policy which would attempt to make England a first-rate military
Power. It seems to me that it would be little short of madness to
attempt any such gigantic undertaking. It is our true wisdom to
limit ourselves to that amount of military force which shall
enable us to defend our own shores, and to protect our great
dependencies abroad. If we can completely defend our own coasts,
it appears to me that the objects of our national policy have
been fulfilled.'
And then, as if he had in view the language of the noble Lord at the
head of the Government and that of his colleague the Member for London,
he proceeded to say,--
'I wish to see a cessation of that inordinate and senseless
desire which has been sometimes expressed of late, almost
usurping the functions of Providence, that we should go to almost
all parts of the world to redress wrong and to see that right is
done.'
I say that the right hon. Gentleman had the language of his colleagues
in view, and when he speaks he will no doubt admit that such was the
case. For what did the noble Lord the Secretary for the Colonies say
when he addressed the baillies and the enthusiastic citizens of
Greenock? He said,--
'It is likewise to be considered, and I trust we shall none of us
forget it, that this country holds an important position among
the nations of the world--that not once, but many times, she has
stood forward to resist oppression, to maintain the independence
of weaker nations, to preserve to the general family of nations
that freedom, that power of governing themselves, of which others
have sought to deprive them. I trust that character will not be
forgotten, will not be abandoned by a people which is now
stronger in means, which is more populous and more wealthy than
it ever has been at any former period. This then, you will agree
with me, is not the period to abandon any of those duties towards
the world, towards the whole of mankind, which Great Britain has
hitherto performed.'
Now let us see what the right hon. Gentleman said, after having accepted
the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman made
a speech, and it was just after the death of the late Emperor of Russia,
and, in referring to the new Emperor, he said,--
'If, however, it should please this mighty Potentate to continue
in the course of aggression upon which his father had entered,
and if our reasonable hopes of a more pacific policy should be
disappointed, then let him know that in England he will find a
country prepared to maintain its own rights and the rights of
other nations.'
Observe, 'the rights of other nations;' and he goes on,--
'A country which, although its army has been placed in a perilous
position, and has had to undergo the rigours of a Russian winter,
has its resources unimpaired, has its revenue flourishing, has
its trade substantially undiminished, has its spirit unbroken,
and will be prepared, in case of necessity, to vindicate its own
honour, and to maintain the rights and liberties of Europe.'
I wish the House to observe what a complete change there is in the
language of the right hon. Gentleman upon these two occasions. Either of
the two opinions which he expressed may be right, but both of them
cannot be so, and I confess that when I find that a Gentleman says one
thing one day, and a month later, when he comes into office, the exact
opposite, I do not think that I can be expected to have that confidence
in him as to be willing to entrust him with the vast issues depending on
the war.
I will now refer to a colleague of the right hon. Gentleman--one who has
also distinguished himself--I mean the First Lord of the Admiralty. That
right hon. Gentleman (Sir C. Wood) has said nothing upon the subject of
the war, and I have felt that he must entertain great doubts as to its
policy; but, not very long ago, he also addressed his constituents, and
indulged in very hostile and insulting language towards 'our great and
magnanimous ally;' but he, too, has changed his mind; and not long ago
he went down by express train to Folkestone or Dover--I forget which--to
meet in the most friendly, and probably in the most humble manner, the
very potentate whom he had formerly abused.
If I have disposed of these Gentlemen and shown why I can have no
confidence in them, are there any better reasons why I should have
confidence in those two noble Lords who were the active and restless
spirits in the Cabinet which the noble Lord the Member for London
overthrew? I regard those noble Lords as responsible for the policy of
this war. I am bound to suppose that they acted in accordance with their
conscientious convictions; but, still, the fact of their having embarked
in that policy is no reason why I should have confidence in them. But,
are those two noble Lords men in whom the House and country ought to
place implicit confidence? What of late could be more remarkable than
the caprices of the noble Lord the Member for London? When that noble
Lord was in the Government of Lord Aberdeen he went to Greenock, I think
to Bedford, and certainly to Bristol--and, in fact, he took every
opportunity which offered itself of bringing himself before the public;
and, with his power of speech, his long experience, and eminent
character, did his utmost to stimulate the feelings of the people to a
policy which I believe to be destructive, and which I think the majority
of this House in calm moments does not believe to have been the wisest
which could have been pursued. It certainly appears to me to be
unjustifiable that, while Lord Aberdeen was honestly endeavouring to
bring the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion, the noble Lord was
taking a course which rendered statesmanship valueless in conducting the
foreign policy of the nation. The noble Lord, however, at last brought
his conduct to a climax. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr.
Roebuck) came forward as a little David with sling and stone--weapons
which he did not even use, but at the sight of which the Whig Goliath
went howling and vanquished to the back benches.
I am afraid, Sir, to trust myself to speak of the conduct of the noble
Lord on that occasion. I presume that we shall have to wait for the
advent of that Somersetshire historian, whose coming the noble Lord
expects, before we know whether his conduct on that occasion was, what
some persons still call it, treachery to his chief, or whether it arose
from that description of moral cowardice which in every man is the death
of all true statesmanship. But in the year 1853 the noble Lord the
Member for London gave me a strong reason why I should feel no
confidence in his present chief. The House will remember that he then
ejected the present First Minister under whom he now serves from the
Cabinet of which he himself was then the head, and in the explanation
which he made to the House, he told us that men like Lord Grey and Lord
Melbourne, men of age, of authority, and experience, had been able in
some degree to control his noble Friend, but, that he being younger than
the noble Lord, and having been a shorter time on the political stage,
had found it difficult to control him. The description which the noble
Lord might give of his colleague is a little like that which we
occasionally see given of a runaway horse--that he got the bit between
his teeth, and there was no holding him.
The noble Lord the Member for London was the captain of the State
vessel, and the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton was the mate. But how
is it now? The noble Lord the Member for the City of London has accepted
the position of mate in the most perilous times, in the most tempestuous
weather, and he goes to sea with no chart on a most dangerous and
interminable voyage, and with the very reckless captain whom he would
not trust as mate. Sir, the noble Lord the Member for London has made a
defence of his conduct at the Conferences at Vienna. I am willing to
give him credit that he did then honestly intend peace; but I do think
that when he goes again, and on such a journey, he will do well to leave
some of his historic knowledge behind him. They were indeed historic
fancies. There is nothing to me so out of place as the comparison which
the noble Lord made between the limitation of the Russian fleet in the
Black Sea and the destruction of Dunkirk, or between the condition of
the Black Sea and that of the lakes of North America. The noble Lord can
never have heard of the Falls of Niagara. If there were Falls like them
between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean the cases would be somewhat
similar, for the Russian fleet in the Black Sea would not then be
exposed to the assaults of the vast navies of England or France. When I
allude to this subject, I am reminded of that Welshman whom Shakspeare
immortalised, who found some analogy between a river in Macedon and a
river in Monmouth. He knew the name of the river in Monmouth, and he did
not know the name of the river in Macedon, but he insisted upon the
analogy between them because there were salmon in both.
Well, Sir, I now come to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. I
do not complain that he is at the head of the Government. The noble Lord
the Member for the City of London had thrown everything into such
inextricable and unlooked-for confusion that any one next door to him
must necessarily occupy the place. But I cannot have confidence in the
noble Viscount, because I cannot but recollect that in 1850 he received
the condemnation of his foreign policy in the other House of Parliament;
and in a speech which I shall never forget, the last and one of the best
ever delivered by the greatest statesman of the time, he received a
similar condemnation, and the noble Viscount only escaped condemnation
by a direct vote of this House by the energetic defence of the noble
Lord the Member for the City of London, and by the stress laid upon many
Members on this side of the House. But only six weeks after this the
noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) presented to the noble Viscount a letter
from his Sovereign, which I cannot but think must have cost him much
pain, and to which I will not refer further, except to say that I do not
know how it is possible, if the contents of that letter were true, that
either the noble Lord or the House can be called upon to place implicit
confidence in the noble Lord the leader of the Government.
I have observed the noble Viscount's conduct ever since I have had the
honour of a seat in this House, and the noble Viscount will excuse me if
I state the reason why I have often opposed him. The reason is, that the
noble Viscount treats all these questions, and the House itself, with
such a want of seriousness that it has appeared to me that he has no
serious, or sufficiently serious, conviction of the important business
that so constantly comes before this House. I regard the noble Viscount
as a man who has experience, but who with experience has not gained
wisdom--as a man who has age, but who, with age, has not the gravity of
age, and who, now occupying the highest seat of power, has--and I say it
with pain--not appeared influenced by a due sense of the responsibility
that belongs to that elevated position.
We are now in the hands of these two noble Lords. They are the authors
of the war. It lies between them that peace was not made at Vienna upon
some proper terms. And whatever disasters may be in store for this
country or for Europe, they will lie at the doors of these noble Lords.
Their influence in the Cabinet must be supreme; their influence in this
House is necessarily great; and their influence with the country is
greater than that of any other two statesmen now upon the stage of
political life in England. They have carried on the war. They have,
however, not yet crippled Russia, although it is generally admitted that
they have almost destroyed Turkey. They have not yet saved Europe in its
independence and civilization,--they have only succeeded in convulsing
it. They have not added to the honour and renown of England, but they
have placed the honour and renown of this country in peril. The country
has been, I am afraid, the sport of their ancient rivalry, and I should
be very sorry if it should be the victim of the policy which they have
so long advocated.
There is only one other point upon which I will trouble the House, if it
will give me its attention. These Ministers--the right hon. Member for
Southwark, the Commissioner of the Board of Works, especially, and
evidently the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I am afraid many other
Members of this House--seem to think little of taxes. Some Members of
this House seem to have no patience with me if I speak of the cost of
the war; but I am obliged to ask its attention to this point. I
recollect reading in the life of Necker, that an aristocratic lady came
to him when he was Finance Minister of Louis XVI, and asked him to give
her 1,000 crowns from the public treasury--not an unusual demand in
those days. Necker refused to give the money. The lady started with
astonishment--she had an eye to the vast funds of the State, and she
asked, 'What can 1,000 crowns be to the King?' Necker's answer was,
'Madam! 1,000 crowns are the taxes of a whole village!'
I ask hon. Gentlemen what are the taxes of a whole village, and what
they mean? They mean bareness of furniture, of clothing, and of the
table in many a cottage in Lancashire, in Suffolk, and in Dorsetshire.
They mean an absence of medical attendance for a sick wife, an absence
of the school pence of three or four little children--hopeless toil to
the father of a family, penury through his life, a cheerless old age,
and, if I may quote the language of a poet of humble life, at last--'the
little bell tolled hastily for the pauper's funeral.' That is what taxes
mean. The hon. Member for Dorsetshire spoke the other night in a manner
rather flippant and hardly respectful to some of us on this question.
But the labourers of Dorsetshire as well as the weavers and spinners of
Lancashire are toiling, and must toil harder, longer, and with smaller
remuneration for every single 100_l_. that you extract in taxes
from the people in excess of what is necessary for the just requirements
of the Exchequer of the country. I hope I may be permitted to treat the
question on this ground, and I ask the House to recollect that when you
strike down the children in the cottage you attack also the children in
the palace. If you darken the lives and destroy the hopes of the humble
dwellers of the country, you also darken the prospects of those children
the offspring of your Queen, in whom are bound up so much of the
interests and so much of the hopes of the people of this country. If I
defend, therefore, the interests of the people on this point, I do not
the less defend the permanence of the dignity of the Crown.
We on this bench are not willing to place ourselves alongside of noble
Lords who are for carrying on this war with no definite object and for
an indefinite period, but are ready to take our chance of the verdict of
posterity whether they or we more deserve the character of statesmen in
the course we have taken on this question. The House must know that the
people are misled and bewildered, and that if every man in this House,
who doubts the policy that is being pursued, would boldly say so in this
House and out of it, it would not be in the power of the press to
mislead the people as it has done for the last twelve months. If they
are thus misled and bewildered, is it not the duty of this House to
speak with the voice of authority in this hour of peril? We are the
depositaries of the power and the guardians of the interests of a great
nation and of an ancient monarchy. Why should we not fully measure our
responsibility? Why should we not disregard the small-minded ambition
that struggles for place? and why should we not, by a faithful, just,
and earnest policy, restore, as I believe we may, tranquillity to Europe
and prosperity to the country so dear to us?
* * * * *
LETTER OF JOHN BRIGHT
TO ABSALOM WATKIN
ON THE RUSSIAN WAR
[This letter was originally published with notes containing extracts
from those authorities which confirmed the writer's views. The text of
these notes has been omitted, but the references have been retained. It
has been thought desirable to reprint this letter, as explaining the
policy which Mr. Bright thought it his duty to recommend--a policy which
was as wise and just as it was unfortunately unpopular.--J. E. T. R.]
[Mr. Absalom Watkin, of Manchester, having invited Mr. Bright to a
meeting about to be held in that city on behalf of the Patriotic Fund,
and having stated that in his opinion the present war was justified by
the authority of _Vattel_, Mr. Bright replied in the subjoined
letter.]
I think, on further consideration, you will perceive that the meeting on
Thursday next would be a most improper occasion for a discussion as to
the justice of the war. Just or unjust, the war is a fact, and the men
whose lives are miserably thrown away in it have clearly a claim upon
the country, and especially upon those who, by the expression of
opinions favourable to the war, have made themselves responsible for it.
I cannot, therefore, for a moment appear to discourage the liberality of
those who believe the war to be just, and whose utmost generosity, in my
opinion, will make but a wretched return for the ruin they have brought
upon hundreds of families.
With regard to the war itself, I am not surprised at the difference
between your opinion and mine, if you decide a question of this nature
by an appeal to _Vattel_. The 'law of nations' is not my law, and
at best it is a code full of confusion and contradictions, having its
foundation on custom, and not on a higher morality; and on custom which
has always been determined by the will of the strongest. It may be a
question of some interest whether the first crusade was in accordance
with the law and principles of _Vattel_; but whether the first
crusade was just, and whether the policy of the crusades was a wise
policy, is a totally different question. I have no doubt that the
American war was a just war according to the principles laid down by
writers on the 'law of nations,' and yet no man in his senses in this
country will now say that the policy of George III. towards the American
colonies was a wise policy, or that war a righteous war. The French war,
too, was doubtless just according to the same authorities; for there
were fears and anticipated dangers to be combatted, and law and order to
be sustained in Europe; and yet few intelligent men now believe the
French war to have been either necessary or just. You must excuse me if
I refuse altogether to pin my faith upon _Vattel_. There have been
writers on international law who have attempted to show that private
assassination and the poisoning of wells were justifiable in war: and
perhaps it would be difficult to demonstrate wherein these horrors
differ from some of the practices which are now in vogue. I will not ask
you to mould your opinion on these points by such writers, nor shall I
submit my judgment to that of _Vattel_.
The question of this present war is in two parts--first, was it
necessary for us to interfere by arms in a dispute between the Russians
and the Turks; and secondly, having determined to interfere, under
certain circumstances, why was not the whole question terminated when
Russia accepted the Vienna note? The seat of war is three thousand miles
away from us. We had not been attacked--not even insulted in any way.
Two independent Governments had a dispute, and we thrust ourselves into
the quarrel. That there was some ground for the dispute is admitted by
the four Powers in the proposition of the Vienna note. [Footnote:
Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell, March 7, 1853--Blue Book, part i. p.
87. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon., April 9 and
May 22, 1853--Ibid, part i. pp. 127 and 235. Lord John Russell to Sir G.
H. Seymour, February 9, 1853--Eastern Papers, part v. p. 8. Earl of
Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour, April 5, 1853--Ibid, part v. p. 22. Lord
Carlisle's Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters, p. 181.] But for the
English Minister at Constantinople and the Cabinet at home the dispute
would have settled itself, and the last note of Prince Menchikoff would
have been accepted, and no human being can point out any material
difference between that note and the Vienna note, afterwards agreed upon
and recommended by the Governments of England, France, Austria and
Prussia. But our Government would not allow the dispute to be settled.
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe held private interviews with the Sultan--did
his utmost to alarm him--insisted on his rejection of all terms of
accommodation with Russia, and promised him the armed assistance of
England if war should arise. [Footnote: Lord Stratford to the Earl of
Clarendon, May 19, 1853. See, however, a despatch of May 10--Blue Book,
part i. p. 213.]
The Turks rejected the Russian note, and the Russians crossed the Pruth,
occupying the Principalities as a 'material guarantee.' I do not defend
this act of Russia: it has always appeared to me impolitic and immoral;
but I think it likely it could be well defended out of _Vattel_,
and it is at least as justifiable as the conduct of Lord John Russell
and Lord Palmerston in 1850, when they sent ten or twelve ships of war
to the Piraeus, menacing the town with a bombardment if the dishonest
pecuniary claims made by Don Pacifico were not at once satisfied.
[Footnote: Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow, February, 1850.]