this side of the House, and I ask hon. Gentlemen who sit below the
gangway especially to consider it--look at the heritage of trouble with
regard to our foreign policy which the existing Government found on
their accession to office. Three months of what was going on upon the
Conspiracy Bill would have landed you on the very verge of a war, if not
in a war, with France, and that danger has been avoided certainly by no
concession which is injurious to the honour of England. Take the
question which has agitated the public mind with regard to Naples. I am
not going into any details; but so far as a Government could act, this
Government appears to have acted with judgment. I think the noble Lord
below me (Lord J. Russell) admitted that himself. I did not say that the
noble Lord said anything against them. On the contrary, I rejoice to
have him with me as a witness to what I am stating. With regard, then,
to these questions, seeing the dilemma into which the foreign affairs of
the country were brought under the last Administration, I think it is
but fair, just, and generous that Members on this side of the House, at
least, should take no course which wears the colour of faction, for the
purpose of throwing the present Government out of office. Whenever I
join in a vote to put Gentlemen opposite out of office, it shall be for
something that the country will clearly understand--something that shall
offer a chance of good to some portion of the British empire--something
that shall offer a chance of advancing distinctly the great principles
for which we--if we are a party at all on this side of the House--
profess to care.
But there is another reason. Not only is it feared that hon. Gentlemen
opposite will get firm in their seats, but it is also feared that some
hon. Gentlemen near me will get less firm in their alliance with the
right hon. Gentlemen on this side. I have heard of mutinous meetings and
discussions, and of language of the most unpardonable character uttered,
as Gentlemen now say, in the heat of debate. But there was something
more going on, which was traced to a meeting of independent Members
recently held in Committee-room No. 11; and if a stop were not put to
it, the powerful ranks on these benches might be broken up, which, if
united, it was believed, would storm the Treasury benches and replace
the late Government in office. I believe it was intended that a
desperate effort should be made to change the state of things here
before Whitsuntide. That was a resolution which had been come to long
before any one knew anything about Lord Ellenborough's despatch. And the
present seems to be a convenient opportunity, inasmuch as it has this in
its favour, that it appears to be defending an absent servant of the
Crown; that it appears to be teaching a lesson to the Government who
have acted injudiciously in publishing a despatch; altogether it has
that about it which makes it an excellent pretext on which hon.
Gentlemen may ride into office. Now, I do not speak to Whigs in office
or to those Gentlemen who have been in office and expect to be in office
again; but I should like to say what I believe to be true to those
Gentlemen who call themselves independent Members, who come here with no
personal object to serve, not seeking place, patronage, or favour, but
with an honest desire, as far as they are able, to serve their country
as Members of the House of Commons. If this Resolution be carried, it is
supposed that the old Government, or something very like it, will come
back again. Now, there was great discontent with that old Government
before it went out; yet no pledge whatever has been given that its
conduct will be better or different; no new measures have been promised,
no new policy has been avowed, no new men, that I have seen, have been
held forth to the public very distinctly as likely to take high office
in the State. There have been some things which I should think Members
of this House must have felt pain at witnessing. There are newspapers in
the interest of this ex-Treasury bench which have, in the most
unblushing manner, published articles emanating from the pen of somebody
who knew exactly what was wanted to be done. In the case of a gentleman,
for example, who was engaged in Committee-room No. 11--a gentleman whom I
need not mention because the House knows all the circumstances of this
case, but a gentleman who took a most prominent part in the proceedings
in that Committee-room--and no one is probably more indignant at what
has been done than himself--those newspapers have positively fixed upon
and designated him for a certain office, if the present Government go
out and another comes in; another gentleman who seconded a Resolution on
that occasion is also held up for an office; but they do not state
exactly what his precise position is to be; and the glittering bauble of
some place in the incoming Government is hung up before many hon.
Gentlemen who sit around me. It is not said, 'It is for you' and 'It is
for you;' but it is hung up dangling before them all, and every man is
expected to covet that glittering bauble.
But this is not all. These are not the only arts which are employed.
Members of this House sitting below the gangway, who have been here for
years--Gentlemen of the most independent character--receive flattering
and beautifully engraved cards to great parties at splendid mansions;
and not later than Friday last, of all times, those invitations were
scattered, if not with a more liberal, no doubt with a much more
discriminating hand than they ever were before. [An hon. Member:
'Absurd!'] Of course it is very absurd; there is no doubt about that, and
that is precisely why I am explaining it to the House. Why, Sir, if
those cards of invitation contained a note with them, giving the exact
history of what was really meant, it would say to hon. Gentlemen, 'Sir,
we have measured your head, and we have gauged your soul, and we know or
believe'--for I believe they do not know--'we believe that your
principles which you came into Parliament to support--your character in
the House--your self-respect will go for nothing if you have a miserable
temptation like this held up before you.' Sir, if we could see them
taking a course which is said to be taken by the celebrated horse-tamer,
who appeals, as I am told, to the nobler and more intelligent instincts
of the animal which he tames, then I should not complain. But they
appeal to instincts which every honourable mind repudiates, and to
aspirations which no hon. Gentleman on this side of the House can for a
moment admit.
Well, then, if they succeed, what sort of a Government shall we have? I
am as anxious for a Liberal Government as any man in this House, but I
cannot believe that, in the present position of things on this side of
the House, a Liberal and solid Government can be formed. We are told,
and the whole country has been in a state of expectation and wonder upon
it, that two eminent statesmen have actually dined together; and I am
very glad to hear that men engaged in the strife of politics can dine
together without personal hostility. I say nothing of the viands that
were eaten. I say nothing of the beverage that was in the 'loving cup'
that went round. One of our oldest and greatest poets has told us that--
'Nepenthe is a drink of soverayne grace.'
He says that it was devised by the gods to subdue contention, and
subject the passions; but that it was given only to the aged and the
wise, who were prepared by it to take their places with ancient heroes
in a higher sphere. But that could not have been the contents of the
'loving cup' in this instance, for these aged statesmen are still
determined to cling to this world, and to mix, as heretofore, with all
the vigour and the fire of youth in the turmoil and contention of public
life. But does the fact of this dinner point to reconciliation, and to a
firm and liberal administration? I believe that any such Government
would be the worst of all coalitions. I believe that it would be built
upon insincerity, and I suspect it would be of no advantage to the
country. Therefore I am not anxious to see such a Government attempted.
I ask the House, then, are they prepared to overthrow the existing
Government on the question which the right hon. Gentleman has brought
before us--a question which he has put in such ambiguous terms? Are they
willing in overthrowing that Government to avow the policy of this
Proclamation for India? Are they willing to throw the country into all
the turmoil of a general election--a general election at a moment when
the people are but just slowly recovering from the effects of the most
tremendous commercial panic that this country ever passed through? Are
they willing to delay all legislation for India till next year, and all
legislation on the subject of Parliamentary reform till the year after
that? Are they willing, above all, to take the responsibility which will
attach to them if they avow the policy contained in this Proclamation?
I confess, Sir, I am terrified for the future of India when I look at
the indiscriminate slaughter which is now going on there. I have seen a
letter, written, I believe, by a missionary, lately inserted in a most
respectable weekly newspaper published in London, in which the writer
estimates that 10,000 men have been put to death by hanging alone. I ask
you, whether you approve of having in India such expressions as these,
which I have taken this day from a Calcutta newspaper, and which
undoubtedly you will be held to approve if you do anything which can be
charged with a confirmation of the tenor of this Proclamation. Here is
an extract from _The Englishman_, which, speaking of the men of the
disarmed regiments, who amount to some 20,000 or 30,000, or even 40,000
men, says:--
'There is no necessity to bring every Sepoy to a court-martial,
and convict him of mutinous intentions before putting him down as
guilty. We do not advocate extreme or harsh measures, nor are we
of those who would drench the land with blood; but we have no
hesitation in saying, that, were the Government to order the
execution of all these Sepoys, they would be legally and morally
justified in doing so. There would be no injustice done.'
No injustice would be done! I ask the House to consider that these men
have committed no offence; their military functions were suspended
because it was thought they were likely to be tempted to commit an
offence, and therefore their arms were taken from them; and now an
Englishman--one of your own countrymen--writing in a newspaper published
in Calcutta, utters sentiments so atrocious as those which I have just
read to the House. I believe the whole of India is now trembling under
the action of volcanic fires; and we shall be guilty of the greatest
recklessness, and I will say of great crime against the Monarchy of
England, if we do anything by which we shall own this Proclamation. I am
asked on this question to overturn Her Majesty's Government. The policy
adopted by the Government on this subject is the policy that was cheered
by hon. Members on this side when it was first announced. It is a policy
of mercy and conciliation. False--may I not say?--or blundering leaders
of this party would induce us, contrary to all our associations and all
our principles, to support an opposite policy. I am willing to avow that
I am in favour of justice and conciliation--of the law of justice and of
kindness. Justice and mercy are the supreme attributes of the perfection
which we call Deity, but all men everywhere comprehend them; there is no
speech nor language in which their voice is not heard, and they cannot
be vainly exercised with regard to the docile and intelligent millions
of India. Yon have had the choice. You have tried the sword. It has
broken; it now rests broken in your grasp; and you stand humbled and
rebuked. You stand humbled and rebuked before the eyes of civilized
Europe. You may have another chance. You may, by possibility, have
another opportunity of governing India. If you have, I beseech you to
make the best use of it. Do not let us pursue such a policy as many men
in India, and some in England, have advocated, but which hereafter you
will have to regret, which can end only, as I believe, in something
approaching to the ruin of this country, and which must, if it be
persisted in, involve our name and nation in everlasting disgrace.
* * * * *
INDIA.
IV.
HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 1, 1859.
_From Hansard._
[On August 1 Sir Charles Wood made his financial statement on India to
the House of Commons. One of his proposals was that the Government
should be empowered to raise 5,000,000_l_. in the United Kingdom in
order to meet the demands of the present year. The Loan Bill passed
through both Houses.]
I have so often addressed the House upon the question of India that I
feel some hesitation in asking a portion of the time of the Committee
this evening. But notwithstanding an observation of the right hon.
Gentleman the Secretary for India that he does not see anything gloomy
in the future of India, I confess that to my view the question assumes
yearly a greater magnitude, and I may say a greater peril. I think,
therefore, that having given some attention to this subject in years
past, I may be permitted to bring my share, be its value more or less,
to the attempt which we are now making to confront this great evil. When
we recollect how insufficient are the statements which he has from
India, the right hon. Gentleman has given us as clear an account of the
finances of India as it was possible for him to do, and looking at them
in the most favourable point of view we come to this conclusion:--We
have what we have had for twenty years, only more rapidly accumulating,
deficit on deficit and debt on debt.
The right hon. Gentleman told the Committee that when he left the
Government of India, I think in 1855, everything was in a most
satisfactory condition. Well, it did happen in that year, perhaps by
some of that kind of management which I have observed occasionally in
Indian finance, that the deficit was brought down to a sum not exceeding
150,000_l_. [Sir C. Wood: 'There was a surplus of 400,000_l_.'] The
deficit, I believe, before the mutiny was 143,000_l_. But, if the right
hon. Gentleman will allow me to take the three years preceding the
mutiny, I think that will give a much fairer idea of the real state of
the case, and it is not the least use shutting our eyes to the real
state of the case, because some day or other it will find us out, or we
shall find it out. The real state of the case in the three years
preceding the mutiny, 1855, 1856 and 1857, ending the 30th of April, is
a deficit of 2,823,000_l_., being an average not very far short of
1,000,000_l_. a-year. That is the state of things immediately after the
right hon. Gentleman left office. I do not in the least find fault with
him. He did not make the deficit, but I merely state this to show that
things are not at the moment in that favourable state which the right
hon. Gentleman would induce the Committee to believe. Keeping our
attention to that period, there is another point of view, which is also
very important. It appears to me that any Government must be an
excessively bad Government which cannot defray its expenses out of the
taxes which it levies on its people. We know, and every one has for
years known, that in India there is a source of revenue, not from taxes
levied on the people, but from opium, and which is very like the revenue
derived by the Peruvian Government from guano. If we turn to those three
years and see what relation the expenditure of the Government had to
taxes levied on the people of India, we shall find, though we may hear
that the taxes are not so much as we imagine, or that the people are
extremely poor, or that the Government is very extravagant--we shall
find that the sum levied for the sale of opium and transit was no less
than 10,500,000_l_., and if we add that to the 2,800,000_l_., we get a
sum of 13,300,000_l_., which is the exact sum which the Government of
India cost in those three years over and above what was raised from the
people by actual taxation. I say that this is a state of things which
ought to cause alarm, because we know, and we find it stated in the last
despatches, that the income derived from opium is of a precarious
character, and from the variation of climate in India, or from a
variation of policy in the Chinese Government, that revenue may
suddenly either be very much impaired or be cut off altogether.
The right hon. Gentleman brings us to the condition in which we are now,
and it may be stated in the fewest possible words to be this,--that the
debt of India has been constantly rising, and that it amounts now to
100,000,000_l_. sterling. ['No, no!'] The right hon. Gentleman said
95,000,000_l_., but he said there would be 5,000,000_l_. next
year, and I will undertake to say that it is fair to argue on the basis
that the debt of India at this moment is about 100,000,000_l_.,
that there is a deficit of 12,000,000_l_. this year, and that there
may be expected to be a deficit of 10,000,000_l_. next year. It is
not to be wondered at that it should be difficult to borrow money on
Indian account.
I am not surprised at the hon. Member for Kendal (Mr. Glyn) being so
lively in the House to-night, and other hon. Gentlemen connected with
the City, who, I understand, have been impressing on the Secretary of
State the fact that money cannot be had in the City for the purpose for
which he wants it. I do not wonder that it is difficult to raise money
on Indian account. I should think it extraordinary if it could be
borrowed without a high rate of interest. That it can be borrowed at all
can only arise from the fact that England, whatever disasters she gets
into, generally contrives, by the blood of her soldiers or by the
taxation of her people, to scramble through her difficulties, and to
maintain before the world, though by enormous sacrifices, a character
for good faith which is scarcely held by any other country in the world.
With regard to the question of an Imperial guarantee, I take an opposite
view from the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) on that particular point, though
I agree with what he said as to certain expenses thrown on the Indian
Government.
Last year I referred to the enormous expense of the Affghan war--about
15,000,000_l_.--the whole of which ought to have been thrown on the
taxation of the people of England, because it was a war commanded by the
English Cabinet, for objects supposed to be English, but which, in my
opinion, were of no advantage either to England or India. It was most
unjust that this enormous burden should have been thrown upon the
finances of the Indian Government. But I do not oppose an Imperial
guarantee because I particularly sympathize with the English taxpayers
in this matter. I think the English taxpayers have generally neglected
all the affairs of India, and might be left to pay for it. But there was
no justice in imposing on the unfortunate millions of India the burden
of a policy with which they had nothing to do, and which could not bring
any one of them a single handful of rice more--it did bring them rather
less than more--than they would have eaten without it. But I object to
an Imperial guarantee on this ground,--if we let the Services of India,
after exhausting the resources of India, put their hands into the
pockets of the English people, the people of England having no control
over the Indian expenditure, it is impossible to say to what lengths of
unimagined extravagance they would go; and in endeavouring to save India
may we not go far towards ruining England?
But look at this question of Indian finance from another point of view.
The noble Lord (Lord Stanley) and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary
for India have both referred to the enormous amount of the whole
taxation of India taken by the Military Service. I believe it has been
shown that at this moment almost, if not altogether, the whole of the
net revenue of India is being absorbed by the Military Service of that
empire; that not a farthing is left out of the whole net revenue of
India to pay the expenses of the civil government or the public
creditor. If we leave out the opium duty, perhaps we shall see how far
the Military Service bears on the taxation of India; we shall see that
more than its net amount is absorbed by the Military Service. That is a
state of things that has never existed in any other country or among any
other people, for any considerable period, without bringing that country
to anarchy and ruin. We have been told by the Governor-General that the
great bulk of the revenue of India is not elastic; that with regard to
the land-tax there has been for a long period no increase in it; that,
on the contrary, that large source of income has decreased. He tells us,
further, that the army cannot, at present, be largely reduced with
safety. If so, what is the end to which we must come? Either the
Government of India must come to an end, or England itself must become
tributary to India. Seeing that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has
within the last fortnight asked 70,000,000_l_. of the English
taxpayer for the expenses of the English Government, to ask nine or ten
millions more for the government of India would certainly cause great
dissatisfaction in this country. The picture is, to my mind, an alarming
one, notwithstanding the cheerful view taken of it by the Secretary for
India; and it has filled many besides myself with dismay.
Now, looking round for modes of escape from this position, I believe
they exist, if we had the courage to adopt them. An hon. Friend has
asked me, 'Is there nobody to tell the House of Commons the truth on
this matter?' I might ask why he has not done it himself. I suppose he
is afraid of being thought rash; but his advice is, that the Government
should re-establish the independence of the Punjab, recall the Ameers of
Scinde, restore the Government of the King of Oude, giving to it the
dependency of Nagpore. I confess, whether it be rash or not, that I
think it would be wise to restore the Government of the Punjab and to
give independence to that province which is called Scinde, because as no
revenue is received from that part of the country in excess of the
expense which its retention causes to this country, we should endeavour
to bring our dominions in India within a reasonable and manageable
compass. No policy can be more lunatic than the policy of annexation we
have pursued of late years in India, and the calamity we are now meeting
is the natural and inevitable consequence of the folly we have
committed. It is not easy for great generals and statesmen who have been
made earls and marquesses and had bronze statues put up in their honour
in our public squares--it is not easy for the statesmen who have done
all this to turn round and reverse it all; they have not the moral
courage to do it; it might be an act of peril; it might appear a descent
from the summit of empire and be wrongly construed throughout the world.
But as a question of finance and good government we should, a few years
hence, admit that it was a sound policy. But I will not pursue this
subject, for I may fairly take it for granted that the House of Commons
and the Government of England are not likely to take such a course till
we are reduced to some extremity even greater than that which now meets
us.