw on the opposite crest,
only to be reached by climbing the steep bare side of the "dirt
hill." But the keen eye of Molineux easily saw through the
difficulties of the ground, and when he was ready his men and
Birge's, rising up and together charging boldly out of the hollow,
up the hill, across the open ground, and over the stone wall, in
the face of a fierce fire, settled the overthrow of Kershaw and
sent a panic running down the line of Ramseur. Wright attacking
with equal vigor, soon the disorder spread through every part of
Early's force, and in rout and ruin the exultant victors of the
morning were flying up the valley.
"Back to your camps!" had been the watchword ever since Sheridan
showed himself on the field. Dwight's men were the first to stand
once more upon their own ground, but by that time Sheridan's army
had executed, though without much regard to order, a complete left
wheel. While the infantry took up its original positions, the
cavalry pursued the flying enemy with such vigor that an accidental
displacement of a single plank on a little bridge near Strasburg
caused the whole of Early's artillery that had not yet passed on,
to fall into the hands of Sheridan. Thus were taken 48 cannon, 52
caissons, all the ambulances that had been lost in the morning,
many wagons, and seven battle flags; of the artillery 24 pieces
were the same that had been lost in the early morning. From every
part of the abandoned field great stacks of rifles were gathered.
The prisoners taken were about 1,200, according to the reports of
Sheridan's officers, or something over 1,000 by Early's account.
Early also gives his loss in killed and wounded, without distinguishing
between the two, as 1,860, and reports the capture of 1,429 prisoners
from the Union army in the early hours of the day. Of these he
had made sure by sending them promptly to the rear. Ramseur was
mortally wounded in the last stand made by his division, and died
a few days later in the hands and under the care of his former
comrades of Sheridan's army.
Sheridan's loss was 644 killed, 3,430 wounded, and 1,591 captured
or missing; in all, 5,665. Of these the Sixth Corps had 298 killed,
1,628 wounded--together, 1,926; the Nineteenth Corps 257 killed,
1,336 wounded--together, 1,593. Crook lost 60 killed, 342 wounded
--together, 402; the cavalry 29 killed, 224 wounded--together, 253.
The missing were thus divided: Wright 194, Emory 776, Crook 548,
Torbert 43. The greatest proportionate loss of the day was suffered
by the 114th New York, which had 21 killed, 86 wounded, including
17 mortally, and 8 missing--in all, 115 out of 250 engaged. Its
fatal casualties reached 15.2, and the killed and wounded 42.8 per
cent. of the number engaged. These figures are from the corrected
reports of the War Department. The missing exceed the captured,
as set down in Early's report, by only 132. Among the killed and
mortally wounded were Bidwell, Thoburn, Kitching, and that superb
soldier and accomplished gentleman, General Charles Russell Lowell,
who, although severely wounded in the morning, at the head of his
brigade held fast to the stone wall until, in the last decisive
charge, his death-blow came. Grover received a second severe wound
early in the final charge that broke the Confederate left. Birge
then took his division.
Without a halt and with scarcely a show of organized resistance,
Early retreated to Fisher's Hill. Merritt and Custer, uniting on
the south bank of Cedar Creek, kept up the pursuit until the night
was well advanced, but soon their captures became so heavy in men
and material, that help was needed to take care of them, so, barely
an hour after going into camp the jaded infantry of Dwight once
more turned out and marched with alacrity to Strasburg.
Toward morning Early withdrew his infantry from the lines of Fisher's
Hill, and marched on New Market, leaving Rosser to cover the
movement. In the morning, upon Torbert's approach, Rosser retired,
closely pursued to Edenburg, sending Lomax to the Luray to guard
the right flank of the retreating Confederates.
The strength of the contending forces in this remarkable battle
may always give ground for dispute. No official figures exist to
determine the question directly; therefore on either side the
numbers are a matter of opinion. The author's, formed after a
careful consideration of all the authorities, is that when the
battle began, Wright commanded an effective force of not more than
31,000 officers and men of all arms, made up of 9,000 in the Sixth
Corps, 9,500 in the Nineteenth Corps, 6,000 in Crook's command,
and 6,500 cavalry. The infantry probably numbered 23,000: Ricketts
8,500, Emory 9,000, Crook 5,500. Of these, therefore, the hard
fighting fell on 17,500. The losses in the Sixth and Nineteenth
Corps, nearly all incurred in the early morning, being about 4,500,
the two corps should have mustered 13,500 for the counter-attack
of the afternoon, yet the ground they then stood upon, from the
road to the brook, measures barely 7,400 feet. With all allowances,
therefore, Sheridan cannot have taken more than 8,000 of his infantry
into this attack. This leaves out Crook's men bodily, and calls
for 5,500 unrepentant stragglers from the ranks of Emory and Wright
--one man in three. After all is said, unhappily there is nothing
so extraordinary in this, but strange indeed would it have been if
many of these skulkers had come back into the fight, as Sheridan
considerately declares they did.
As to Early's force, the difficulty of coming to a positive conclusion
is even greater. General Early himself says he went into the battle
with but 8,800 muskets. General Dawes, perhaps the most accomplished
statistician of the war, makes the total present for duty 22,000;
of these 15,000 would be infantry. The figures presented by the
unprejudiced statistician of the "Century War Book" (11) call for
15,000 of all arms. Of these 10,000 would be infantry.
Early may be said to have accomplished the ultimate object of his
attack at Cedar Creek, yet at a fearful cost, for although all
thought of transferring any part of Sheridan's force to the James
was for the moment given up, on the other hand Early had completed
the destruction (12) of his prestige, had suffered an irreparable
diminution of numbers, and had seen his army almost shaken to
pieces.
Grant once more returned to his favorite project of a movement in
force on Charlottesville and Gordonsville, but Sheridan continuing
to oppose the scheme tenaciously, it came to nothing. His own
plan, eventually carried out, was to hold the lower valley in
sufficient strength, and to move against the line of the Virginia
Central railway with all his cavalry. The rails of the Manassas
Gap line, so often relaid, were once more and for the last time
taken up from the Blue Ridge back to Augur's outposts at Bull Run,
and so this will-o'-the-wisp, that had danced before the eyes of
the government ever since 1861, was at last extinguished, while
from Winchester to the Potomac the railway, abandoned by Johnston
when he marched to Bull Run, was re-constructed to simplify the
question of supplies.
(1) Strictly southeast, for the course of the turnpike toward
Winchester is about northeast.
(2) The present bridge is a short distance above where the old one
was.
(3) Dwight having been in arrest during the past fortnight by
Emory's orders under charges growing out of criticisms and statements
made in his report of the battle of the Opequon, McMillan commanded
the First division, leaving his brigade to Thomas. Beal had gone
home on leave of absence when the campaign seemed ended, and Davis
commanded his brigade.
(4) Being actually three days past the full, the moon rose October
18-19, 1864 at 8.5 P.M., southed at 2.25 A.M., and set at 8.45 A.M.
Daylight on the 19th was at 5.40 A.M.; the sun rose at 6.14, set
at 5.16; twilight ended 5.50 P.M.
(5) This was probably the first sound heard that morning.
(6) According to the regimental history (p. 218) over 100 were lost
out of 159 engaged; of 16 officers 13 were killed or wounded. The
monument erected September 21, 1885, says 110 were killed and
wounded out of 164 engaged. The revised official figures are 17
killed, 66 wounded--together 83 (including 12 officers); besides
these there were 23 missing; in all, 106.
(7) The official map, accurate as it is in general, errs in some
important particulars; for one, in representing Emory as retreating
in a direct line toward the north from Red Hill to the Old Forge
line. This would actually have carried his force through the ranks
of the cavalry.
(8) "The Battle of Cedar Creek," by Col. Moses M. Granger, 122d
Ohio, printed in the valuable collection of "Sketches of War
History," published by the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion,
vol. iii., pp. 122-125. The author is likewise indebted to General
Keifer for the opportunity to use in this manuscript his paper on
Cedar Creek, prepared for the same series.
(9) Called Mill Creek in Sheridan's report and "Memoirs." There
is a mill on the north bank.
(10) "Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan," vol. ii., pp. 75-83.
The distance from Winchester to Getty's position is ten and three
quarter miles.
(11) Vol. iv., pp. 524, 532. And see appendix for the valuable
memorandum kindly prepared expressly for this work by General E.
C. Dawes.
(12) Justly or unjustly; unjustly I think, being unable to see how
any one could have done better.