take India as it is, the empire with all your annexations as it stands,
and to see if it is not possible to do something better with it than you
have done before, and to give it a chance in future years of redeeming
not only the character of the Government but its financial and
legislative position. The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) says there cannot be
any great diminution in the expenditure for the Civil Service of India;
but I do not in the least agree with the Secretary for India when he
says that the gentlemen of the Civil Service in that country are not
overpaid. Every one knows that they are overpaid; except some very high-
salaried bishops of whom we have heard, no men are so grossly overpaid
as the officials of the Civil Service in India. The proof of this may be
found everywhere. Look at the Island of Ceylon; there the duties are as
arduous and the climate as unfavourable as in India; yet the Government
does not pay its officials there more than one-half or two-thirds of the
salaries they are paid in India. There are in India itself many hundreds
of Europeans, the officers of the Indian army, all the Indian clergy,
and missionaries; there are also English merchants, carrying on their
business at rates of profit not much exceeding the profits made in this
country. But the Civil Service of the Indian Government, like everything
privileged and exclusive, is a pampered body; and, notwithstanding it
has produced some few able men who have worthily done their duty, I do
not think the Civil Service of India deserves the loud praise we have so
frequently heard awarded to it by speakers in this House. Now if you
could reduce the expense of the Civil Service by any considerable
amount, the best thing you could do with the money would be to increase
the establishment by sending a greater number of competent persons as
magistrates, collectors, and officials into the distant provinces, and
thereby double the facilities for good government in those districts. If
you could reduce the income of the Civil Service one half, you could for
the same money have a more efficient Service throughout India than at
present. You might not save money, but you would get a more complete
Service for it.
But the military question the House of Commons will certainly have to
take in hand; though Secretaries for India are afraid to grapple with
it, I am not astonished that they feel some hesitation in doing so, for
from every one connected with the Military Service they would hear the
strongest objections to reducing the number of the troops. But let me
ask the Committee to consider what it has just heard. Before the Revolt
the European troops in India numbered 45,000 and the Native troops
250,000; now the 45,000 European troops are 110,000, and the 250,000
Native soldiers are raised to 300,000. What was it that we heard during
the Indian mutiny; what was the cause of all the letters that appeared
in the newspapers? Every man said that the great evil was having a
Native army far larger than was required. That has been the source of
peril, and that was the real cause of the mutiny. Now we have even a
larger portion of this most perilous element than we had before. The
authorities of India do not appear to have learnt anything from the
mutiny, or they have learnt that all that was said in this House and in
this country was untrue, because they have 50,000 more Native troops
than they had before the mutiny. Therefore, the mode of argument appears
to be this:--A Native army was the cause of the mutiny, the cause of all
our perils, and now it is necessary to have more of it; and, as that is
the perilous element, of course 45,000 troops are not sufficient to keep
them in check; therefore, you have at present 110,000; and certain
officers who were examined, and the Commissioners who reported,
recommended that you should always have at least 80,000 Europeans there.
If we are only to have one body of troops to watch another, it seems to
me there can be no hope of any diminution of our military force, nor any
real reduction in our expenditure. Why is it that you require all this
army? Let me ask the Committee to look at the matter as sensible men of
business. The Revolt, which has been such a terrible affair, has been
suppressed. It was suppressed mainly by the 45,000 men in India, and not
by the 110,000 you have succeeded in placing there at a later period.
More than that, there is not at the present moment any alarming amount
of dissatisfaction in India, or at least the dissatisfied are
dispirited, and have lost all hope of resisting the power of England,
and must for a long period, I think, remain wholly dispirited. At the
same time, you have disarmed the people over a vast province. There are
millions of people in India, a great number of whom were previously in
possession of arms, who do not now possess a single weapon. I have seen
in the last accounts, only a day or two since, a statement that not less
than 1,400 forts in the kingdom of Oude alone have been destroyed, and
we know that many more have been destroyed in other parts. There is at
this moment no power for combined organized armed resistance against
you, except that which is in the Native army, which the Indian
Government has been building up of late to a greater extent than ever.
The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) spoke of one point--the great importance
of which I admit--the want of confidence and sympathy that must have
arisen between the two races in consequence of the transactions of the
last two years. The shock of revolt must have created great suspicion
and hatred and fear, and there is nothing out of which panic grows so
easily as out of those conditions. I believe that is the case in India,
and perhaps there are indications of something of the kind at home.
There is a panic, therefore, and neither the Governor-General nor the
Civil Service nor military officers can make up their minds that they
are safe, recollecting the transactions of the past two years, in having
a less military force than we now have in India. But if you ask those
gentlemen they will never say they have enough. There are admirals here,
as we know, who are perfectly wild about ships, with whom arithmetic on
such a question goes for nothing. They would show you in the clearest
possible manner that you have not ships enough. So also, although I am
glad to find not to the same extent, as to troops. Some one said the
other night, in answer to an hon. Gentleman, about an increased force of
a particular kind, 'There is nothing like leather' and it is so. I say
naval officers and military officers are not the men to whom the
Chancellor of the Exchequer should depute the great and solemn duty of
determining what amount shall be expended for military purposes. There
is not a country in the world that would not have been bankrupt long
since, and plunged into irretrievable ruin, if the military authorities
had been allowed to determine the amount of military force to be kept
up, and the amount of revenue to be devoted to that purpose.
I have another objection to this great army, and I now come to the
question of policy, which, I am sorry to say for India, has not been
touched upon. I do not think this is a question to be merely settled by
a very clever manner of giving the figures of the case. Those figures
depend upon the course you intend to pursue, upon the policy which the
Government intends to adopt, in that country. With this great army two
things are certain--we can have no reform of any kind in the Government
of India, nor an improved conduct on the part of the English in India
towards the Natives of India. With a power like this--110,000 English
troops, with an English regiment within an hour's reach of each civil
servant, you will find that the supremacy of the conquering race will be
displayed in the most offensive manner.
Everybody connected with India--the hon. Member for Devonport (Sir
Erskine Perry), the hon. Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes)--all who
are connected with India, know well that when the English were feeble in
India, when they had not a great army in the field or a great revenue to
support it, every Englishman treated the Natives by whom he was
surrounded rather with the feeling that he was an intruder in the
country, and that it was not only proper but absolutely necessary to
deal in a conciliatory and just manner with the great body of the
Natives of India; but precisely as our power increased the conduct of
our countrymen changed, and I find in the excellent book of Mr. Shore
that thirty years ago he describes this as the very source of the
growing ill feeling between the races in India. It has grown from that
time to this, until we have an irritation and animosity which in our
time, it may be, we shall see very little removed, and which may perhaps
never be wholly allayed. A Government, then, with this vast army, must
always be in a difficulty. Lord Canning--lord anybody else--cannot turn
his attention to anything but this wearing, exasperating question of how
money is to be got for the next quarter to pay this army. He cannot turn
his attention in any way to reforms, and I am convinced that this House
must insist upon the Government reducing its army, whatever be the risk.
A large army will render it impossible for you to hold the country, for
you will have a constantly increasing debt, and anarchy must inevitably
overwhelm you in the end. A small army, a moderate, conciliatory, and
just Government, with the finances in a prosperous condition;--and I
know not but that this country may possess for generations and centuries
a share, and a large share, in the government of those vast territories
which it has conquered.
As to measures of reduction, I admit that it is of little use attempting
them unless they are accompanied by other changes. Here I have a charge
to bring against the Indian Government. I did hope when the noble Lord
spoke to-night that he would have told us something which I am sure he
must have known; that there is no such thing as a real Government in
India at all; that there is no responsibility either to a public opinion
there, or to a public opinion at home; and that therefore we cannot
expect a better policy or happier results. Let hon. Gentlemen imagine a
Government like that in India, over which the payers of the taxes have
not the slightest control; for the great body of the people in India
have, as we all know, no control in any way over the Government. Neither
is there any independent English opinion that has any control over the
Government, the only opinions being those of the Government itself, or
those of the Military and Civil Services, and chiefly of the latter.
They are not the payers of taxes; they are the spenders and the enjoyers
of the taxes, and therefore the Government in India is in the most
unfortunate position possible for the fulfilment of the great duties
that must devolve upon every wise and just Government. The Civil
Service, being privileged, is arrogant, and I had almost said tyrannous,
as any one may see who reads the Indian papers, which mainly represent
the opinion of that Service and the Military Service, which, as
everywhere else where it is not checked by the resolution of the
taxpayers and civilians, is clamorous and insatiable for greater
expenditure. The Governor-General himself,--and I do not make any attack
upon Lord Canning, although I could conceive a Governor-General more
suited to his great and difficult position,--he is a creature of these
very Services.
I now ask the noble Lord to remember a case which happened during the
time he held office, and if the Committee will allow me, for the sake of
illustration, to refer to it, I do not think it will be any waste of
time. Hon. Gentlemen will recollect that during the last year, my hon.
Friend the Member for Stockport (Mr. J. B. Smith), who has paid great
attention to Indian subjects, put a question to the noble Lord relating
to the annexation of a small territory called Dhar. What has been the
course of events in relation to that case? The news of the annexation
reached this country on the 20th of March last year. Upon the 23rd the
question was put in this House, when the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr.
Baillie), then Under-Secretary, replied, that the Government had just
been informed of it by the Governor-General, and that he was solely
responsible for the act, the Government here having had no previous
communication upon it. Upon the 11th of June the noble Lord (Lord
Stanley) announced to the House, in answer to a question, that he had
disallowed the annexation of Dhar. The despatch disallowing it has since
been laid upon the table. It is dated June 22, and it asks for
information from the Governor-General. In India they assumed this
unfortunate Rajah to be guilty of misdemeanour, because his troops had
revolted, and the noble Lord in his despatch said, as I think very
sensibly, 'If we cannot keep our own troops, what argument is it for
overturning the independence of the territory of Dhar, seeing that the
Rajah himself has been faithful towards us, but his troops have
rebelled?' The noble Lord asked for further information. In the
preceding April the Ranee, the mother or step-mother of the Rajah, a
mere boy of thirteen, sent two memorials to the Governor-General, one by
post, and the other through the local British officer, remonstrating
against the annexation, and proving, as far as she could, that the Rajah
had not been guilty of any wrong against us. This memorial was not
acknowledged until August, when the Secretary for the Government of
India desired the Ranee to forward the memorial through the Governor-
General's agent in Central India. In April these papers were laid upon
the table of the House with one exception. The Ranee's memorial was not
included in those papers.
Now, when those papers were laid before the House, why was not that
memorial, relating to the annexed territory, sent home and printed with
the other papers, so that hon. Members of this House might have read it?
The letter of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) was dated the 22nd of June,
1858, and to this hour it has never been answered. The noble Lord's
despatch disallowed the annexation; it condemned it, and asked for
information. From the date of that despatch to this present 1st of
August, 1859, there has not come any official information from the
Governor-General as to what he has done, or any answer to the noble
Lord's despatch, although sixteen months have elapsed. I say it is not
fitting that the Secretary of State for India should be treated with
utter disregard, if not with something like contempt, by any great
satrap who happens to be sent out to govern any of the provinces of this
country. This very case shows, that in the midst of the terrible
hurricane of the mutiny, the thirst for annexation was unslaked. At the
very moment, or just before, that the Queen issued her gracious
Proclamation here, the Government in India annexed the territory of this
Rajah, a boy of thirteen years of age, manifesting at the same time an
utter disregard of the Government at home and the just sentiments, if
they could have been ascertained, of the whole body of the people of
this country. And this must be so as long as you have a Government like
that of Calcutta. Procrastination is its very nature.
The noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley) did an excellent thing. He did
honour to himself by appointing a man of a new sort as Governor of
Madras. I have not much acquaintance with Sir C. Trevelyan, but I
believe him to be a very intelligent man and very earnest for the good
of India. But he finds that at Madras he is like a man who is manacled,
as all the Governors are. He is able to do almost nothing. But he has a
spirit above being the passive instrument for doing nothing in the hands
of the Governor-General, and he has been disposed to make several
changes which have looked exceedingly heterodox to those who are
connected with the old Government of India, and which have shocked the
nerves of the fifteen old gentlemen who meet in Leadenhall-street, and
their brethren in India. I find that among the changes endeavoured to be
effected by Sir C. Trevelyan, the following are enumerated:--He has
endeavoured to conciliate the Natives by abolishing certain ceremonial
distinctions which were supposed to degrade them when visiting the
Government House; he has shown that personal courtesy to them which
appears to be too much neglected in India; he has conspicuously rewarded
those who have rendered services to the State; he has made one of the
Natives his aide-de-camp; he has endeavoured to improve the land tenure,
to effect a settlement of the Enam, and to abolish the impress of cattle
and carts. He has also abolished three-fourths, or perhaps more, of the
paper work of the public servants. He also began the great task of
judicial reform, than which none is more urgently pressing. But what is
said of Sir C. Trevelyan for instituting these reforms? He has raised a
hornets' nest about him. Those who surround the Governor-General at
Calcutta say, 'We might as well have the Governors of the Presidencies
independent, if they are to do as they like without consulting the
Governor-General as has been done in past times' The _Friend of
India_ is a journal not particularly scrupulous in supporting the
Calcutta Government, but it has a horror of any Government of India
except that of the Governor-General and the few individuals who surround
him. A writer in the _Friend of India_ says:--
'Sir C. Trevelyan relies doubtless on Lord Stanley, and we do not
dream of denying that the Secretary of State has provocation
enough to excuse the unusual course he seems obliged to pursue.
To send a reform to Calcutta is, at present, simply to lay it
aside. It will probably not even be answered for two years,
certainly not carried in five. Even when sanctioned, it will have
to pass through a crucible through which no plan can escape
entire. That weary waiting for Calcutta, of which all men, from
Lord Stanley to the people of Singapore, now bitterly complain,
may well tempt the Secretary to carry on his plans by the first
mode offered to his hand.'
Here are only a dozen lines from a long article, and there are other
articles in the same paper to the same purport. I think, then, that I am
justified in condemning any Secretary for India who contents himself
with giving us the figures necessary to show the state of the finances,
which any clerk in the office could have done, and abstains from going
into the questions of the government of India and that policy upon which
alone you can base any solid hope of an improvement in the condition of
that country.
There is another point I would mention. The Governor-General of India
goes out knowing little or nothing of India. I know exactly what he does
when he is appointed. He shuts himself up to study the first volumes of
Mr. Mill's _History of India_, and he reads through this laborious
work without nearly so much effect in making him a good Governor-General
as a man might ignorantly suppose. He goes to India, a country of twenty
nations, speaking twenty languages. He knows none of those nations, and
he has not a glimmer of the grammar and pronunciation or meaning of
those languages. He is surrounded by half-a-dozen or a dozen gentlemen
who have been from fifteen to forty years in that country, and who have
scrambled from the moderate but sure allowance with which they began in
the Service to the positions they now occupy. He knows nothing of the
country or the people, and they are really unknown to the Government of
India. To this hour the present Governor-General has not travelled
through any considerable portion of the territory of India. If he did,
he would have to pay an increased insurance upon his life for travelling
through a country in which there are very few roads and no bridges at
all. Observe the position, then, in which the Governor-General is
placed. He is surrounded by an official circle, he breathes an official
air, and everything is dim or dark beyond it. You lay duties upon him
which are utterly beyond the mental or bodily strength of any man who
ever existed, and which he cannot therefore adequately perform.
Turning from the Governor-General to the Civil Service, see how short
the period is in which your servants in that country remain in any
particular office. You are constantly criticising the bad customs of the
United States, where every postmaster and many other officers lose their
situations, and where others are appointed whenever a new President is
elected. You never make blunders like the United States, and you will
therefore be surprised at a statement given in evidence by Mr.
Underbill, the Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society. He says that
in certain districts in Bengal there are three or four Englishmen to
1,000,000 inhabitants, and that the magistrates are perpetually moving
about. I have here the names of several gentlemen cited. Mr. Henry
Lushington went to India in 1821, and remained till 1842. During these
twenty-one years he filled twenty-one different offices; he went to
Europe twice, being absent from India not less than four and a quarter
years. Upon an average, therefore, he held his twenty-one offices not
more than nine months each. Mr. J. P. Grant was Governor of Bengal. That
was so good a place that he remained stationary in it. But he went to
India in 1828 and remained there until 1841. In those thirteen years he
held twenty-four different situations, being an average of less than six
months for each. Mr. Charles Grant--and I may say that Grant is a name
which for three or four generations has been found everywhere in India,--
he was in India from 1829 to 1842, and in those thirteen years he
filled seventeen offices, being an average of only eight months for each
office. Mr. Halliday, Governor of Bengal, went to India in 1825, and
remained until 1843. In those eighteen years he held twenty-one offices,
and he did not become stationary until he was accredited to the
lucrative and great office of Governor of Bengal.
I think these facts show that there is something in the arrangements of
the Indian Government which makes it no Government at all, except for
the purpose of raising money and spending taxes. It is no Government for
watching over the people and conferring upon them those blessings which
we try to silence our consciences by believing the British Government is
established in India to promote. What can a Governor-General do with
such a Council, and with servants who are ever changing in all the
departments? I am not stating my own opinion, but what is proved by the
blue-books. Mr. Halliday stated that the police of Bengal were more
feared than the thieves and dacoits. But how is this Government, so
occupied and so embarrassed, to be expected to put the police on a
satisfactory footing? With regard to justice, I might appeal to any
gentleman who has been in India whether, for the most part, the Judges
in the Company's Courts are not without training, and if they are
without training, whether they will not probably be without law. The
delay is something of which we can have no conception, even with our
experience of the Court of Chancery in this country. Perjury and wrong
are universal wherever the Courts of the Company's Service have been
established in India. Of their taxation we hear enough to-night. It is
clumsy and unscientific. In their finance there is such confusion that
the Government proposes to send out somebody, not to raise revenue, not
to spend it, but somebody who will be able to tell you how it is raised
and spent, for that is what you want to know. They have no system of
book-keeping whatever. The Secretary of State gives us a statement of
revenue and expenditure up to the 30th of April, 1858, sixteen months
back, and even for the year preceding he can only furnish what he calls
an 'estimate.' Would any other Legislative Assembly in the whole world,
except this, tolerate such a state of things? I did try myself several
years ago to get a statement of the accounts up to a later period; but I
found it was of no use. They ought to be brought up to a later period;
the thing is quite within the range of possibility; it is simply not
done because there is no proper system of book-keeping, and no one
responsible for not doing it.