The Uses of History

A Lecture Delivered Before Members of the Society, January 15, 1965

By Col. Trevor N. Dupuy

At the outset I should make clear that I have no credentials in

historiography. In fact I do not have even have the so-called Union Card

for the professional academic historian--a Ph. D. degree--but I do

believe that I have enough practical experience in the writing of

history, and in teaching it at three universities, to warrant having

some thoughts on the nature of history, and of its uses. And I have

another reason, as well, as you will see.

Let me start by explaining how I intend to treat this important topic:

The uses of history. First I shall give you my interpretation of what

the _nature_ of history is. Next I will offer some very _general_

thoughts on the _uses_ of history. Then I would like to make one or two

comments on how I visualize history being currently useful for Loudoun

County. Finally, I shall tell you a little bit about my own day-to-day

involvement in several very specific uses of history.

First, then, for my views on what history is--and what it is not.

Several months ago there was an interesting debate in the New York

_Times Magazine_ about the nature of history, provoked by an article

written by Barbara Tuchman, the historian whose public reputation is

based primarily upon her magnificent book, _The Guns of August_. The

essence of the debate was whether history is what _actually happened_ in

the past, or is merely the _record_ of what happened. The subtle

distinction, of course, is comparable to that involved in the question

of whether there can be noise--as from a tree falling in the middle of

an impenetrable forest--if there is no ear to hear the sound waves. I

don't intend to revive the debate; I merely want to suggest that there

are various ways of looking at the nature of history. You are about to

be exposed to _my_ way of looking at it.

As I see it, recorded history is society's memory. For society as a

whole, as well as for an individual, memory can provide insights,

wisdom, and the recollection of past experiences which are in some way

relevant to every new experience--no matter how unanticipated the

manifestation of that new experience may be. And of course each new

experience adds to the information stored in that amazing electronic

computer--the human brain. Sometimes the new experience reinforces the

information already stored there, sometimes it qualifies the existing

information, but always the new experience is in some way relevant to

events in the past which are already recorded in the memory. This same

process is to some degree true of society as a whole.

Every event of significance in mankind's past can enrich the memory of

human society, and can be used to the future benefit of mankind--if some

way can be found to relate that experience to current issues and

problems, without distortion, through some kind of memory process. The

historian, of course, is the essential element of this memory process.

In considering this relationship of experience to memory, it is

pertinent to point out that even the most startling new scientific

development invariably has had a historical background of its own. New

wonders of technology and science all have a direct connection with the

past, not only through the evaluation and analysis of empirical records,

but also through discontinuities or continuities which exist between the

new development and what has happened in the past.

If there is anything to my suggestion that historical experience is the

basic material for the memory of society, then the record of past

experience is a natural resource, which can and should be mined for the

present and future benefit of mankind. Save possibly in the area of

science, human society has never come near to efficiently exploiting

this resource of its own experience.

When it _is_ mined, this natural resource can make its principal

contribution to social memory by enriching wisdom. We have a tendency to

speak of the "lessons" of history, as though they were immutable--I do

this as much as anyone--but I realize that in a literal sense this is

impossible. One can never recreate, in every detail and particular, the

exact circumstances of a past event. History can never _exactly_ repeat

itself, and so its so-called lessons cannot be applied blindly or

automatically.

But if history doesn't repeat itself it does, in the words of Herman

Kahn, paraphrase itself. Kahn, incidentally, is a scientist and not a

historian, but he, like Toynbee and other historians, recognizes that

human and institutional relationships in modern times can often bear a

close resemblance to events of the past. One can discern many parallel

patterns in history, and both trends and specific events are often

directly comparable between these patterns. The rise and fall of nations

and dynasties, for instance. And since human reactions to circumstances

and stimuli are not ever likely to change radically, it is easy to note

danger signals from certain circumstances in related patterns of events,

and to see what kinds of actions have been successful in certain

circumstances in the past, and which have failed, in similar patterns.

Thus, while rejecting the idea that history teaches us lessons from the

past, I am convinced that history will widen our horizons, revealing new

perspective, providing insights, and generally enriching wisdom in using

good judgment in dealing with the present. There is still one caution,

however. If there is _any_ immutable lesson which history teaches, it is

that no quantity of insights can ever replace or substitute for good

judgement or the basic intellectual capacity which experience transforms

into wisdom.

I have tried to indicate what I think the nature of history is, and in

the process I have given you some very general thoughts about the use

and utility of history. I would like to pursue this question of uses of

history a bit further.

What really do any of us have in mind in speaking of the "Uses of

History?" Is it history for the enrichment of one's life? For the

lessons (so-called) to be gained from experience? For developing

patriotism or a sense of one's heritage? For making money?

At this point it might be useful to recall that a number of ancient and

not-so-ancient philosophers have commented on the value and importance

of history. Let me simply refresh your memory on four that I happen to

like:

_Polybius_: For it is history and history alone, which will mature our

judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the

crisis or the posture of affairs.

_Shakespeare_: The past is prologue.

_Santayana_: Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to

repeat it.

_John Gardner_: "In the renewing society the historian consults the

past in the service of the present and the future."

But, like so many philosophical sayings, these aphorisms are somewhat

cryptic. We understand them, but they require some elaboration, and

possibly some interpretation.

Many academic historians would insist that history doesn't need to have

a use. Its existence is as inevitable as life itself; as last night's

sunset, this morning's sunrise. These scholars feel that the study of

the events which make up history is rewarding in itself without any

further direct use. It is a part of the well-educated man or woman.

There are other people, of course, who would insist that--save for the

scholars who teach it--history has no more utility than knowledge of

Latin and Greek. Having found no adult use for the contents of their

history textbooks, such people might be pardoned for feeling that

history is merely the useless foible of educators. (I leave it up to you

whether it is appropriate to apply the same logic to the so-called dead

languages.)

Yet, if there is any validity to what I said earlier about history being

the memory of human society--and of individual humans as well--I suspect

that history has had some utility--direct and indirect--to even the most

pragmatic amongst us. Certainly _something_ of what was taught us in our

history courses has entered our memories, even if subconsciously so.

Otherwise we could not have any opinions about it. It is even more

certain that the reader of a daily newspaper will retain _some_

recollection of what he has read in that paper, and then will relate

these recalled events to what he does, what he thinks, what he talks

about, and what he reads in the next day's newspaper. These events,

recorded in the newspaper, are as much history as events which happened

in the days of Roman power, as recorded by Julius Caesar, Livy, and

other writers of those times. Thus the man who reads a daily newspaper,

or a weekly newsmagazine, is making definite use of history--otherwise

he wouldn't bother to read!

Equally, events which happened to us in our daily work last year, last

week, even today, are as much historical events as things which occurred

centuries ago. These events are experience, and our recollection of

these day to day events are used by all of us in planning and doing

things in subsequent days. Deprived of this memory, we would be both

useless and helpless. The same is true of society as a whole.

Recognizing this, there are economic and social historians who

concentrate their efforts on events of the very recent past, in order to

provide useful inputs to the memories of scholars, policy makers, and

others who are concerned with modern economic or social affairs. It is

beside the point whether or not we believe the job could be done more

systematically.

Even more basically, some of us believe that a sense of history, and a

consciousness of participation in history, is a basic human need. Now

there are, of course, different kinds of basic human needs--there are

the powerful and elemental forces of life and the preservation and

continuation of life; instincts and drives relating to food, shelter,

sex, parenthood and survival. Then there are the other, more social,

needs--as for recreation, privacy, living space, and the like. It is in

this latter category that I would place the need for a sense of history.

Aside from the memory aspect, to which I have already alluded, there is

an enrichment and humanizing effect on peoples' lives resulting from a

consciousness of making history as they vote in an election, testify at

a local hearing, help create a local institution, or work at responsible

jobs. Essential to this enrichment is some kind of prior realization of

what history is, and how these personal activities can contribute to it.

What I have been saying so far has all been rather theoretical and

ethereal. I believe it is probably time for me to come down to earth

with some practical uses of history, as I see them, and as I have

personally experienced them.

First let me say a few words about how the use of history can be

directly relevant to Loudoun County. Before going further I should

explain to you that, even though I am not a resident, I am no stranger

to the County or to Leesburg. For about twenty years the Dupuys have

been property-owners in Loudoun County. As my father used to comment, we

are thus modern recruits of the Army of Northern Virginia. My wife and I

even have plans for a house which we someday expect to build on our

property on the banks of Goose Creek.

So I know something about the county, and something about its history.

Not enough to discuss in any detail with _this_ group--but enough to

know that it is an appropriate place to settle for one who (like myself)

has forebears who fought on both sides in the Civil War (a conflict

which, as most of you know, my friends, Pat Andrews, always refers to as

the War of Northern Aggression; I won't bother you with the details of

my many Civil War controversies with Pat; I'll simply mention the fact

that our principal dispute centers over the question whether McClellan

was a greater detriment to the Union cause than Braxton Bragg was to

that of the Confederacy.)

To return to history and Loudoun County.

A number among you know my father--who is still at heart a recruit in

the Army of Northern Virginia, and who left Loudoun County only because

of pressure on him from those of the family who felt that his age and

health required a less rigorous life and a more accessible home than

conditions permitted in their isolated house on Goose Creek. While he

lived here, he took the time to immerse himself in Loudoun County

History; in fact, he probably should be talking to you tonight instead

of me.

Anyway, I recall his telling me about the old canal locks in front of

his house--long since inundated by the dam built largely on what used to

be their property. These canal lock ruins clearly demonstrated the

relationship of past events to the present--and of the usefulness of

being able to interpret such relevance. Even submerged, they are mute

evidence of a dream of mass transportation--movement of Loudoun County

produce to the Potomac. This dream was a bubble pricked by the

unexpectedly rapid growth of the railroads. The local railroad, in turn,

has given way to the equally unexpected rapid growth of road

transportation, which has not only brought this rural region into the

suburban circle of the nearby metropolis, but has actually brought about

the appearance within the county of the major metropolitan terminus for

a still newer means of mass transportation--and of course I am speaking

of Dulles Airport.

This is only one of the many manifestations of the fact that history is

certainly sweeping Loudoun County into the Eastern Seaboard Megalopolis.

This historical fact has great relevance and use to this county--and I

should think poses a challenge to this Historical Society.

I am sure the county must have some plans for coping with this

historical fact, and I imagine that this Society has probably done much

thinking about its role in these plans. But let me mention anyhow, at

the risk of telling you things you have already thought of, how I

visualize using history for planning purposes in Loudoun County right

now.

I understand that Fairfax County has recently begun to prepare to

identify its historical landmarks. There are several reasons for such

identification, particularly to permit the county to preserve the

essentials of its past history, as embodied in places, objects and

memories, while still participating in present history. I would hope

that Loudoun County has done, or will do, the same, relying upon this

Society for advice and counsel.

I should like to spend the next few minutes in telling you about some

examples of practical use of history by an organization created for the

specific purpose of making use of history.

This is the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization--which we

modestly call HERO. HERO is dedicated to stimulating improved use of

historical experience--as well as improved use of the professional

historians who are most competent to marshal and to evaluate historical

experience--in the development of national security policy.

Interestingly, and not surprisingly, we have encountered some skepticism

amongst Government officials and others who had some doubts about the

need for or the utility of our principal function: The application of

historical experience to the development of current and future national

security policy. There were two principal reasons for the skepticism.

First, there are a number of people who feel that the tremendous

technological advances of our times have totally invalidated any

possible relevance of the past experience which is the stuff of history.

Secondly, there are those who feel that the competent Government

specialist has no need for the services of the historian; he is usually

far more conversant with his field of interest than any academic scholar

can be; he has his files available for documentation; he knows what

facts can be considered relevant, and he will include these in any

statement which may be required of "Facts Bearing on the Problem."

As to the first of these doubts, as I shall show, we have clearly

demonstrated the relevance of history to current policy issues. For the

second, we believe that the dangers of the concept of "every man his own

historian" are becoming apparent to many Government officials. The

historical background of Government specialists, even in their own area

of specialty, is not only spotty, but their recollection of historical

experience is limited mostly to those examples which tend to support

their own pre-conceived ideas. Furthermore, their own Governmental

documentation is often inadequate in most areas other than in classified

documents. More and more people are beginning to recognize the ability

of the trained historian to bring out _all_ of the pertinent facts, and

to weigh their relative value far more objectively than is possible for

the average person without historical training.

Thus, HERO is convinced of the utility of our primary mission of mining

the rich natural resource which we think history is, and also of

refining the ore so as to permit history to serve mankind, as

philosophers have always said it should. This has never been done

before, either here or in any other country, to the best of my

knowledge--though, as a historian, I am aware of the danger of using

such absolute terms as "never," or "the first ever."

Rather than going into any generalized explanation of how we go about

mining and refining this resource, I think I can demonstrate how we do

it--and at the same time give concrete examples of some uses of

history--by talking about some of HERO's past and current work.

The first study which HERO completed was done for the Sandia

Corporation--a special contracting agency for the Atomic Energy

Commission. The purpose of this study--which we dubbed "Pre-Alert"--was

to ascertain the extent to which historical example and experience could

be useful in the area of military command and control. The Sandia

Corporation had the responsibility for developing the so-called "black

box" to provide foolproof, automatic controls which will prevent

accidental or unauthorized employment of nuclear weapons systems. Our

study was unclassified, so we didn't get into the classified details of

these foolproof, automatic controls. Our task was to assess the

likelihood that such controls might be so complicated, or might be so

inhibiting to individual initiative, as to preclude adequate military

response in the event of unforeseen emergency conditions or

circumstances.

Sandia had, of course, called upon the psychologists and sociologists to

study this problem but the results of these scientific studies were not

completely satisfactory in synthetic "model" environments. So we were

asked to see if anything could be learned from historical experience.

After surveying the history of weapon systems, and the sometimes

divergent history of command and control systems, we came to the

conclusion that much _could_ be learned from history about the human

aspects of command and control. We laid out a program for a detailed

investigation of a number of pertinent case studies, and some general

areas for intensive research. We don't know how useful our study was to

the Sandia Corporation. We do know, however, that it aroused

considerable interest in the Army. And it proved to us, without

question, that our thesis about the relevance of history to current and

future problems was as sound in the nuclear era, and with respect to

nuclear weapon systems, as we had believed would be the case.

Our next study was for the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Entitled "Riposte," the purpose of this study was to survey historical

experience in the field of international treaties, to analyze this

experience, and to point out lessons applicable to current and future

treaty negotiations and treaty enforcement, particularly as this

experience might be relevant to arms control treaties.

For over a year we surveyed and analyzed modern treaty experience,

particularly looking at instances of violations of treaties, and

enforcement measures that were taken, or that could have been taken, in

response to these violations. We gave special attention to the

enforcement (and non-enforcement) of the Treaty of Versailles; to

sanctions and treaty enforcement experience of international

organizations like the League of Nations, the Organization of American

States, and the United Nations; and to the details of experience in

negotiating and enforcing agreements with the Communists since World War

II, such as those dealing with access rights to Berlin, the Geneva

Conferences of 1954 and 1961 on Southeast Asia, and the Korean

Armistice.

We were very pleased with the results of this study, and we understand

that the Arms Control Agency was, also. We demonstrated how our

Government may profit from its own experience and from that of others in

the fields of treaty negotiation and enforcement.

Perhaps the most significant study we have done to date, and the one

which gives promise of having the greatest impact upon policy makers, is

one which we completed for the Army last fall, entitled "Historical

Trends Related to Weapon Lethality." The purpose of the study was to

provide useful insights to men who are trying to develop new doctrines,

and new organizations, for the most efficient possible employment of the

terribly destructive new weapons which are available to the Army today.

In the process we surveyed the history of weapons development from the

Fourth Century B. C. to the end of the Korean War.

This comprehensive survey provided us with a formidable mass of data on

weapon experience in the history of war. We grouped related facts

according to novel schemes of classification and analysis, and then

tried to ascertain what these groupings meant. From this we derived a

number of most interesting conclusions. Let me mention a few:

We learned that the mere invention of a new weapon has almost never

affected the course of world events, or altered the balance of power.

The real impact of weapons on events comes from the assimilation of

weapons into an effective military system. (By assimilation of a weapon

we mean its integration into the nation's milita organization and

doctrine in such a way that it is employed effectively and confidently,

and that its employment usually results in a relative decrease in the

user's casualties, while permitting the user to inflict higher

casualties on military forces that have not assimilated it.) One

interesting pattern which emerged from our analysis of assimilation,

incidentally, is the fact that it has almost always, through history,

taken at least one full generation, or about 20 years, for a weapon to

become assimilated after its first adoption. This time lag of about 20

years seems still to be with us today, despite the accelerating trends

of technological weapon development. Nuclear weapons, first employed in

1945, have not yet been effectively assimilated into a tactical system

by our army or--to the best of our knowledge--any other army--though of

course the weapons are available, and can be used.

Of the many significant conclusions that emerged from this study,

however, one seemed to us to be especially important: New and effective

tactical systems in history seem to have been more the result of new

ideas than of new or improved weapons. New and imaginative concepts have

often permitted inferior forces to overcome handicaps in numbers and/or

equipment. We suspect that Vietnam is no exception to this.

Another thing which we did in this report was to develop a basis for

calculating what we term "lethality indices" for all weapons in history,

from hand-to-hand implements of antiquity to nuclear explosives. Using

data derived from history, we have been able to calculate the relative

theoretical efficiency of weapons, and have discovered that these

lethality indices are consistent with actual combat experience in a

number of wars which we analyzed in depth. This, in turn, permitted us

to develop a quantitative relationship between lethality, mobility, and

dispersion in combat.

As a military historian, what we did, and what we ended up with, in that

study are particularly fascinating to me. I might add that we have also

stimulated very gratifying interest in the Army. This very afternoon I

presented a briefing of the study report to the Army staff, and

discussed some new, and we think potentially important, tactical

concepts which the results of the study seem to point out to us.

Before leaving the subject of this study, I wish to mention that one of

the members of your Society--Mr. Marshall Andrews--was a very important

contributor to that study.

HERO has also done quite a bit of work in a rather different field of

historical research--in which we have concerned ourselves with the

teaching of history in American schools--which also demonstrates how

history can be used.

We became interested in the subject of the teaching of American history

in our schools for two reasons. First, because we have reason to think

that the teaching of history has not been as good or as effective as it

can be and should be. Too often children think of history as one of the

dullest of their subjects, instead of one which can provide endless,

dramatic fascination. And, as historians, we saw in this situation the

possibility that historians could make a direct contribution to one of

the great social problems of our time: the alienation of important

minority groups, particularly in our large urban areas, from the rest of

American society.

It is our hypothesis that improvement in the teaching of history will

not only be a contribution to American education in general, but may

also be a start toward the building of a bridge between these alienated

minorities and the main stream of American society. This will be no easy

task. The imaginations of Negro, Puerto Rican, and Mexican-American

children will not be stimulated by such simple methods as teaching them

about great American heroes--nor teaching them about Negro, Puerto Rican

or Mexican-American heroes. History and historians can play only a

contributory role in this task, which will require the cooperation of

many different specialists. We know that two apparently divergent

results must be achieved by this cooperation: improvement of the

self-concept and self-respect of these minority children, who have been

largely second-class citizens, while at the same time stimulating their

feeling of association with the larger white majority.

As a start toward testing--and we hope proving--our hypothesis that

history can help in the effort to achieve these apparently divergent

goals, we developed a five-city survey plan to see how history is being

taught in five major cities, and particularly how it is being taught to

the underprivileged minority groups in those cities. We developed these

plans with the cooperation of the school authorities in New York,

Washington, D.C., Detroit, Phoenix, and Los Angeles. We are currently

seeking funds which will permit us to undertake this planned survey

which, in turn, will provide the basis for long-range research and

experimentation in the teaching of history to underprivileged minority

groups.

Without waiting for the survey, we have already begun one small

experimental program ourselves. We came to the conclusion, while we were

developing our survey plans, that if History is to have any effective

impact on these minority group children, they should be exposed to it as

early as possible, and as effectively as possible, before they have

become embittered and alienated in their reaction to the social

conditions in which they live. We accordingly developed a teachers'

source-book for teachers of kindergarten and the early elementary

grades. The book comprises 27 separate essays on important holidays

commemorating events of significance in American history. I can perhaps

best describe the book, and what we hope it will accomplish, by reading

two paragraphs from its introduction:

"'Holidays' has been written primarily for elementary school teachers

who are searching for ways to communicate meaningfully and with balanced

perspective to very young children those values inherent in American

history: patriotism, heroism, self-reliance, and tolerance, to name but

a few. The book is intended to help busy teachers who need brief, pithy,

scrupulously-researched essays that are laced with ideas for

presentation. The authors are specialists, whose experience and

scholarship have particularly qualified them to write with authority and

accuracy on their subjects.

"Included in this book are regularly celebrated American holidays for

all races, creeds, and regions across the entire nation. Among these

are: Alamo Day, celebrating the memory both of valiant Mexican-Texans

and Anglo-Americans who died together for the principle of

self-government; United Nations Day and Pan-American Day, which both

symbolize world unity and peace; American Indian Day and Commonwealth

Day, neither widely celebrated, but both undeniably American. From these

and the other stories youngsters can start to learn about their

privileges and responsibilities as members of a pluralistic, democratic

society. They will also begin to establish a useful base of historical

knowledge upon which they can build in subsequent school years."

In this endeavor, and in some related educational-historical projects,

we believe that we are indeed making some very good use of history in

the national interest.

I have one last HERO project which I should like to mention as being

relevant to the uses of history.

You will recall my concept of history as society's memory. Several of

us, through long and bitter experience, have come to the conclusion that

the memory of the Government is not very good. We are dismayed by the

duplication of effort in Government research and in policy-making; by

the lack of communication which exists between people doing related work

in different Government offices, and by the lack of communication within

individual Government offices--which is another way of saying lack of

continuity.

We have also been struck by the fact that the richest single source of

material for the Government's memory has been almost ignored, and never

organized or utilized systematically. This is the mass of information on

all of the varied activities of the Government which is available in

unclassified publications prepared in and for the Congress. For all

practical purposes, this material is not even usefully available, in

organized form, to members of Congress or its committees. Accordingly,

HERO has decided to do something about this.

We are in the process of developing what we call a "Defense Memory

System." This comprises the collection of all Congressional documents

dealing with national defense, abstracting them, then indexing the

abstracts so that queries on any aspects of national defense can be

answered by going directly--via the index--to the abstract or abstracts

which deal with the topic in question, and--if necessary--going to the

basic document itself. What we are doing, essentially, is to apply to

the conceptual field of non-technical, non-scientific policy-type

information the same kind of modern storage and retrieval methods which

have been so successfully applied to the physical sciences, to

engineering data, and to hardware information.

We are in the process of preparing a prototype of this system for

demonstration next month to Congress and to possible private users of

this historical data. In this project, then, we at HERO are not only

making use of history, we are organizing it so that others can use it as

well.

Which is, I think, about as much as I can say about the uses of history.