shadow of an army, compelled to retreat southward in New Jersey, hotly
pursued by the well-equipped British,--almost a fugitive, like David
fleeing from the hand of Saul. He dared not risk an engagement against
greatly superior forces in pursuit, triumphant and confident of success,
while his followers were half-clad, without shoes, hungry, homesick, and
forlorn. So confident was Howe of crushing the only army opposed to him,
that he neglected opportunities and made mistakes. At last the remnant
of Lee's troops, commanded by Sullivan and Gates, joined Washington; but
even with this reinforcement, giving him barely three thousand men, he
could not face the enemy, more than double the number of his
inexperienced soldiers. The only thing to do was to put the Delaware
between himself and Howe's army. But it was already winter, and the
Delaware was full of ice. Cornwallis, a general of great ability, felt
sure that the dispirited men who still adhered to Washington could not
possibly escape him; so he lingered in his march,--a fatal confidence,
for, when he arrived at the Delaware, Washington was already safely
encamped on the opposite bank; nor could he pursue, since all the boats
on the river for seventy miles were either destroyed or in the hands of
Washington. This successful retreat from the Hudson over the Delaware
was another exhibition of high military qualities,--caution, quick
perception, and prompt action.
Washington had now the nucleus of an army and could not be dislodged by
the enemy, whose force was only about double his own. Howe was
apparently satisfied with driving the American forces out of New Jersey,
and, retaining his hold at certain points, sent the bulk of his army
back to New York.
The aim of Washington was now to expel the British troops from New
Jersey. It was almost a forlorn hope, but he never despaired. His
condition was not more hopeless than that of William the Silent when he
encountered the overwhelming armies of Spain. Always beaten, the heroic
Prince of Orange still held out when Holland was completely overrun. But
the United States were not overrun. New England was practically safe,
although the British held Newport; and all the country south of the
Delaware was free from them. The perplexities and discouragements of
Washington were great indeed, while he stubbornly held the field with a
beggarly makeshift for an army and sturdily continued his appeals to
Congress and to the country for men, arms, and clothing; yet only New
York City and New Jersey were really in the possession of the enemy. It
was one thing for England to occupy a few cities, and quite another to
conquer a continent; hence Congress and the leaders of the rebellion
never lost hope. So long as there were men left in peaceable possession
of their farms from Maine to Georgia, and these men accustomed to
fire-arms and resolved on freedom, there was no real cause of despair.
The perplexing and discouraging things were that the men preferred the
safety and comfort of their homes to the dangers and hardships of the
camp, and that there was no money in the treasury to pay the troops, nor
credit on which to raise it. Hence desertions, raggedness, discontent,
suffering; but not despair,--even in the breast of Washington, who
realized the difficulties as none else did. Men would not enlist unless
they were paid and fed, clothed and properly armed. Had there been an
overwhelming danger they probably would have rallied, as the Dutch did
when they opened their dikes, or as the Greeks rallied in their late
Revolution, when fortress after fortress fell into the hands of the
Turks, and as the American militia did in successive localities
threatened by the British,--notably in New Hampshire, Vermont, and New
York, when they swarmed about Burgoyne and captured him at Saratoga. But
this was by no means the same as enlisting for a long period in a
general army.
I mention these things, not to discredit the bravery and patriotism of
the Revolutionary soldiers. They made noble sacrifices and they fought
gallantly, but they did not rise above local patriotism and sustain the
Continental cause. Yet at no time, even when Washington with his small
army was flying before Cornwallis across New Jersey, were there grounds
of despair. There were discouragements, difficulties, and vexations; and
these could be traced chiefly to the want of a strong central
government. The government was divided against itself, without money or
credit,--in short, a mere advisory board of civilians, half the time
opposed to the plans of the commander-in-chief. But when Washington had
been driven beyond the Delaware, when Philadelphia, where Congress was
sitting, was in danger, then dictatorial powers were virtually conferred
on Washington,--"the most unlimited authority" was the phrase used,--and
he had scope to act as he saw fit.
Washington was, it is true, at times accused of incompetency, and
traitors slandered him, but Congress stood by him and the country had
confidence in him; as well it might, since, while he had not gained
great victories, and even perhaps had made military mistakes, he had
delivered Boston, had rescued the remnant of his army from the clutches
of Howe and Cornwallis, and had devoted himself by day and night to
labors which should never have been demanded of him, in keeping Congress
up to the mark, as well as in his arduous duties in the field,--evincing
great prudence, sagacity, watchfulness, and energy. He had proved
himself at least to be a Fabius, if he was not a Hannibal. But a
Hannibal is not possible without an army, and a steady-handed Fabius was
the need of the times. The Caesars of the world are few, and most of
them have been unfaithful to their trust, but no one doubted the
integrity and patriotism of Washington. Rival generals may have disliked
his austere dignity and proud self-consciousness, but the people and the
soldiers adored him; and while his general policy was, and had to be, a
defensive one, everybody knew that he would fight if he had any hope of
success. No one in the army was braver than he, as proved not only by
his early warfare against the French and Indians, but also by his whole
career after he was selected for the chief command, whenever a fair
fighting opportunity was presented, as seen in the following instance.
With his small army on the right bank of the Delaware, toilsomely
increased to about four thousand men, he now meditated offensive
operations against the unsuspecting British, who had but just chased him
out of New Jersey. Accordingly, with unexpected audacity, on Christmas
night he recrossed the Delaware, marched nine miles and attacked the
British troops posted at Trenton. It was not a formal battle, but a
raid, and proved successful. The enemy, amazed, retreated; then with
fresh reinforcements they turned upon Washington; he evaded them, and on
January 3, 1777, made a fierce attack on their lines at Princeton,
attended with the same success, utterly routing the British. These were
small victories, but they encouraged the troops, aroused the New Jersey
men to enthusiasm, and alarmed Cornwallis, who retreated northward to
New Brunswick, to save his military stores. In a few days the English
retained only that town, Amboy, and Paulus Hook, in all New Jersey. Thus
in three weeks, in the midst of winter, Washington had won two fights,
taken two thousand prisoners, and was as strong as he was before he
crossed the Hudson,--and the winter of 1777 opened with hope in the
Revolutionary ranks.
Washington then intrenched himself at Morristown and watched the forces
of the English generals; and for six months nothing of consequence was
done by either side. It became evident that Washington could not be
conquered except by large reinforcements to the army of Howe. Another
campaign was a necessity, to the disgust and humiliation of the British
government and the wrath of George III. The Declaration of Independence,
thus far, had not proved mere rhetoric.
The expulsion of the British troops from New Jersey by inferior forces
was regarded in Europe as a great achievement, and enabled Franklin at
Paris to secure substantial but at first secret aid from the French
Government. National independence now seemed to be a probability, and
perhaps a certainty. It was undoubtedly a great encouragement to the
struggling States. The more foresighted of British statesmen saw now the
hopelessness of a conflict which had lasted nearly two years, and in
which nothing more substantial had been gained by the English generals
than the occupation of New York and a few towns on the coast, while the
Americans had gained military experience and considerable prestige. The
whole civilized world pronounced Washington to be both a hero and
a patriot.
But the English government, with singular obstinacy, under the lash of
George III., resolved to make renewed efforts, to send to America all
the forces which could be raised, at a vast expense, and to plan a
campaign which should bring the rebels to obedience. The plan was to
send an army by way of Canada to take the fortresses on Lake Champlain,
and then to descend the Hudson, and co-operate with Howe in cutting off
New England from the rest of the country; in fact, dividing the land in
twain,--a plan seemingly feasible. It would be possible to conquer each
section, east and south of New York, in detail, with victorious and
overwhelming forces. This was the great danger that menaced the States
and caused the deepest solicitude.
So soon as the designs of the British government were known, it became
the aim and duty of the commander-in-chief to guard against them. The
military preparations of Congress were utterly inadequate for the
crisis, in spite of the constant and urgent expostulations of
Washington. There was, as yet, 110 regular army, and the militia
shamefully deserted. There was even a prejudice against a standing army,
and the militia of every State were jealous of the militia of other
States. Congress passed resolutions, and a large force was created on
paper. Popular enthusiasm was passing away in the absence of immediate
dangers; so that, despite the glorious success in New Jersey, the winter
of 1777 was passed gloomily, and in the spring new perils arose. But for
the negligence of General Howe, the well-planned British expedition from
the North might have succeeded. It was under the command of an able and
experienced veteran, General Burgoyne. There was apparently nothing to
prevent the junction of the forces of Howe and Burgoyne but the fortress
of West Point, which commanded the Hudson River. To oppose this movement
Benedict Arnold--"the bravest of the brave," as he was called, like
Marshal Ney--was selected, assisted by General Schuyler, a high-minded
gentleman and patriot, but as a soldier more respectable than able, and
Horatio Gates, a soldier of fortune, who was jealous of Washington, and
who, like Lee, made great pretensions,--both Englishmen by birth. The
spring and summer resulted in many reverses in the North, where Schuyler
was unable to cope with Burgoyne; and had Howe promptly co-operated,
that campaign would have been a great triumph for the British.
It was the object of Howe to deceive Washington, if possible, and hence
he sent a large part of his army on board the fleet at New York, under
the command of Cornwallis, as if Boston were his destination. He
intended, however, to capture Philadelphia, the seat of the "rebel
Congress," with his main force, while other troops were to co-operate
with Burgoyne. Washington, divining the intentions of Howe, with his
ragged army crossed the Delaware once more, at the end of July, this
time to protect Philadelphia, leaving Arnold and Schuyler to watch
Burgoyne, and Putnam to defend the Hudson. When, late in August, Howe
landed his forces below Philadelphia, Washington made up his mind to
risk a battle, and chose a good position on the heights near the
Brandywine; but in the engagement of September 11 was defeated, through
the negligence of Sullivan to guard the fords above against the
overwhelming forces of Cornwallis, who was in immediate command. Still,
he rallied his army with the view of fighting again. The battle of
Germantown, October 4, resulted in American defeat and the occupation by
the British of Philadelphia,--a place desirable only for comfortable
winter quarters. When Franklin heard of it he coolly remarked that the
British had not taken Philadelphia, but Philadelphia had taken them,
since seventeen thousand veterans were here kept out of the field, when
they were needed most on the banks of the Hudson, to join Burgoyne, now
on his way to Lake Champlain.
This diversion of the main army of Howe to occupy Philadelphia was the
great British blunder of the war. It enabled the Vermont and New
Hampshire militia to throw obstacles in the march of Burgoyne, who
became entangled in the forests of northern New York, with his flank and
rear exposed to the sharpshooters of the enemy, fully alive to the
dangers which menaced them. Sluggish as they were, and averse to
enlistment, the New England troops always rallied when pressing
necessity stared them in the face, and fought with tenacious courage.
Although Burgoyne had taken Ticonderoga, on Lake Champlain, as was to be
expected, he was, after a most trying campaign, at last surrounded at
Saratoga, and on October 17 was compelled to surrender to the militia he
despised. It was not the generalship of the American commander which led
to this crushing disaster, but the obstacles of nature, utilized by the
hardy American volunteers. Gates, who had superseded Schuyler in the
command of the Northern department, claimed the chief merit of the
capture of the British army, nearly ten thousand strong; but this claim
is now generally disputed, and the success of the campaign is ascribed
to Arnold, while that of the final fighting and success is given to
Arnold together with Morgan and his Virginia riflemen, whom Washington
had sent from his own small force.
The moral and political effect of the surrender of Burgoyne was greater
than the military result. The independence of the United States was now
assured, not only in the minds of American statesmen, but to European
intelligence. The French Government then openly came out with its
promised aid, and money was more easily raised.
The influence of Washington in securing the capture of Burgoyne was
indirect, although the general plan of campaign and the arousing of the
Northern militia had been outlined by him to General Schuyler. He had
his hands full in watching Howe's forces at Philadelphia. His defeat at
Germantown, the result of accident which he could not prevent, compelled
him to retreat to Valley Forge, on the Schuylkill, about nine miles from
Philadelphia. There he took up his quarters in the winter of 1777-78.
The sufferings of the army in that distressing winter are among the
best-known events of the whole war. At Valley Forge the trials of
Washington culminated. His army was reduced to three thousand men,
incapable of offensive operations, without suitable clothing, food,
or shelter,
"As the poor soldiers," says Fiske, in his brilliant history, "marched
on the 17th of December to their winter quarters, the route could be
traced on the snow by the blood which oozed from bare, frost-bitten
feet. For want of blankets many were fain to sit up all night by fires.
Cold and hunger daily added to the sick list, and men died for want of
straw to put between them and the frozen ground."
Gates, instead of marching to the relief of Washington before
Philadelphia, as he was ordered, kept his victorious troops idle at
Saratoga; and it was only by the extraordinary tact of Alexander
Hamilton, the youthful aide, secretary, and counsellor of Washington,
who had been sent North for the purpose, that the return of Morgan with
his Virginia riflemen was secured. Congress was shaken by the intrigues
of Gates, who sought to supplant the commander-in-chief, and who had won
to his support both Morgan and Richard Henry Lee.
At this crisis, Baron Steuben, a Prussian officer who had served under
Frederic the Great, arrived at the headquarters of Washington. Some say
that he was a mere martinet, but he was exceedingly useful in drilling
the American troops, working from morning till night, both patient and
laborious. From that time Washington had regular troops, on which he
could rely, few in number, but loyal and true. La Fayette also was
present in his camp, chivalrous and magnanimous, rendering efficient
aid; and there too was Nathaniel Greene of Rhode Island, who had made
but one great mistake in his military career, the most able of
Washington's generals. With the aid of these trusted lieutenants,
Washington was able to keep his little army together, as the nucleus of
a greater one, and wait for opportunities, for he loved to fight when he
saw a chance of success.
And now it may be said that the desertions which had crippled
Washington, the reluctance to enlist on the part of the farmers, and the
tardy response to his calls for money, probably were owing to the
general sense of security after the surrender of Burgoyne. It was felt
that the cause of liberty was already won. With this feeling men were
slow to enlist when they were not sure of their pay, and it was at this
period that money was most difficult to be raised. Had there been a
strong central government, and not a mere league of States, some Moses
would have "smitten the rock of finance," as Hamilton subsequently did,
and Chase in the war of the Southern Rebellion, and abundant streams
would have gushed forth in the shape of national bonds, certain to be
redeemed, sooner or later, in solid gold and silver, and which could
have been readily negotiated by the leading bankers of the world. The
real difficulty with which Congress and Washington had to contend was a
financial one. There were men enough to enlist in the army if they had
been promptly paid. Yet, on the other hand, England, with ample means
and lavish promises, was able to induce only about three thousand Tories
out of all the American population to enlist in her armies in America
during the whole war.
By patience unparalleled and efforts unceasing, Washington slowly
wrought upon Congress to sustain him in building up a "Continental"
army, in place of the shifting bodies of militia. With Steuben as
inspector-general and Greene as quartermaster, the new levies as they
came in were disciplined and equipped; and in spite of the conspiracies
and cabals formed against him by ambitious subordinates,--which enlisted
the aid of many influential men even in Congress, but which came to
nought before the solid character and steady front of the man who was
really carrying the whole war upon his own shoulders,--Washington
emerged from the frightful winter at Valley Forge and entered the spring
of 1778 with greater resources at his command than he had ever
had before.
In January, 1778, France acknowledged the independence of the United
States of America and entered into treaty with them. In the spring Sir
William Howe resigned, and Sir Henry Clinton succeeded him in command.
After wintering in Philadelphia, the British commander discovered that
he could do nothing with his troops shut up in a luxurious city, while
Washington was watching him in a strongly intrenched position a few
miles distant, and with constantly increasing forces now trained to war;
and moreover, a French fleet with reinforcements was now looked for. So
he evacuated the Quaker City on the 18th of June, 1778, and began his
march to New York, followed by Washington with an army now equal to his
own. On the 28th of June Cornwallis was encamped near Monmouth, N.J.,
where was fought the most brilliant battle of the war, which Washington
nearly lost, nevertheless, by the disobedience of Lee, his second in
command, at a critical moment. Boiling with rage, the commander-in-chief
rode up to Lee and demanded why he had disobeyed orders. Then, it is
said, with a tremendous oath he sent the marplot to the rear, and Lee's
military career ignominiously ended. Four years after, this military
adventurer, who had given so much trouble, died in a mean tavern in
Philadelphia, disgraced, unpitied, and forlorn.
The battle of Monmouth did not prevent the orderly retreat of the
British to New York, when Washington resumed his old post at White
Plains, east of the Hudson in Westchester County, whence he had some
hopes of moving on New York, with the aid of the French fleet under the
Count d'Estaing. But the big French ships could not cross the bar, so
the fleet sailed for Newport with a view of recapturing that town and
repossessing Rhode Island. Washington sent Greene and La Fayette thither
with reinforcements for Sullivan, who was in command. The enterprise
failed from an unexpected storm in November, which compelled the French
admiral to sail to Boston to refit, after which he proceeded to the West
Indies. It would appear that the French, thus far, sought to embarrass
the English rather than to assist the Americans. The only good that
resulted from the appearance of D'Estaing at Newport was the withdrawal
of the British troops to New York.
It is singular that the positions of the opposing armies were very much
as they had been two years before. The headquarters of Washington were
at White Plains, on the Hudson, and those of Clinton at New York,
commanding the harbor and the neighboring heights. Neither army was
strong enough for offensive operations with any reasonable hope of
success, and the commanding generals seem to have acted on the maxim
that "discretion is the better part of valor." Both armies had been
strongly reinforced, and the opposing generals did little else than
fortify their positions and watch each other. A year passed in virtual
inaction on both sides, except that the British carried on a series of
devastating predatory raids in New England along the coast of Long
Island Sound, in New York State (with the savage aid of the Indians), in
New Jersey, and in the South,--there making a more formal movement and
seizing the coast of Georgia and South Carolina. No battles of any
account were fought. There was some skirmishing, but no important
military movements were made on either side. Washington, in December,
1778, removed his headquarters to Middlebrook, N.J., his forces being
distributed in a series of camps from the Delaware north and east to
Rhode Island. The winter he passed in patient vigilance; he wrote
expostulating letters to Congress, and even went personally to
Philadelphia to labor with its members. Meanwhile Clinton was taking his
ease, to the disgust of the British government.
There was a cavilling, criticising spirit among the different parties in
America; for there were many who did not comprehend the situation, and
who were disappointed that nothing decisive was done. Washington was
infinitely annoyed at the stream of detraction which flowed from
discontented officers, and civilians in power, but held his soul in
patience, rarely taking any notice of the innumerable slanders and
hostile insinuations. He held together his army, now chiefly composed of
veterans, and nearly as numerous as the troops of the enemy. One thing
he saw clearly,--that the maintenance of an army in the field, held
together by discipline, was of more importance, from a military point of
view, than the occupation of a large city or annoying raids of
destruction. While he was well intrenched in a strong position, and
therefore safe, the British had the command of the Hudson, and
ships-of-war could ascend the river unmolested as far as West Point,
which was still held by the Americans and was impregnable. Outside of
New York the British did not possess a strong fortress in the country,
at least in the interior, except on Lake Champlain,--not one in New
England. West Point, therefore, was a great eyesore to the English
generals and admirals. Its possession would be of incalculable advantage
in case any expedition was sent to the North.
And the enemy came very near getting possession of this important
fortress, not by force, but by treachery. Benedict Arnold, disappointed
in his military prospects, alienated from his cause, overwhelmed with
debts, and utterly discontented and demoralized, had asked to be ordered
from Philadelphia and put in command of West Point. He was sent there in
August, 1780. He was a capable and brave man; he had the confidence of
Washington, in spite of his defects of character, and moreover he had
rendered important services. In an evil hour he lost his head and
listened to the voice of the tempter, and having succeeded in getting
himself put in charge of the stronghold of the Hudson, he secretly
negotiated with Clinton for its surrender.