FISHER'S HILL.
The frowning heights of Fisher's Hill had long been the bugbear of
the valley. The position was, in truth, a purely defensive one,
its chief value being that there was no other. Except for defence
it was worthless, because it was as hard to get out of as to get
at; and even for defence it was subject to the drawback that it
could be easily and secretly turned upon either flank. In a word,
its strength resided mainly in the fact that between the peaks of
Massanutten and the North Mountain the jaws of the valley were
contracted to a width of not more than four miles. The right flank
of the shortened front rests securely upon the north fork of the
Shenandoah, where it winds about the base of Three Top Mountain
before bending widely toward the east to join the south fork and
form the Shenandoah River. Across the front, among rocks, between
steep and broken cliffs, winds the brawling brook called Tumbling
Run, and above it, from its southern edge, rises the rugged crag
called Fisher's Hill. Here, behind his old entrenchments, Early
gathered the remnants of his army for another stand, and began to
strengthen himself by fresh works. The danger of a turning movement
through the twin valley of Luray was in his mind, and to guard
against it he sent his cavalry to Milford, while Sheridan, who was
thinking of the same thing, ordered Torbert to ride up the Luray
valley from Front Royal.
On the morning of the 20th of September Sheridan set out to follow
Early, and in the afternoon took up a position before Strasburg,
the Sixth Corps on the right, Emory on the left, and Crook behind
Cedar Creek in support. The next morning, the 21st, Sheridan pushed
and followed Early's skirmishers over the high hill that stands
between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, overlooking both, drove them
behind the defences of Fisher's Hill, and took up a position covering
the front from the banks of the North Fork on the left, where
Emory's left rested lightly, to the crown of the hill just mentioned,
which commanded the approach by what is called the back road, or
Cedar Creek grade, and was but slightly commanded by Fisher's Hill
itself. This strong vantage-ground Wright wrested from the enemy
after a struggle, and felling the trees for protection and for
range, planted his batteries there. The ground was very difficult,
broken and rocky, and to hold it the Sixth corps had to be drawn
toward the right, while Emory, following the movement, in the dark
hours of the early morning of the 22d of September, extended his
front so as to cover the ground thus given up by Wright.
Sheridan now thought of nothing short of the capture of Early's
army. Torbert was to drive the Confederate cavalry through Luray,
and thence, crossing the Massanutten range, was to lay hold of the
valley pike at New Market, and plant himself firmly in Early's rear
on his only line of retreat. Crook, by a wide sweep to the right,
his march hidden by the hills and woods, was to gain the back road,
so as to come up secretly on Early's left flank and rear, and the
first sounds of battle that were certain to follow the discovery
of his unexpected approach in this quarter were to serve as a signal
for Wright and Emory to fall on with everything they had.
During the forenoon of the 22d, Grover held the left of the position
of the Nineteenth Corps, his division formed in two lines in the
order of Macauley,(1) Birge; Shunk, Molineux. Dwight, in the order
of Beal, McMillan, held the right, and connected with Wheaton. In
taking ground towards the right, as already described, this line
had become too extended, and, as it was necessary that the left of
the skirmishers, at least, should rest upon the river, Grover
shortened his front by moving forward Foster with the 128th and
Lewis with the 176th New York to drive in the enemy's skirmishers
opposite, and to occupy the ground that they had been holding.
This was handsomely done under cover of a brisk shelling from Taft's
and Bradbury's guns. As on the rest of the line, the whole front
of the corps was covered as usual by hasty entrenchments. In the
afternoon Ricketts moved far to the right, and seized a wooded
knoll commanding Ramseur's position on Fisher's Hill. In preparation
for the attack Sheridan gave Emory the ground on the left of the
railway, and Wright that beyond it, and Molineux moved forward to
lead the advance of Grover. The sun was low when the noise of
battle was heard far away on the right. This was Crook, sweeping
everything before him as he charged suddenly out of the forest full
upon the left flank and rear of Lomax and Ramseur, taking the whole
Confederate line completely in reverse. The surprise was absolute.
Instantly Wright and Emory took up the movement, and, inspired by
the presence and the impetuous commands of Sheridan, descended
rapidly the steep and broken sides of the ravine, at the bottom of
which lies Tumbling Run, and then rather scrambling than charging
up the rocky and almost inaccessible sides of Fisher's Hill, swarmed
over the strong entrenchments, line after line, and planting their
colors upon the parapets, saw the whole army of Early in disorderly
flight. Foremost to mount the parapet was Entwistle with his
company of the 176th New York. To them the good fortune fell of
being the first to lay hands on four pieces of artillery in battery,
abandoned in the panic caused by the appearance of Crook, but almost
at the same instant Wilson, gallantly leading the 28th Iowa, planted
the colors of his regiment on the works. That nothing might be
wanting to the completeness of the victory, the Confederates, who,
until that moment had felt their position so secure that they had
even taken the ammunition boxes from the caissons, abandoned sixteen
pieces of artillery where they stood. Early was unable to arrest
the retreat of his army until he found himself near Edenburg, four
miles beyond Woodstock.
Sheridan's loss in this battle was 52 killed, 457 wounded, 19
missing, in all, 528. Of this the Sixth Corps suffered nearly
half, namely, 27 killed, 208 wounded, 3 missing, in all, 238.
Crook's loss was 8 killed, 152 wounded, 2 missing, total 162, and
Emory accounts for 15 killed, 86 wounded, 13 missing, together 114.
All the casualties of the cavalry numbered but 14. Early reports
his loss in the infantry and artillery alone as 30 killed, 210
wounded, 995 missing, total 1,235; but Sheridan claims 1,100
prisoners.
Now came Torbert's opportunity, but unfortunately, after suffering
a check from the two brigades of Fitzhugh Lee under Wickham, Torbert
had on the 22d fallen back down the Luray valley toward his
starting-point, and when on the afternoon of the 23d word came to
him of what had happened at Fisher's Hill, although he again advanced,
he was then too late. Thus for once the cavalry column completely
failed. Sheridan, from the tenor of his despatches to Torbert,
must have felt that this result was probable, but he did not let
it disturb his own movements, and without a halt he pushed forward
his whole force in pursuit, with slight regard to organization,
each regiment or brigade nearly in the order in which it chanced
to file into the road. Devin's cavalry brigade trod closely on
the heels of what was left of Lomax, and Emory, whose line had
crossed the valley road, pushed up it as fast as the men could move
over the ground. Wright moved in close support of Emory and
personally directed the operations of both corps, the Nineteenth
as well as the Sixth. So fast did the infantry march that it was
ten o'clock at night before Devin, from his place in line on the
right of the Sixth Corps, was able to take the road abreast with
the Nineteenth, and broad daylight before his or any other horsemen
passed the hardy yet toil-worn soldiers of Molineux, who were left
all night to lead the swift pursuit. Molineux caused Day to deploy
the 131st New York as skirmishers on the right of the road, while
the 11th Indiana, led by Macauley, performed the same service on
the left. About half-past eight the head of the column first came
in contact with the rear-guard of the enemy, but this was soon
driven in, and no further resistance was offered until about an
hour later, at the crossing of a creek near Woodstock, a brisk fire
of musketry, aided by two guns in the road, was opened on Molineux's
front, but was quickly silenced. At dawn on the 23d of September
Sheridan went into bivouac covering Woodstock, and let the infantry
rest until early in the afternoon, when he again took up the pursuit
with Wright and Emory, leaving Crook to care for the dead and
wounded. Early fell back to Mount Jackson, and was preparing to
make a stand when Averell coming up, he and Devin made so vigorous
a demonstration with the cavalry alone that Early thought it best
to continue his retreat beyond the North Fork to Rude's Hill, which
stands between Mount Jackson and New Market.
Sheridan advanced to Mount Jackson on the morning of the 24th of
September, and before nightfall had concentrated his whole army
there. He was moving his cavalry to envelop both of Early's flanks
and the infantry, Wright leading, to attack in front. However,
Early did not wait for this, but retreated rapidly in order of
battle, pursued by Sheridan in the same order, that is by the right
of regiments with an attempt at deploying intervals, through New
Market and six miles beyond to a point where a country road diverges
through Keezeltown and Cross Keys to Port Republic, at the head of
the South Fork. Here both armies halted face to face, Sheridan
for the night; but Early, as soon as it was fairly dark, fell back
about five miles on the Port Republic road, and again halted at a
point about fourteen miles short of that town.
Early's object in quitting the main valley road, which would have
conducted him to Harrisonburg, covering Staunton, was to receive
once more the reinforcements that Lee, at the first tidings from
Winchester, had again hurried forward under Kershaw. On the 25th
of September, therefore, Early retreated through Port Republic
towards Brown's Gap, where Kershaw, marching from Culpeper through
Swift Run Gap, joined him on the 26th. Here also Early's cavalry
rejoined him, Wickham from the Luray valley, and Lomax, pressed by
Powell, from Harrisonburg.
Sheridan, keeping to the main road, advanced to Harrisonburg with
Wright and Emory, leaving Crook to hold the fork of the roads where
Early had turned off. At Harrisonburg Torbert rejoined with Merritt
and Wilson. Then Sheridan sent Torbert with Wilson and Lowell by
Staunton to Waynesboro', where, before quitting the valley by
Rockfish Gap, the major road, as well as the railway to Charlottesville,
crossed the affluent of the Shenandoah known as the South River.
To divert attention from this raid Sheridan reinforced Devin, who,
in the absence of Torbert's main body, had been following and
observing Early near Port Republic without other cavalry support,
and thus Merritt presently ran into Kershaw marching to join Early
at Brown's Gap. Early, having gone as far as he wished, turned
upon Merritt and drove him across the South Fork, but just then
getting the first inkling of Torbert's movements, divined their
purpose, and, to check them, marched with all speed, in compact
order and with the greatest watchfulness in every direction, on
Rockfish Gap. But Torbert, having a good start, won the race, and
had accomplished his object when the advance of Early's column came
up, and caused him to draw off.
Sheridan, on his part, had gone nearly as far as he intended, but
as he meant presently to begin with his cavalry above Staunton the
work of destroying the value of the whole valley to the Confederate
army, on the 29th he ordered Wright and Emory to Mount Crawford to
support Torbert in this work.
Grant, who, ever since he reached the James, had cast longing eyes
upon the Virginia Central railway, as well as upon the great junction
at Gordonsville, now strongly desired Sheridan to go to Staunton
or Charlottesville, but Sheridan set himself firmly against the
plan on account of the daily increasing difficulty of supplying
his army and the great force that must be wasted in any attempt to
keep open a line of communication longer or more exposed than that
he already had to maintain. As an alternative, Sheridan, who seems
to have thought Early had quitted the valley for good, proposed to
bring the Valley campaign to an end with the destruction of the
crops, and then to move with his main force to join Grant on the
James. Grant, at once agreeing to this, directed Sheridan to keep
Crook in the valley and to transfer the rest of his force to the
armies before Richmond.
On the morning of the 6th of October Sheridan faced about and began
moving down the valley, the infantry leading in the inverse order
of its advance, and the cavalry bringing up the rear in one long
line that reached from mountain to mountain, busied in burning as
it marched the mills, the barns, and everything edible by man or
beast. From the Blue Ridge to the Shenandoah Mountains, nothing
was spared that might be of use to the Confederates in prolonging
the war.
When Early discovered this he followed on the morning of the 7th
of October, with his whole force, including Kershaw, as well as
the cavalry brigade of Rosser, sent by Lee from Petersburg. The
command of all the cavalry being given to Rosser, he at once began
treading on the heels of Torbert. On the 9th, at Tom's Brook,
Torbert, under the energetic orders of Sheridan to whip the
Confederate cavalry or get whipped himself, turned on Rosser, and,
after a sharp fight, completely overwhelmed him and hotly pursued
his flying columns more than twenty miles up the valley. Several
hundred prisoners, eleven guns with their caissons, and many
wagons --tersely described by Sheridan "as almost everything on
wheels"--fell into the hands of the captors. But more important
even than these trophies, confidence in Rosser's cavalry was
destroyed at a blow, and its early prestige wiped out forever.
On the 10th of October Sheridan once more crossed Cedar Creek and
went into camp, Emory holding the right or west of the valley road,
Crook on the left or east of the road, and the cavalry covering
the flanks. Wright took up the line of march by Front Royal on
Washington.
The first intention of the government was that he should take
advantage of the Manassas Gap railway, which was again being restored
under the protection of Augur's troops; but this work was not yet
completed, and while Wright waited at Front Royal, Grant once more
fell back on his first and favorite plan of a movement on
Charlottesville and Gordonsville. To effect this he wished Sheridan
to take up an advanced position toward the head of the valley, and
to this the government added its favorite notion of rebuilding the
railways in the rear. Halleck even went so far as to instruct
Sheridan to fortify and provision heavily the position Grant had
directed him to occupy. All these ideas Sheridan combated with
such earnestness that he was summoned to Washington for consultation.
Grant at the same time reduced his call on Sheridan for troops for
service on the James to the Sixth Corps, and Sheridan, having on
his own motion stopped the work on the Manassas Gap railway, ordered
Wright to march on Alexandria by Ashby's Gap. Wright set out on
the 12th.
Sheridan having lost touch with the main body of the Confederates
in returning down the valley, he, in common with Grant and with
the government, now thought that Early had quitted the region for
good. Sheridan's information placed Early variously at Gordonsville,
Charlottesville, and in the neighborhood of Brown's Gap; but in
truth, though nothing had been seen of Early's troops for some
days, they had never gone out of the valley, but had slowly and at
a long and safe interval been following Sheridan's footsteps, so
that on the 13th, while Wright was well on his way towards Alexandria,
and Sheridan himself was getting ready to go to Washington, Early
once more took post at Fisher's Hill, and sent his advance guard
directly on to Hupp's Hill to look down into the Union camps on
the farther bank of Cedar Creek and see what was going on there.
The first news of Early's presence, within two miles of the Union
camp, at the very moment when he was thought to be sixty miles away
on the line of the Virginia Central railway, was brought by the
shells his artillery suddenly dropped among the tents of Crook.
Thoburn at once moved out to capture the battery whose missiles
had presented themselves as uninvited guests at his dinner-table,
but was met by Kershaw and driven back after a sharp fight. Custer,
who was covering the right flank of the army, was assailed at the
same time by the Confederate cavalry, but easily threw off the
attack. At the first sound Torbert sent Merritt from the left to
the support of Custer, and afterward Sheridan kept him there.
When on the 12th of October Sheridan received Grant's definite
instructions for the movement on Gordonsville and Charlottesville,
he ceased to offer any further opposition, yet, realizing that he
would need his whole force, he withdrew the order for Wright's
movement to Alexandria and sent him word to come back to Cedar
Creek. The head of Wright's column was wading the Shenandoah when
these orders overtook it. Wright at once faced about, and on the
next day, the 14th of October, went into camp behind the lines of
Cedar Creek on the right and rear of Emory. No change was made in
the positions of the other troops, because, until Sheridan's return
from Washington, the policy and plan of the campaign must remain
unsettled, and Wright might at any moment be called upon to resume
his march.
On the 15th of October Sheridan received formal instructions from
Grant, limiting the proposed movement on Charlottesville and
Gordonsville to a serious menace, instead of an occupation, and
again reducing the call for troops to a single division of cavalry.
Sheridan at once sent Merritt in motion toward Chester Gap, directing
Powell to follow, and he himself rode with Merritt to Front Royal,
meaning to pay his postponed visit to the Secretary of War at
Washington; but on the 16th, before quitting Front Royal, he was
overtaken by an officer from Wright bringing the words of the
strange message read off by our signal officers from the waving
flags of the Confederates in plain sight on the crest of Three Top
Mountain.(2) This message purported to have been sent by Longstreet
to Early. "Be ready," it said, "to move as soon as my forces join
you, and we will crush Sheridan." The true story of this despatch
has not until now been made public,(3) and many are the surmises,
clever or stupid, that have been wasted upon the mystery. In fact,
the message was, as both Sheridan and Wright naturally inferred,
a trick intended to deceive them; Early thought to induce them to
move back without waiting for the attack which, with his reduced
strength, he wished to avoid. The effect was to put the Union
commanders on their guard against what was actually about to happen.
Therefore Sheridan instantly turned back all the cavalry save one
regiment, which he kept for an escort, and rode on to Rectortown,
and so went by rail to Washington--first, however, taking the
precaution to warn Wright to strengthen his position, to close in
Powell from Front Royal, to look well to the ground, and to be
prepared. In his official report of the campaign, Sheridan, speaking
of the events now to be related, said:
"This surprise was owing probably to not closing in Powell or that
the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were placed at the
right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there was
but little danger of attack."
But it is important to observe and remember that although Wright,
in sending Longstreet's message, had remarked--
"If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry he might,
by turning my right, give us a great deal of trouble. . . . I shall
only fear an attack on my right,"
yet Sheridan in his reply made no allusion to any difference of
opinion on his part as to the place of danger. His instructions
to close in Powell, Torbert, under Wright's direction, executed by
calling in Moore's brigade to cover Buckton's Ford, on the left
and rear of Crook. Powell, with the rest of his division, was left
at Front Royal to hold off Lomax.
Sheridan went on to Washington. Arriving there on the morning of
the 17th, he at once asked for a special train to take him to
Martinsburg at noon, and having, between a late breakfast and an
early luncheon, transacted all his business at the War Office,
including the conversion of the government to his views, set out
to rejoin his command. With him went two engineer officers,
Alexander and Thom, with whom he was to consult as to the best
point, if any, in the lower valley to be fortified and held; for
this venerable error was not dead, merely sleeping.
Torbert rejoined the army at Cedar Creek on the 16th, and Merritt
took up his old position on the right. On the same night Rosser
took one of his brigades with a brigade of infantry mounted behind
the horsemen, and, supported by the whole of Early's army, set out
to capture the outlying brigade of Custer's division, but found
instead a single troop on picket duty. This he took, but it was
a rather mortifying issue to his heavy preparations and great
expectations, and a long price to pay for putting Torbert on the
alert.
For the next two days nothing was seen of Early, although the
cavalry and both of the infantry corps of the main line kept a good
watch toward the front. There was some probability that Early
would attack, especially if he should have heard of Wright's
departure and not of his return. That Early must either attack
soon or withdraw to the head of the valley was certain, for Sheridan
had stripped the country of the supplies on which the Confederates
had been accustomed to rely, and Early had now to feed his men and
animals by the long haul of seventy-five miles from Staunton. It
was thus that Wright viewed the situation, and in fact the same
things were passing through the mind of Early. On the 18th of
October, Crook, by Wright's orders, sent Harris with his brigade
of Thoburn's division, to find out where Early really was and what
he was doing. How far Harris went is not certainly known, but when
he returned at nightfall he reported that he had been to Early's
old camps and found them evacuated. In reality Early was at Fisher's
Hill with his whole force, engaged in his last preparations for
the surprise of the morrow, but the report brought back by Harris
soon spread as a camp rumor among the officers and men of Crook,
so that they may have slept that night without thought of danger
near, and even the vigilance of their picket line, as well as that
of the cavalry to whom they largely looked for protection against
a surprise, may or may not have been inopportunely relaxed.
For Early, warned of the strength of Sheridan's right, by the
failure of Rosser's adventure, had since been studying the chances
of an attack on the opposite flank. To this indeed the very
difficulty of the approach invited, for in all wars enterprises
apparently impracticable have been carelessly guarded against and
positions apparently impregnable have been loosely watched and
lightly defended, so that it might not be too much to say that
every insurmountable difficulty has been surmounted and every
impregnable stronghold taken. Such apprehensions as the commander
of the Union army may be supposed to have entertained were directed
toward his right, where Torbert was, and where the back road to
Winchester gave easy access to his rear.
While Early was engaged in considering this plan, he sent Gordon,
accompanied by Major Hotchkiss of the engineers, to the signal
station on the crest of Three Top Mountain to examine the position
of the Union army and to study the details of the proposed movement.
From this height these officers looked down upon the country about
Cedar Creek as upon an amphitheatre and saw the Union camps as in
a panorama. Every feature was in plain view; they counted the
tents; they noted the dispositions for attack; they made out the
exact situation of the various headquarters; and casting careful
glances into the shadowy depths of the Shenandoah, winding about
the foot of the mountain far below them, they perceived that the
flank of Three Top afforded a footing for the passage of the infantry
at least. Upon this information Early was not long in deciding
upon his course. Under cover of the night he would send the
divisions of Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram,(4) all under the command
of Gordon, over the Shenandoah near Fisher's Hill, across the
ox-bow, to the foot of Three Top. Thence picking his way over the
foot of the mountain, Gordon in two columns was to cross the river
a second time at McInturff's Ford, just below the mouth of Cedar
Creek and at Bowman's Ford, several hundred yards below. There he
would find himself on the flank and in easy reach of the rear of
Crook, and indeed of the whole Union army, with nothing but a thin
line of pickets to hinder the rush. While Gordon was thus stealthily
creeping into position for his spring, Early meant to take Kershaw
and Wharton upon the valley road and quietly to gain a good position
for assailing Crook and Emory in front, as soon as the rifles of
Gordon should be heard toward the rear. Rosser was to drive in
the cavalry on the right of the Union army, while Lomax, from the
Luray, was expected to gain the valley road somewhere near Newtown,
so as to cut off the retreat. Everything that could jingle or
rattle was to be left behind, and the march was to be made in dead
silence, while, as the rumble of the guns would be sure to reveal
the movement, the whole of the artillery was massed at Strasburg,
all ready to gallop to the front as soon as the battle should begin.
A closer study of the trail showed Gordon that it would be possible,
however difficult and risky, for dismounted troopers to lead their
horses over the path already marked out for his infantry. Accordingly
the cavalry brigade of Payne was added to Gordon's column, and
after surprising and making good the passage of the fords, the
first duty of these horsemen was to ride straight to Belle Grove
House and capture Sheridan. Early supposed Sheridan to be still
present in command.
Bold as was Early's design of surprising and attacking the vastly
superior forces of Sheridan, under conditions that must inevitably
stake everything upon the hazard of complete success, it may well
be doubted whether in the whole history of war an instance can be
found of any similar plan so carefully and successfully arranged
and so completely carried out in every detail, up to the moment
that must be looked for in the execution of every operation of war,
when the shock of battle comes and puts even the wisest prevision
in suspense.
(1) As the wounding of Sharpe left no officer present with his
brigade of higher rank than lieutenant-colonel, Emory took Colonel
Daniel Macauley, 11th Indiana, from the 4th brigade and placed him
in command of the 3d.
(2) According to Sheridan, agreeing with the general recollection
of the survivors; but Wright and Early both say Round Top, which
is behind Fisher's Hill. Might not the message sent from Round
Top have been repeated from Three Top?
(3) To the courtesy and kindness of General Early, the author is
greatly indebted for the key to the riddle. Under date of Lynchburg,
Virginia, November 6, 1890, he writes: "The signal message . . .
was altogether fictitious. As Sheridan's troops occupied the north
bank of Cedar Creek in such a strong position as to render it
impracticable for me to attack them in front, I went to the signal
station just in my rear for the purpose of examining the position,
and I found the officer in charge of the station reading some
signals that were being sent by the Federal signal agents. I then
asked him if the other side could read his signals and he told me
that they had discovered the key to the signals formerly used, but
that a change had been made. I then wrote the message purporting
to be from Longstreet and had it signalled in full view of the
Federal signal men whom we saw on the hill in front of my position,
so that it might be read by them. My object was to induce Sheridan
to move back his troops from the position they then occupied, and
I am inclined to think that if he had then been present with his
command he would have done so. However, the movement was not made,
and I then determined to make the attack which was made on the 19th
of October. The object of that attack was to prevent any troops
from being returned to Grant's army."
(4) Observe that Ramseur was now commanding the division that had
been Rodes's; Pegram having succeeded to Ramseur's old division.