humbling Russia. I am, of course, willing to admit that when people go
to war they are not expected to be very nice in their treatment of each
other, and, if the taking of Sebastopol be an object of those who are in
favour of the war, to take Sebastopol they will inflict any injury they
can upon Russia. But the noble Lord told us last year that he still
intended to leave Russia a great empire. I thought that exceedingly
considerate of the noble Lord, and I understand--I think it has been
stated in the public papers--that it is considered at St. Petersburg a
great condescension on the part of so eminent a statesman. Well, then,
if we are not going to war for nationalities, nor for conquest, nor for
any such crippling of Russia as would be effected by her dismemberment,
we come to this simple question--in the condition in which Turkey has
long existed, what are the means by which the security of Turkey can be
best guaranteed? No man asserts that the security of Turkey can be
absolute, but that it must be partial and conditional. As it is well to
have high authority for these statements, I have here an extract from a
speech made by Lord Clarendon a few nights ago on the Resolution moved
by Lord Grey. The noble Lord then stated:--
'My noble Friend says, and says truly, that the attainment of all
this would offer no security to Turkey. The value of a treaty
must always depend upon the spirit in which it is agreed to, and
the good faith with which it is entered into. No treaty can make
a weak Power like Turkey perfectly safe against a powerful
neighbour immediately in contact with her, if that neighbour is
determined to act the aggressive towards her.'--[3
_Hansard_, cxxxviii. 1152.]
Thus Lord Clarendon admits, what is perfectly obvious to the common
sense of all who have heard anything of Russia or Turkey, except from
the lips of the Prime Minister, that what we are seeking to obtain is
not an absolute security for Turkey, but a conditional security, such as
her circumstances, her population, her government, and geographical
position render attainable by her friends and allies. We have now been
fourteen months at war, and two Cabinets--the Cabinets of Lord Aberdeen
and of the present First Minister--I might say four Cabinets, for the
Cabinets of France and Austria must have agreed to the same thing--have
agreed to certain terms, and have offered them to Russia. They have been
accepted as the basis of negotiations, conferences have been opened, and
certain proceedings towards a settlement have taken place; and now I
should like to know whether the terms which were offered were offered in
earnest. Judging of the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen by the conduct of some
of its Members, and especially of Lord Aberdeen himself, I am certain
that they were sincere in the terms they offered. But the _Times_
newspaper, which now in its many changes has become the organ and great
stimulant of the present Cabinet, expresses its astonishment that any
person should think that peace was intended by the Conferences at
Vienna. The _Times_ states that the object of the Conferences was
not to bring about a peace, but to shame Austria into becoming a
faithful and warlike ally.
Now, when the noble Lord the Member for London was sent to Vienna to
negotiate, I confess I was one of those who formed the opinion that the
noble Lord, amid the many eccentricities of his career, would not have
undertaken that mission unless he himself had been honest with regard to
the terms to be offered, and anxious, if possible, to consolidate a
peace. There were, however, certain persons--malicious people, of
course--who found out that it would be convenient to the First Minister
to have the noble Lord at a distance, at least for a time. But I never
adopted that idea. I did not believe that the noble Lord's journey to
Vienna, with a retinue that required him to occupy no less than thirty-
two rooms in one hotel, would have been undertaken unless the noble Lord
considered that the object was a reality, on which the interests of the
country and of Europe depended. I think he would have been the last man
in the country to lend himself to such a miserable hoax as going to
Vienna, not to make peace, but to shame Austria into becoming a faithful
and warlike ally. I assume, therefore, that terms were sincerely
offered, and that those terms gave guarantees which were sufficient, and
a security which was as ample as the circumstances admitted for the
integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is from that
starting-point that I would discuss this question.
There are hon. Members in this House who think that even if those terms
were obtained they would still be in no degree a compensation for the
enormous sacrifices which the country has made. I happen to hold the
same opinion, and it was with that conviction that I protested against
going into the war. Indeed, I think that the argument I used a year ago,
that nothing to be obtained in the war could at all approach a
compensation for the enormous sacrifices the country would be called
upon to make, has been greatly strengthened. Well, Sir, the terms
offered are called 'bases:' from which one understands, not that they
are everything, but that they are something capable of what diplomatists
call 'development.' I recollect a question asked of a child at school,
in one of those lessons called 'object lessons,' 'What is the basis of a
batter pudding?' It was obvious that flour was the basis, but the eggs
and the butter and the rest were developments and additions. But if the
bases are capable of development, so I take it for granted that the
meaning of negotiation is not the offering of an _ultimatum_, but
the word involves to every man's sense the probability of concession--
butter, it may be--but concession of one sort or another.
I will not go through all the Four Points, because the attention of the
House ought really to be centred upon the third article and the matters
connected with it. The House must remember that this article involves
two most important subjects--first, the territorial guarantee, which if
it were sufficiently secured would be everything the House and the
country required from the war--namely, that the territories of Turkey
shall never be molested, so long as the treaty shall continue, by any of
the great Powers who are parties to such treaty; and, secondly, that the
preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea shall cease. Now, the
territorial guarantee was granted without difficulty. [An hon. Member:
'No.'] Well, no difficulty was made about the territorial guarantee but
this:--Prince Gortchakoff said, very wisely, that he would not enter
into an absolute pledge to go to war in case of any infraction of the
treaty, and the noble Lord who said 'No' will find, when he has examined
the question a little more closely, that it does not make the slightest
difference as to the actual results of a treaty whether a Power
guarantees in the mode proposed by Russia, or in the manner proposed by
the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, because, when an
infraction of a treaty occurs, the power of judging whether any of the
Governments who are parties to such treaty should go to war or not, is
left with each individual Government. If, for example, France stretched
her dominions westward towards Morocco, or eastward towards Tunis or
Tripoli, it would, of course, have been the duty, and would have been in
the power of Russia, even had she accepted the exact terms proposed by
the allies, to judge for herself whether a case had arisen which
required her to go to war, or which justified her in doing so.
Such a case arose very lately with reference to Schleswig-Holstein. We
were bound, under an ancient treaty, to go to war in the event of the
infraction of certain treaties affecting Schleswig-Holstein; but when
this case occurred the subject was considered by the Government, the
noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) being at the time, I believe, Foreign
Secretary--who most wisely and properly, not only for this country, but
for the interests of Schleswig-Holstein and of Europe, declined to act
upon what was represented to be the strict letter of the treaty, and
England did not engage in war in consequence of the disputes which then
took place. I must say that what seems to me as the most statesmanlike
and elevated declaration in the protocols is the statement of Prince
Gortchakoff, that the blood of Russia is the property of Russia, and
that he will not pledge himself that years hence--it may be even a
century hence--the blood of Russia shall be shed in a cause which, when
the time arrives, may be one which would be altogether unworthy of such
a sacrifice.
With respect to the question of the Christian protectorate, the House
will probably recollect that it was represented over and over again by
Ministers in this House--it was stated in the speeches of Lord Clarendon
in another place--that the proposition of Russia, as conveyed in the
Menchikoff note, was intended to transfer the virtual sovereignty of
10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of Ottoman subjects to the Czar. If that were
so, the Menchikoff note and all the old protectorate treaties being
abolished, surely the House will consider whether the combination of the
three propositions--the territorial guarantees, the Christian
protectorate, and the Black Sea project--do not give such securities to
Turkey as the condition of Turkey will permit. Now the preponderance of
Russia in the Black Sea, as I think my hon. Friend the Member for the
West Riding (Mr. Cobden) showed very clearly the other evening, is in a
certain sense a fact which all the negotiations in the world cannot
write off. I see that one of the public journals this morning,
commenting upon my hon. Friend's speech, says, 'Yes, truly, the
commercial preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea is a fact which
cannot be denied;' and then proceeds to argue that it does not follow
that Russia should have a political and naval preponderance. But I do
not know any case in which there is a commercial supremacy in a sea like
the Black Sea that is not followed by a preponderance of every other
kind. The question now is, however, how is that preponderance to cease?
The noble Lord the Member for the City of London referred the other
night to a proposition made by the French Government, but which, I
think, does not appear at all distinctly in the protocols, with regard
to making the Black Sea a neutral sea. I conceive that was so monstrous
a proposition, in the present condition of Europe, that I am surprised
it should have been entertained for a moment by any sensible man. I
supposed it was found so utterly indefensible that it does not appear as
a distinct proposition in the protocols. This proposal of making the
Black Sea a neutral sea gave place to another project, and it appears to
me very like asking Russia, voluntarily or by compulsion, to perform the
operation of amputation upon herself. I maintain that the third article
as offered to Russia in December last could not mean what the noble Lord
offered to Russia at Vienna, because the cessation of preponderance does
not mean the transfer of preponderance, but rather the establishment of
an equilibrium--not the destruction of an equilibrium and the
establishment of preponderance on the other side.
Some hon. Gentlemen talk as if Russia were a Power which you could take
to Bow Street, and bind over before some stipendiary magistrate to keep
the peace for six months. Russia is a great Power, as England is, and in
treating with her you must consider that the Russian Government has to
consult its own dignity, its own interests, and public opinion, just as
much at least as the Government of this country. Now, what was the
proposition of this third article? The proposal was, that Russia should
have eight ships; but what was the proposition with regard to her
present antagonists? That Turkey should also have eight ships, that
France should have four, and that England should have four; and I
believe that in a preceding protocol, which has not been alluded to in
this debate, it is proposed that the contracting Powers should have two
ships each at the mouth of the Danube, so that if these terms had been
agreed upon, Russia would have had eight ships in the Black Sea, while
Turkey, France, and England would have had twenty. Now, that is not a
mere cessation of a preponderance; it is not the establishment of an
equilibrium; it is a transfer of the supremacy of the Black Sea from
that country which, if any country should be supreme there, has the best
claim--namely, Russia. Besides this, however, Turkey would have had
whatever ships she liked in the Bosphorus, and the allies would also
have had as many ships as they chose in the Mediterranean and the
Levant.
Now, let us for a moment consider the offer with which Russia met this
proposal. The first proposition was that of the open Straits, which is
disapproved by the hon. Baronet opposite. I am not about to say that
this proposition should have been accepted in preference to the other,
but I think it is the true interest of Europe, and also of Turkey
itself, that the Straits should be thrown open. At any rate, it must be
admitted that the preponderance of Russia, in the sense in which we now
understand it, would be absolutely destroyed if the Straits were thrown
open. Russia made a proposition which appears to me to be highly
satisfactory--that such regulations should be made by the Sultan and his
Government with regard to the position and duration of the anchorages of
ships between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea as would preclude the
possibility, so far as there were means of doing so, of any
inconvenience or danger to Constantinople from the opening of the
Straits. If that had been agreed to, all nations would have been
entitled to the passage of the Straits, and I believe that all nations
would equally have respected the privilege thus granted to them. Now,
suppose these Straits, instead of being one mile wide, had been ten
miles wide, what difference would it make to Turkey? If the Straits were
ten miles wide they would be open. Turkey would have no right to close
them, and European nations would not permit her to pretend to, or to
exercise, any such power; but Constantinople would be no more secure
then than it would be now with the Straits open, whether they were ten
miles wide or one mile wide. If the Straits were open, the consequences
to Constantinople and to Turkey appear to me to be precisely the same.
Turkey would be equally safe; Turkey would be equally menaced. Our
fleets would visit the Black Sea in the course of the season, and the
Russian Black Sea fleet, if it chose, would visit the Mediterranean.
There would be no sort of pretence for wrangling about the Straits; and
the balance of power--if I may use the term--between the fleets of
Russia, France, and England, would be probably the best guarantee that
could be offered for the security of Constantinople and Turkey, so far
as they are in danger of aggression either from the Black Sea or the
Mediterranean.
But it is said, the Sultan's sovereignty would be menaced--that he has
an undoubted right to close the Straits. I doubt whether that right will
be very long maintained; but if it be maintained, and if you are to
reject any proposition which interferes with the Sultan's sovereignty, I
ask you whether the sovereignty of the Czar is not as dear to him? and
whether, if, in negotiations of this kind, you can find any mode of
attaining your object without inflicting injury upon either the
sovereignty of the Sultan or the Czar, it would not be much more
statesmanlike to adopt it, and so to frame your treaties that neither
should feel that it was subjected to an indignity, and therefore seek to
violate such treaties at the first opportunity? Well, but the second
proposition, which I think the hon. Baronet approved, and which I think
the noble Lord proposed, was, that the Sultan should open the Straits at
will. I ask the House whether that proposition, if accepted, would not
imply that the Sultan could have no other enemy than Russia?--which I
think is doubtful. If the Black Sea were open to the West, and the
Mediterranean closed to the East, surely that is assuming that the
Sultan could have no enemy but Russia. The Sultan could close the
Straits to Russia, but the Western Powers could always proceed to the
Black Sea. The French plan, in my opinion, exposed Turkey far more to
the West than the Russian plan exposed her to the East. Nothing can be
more short-sighted than the notion which the noble Lord the Member for
London started at the conferences, that Turkey could have no enemy but
Russia. In fact, everybody there seemed to be on exceedingly good terms
with himself. The Austrian Minister said nobody would suspect Austria--
no one could be suspected but Russia. But our experience for many years
will tell us that there has been just as much menace from the West as
from the East--the rapacity of the West is not less perceptible than
that of the East. ['Hear.'] Some one expresses a sentiment in opposition
--it is a gentleman who has never read the Blue Books--he does not know
that almost the whole of this business began in a threat of the most
audacious and insulting character from the Ambassador of France--a
threat to order up the French fleet to the Dardanelles, and further to
land an expedition in Syria to take possession of Jerusalem and the
whole of the Holy Places. Do you mean to tell me, you and the noble Lord
himself, who tried to frighten the country with the notion of the French
fleet coming to invade England, that the fleet which three years ago
threatened England, and more recently threatened the Dardanelles, has
for ever abandoned rapacious desires, and that therefore there will
never again be a menace against Turkey from France?
I understand, however, there is a very different opinion prevalent upon
the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Emperor of Morocco, a
potentate somewhat allied to this country, as I am told his empress is
an Irish lady--the Emperor of Morocco, who is not very well versed in
what is going on in this House, has been making inquiries of the most
anxious character as to whether the particular guarantee which the noble
Lord was going to enter into included the territory of Morocco; and I
understand he has not been able to find it out from the most assiduous
study of the Gibraltar newspapers. It so happens that the Governor of
Gibraltar--the noble Lord at the head of the Government corrected me the
other night when I called him an irrational man--has issued an ordinance
by which he has entirely suppressed the newspaper press in that town and
garrison.
Now we come to the question, which of the propositions would be most
secure? I was very much struck by an observation which fell from my hon.
Colleague (Mr. M. Gibson) in the course of his speech the other night--a
point I think very worthy of the attention of the House and of the
Government; he said the limitation plan was one which must depend for
its efficacy on the will and fidelity of Russia. I am not one of those
who believe Russia to be the treacherous and felonious Power which she
is described to be by the press of this country, as she is described by
the noble Lord to be. I believe the right hon. Baronet the Member for
Southwark gave her the same character. Although Russia may not be more
treacherous than other Powers, when you are making a bargain with her,
it is better you should make the efficacy of the terms depend more on
your own vigilance than on her good faith. The noble Lord the Member for
London has admitted that the limitation plan is, after all, an
inefficient one. He said that Russia might get another ship--perhaps
three or four--and when she had doubled the navy permitted to her,
perhaps the noble Lord would be writing despatches about it, although I
am not sure he would do that. I think it would be holding out a
temptation to buy Mr. Scott Russell's great ship as one of the eight
ships she is to be allowed to keep by the treaty.
My hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding remarked that Russia might
purchase vessels of large size from the United States, and still keep
within the prescribed limit; but if this great ship, now building in the
Thames, should succeed, as I hope she will, Russia might buy her and
send her into the Black Sea. Somebody says she could not go there
without passing the Straits, but, as she is built for mercantile
purposes, that monster vessel might freely be taken up, and then form
one of the eight ships allowed to Russia. Another proposition has been
alluded to by the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Sir W. Clay)--that
pointed out by the Russian Plenipotentiary--that Russia and Turkey
should enter into a friendly treaty between themselves and arrange that
point; but the other diplomatists would not allow it, unless it were
done under the eyes of the conference and bearing the same features of
force and compulsion as their proposal of the limitation possessed. I
was astonished to hear the hon. Baronet, as I understood him, say that,
even although it could be shown that the Russian propositions were
better than our own, he thought the proposition which bore on its face
coercion of Russia was most desirable. A more unstatesman-like and
immoral view upon a great question between nations I have rarely heard
of. [Sir William Clay rose, and was understood to deny the sentiments
imputed to him by the hon. Member.] I understood my hon. Friend so.
Perhaps he did not mean what I thought he did mean, but that was the
conclusion I came to from his argument, and I do not think he will say I
entirely misrepresented him. It has, however, been said by the press
that, whether we were sincere or not at the conference, Russia was not.
Hon. Gentlemen have read in the _Times_ and other papers blowing
the flames of war, that from first to last Russia was treacherous and
insincere. I would put it to the noble Lord the Member for London
whether he can say that was the case, for I observe he said, in his
speech in this House on the 23rd of January last, in answer to a
question from the hon. Member for Aylesbury, or some other Member--
'My hon. Friend will see that by that act the Russian
Plenipotentiary accepted this interpretation as the basis of
negotiation, of course reserving to himself the power, when this
basis shall have been laid down in a definite article, of making
any observations on the part of his Government which he should
think proper.'--[3 _Hansard_ cxxxvi. 911]
Of course the Russian Plenipotentiary, when he accepted it, did so upon
the understanding that it was the basis of negotiation and discussion,
as no one will deny it was a question capable of being solved in more
ways than one, and it was no indication of insincerity for him to refuse
the precise mode proposed by the Plenipotentiary for England. With
regard to the terms proposed, I should like to read to the House a
statement I have on very good authority as to the language which Prince
Gortchakoff held at Vienna. The statement I have is not to be found in
the protocols, but I believe it may be relied upon as the precise words
he used. The noble Lord insisted, as I understand, that it was no
indignity to ask Russia to limit the number of her ships in the Black
Sea; but I would submit it is precisely the same in principle as if she
were asked to limit the amount of her force in the Crimea to four or six
regiments. Prince Gortchakoff said--
'To ask from an independent Power that it should limit its force,
is to assail its rights of sovereignty on its own territory. It
is with a bad grace that they would sustain the rights of the
Sultan and wish to attack those of the Emperor of Russia. The
proposition to render the Black Sea inaccessible to vessels of
war of all nations is so strange (_si bizarre_) that one is
astonished to see the fate of nations confided to men such as
those who have conceived it. How could it be believed that Russia
would consent to give herself up disarmed at the good pleasure of
the Napoleons and the Palmerstons, who will be able themselves to
have armed forces in the Mediterranean?'