By Col. A. B. Johnson
U.S. Army (Ret.)
Following the battle of Second Manassas General Lee brought his Army of
Northern Virginia through Loudoun County for the first invasion of the
North. One of Lee's prime considerations for the movement through
Loudoun is best described in a letter from Lee to President Davis dated
September 4, 1862: "I did not think it advantageous to follow the enemy
into his fortifications. If I had possessed the necessary ammunition I
should be unable to supply provisions for the troops. I therefore
determined to draw troops into Loudoun County where forage and
provisions could be obtained."
White's Ford, a low water crossing of the Potomac, offered his best
access to the Maryland shore. (White's Ford is not to be confused with
present day White's Ferry. The ford is about three miles upstream, and
can be reached via Routes 661 and 656, east of Route 15).
General J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry was to screen the advance, and in
doing so he sent Colonel T. T. Munford with the 2nd Virginia Cavalry
toward Leesburg. Munford's mission was to clear the enemy from the river
crossings, and in so doing he was to strike the "notorious Means" who
was thought to be at or near Leesburg.
Captain Samuel C. Means of Waterford had organized a company of Union
cavalry known as the Loudoun Rangers from the northern part of Loudoun.
This act had embittered the Confederates and at every opportunity they
tried to annihilate these Virginians who would not support the State.
The Rangers had been roughly handled a few days before at the Waterford
Baptist Church by Major E. V. White's 35th Battalion, Virginia Cavalry.
On September 1, Munford left the army and bivouaced at Goose Creek near
where it crosses Route 7. In the meantime, Cole's Independent Maryland
Cavalry (3 companies) and Means' depleted company were in Leesburg.
On the 2nd as Munford approached Leesburg he divided his command,
sending Captain Irvine of Company C with a squadron to drive through the
town. With the remainder of the regiment, Munford turned off Route 7 in
a northerly direction, crossing the Edwards Ferry road and the Trundle
plantation (Exeter). While Munford was making this flanking movement,
Captain Irvine charged into the town wounding four of the Loudoun
Rangers and causing Means to withdraw north on present day Route 15.
Cole's three companies had taken position on a slight eminence about a
mile north of town. In taking up this position Cole had dismounted his
troopers and sent the horses to the rear near Big Spring; one holder was
in charge of four horses, thus depleting his fighting strength by one
fourth. (Cole's line was in the "V" between old Route 15 and the new
part that has been recently straightened, and approximately on the ridge
at the entrance to Ball's Bluff.)
Fences bordered the road and a wheat field in shocks was on the
southeast side. Irvine's squadron had followed Means from the town and
was firing from behind the shocks as they drove the Loudoun Rangers back
on Cole's line.
Irvine had performed his work well, for in attacking from the front he
had allowed Munford with the rest of the regiment to circle around
behind Cole unnoticed. Suddenly from the rear came the horseholders at a
full gallop shouting, "Here come the Rebs." Munford with most of his
regiment riding boot to boot and shouting at the top of their lungs was
upon them. No time was lost in formal maneuvers as Cole shouted to his
men to mount up and charge to the right--the melee was on. Some of the
blue troopers were shot down and sabred before they could mount, others
were captured on foot; many with blood streaming down their faces from
sabre cuts on the head.
The melee developed into a running fight as Cole led his men toward the
mountain road that runs past the Burdett Wright farm toward Waterford.
Again the sabre was freely used as it was impossible to reload revolvers
on moving horses. The pursuit continued for about two miles until
Munford called a halt to secure horses and prisoners that had been
passed in the chase.
From existing reports it is difficult to reconcile either the strength
or the casualties for the opposing forces in this engagement. Munford
officially reported his strength at 163. This figure seems low, for at
this early date in the war a company of only 16 men was the exception
rather than the rule. Munford adds further that: "A squadron of 40 men
under Captain H. Clay Dickinson disgraced itself, having run as far as
Goose Creek and failed to support the regiment in the fight." The usual
Confederate system for reporting strength was to count only those on the
field with musket in hand; thus, it is possible that the 2nd Virginia
Cavalry had a pre-battle strength of 203 of all ranks.
The Confederates list only 2 killed and 5 badly wounded; evidently there
were no slightly wounded or they failed to report them.
The Union strength was not reported officially. Goodhart, the company
historian, estimates the Loudoun Rangers had 30 men on the field. Its
casualties were 1 killed, 6 wounded and 4 captured; four of the wounded
also fell into the hands of the enemy. Cole's strength may be placed at
150 or an average of 50 men per company for his three companies. The
battalion historian gives the names, which total 6 killed, 27 wounded,
of whom 11 were captured, as the losses sustained.
Goodhart says that this engagement coming in such close succession after
the debacle at Waterford, and before the company had attained
proficiency in discipline and drill, seriously affected recruiting and
nearly broke up the company.
It is interesting to note the high percentage of officers among the
casualties; this is no doubt due to the fact that in cavalry the
officers rode in front and led the charge.
The psychological effect of a mounted charge, particularly when a
surprise, is powerful. In this instance the 2nd Virginia Cavalry with
about 200 men was reported by Cole as an entire brigade.
Cole's great mistake was of course in not posting pickets at his rear
and flanks to prevent just what happened, a surprise attack. He left the
Smart's Mill road, less than a half mile from his flank, entirely
unguarded; a fatal mistake as it left open a road mostly sheltered from
view for Munford to follow to his rear.
Munford appears to have handled his operations without flaw. He kept his
men well under control, even in pursuit of Cole, which so often broke up
commands and caused the men to scatter and not answer recall. He was
completely successful in clearing the enemy from the area to allow Lee's
infantry and artillery to make uninterrupted marches to the river
crossings.
Source material has been drawn from the following sources:
Goodhart: The History of the Loudoun Rangers
Newcomer: Cole's Maryland Cavalry
Official Records: Vol. XIX parts 1 & 2
Manuscripts of an unpublished history of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry now
in the library at Duke University