History, like an individual's life, is a succession of well-defined
periods. Herodotus took as his subject a long cycle of events; the
shorter period was first treated by Thucydides who introduced methods
which entitle him to be regarded as the first modern historian. Born in
Attica in 471 he was a victim of the great plague, was exiled for his
failure to check Brasidas at Eion in 424 and spent the rest of his life
in collecting materials for his great work. His death took place about
402.
His preface is remarkable as outlining his creed. First he states his
subject, the Peloponnesian war of 431-404; he then tests by an appeal to
reason the statements in old legends and in Homer, arguing from analogy
or from historical survivals in his own time to prove that various
important movements were caused or checked by economic influence. He
uses his imagination to prove that the importance of an event cannot be
decided from the extant remains of its place of origin, for if only the
ruins of both Sparta and Athens were left, Sparta would be thought to
be insignificant and Athens would appear twice as powerful as she really
is. Poetical exaggeration is easy and misleading, and ancient history is
difficult to determine by absolute proofs.
"Men accept statements about their own national past from one
another without testing them."
"To most men the search for truth implies no effort; they prefer to
turn to the first accounts available."
"It was difficult for me to write an exact narrative of the speeches
actually made; I have therefore given the words that might have been
expected of each speaker, adhering to the broad meaning of what was
really uttered. The facts I have not taken from any chance person,
nor have I given my own impressions, but have as accurately as
possible written a detailed account of what I witnessed myself or
heard from others. The discovery of these facts was laborious owing
to conflicting statements and confused memories and party favour.
Perhaps the unromantic nature of my record will make it uninteresting;
but if any person will judge it useful because he desires to consider
a clear account of actual facts and of what is likely to recur at some
future time, I shall be content. As a compilation it is rather an
eternal possession than a prize-essay for a moment."
The essentially modern idea of history writing is here perfectly
evident.
Having pointed out the significance of the war, not only to Greece but
to the whole of the world, he gives its causes. To him the real root of
the trouble was Sparta's fear of Athenian power: the alleged pretexts
were different. The rise of Athens is rapidly described, her building of
the walls broken down by the Persians, her control of the island-states
in a Delian league which eventually became the nucleus of her Empire,
her alliance with Megara, a buffer-state between herself and Corinth.
This last saved her from fears of a land invasion; when she built for
Megara long walls to the sea she incurred the intense anger of Corinth
which smouldered for years and at last caused the Peloponnesian
conflagration. The reduction of Aegina in 451 compensated for the loss
of Boeotia and Egypt. Eventually the Thirty Years' Peace was concluded
in 445; Athens gave up Megara, but retained Euboea; her definite policy
for the future was concentration on a maritime empire; she controlled
nearly all the islands of the Aegean and was mistress of the Saronic
gulf, Aegina, "the eyesore of the Peiraeus", having fallen.
But if she was to confine her energies to the sea, it was essential that
she should be mistress of all the trade-routes which in ancient history
usually ran along the coast. On both east and west she found Corinth in
possession; a couple of quarrels with this city ruptured the peace.
In the west, Corinth had founded Corcyra (Corfu); this daughter colony
quarrelled with her mother and prevailed. In itself Corcyra was of
little importance in purely Greek politics, but it happened to possess a
large navy and commanded the trade-route to Sicily, whence came the
corn supply. When threatened with vengeance by Corinth, she appealed to
Athens, where ambassadors from Corinth also appeared. Their arguments
are stated in the speeches which are so characteristic of Thucydides.
The Athenians after careful consideration decided to conclude a
defensive alliance with Corcyra, for they dreaded the acquisition of
her navy by Corinth. But circumstances turned this into an offensive
alliance, for Corinth attacked and would have won a complete victory at
sea but for timely Athenian succour. In the east Athens was even more
vitally concerned in trade with the Hellespont, through which her own
corn passed. On this route was the powerful Corinthian city Potidaea,
situate on the western prong of Chalcidice. It had joined the Athenian
confederacy but had secured independence by building strong walls. When
the Athenians demanded their destruction and hostages as a guarantee,
the town revolted and appealed to the mother-city Corinth. A long
and costly siege drained Athens of much revenue and distracted her
attention; but worst of all was the final estrangement of the great
trade rival whom she had thwarted in Greece itself by occupying Megara,
in the west by joining Corcyra, and in the east by attacking Potidsea.
The final and open pretext for war was the exclusion of Megara from
all Athenian markets; this step meant the extinction of the town as a
trading-centre and was a definite set-back to the economic development
of the Peloponnese, of which Corinth and Megara were the natural avenues
to northern Greece. The cup was full; Athenian ambition had run its
course. The aggrieved states of the Peloponnese were invited to put
their case at Sparta; Corinth drew a famous picture of the Athenian
character, its restlessness, energy, adaptability and inventiveness. "In
the face of such a rival," they added,
"Sparta hesitates; in comparison Spartan methods are antiquated,
but modern principles cannot help prevailing; in a stagnant state
conservative institutions are the best, but when men are faced with
various difficulties great ingenuity is essential; for that reason
Athens through her wide experience has made more innovations."
An Athenian reply failed to convince the allies of her innocence; one
of the Spartan Ephors forced the congress to declare that Athens
had violated the peace. A second assembly was summoned, at which the
Corinthians in an estimate of the Athenian power gave reasons for
believing it would eventually be reduced. They further appealed to what
has never yet failed to decide in favour of war--race antagonism; the
Athenians and her subjects were Ionians, whereas the Peloponnesians were
mainly Dorians. The necessary vote for opening hostilities was secured;
but first an ultimatum was presented. If Athens desired peace she
must rescind the exclusion acts aimed at Megara. At the debate in the
Athenian assembly Pericles, the virtual ruler, gave his reason for
believing Athens would win; he urged a demand for the withdrawal
of Spartan Alien Acts aimed at Athens and her allies and offered
arbitration on the alleged grievances.
It is well to repeat the causes of this war: trade rivalry, naval
competition, race animosity and desire for predominance. Till these are
removed it is useless to expect permanent peace in spite of Leagues
or Tribunals or Arbitration Courts. Further, it should be noted that
Thucydides takes the utmost care to point out the excellent reasons
the most enlightened statesmen had for arriving at contradictory
conclusions; the event proved them all wrong without exception. The
future had in store at least two events which no human foresight could
discover, and these proved the deciding factors in the conflict.
The war began in 431 by a Theban attack on Plataea, the little town just
over the Attic frontier which had been allied with Athens for nearly a
century and protected her against invasion from the north. This city had
long been hated by Thebes as a deserter from her own league; it alone of
Boeotian towns had not joined the Persians. Burning with the desire to
capture it, a body of Thebans entered the place by night, seizing the
chief positions. But in the morning their scanty numbers were apparent;
recovering from panic the Plataeans overwhelmed the invaders and
massacred them. This open violation of the treaty kindled the
war-spirit. Both sides armed, Sparta being more popular as pretending
to free Greece from a tyrant. Their last ambassador on leaving Athenian
territory said: "This day will be the beginning of mighty woes for
Greece".
The Spartans invaded Attica, cutting down the fruit trees and forcing
the country folk into the city; the Athenians replied by ravaging parts
of Peloponnese and Megara. The funeral of the first Athenian victims of
the war was the occasion of a remarkable speech. Pericles in delivering
it expounds the Athenian ideal of life.
"We do not compete with other constitutions, we are rather a pattern
for the rest. In our democracy all are equal before the law; each man
is promoted to public office not by favour but by merit, according as
he can do the State some service. We love beauty in its simplicity, we
love knowledge without losing manliness. Our citizens can administer
affairs both private and public; our working classes have an adequate
knowledge of politics. To us the most fatal error is the lack of
theoretical instruction before we attempt any duty. In a word, I say
that Athens is an education for all Greece; individually we can prove
ourselves competent to face the most varied forms of human activity
with the maximum of grace and adaptability.... We have forced the
whole sea and every land to open to our enterprise. Look daily at the
material power of the city and love her passionately. Her glory was
won by men who did their duty and sacrificed themselves for her. The
whole world is the sepulchre of famous men; their memory is not only
inscribed on pillars in their own country, it lives unwritten in the
hearts of men in alien lands."
At the beginning of the next year a calamity which no statesman could
have foreseen overtook Athens. A mysterious plague of the greatest
malignity scourged the city, the mortality being multiplied among the
crowds of refugees. The city's strength was seriously impaired, public
and private morality were undermined, inasmuch as none knew how long he
had to live. Discouraged by it and by the invasions the Athenians sent
a fruitless embassy to Sparta and tinned in fury on Pericles. He made
a splendid defence of his policy and gave them heart to continue the
struggle; he pointed out that it was better to lose their property and
save the State than save their property and lose the State; their
fleet opened to them the world of waters over which they could range as
absolute masters. Soon afterwards he died, surviving the opening of the
war only two years and a half; his character and abilities received due
acknowledgment from Thucydides.
At this point Sparta decided to destroy Plataea, the Athenian outpost
in Boeotia. A very brilliant description of the siege and
counter-operations reveals very clearly the Spartan inability to attack
walled towns and explains their objection to fortified friends. Leaving
the town guarded they retired for a time, to complete the work later.
The war began to spread beyond the Peloponnese to the north of the
Corinthian gulf, the control of which was important to both sides. The
Acarnanians were attacked by Sparta and appealed to the Athenian
admiral Phormio. Two naval actions in the gulf revealed the astonishing
superiority of the Athenian navy on the high seas. Threatened in her
corn supply in the west, Sparta began to intrigue with the outlying
kingdoms on the north-east, the "Thraceward parts" on the trade-route
being the objective.
A spirit of revolt against Athenian rule appeared in Lesbos, which
seceded in 428. The chief town in this non-Ionic island was Mytilene,
which sent ambassadors to Sparta. Their speech clearly explains how the
Athenians were able to keep their hold on their policy; her policy
(like that of Rome) was to divide the allies by carefully grading their
privileges, playing off the weak against the stronger. The Spartans
proved unable to help and the Athenians easily blockaded the city,
capturing it early in 427. In their anger they at first decided to slay
all the inhabitants, but a better feeling led to a reconsideration next
day. In the Assembly two great speeches were delivered. Pericles had
been succeeded by Cleon, to whom Thucydides seems to have been a little
unjust. He opened his speech with the famous remark that a democracy
cannot govern an Empire; it is liable to sudden fits of passion which
make a consistent policy impossible. He himself never changed his plans,
but his audience were different.
"You are all eyes for speeches, all ears for deeds; you judge of
the possibility of a project from good speeches; accomplished facts
you believe not because you see them but because you hear them from
smart critics. You are easily duped by some novel plan, but you
refuse to adhere to what has been proved sound. You are slaves to
every new oddity and have nothing but contempt for what is familiar.
Every one of you would like to be a good speaker, failing that, to
rival your orators in cleverness. You are as quick to guess what is
coming in a speech as you are slow at foreseeing its consequences.
In a word, you live in some non-real world."
He pleaded for the rigorous application of the extreme penalty already
voted.
He was opposed by Diodotus, who appealed to the same principle as Cleon
did expediency.
"No penalty will deter men, not even the death penalty. Men have
run through the whole catalogue of deterrents in the hope of
securing themselves against outrage, yet offences still are common.
Human nature is driven by some uncontrollable master passion which
tempts it to danger. Hope and Desire are everywhere and are most
mischievous, for they are invisible. Fortune too is as powerful a
means of exciting men. At tunes she stands unexpectedly at their
side and leads them to take risks with too slender resources. Most
of all she tempts cities, for they are contending for the greatest
prizes, liberty or domination. It is absolutely childish then to
imagine that when human nature is bent on performing a thing it will
be deterred by law or any other force. If revolting cities are quite
sure that no mercy will be shown, they will fight to the last,
bequeathing the victors only smoking ruins. It would be more expedient
to be merciful and thus save the expenses of a long siege."
This saner view prevailed. The doctrine of a "ruling passion" is
a remarkable contribution to Greek political thought, the abstract
personifications reading like the work of a poet or philosopher. An
exciting race against time is most graphically described. After great
exertions the ship bearing the reprieve arrived just in time to save
Mytilene. This act of mercy stands in sinister contrast with the
treatment the unhappy Plataeans received from the liberators of Greece.
The citizens were captured, Athens having strangely abandoned them in
spite of her promise to help. They were allowed to commemorate their
services to Greece, appealing in a most moving speech to the sacred
ground of their city, the scene of the immortal battle. All was in vain.
The Thebans accused them of flat treachery to Boeotia, securing their
condemnation. Corcyra similarly proved unprofitable; it was afflicted
by fratricidal dissensions which coloured one of Thucydides' darkest
pictures. As the war went on it became clearer that it was a struggle
between two rival political creeds, democracy and oligarchy. To the
partisans all other ties were of little value, whether of blood or race
or religion; only frenzied boldness and unquestioning obedience to a
party organisation were of any consequence. This wretched spirit of feud
was destined in the long run to spell the doom of the Greek cities. In
427 the first mention was made of the will-of-the-wisp which in time led
Athens to her ruin. In her anxiety to intercept the Peloponnesian corn
she supported Leontini against Syracuse, the leading Sicilian state. In
Acarnania the capable general Demosthenes after a series of movements
not quite fruitless succeeded in bringing peace to the jarring mountain
tribes.
In 425 a most important event took place. As an Athenian squadron
was proceeding to Sicily it was forced to put in at Pylos, where many
centuries later Greece won a famous victory over the Turks. Demosthenes,
though he had no official command, persuaded his comrades to fortify the
place as a base from which to harry Spartan territory. It was situated
in the country which had once belonged to the Messenians who for
generations had been held down by the Spartan oligarchs. Deserters soon
began to stream in; the gravity of the situation was recognised by
the Spartan government who landed more than four hundred of their best
troops on the island of Sphacteria at the entrance to the bay. These
were speedily isolated by the Athenian navy; and news of the event
filled all Greece with excitement. A heated discussion took place at
Athens, where Cleon accused Nicias, the commander-in-chief, of slackness
in not capturing the blockaded force. Spartan overtures for a peace on
condition of the return of the isolated men proved vain; after a lively
altercation with Nicias Cleon made a promise to capture the Spartans
within thirty days, a feat which he accomplished with the aid of
Demosthenes. Nearly three hundred were found to prefer surrender to
death; these were conveyed to Athens and were an invaluable asset for
bargaining a future peace.
A further success was the capture of Nisaea, the port of Megara, in
424, but an attempt to propagate democracy in Boeotia ended in a severe
defeat at Delium; the fate of Plataea was a bad advertisement in an
oligarchically governed district. Worse was to follow. Brasidas, a
Spartan who had greatly distinguished himself at Pylos, passed through
Thessaly with a volunteer force, reaching Thrace and capturing some
important towns; the loss of one of these, Eion, caused the exile of the
historian, who was too late to save it. In 423 a truce for one year
was arranged between the combatants, but Brasidas ignored it, sowing
disaffection among the Athenian allies. His personal charm gave them a
good impression of the Spartan character and his offer of liberty
was too attractive to be resisted. His success was partly due to a
deliberate misrepresentation of the Athenian power which proved greater
than it seemed to be. The two real obstacles to peace were Brasidas
and Cleon; at Amphipolis they met in battle; a rash movement gave the
Spartan an opportunity for an attack. He fell in action, but the town
was saved. Cleon was killed in the same battle and the path to peace
was clear. The truce for one year developed into a regular settlement in
421, Nicias being responsible for its negotiation in Athens. The chief
clause provided that Athens should recover Amphipolis in exchange for
the Spartan captives.
The members of the Peloponnesian league considered themselves betrayed
by this treaty, for their hated rival Athens had not been humbled.
Corinth was the ringleader in raising disaffection. She determined to
create a new league, including Argos, the inveterate foe of Sparta. This
state had stood aloof from the war, nursing her strength and biding
her time for revenge. When Sparta failed to restore Amphipolis, the war
party at Athens, led by Alcibiades, formed an alliance with Argos to
reduce Sparta; but this policy alienated Corinth, who refused to act
with her trade rival. An Argive attack on Arcadia ended in the fierce
battle of Mantinea in 418, in which Sparta won a complete victory. Argos
was forced to come to terms, the new league was dissolved and Athens was
once more confronted by her combined enemies, her diplomacy a failure
and her trump-card, the Sphacterian prisoners, lost.
Next year she was guilty of an act of sheer outrage. Her fleet
descended on the island of Melos, which had remained neutral, though its
inhabitants were colonists from the Spartan mainland close by. Nowhere
does the dramatic nature of Thucydides' work stand more clearly revealed
than in his account of this incident. He represents the Athenian and
Melian leaders as arguing the merits of the case in a regular dialogue,
essentially a dramatic device. The Athenian doctrine of Might and
Expediency is unblushingly preached and acted upon, in spite of Melian
protests; the island was captured, its population being slain or
enslaved. Such an act is a fitting prelude to the great disaster which
forms the next act of Thucydides' drama.
In 416 Athens proceeded to develop her design of subjugating Sicily.
Segesta was at feud with Selinus; as the latter city applied to Syracuse
for aid, the former bethought her of her ancient alliance with Athens.
Next year the Sicilian ambassadors arrived with tales of unlimited
wealth to finance an expedition. Nicias, the leader of the peace
party, vainly counselled the Assembly to refrain; he was overborne by
Alcibiades, whose ambition it was to reduce not only Sicily but Carthage
also. When the expedition was about to sail most of the statues of
Hermes in the city were desecrated in one night. Alcibiades, appointed
to the command with Nicias and Lamachus, was suspected of the outrage,
but was allowed to sail. The fleet left the city with all the pomp and
ceremony of prayer and ritual, after which it showed its high spirits in
racing as far as Aegina.
In Sicily itself Hermocrates, the great Syracusan patriot, repeatedly
warned his countrymen of the coming storm, advising them to sink all
feuds in resistance to the common enemy. He was opposed by Athenagoras,
a democrat who, true to his principles, suspected the story as part of
a militarist plot to overthrow the constitution. His speech is the most
violent in Thucydides, but contains a passage of much value.
"The name of the whole is People, that of a part is Oligarchy;
the rich are the best guardians of wealth, the educated class can
make the wisest decisions, the majority are the best judges of
speeches. All these classes in a democracy have equal power both
individually and collectively. But oligarchy shares the dangers
with the many, while it does not merely usurp the material benefits,
rather it appropriates and keeps them all."
The Athenians received a cold welcome wherever they went. At Catana they
found their state vessel waiting to convey Alcibiades home to stand his
trial; he effected his escape on the homeward voyage, crossing to the
Peloponnese. The great armament instead of thrusting at Syracuse
wasted its time and efficiency on side-issues, mainly owing to the cold
leadership of Nicias. This valuable respite was used to the full by
Hermocrates, who at a congress held at Camarina was insistent on the
racial character of the struggle between themselves who were Dorians and
the Ionians from Athens. This national antipathy contributed greatly to
the final decision of the conflict.
Passing to Sparta, Alcibiades deliberately betrayed his country. His
speech is of the utmost importance.
His view of democracy is contemptuous. "Nothing new can be said of what
is an admitted folly." He then outlined the Athenian ambition; it was
to subdue Carthage and Sicily, bring over hosts of warlike barbarians,
surround and reduce the Peloponnese and then rule the whole
Greek-speaking world. He advised his hearers to aid Sicilian incapacity
by sending a Spartan commander; above all, he counselled the occupation
of Deceleia, a town in Attica just short of the border, through which
the corn supply was conveyed to the capital; this would lead to the
capture of the silver-mines at Laureium and to the decrease of the
Athenian revenues. He concluded with an attempt to justify his own
treachery, remarking that when a man was exiled, he must use all means
to secure a return.
The Spartans had for some time been anxious to open hostilities; an act
of Athenian aggression gave them an opportunity. Meanwhile in Sicily
Lamachus had perished in attacking a Syracusan cross-wall. Left in
sole command, Nicias remained inactive, while Gylippus, despatched
from Sparta, arrived in Syracuse just in time to prevent it from
capitulating. The seventh book is the record of continued Athenian
disasters. Little by little Gylippus developed the Syracusan resources.
First he made it impossible for the Athenians to circumvallate the city;
then he captured the naval stores of the enemy, forcing them to encamp
in unhealthy ground. Nicias had begged the home government to relieve
him of command owing to illness. Believing in the lucky star of the man
who had taken Nissea they retained him, sending out a second great
fleet under Demosthenes. The latter at once saw the key to the whole
situation. The Syracusan cross-wall which Nicias had failed to render
impassable must be captured at all costs. A night attack nearly
succeeded, but ended in total defeat. Demosthenes immediately advised
retreat; but Nicias obstinately refused to leave. In the meantime the
Syracusans closed the mouth of their harbour with a strong boom, penning
up the Athenian fleet. The famous story of the attempt to destroy it
calls out all the author's powers of description. He draws attention
to the narrow space in which the action was fought. As long as the
Athenians could operate in open water they were invincible; but the
Syracusans not only forced them to fight in a confined harbour, they
strengthened the prows of their vessels, enabling them to smash the
thinner Athenian craft in a direct charge. The whole Athenian army
went down to the edge of the water to watch the engagement which was to
settle their fate. Their excitement was pitiable, for they swayed to and
fro in mental agony, calling to their friends to break the boom and save
them. After a brave struggle, the invaders were routed and driven to the
land by the victorious Syracusans.
Retreat by land was the only escape. A strategem planned by Hermocrates
and Nicias' superstitious terrors delayed the departure long enough to
enable the Syracusans to secure the passes in the interior. When the
army moved away the scene was one of shame and agony; the sick vainly
pleaded with their comrades to save them; the whole force contrasted the
proud hopes of their coming with their humiliating end and refused to
be comforted by Nicias, whose courage shone brightest in this hour
of defeat. Demosthenes' force was isolated and was quickly captured;
Nicias' men with great difficulty reached the River Assinarus, parched
with thirst. Forgetting all about their foes, they rushed to the water
and fought among themselves for it though it ran red with their own
blood. At last the army capitulated and was carried back to Syracuse.
Thrown into the public quarries, the poor wretches remained there for
ten weeks, scorched by day, frost-bitten by night. The survivors were
sold into slavery.
"This was the greatest achievement in the war and, I think, in
Greek history the most creditable to the victors, the most
lamentable to the vanquished. In every way they were utterly
defeated; their sufferings were mighty; they were destroyed
hopelessly; ships, men, everything perished, few only returning
from the great host."
So ends the most heartrending story in Greek history, told with absolute
fidelity by a son of Athens and a former general of her army.
The last book is remarkable for the absence of speeches; it is a
record of the continued intrigues which followed the Sicilian disaster.
Upheavals in Asia Minor brought into the swirl of plots Tissaphernes,
the Persian satrap, anxious to recover control of Ionia hitherto
saved by Athenian power. In 412 the Athenian subjects began to revolt,
seventeen defections being recorded in all. At Samos a most important
movement began; the democrats rose against their nobles, being
guaranteed independence by Athens. Soon they made overtures to
Alcibiades who was acting with the Spartan fleet; he promised to detach
Tissaphernes from Sparta if Samos eschewed democracy, a creed odious to
the Persian monarchy. The Samians sent a delegation to Athens headed by
Pisander, who boldly proposed Alcibiades' return, the dissolution of the
democracy in Samos and alliance with Tissaphernes. These proposals were
rejected, but the democracy at Athens was not destined to last much
longer, power being usurped by the famous Four Hundred in 411. The
Samian democracy eventually appointed Alcibiades general, while in
Athens the extremists were anxious to come to terms with Sparta. This
movement split the Four Hundred, the constitution being changed to
that of the Five Thousand, a blend of democracy and oligarchy which won
Thucydides' admiration; the history concludes with the victory of the
Athenians in the naval action at Cynossema in 410.
The defects of Thucydides are evident; his style is harsh, obscure and
crabbed; it is sometimes said that he seems wiser than he really is
mainly because his language is difficult; that if his thoughts were
translated into easier prose our impressions of his greatness would be
much modified. Yet it is to be remembered that he, like Lucretius, had
to create his own vocabulary. It is a remarkable fact that prose
has been far more difficult to invent than poetry, for precision is
essential to it as the language of reasoning rather than of feeling.
Instead of finding fault with a medium which was necessarily imperfect
because it was an innovation we should be thankful for what it has
actually accomplished. It is not always obscure; at times, when "the
lion laughed" as an old commentator says, he is almost unmatched in pure
narrative, notably in his rapid summary of the Athenian rise to power in
the first book and in the immortal Syracusan tragedy of the seventh.
His merits are many and great; his conciseness, repression of personal
feeling, love of accuracy, careful research, unwillingness to praise
overmuch and his total absence of preconceived opinion testify to
an honesty of outlook rare in classical historians. Because he feels
certain of his detachment of view, he quite confidently undertakes what
few would have faced, the writing of contemporary history. Nowadays
historians do not trust themselves; we may expect a faithful account
of our Great War some fifty years hence, if ever. Not so Thucydides;
he claims that his work will be a treasure for all time; had any other
written these words we should have dismissed them as an idle boast.
For he is the first man to respect history. It was not a plaything;
it was worthy of being elevated to the rank of a science. As such, its
events must have some deep causes behind them, worth discovering not
only in themselves as keys to one particular period, but as possible
explanations of similar events in distant ages. Accordingly, he deemed
it necessary to study first of all our human nature, its varied motives,
mostly of questionable morality, next he studied international ethics,
based frankly on expediency. The results of these researches he has
embodied (with one or two exceptions) in his famous speeches.
He surveyed the ground on which battles were fought; he examined
inscriptions, copying them with scrupulous care; he criticised ancient
history and contemporary versions of famous events, many of which he
found to be untrue. Further, his anxiety to discover the real sources
of certain policies made it necessary for him to write an account of
seemingly purposeless action in wilder or even barbarous regions such as
Arcadia, Ambracia, Macedonia; in consequence his work embraces the whole
of the Greek world, as he said it would in his famous preface.
As an artist, he is not without his merits. The dramatic nature of
his plan has been frequently pointed out; to him the main plot is the
destruction not of Athens, but of the Periclean democracy, the overthrow
thereof being due to a conflict with another like it; hence the marked
change in the last book, in which the main dramatic interest has waned.
This dramatic form has, however, defeated its own objects sometimes, for
all the Thucydidean fishes talk like Thucydidean whales.
To us he is indispensable. We are a maritime power, ruling a maritime
empire, our potential enemies being military nations. He has warned us
that democracy cannot govern an empire. Perhaps our type of this creed
is not so full of the lust for domination and aggrandisement as was that
of Athens; it may be suspected that we are virtuous mainly because we
have all we need and are not likely to be tempted overmuch. But there is
the other and more subtle danger. The enemies within the state betrayed
Deceleia which safeguarded the food-supply. We have many Deceleias,
situate along the great trade-routes and needing protection. Once these
are betrayed we shall not hold out as Athens did for nearly ten years;
ten weeks at the outside ought to see our people starving and beaten,
fit for nothing but the payment of indemnities to the power which
relieves us of our inheritance.