To say that such a system is ancient, is no defence. My hono

Produced by Mike Alder and Sue Asscher

THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF LORD MACAULAY.

Lord Macaulay's Speeches

By Thomas Babington Macaulay

VOLUME IV.

LORD MACAULAY'S SPEECHES.

TO HENRY, MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

THESE SPEECHES ARE DEDICATED BY HIS GRATEFUL

AND AFFECTIONATE FRIEND

THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY.

PREFACE.

It was most reluctantly that I determined to suspend, during the last

autumn, a work which is the business and the pleasure of my life,

in order to prepare these Speeches for publication; and it is most

reluctantly that I now give them to the world. Even if I estimated their

oratorical merit much more highly than I do, I should not willingly have

revived, in the quiet times in which we are so happy as to live, the

memory of those fierce contentions in which too many years of my public

life were passed. Many expressions which, when society was convulsed

by political dissensions, and when the foundations of government were

shaking, were heard by an excited audience with sympathy and applause,

may, now that the passions of all parties have subsided, be thought

intemperate and acrimonious. It was especially painful to me to find

myself under the necessity of recalling to my own recollection, and to

the recollection of others, the keen encounters which took place between

the late Sir Robert Peel and myself. Some parts of the conduct of that

eminent man I must always think deserving of serious blame. But, on a

calm review of his long and chequered public life, I acknowledge, with

sincere pleasure, that his faults were much more than redeemed by great

virtues, great sacrifices, and great services. My political hostility to

him was never in the smallest degree tainted by personal ill-will. After

his fall from power a cordial reconciliation took place between us: I

admired the wisdom, the moderation, the disinterested patriotism, which

he invariably showed during the last and best years of his life; I

lamented his untimely death, as both a private and a public calamity;

and I earnestly wished that the sharp words which had sometimes been

exchanged between us might be forgotten.

Unhappily an act, for which the law affords no redress, but which I

have no hesitation in pronouncing to be a gross injury to me and a gross

fraud on the public, has compelled me to do what I should never have

done willingly. A bookseller, named Vizetelly, who seems to aspire to

that sort of distinction which Curll enjoyed a hundred and twenty years

ago, thought fit, without asking my consent, without even giving me any

notice, to announce an edition of my Speeches, and was not ashamed to

tell the world in his advertisement that he published them by special

license. When the book appeared, I found that it contained fifty-six

speeches, said to have been delivered by me in the House of Commons. Of

these speeches a few were reprinted from reports which I had corrected

for the Mirror of Parliament or the Parliamentary Debates, and were

therefore, with the exception of some errors of the pen and the press,

correctly given. The rest bear scarcely the faintest resemblance to

the speeches which I really made. The substance of what I said

is perpetually misrepresented. The connection of the arguments is

altogether lost. Extravagant blunders are put into my mouth in almost

every page. An editor who was not grossly ignorant would have perceived

that no person to whom the House of Commons would listen could possibly

have been guilty of such blunders. An editor who had the smallest

regard for truth, or for the fame of the person whose speeches he had

undertaken to publish, would have had recourse to the various sources of

information which were readily accessible, and, by collating them, would

have produced a book which would at least have contained no absolute

nonsense. But I have unfortunately had an editor whose only object was

to make a few pounds, and who was willing to sacrifice to that object my

reputation and his own. He took the very worst report extant, compared

it with no other report, removed no blemish however obvious or however

ludicrous, gave to the world some hundreds of pages utterly contemptible

both in matter and manner, and prefixed my name to them. The least that

he should have done was to consult the files of The Times newspaper.

I have frequently done so, when I have noticed in his book any passage

more than ordinarily absurd; and I have almost invariably found that

in The Times newspaper, my meaning had been correctly reported, though

often in words different from those which I had used.

I could fill a volume with instances of the injustice with which I have

been treated. But I will confine myself to a single speech, the speech

on the Dissenters' Chapels Bill. I have selected that speech, not

because Mr Vizetelly's version of that speech is worse than his versions

of thirty or forty other speeches, but because I have before me a report

of that speech which an honest and diligent editor would have thought it

his first duty to consult. The report of which I speak was published by

the Unitarian Dissenters, who were naturally desirous that there should

be an accurate record of what had passed in a debate deeply interesting

to them. It was not corrected by me: but it generally, though not

uniformly, exhibits with fidelity the substance of what I said.

Mr Vizetelly makes me say that the principle of our Statutes of

Limitation was to be found in the legislation of the Mexicans and

Peruvians. That is a matter about which, as I know nothing, I certainly

said nothing. Neither in The Times nor in the Unitarian report is there

anything about Mexico or Peru.

Mr Vizetelly next makes me say that the principle of limitation is found

"amongst the Pandects of the Benares." Did my editor believe that I

uttered these words, and that the House of Commons listened patiently

to them? If he did, what must be thought of his understanding? If he did

not, was it the part of an honest man to publish such gibberish as mine?

The most charitable supposition, which I therefore gladly adopt, is

that Mr Vizetelly saw nothing absurd in the expression which he has

attributed to me. The Benares he probably supposes to be some Oriental

nation. What he supposes their Pandects to be I shall not presume to

guess. If he had examined The Times, he would have found no trace of the

passage. The reporter, probably, did not catch what I said, and, being

more veracious than Mr Vizetelly, did not choose to ascribe to me what

I did not say. If Mr Vizetelly had consulted the Unitarian report, he

would have seen that I spoke of the Pundits of Benares; and he might,

without any very long or costly research, have learned where Benares is,

and what a Pundit is.

Mr Vizetelly then represents me as giving the House of Commons some very

extraordinary information about both the Calvinistic and the Arminian

Methodists. He makes me say that Whitfield held and taught that the

connection between Church and State was sinful. Whitfield never held

or taught any such thing; nor was I so grossly ignorant of the life and

character of that remarkable man as to impute to him a doctrine which he

would have abhorred. Here again, both in The Times and in the Unitarian

report, the substance of what I said is correctly given.

Mr Vizetelly proceeds to put into my mouth a curious account of the

polity of the Wesleyan Methodists. He makes me say that, after John

Wesley's death, "the feeling in favour of the lay administration of the

Sacrament became very strong and very general: a Conference was applied

for, was constituted, and, after some discussion, it was determined that

the request should be granted." Such folly could have been uttered only

by a person profoundly ignorant of the history of Methodism. Certainly

nothing of the sort was ever uttered by me; and nothing of the sort will

be found either in The Times or in the Unitarian report.

Mr Vizetelly makes me say that the Great Charter recognises the

principle of limitation, a thing which everybody who has read the Great

Charter knows not to be true. He makes me give an utterly false history

of Lord Nottingham's Occasional Conformity Bill. But I will not weary

my readers by proceeding further. These samples will probably be thought

sufficient. They all lie within a compass of seven or eight pages. It

will be observed that all the faults which I have pointed out are grave

faults of substance. Slighter faults of substance are numerous. As to

faults of syntax and of style, hardly one sentence in a hundred is free

from them.

I cannot permit myself to be exhibited, in this ridiculous and degrading

manner, for the profit of an unprincipled man. I therefore unwillingly,

and in mere self-defence, give this volume to the public. I have

selected, to the best of my judgment, from among my speeches, those

which are the least unworthy to be preserved. Nine of them were

corrected by me while they were still fresh in my memory, and appear

almost word for word as they were spoken. They are the speech of the

second of March 1831, the speech of the twentieth of September 1831,

the speech of the tenth of October 1831, the speech of the sixteenth of

December 1831, the speech on the Anatomy Bill, the speech on the India

Bill, the speech on Serjeant Talfourd's Copyright Bill, the speech on

the Sugar Duties, and the speech on the Irish Church. The substance of

the remaining speeches I have given with perfect ingenuousness. I have

not made alterations for the purpose of saving my own reputation either

for consistency or for foresight. I have not softened down the strong

terms in which I formerly expressed opinions which time and thought may

have modified; nor have I retouched my predictions in order to make them

correspond with subsequent events. Had I represented myself as speaking

in 1831, in 1840, or in 1845, as I should speak in 1853, I should have

deprived my book of its chief value. This volume is now at least a

strictly honest record of opinions and reasonings which were heard

with favour by a large part of the Commons of England at some important

conjunctures; and such a record, however low it may stand in the

estimation of the literary critic, cannot but be of use to the

historian.

I do not pretend to give with accuracy the diction of those speeches

which I did not myself correct within a week after they were delivered.

Many expressions, and a few paragraphs, linger in my memory. But

the rest, including much that had been carefully premeditated, is

irrecoverably lost. Nor have I, in this part of my task, derived much

assistance from any report. My delivery is, I believe, too rapid. Very

able shorthand writers have sometimes complained that they could not

follow me, and have contented themselves with setting down the substance

of what I said. As I am unable to recall the precise words which I used,

I have done my best to put my meaning into words which I might have

used.

I have only, in conclusion, to beg that the readers of this Preface will

pardon an egotism which a great wrong has made necessary, and which is

quite as disagreeable to myself as it can be to them.

CONTENTS.

Parliamentary Reform. (March 2, 1831)

Parliamentary Reform. (July 5, 1831)

Parliamentary Reform. (September 20, 1831)

Parliamentary Reform. (October 10, 1831)

Parliamentary Reform. (December 16, 1831)

Anatomy Bill. (February 27, 1832)

Parliamentary Reform. (February 28, 1832)

Repeal of the Union with Ireland. (February 6, 1833)

Jewish Disabilities. (April 17, 1833)

Government of India. (July 10, 1833)

Edinburgh Election, 1839. (May 29, 1839)

Confidence in the Ministry of Lord Melbourne. (January 29, 1840)

War with China. (April 7, 1840)

Copyright. (February 5, 1841)

Copyright. (April 6, 1842)

The People's Charter. (May 3, 1842)

The Gates of Somnauth. (March 9, 1843)

The State of Ireland. (February 19, 1844)

Dissenters' Chapels Bill. (June 6, 1844)

The Sugar Duties. (February 26, 1845)

Maynooth. (April 14, 1845)

The Church of Ireland. (April 23, 1845)

Theological Tests in the Scotch Universities. (July 9, 1845)

Corn Laws. (December 2, 1845)

The Ten Hours Bill. (May 22, 1846)

The Literature of Britain. (November 4, 1846)

Education. (April 19, 1847)

Inaugural Speech at Glasgow College. (March 21, 1849)

Re-election to Parliament. (November 2, 1852)

Exclusion of Judges from the House of Commons. (June 1, 1853)

SPEECHES, ETC.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. (MARCH 2, 1831) A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF

COMMONS ON THE 2D OF MARCH, 1831.

On Tuesday, the first of March, 1831, Lord John Russell moved the House

of Commons for leave to bring in a bill to amend the representation of

the people in England and Wales. The discussion occupied seven nights.

At length, on the morning of Thursday, the tenth of March, the motion

was carried without a division. The following speech was made on the

second night of the debate.

It is a circumstance, Sir, of happy augury for the motion before

the House, that almost all those who have opposed it have declared

themselves hostile on principle to Parliamentary Reform. Two Members,

I think, have confessed that, though they disapprove of the plan now

submitted to us, they are forced to admit the necessity of a change in

the Representative system. Yet even those gentleman have used, as far as

I have observed, no arguments which would not apply as strongly to the

most moderate change as to that which has been proposed by His Majesty's

Government. I say, Sir, that I consider this as a circumstance of happy

augury. For what I feared was, not the opposition of those who are

averse to all Reform, but the disunion of reformers. I knew that, during

three months, every reformer had been employed in conjecturing what the

plan of the Government would be. I knew that every reformer had imagined

in his own mind a scheme differing doubtless in some points from that

which my noble friend, the Paymaster of the Forces, has developed. I

felt therefore great apprehension that one person would be dissatisfied

with one part of the bill, that another person would be dissatisfied

with another part, and that thus our whole strength would be wasted in

internal dissensions. That apprehension is now at an end. I have seen

with delight the perfect concord which prevails among all who deserve

the name of reformers in this House; and I trust that I may consider it

as an omen of the concord which will prevail among reformers throughout

the country. I will not, Sir, at present express any opinion as to the

details of the bill; but, having during the last twenty-four hours given

the most diligent consideration to its general principles, I have no

hesitation in pronouncing it a wise, noble, and comprehensive measure,

skilfully framed for the healing of great distempers, for the securing

at once of the public liberties, and of the public repose, and for the

reconciling and knitting together of all the orders of the State.

The honourable Baronet who has just sat down (Sir John Walsh.), has

told us, that the Ministers have attempted to unite two inconsistent

principles in one abortive measure. Those were his very words. He

thinks, if I understand him rightly, that we ought either to leave

the representative system such as it is, or to make it perfectly

symmetrical. I think, Sir, that the Ministers would have acted unwisely

if they had taken either course. Their principle is plain, rational, and

consistent. It is this, to admit the middle class to a large and

direct share in the representation, without any violent shock to the

institutions of our country. I understand those cheers: but surely the

gentlemen who utter them will allow that the change which will be made

in our institutions by this bill is far less violent than that which,

according to the honourable Baronet, ought to be made if we make any

Reform at all. I praise the Ministers for not attempting, at the present

time, to make the representation uniform. I praise them for not effacing

the old distinction between the towns and the counties, and for not

assigning Members to districts, according to the American practice, by

the Rule of Three. The Government has, in my opinion, done all that was

necessary for the removing of a great practical evil, and no more than

was necessary.

I consider this, Sir, as a practical question. I rest my opinion on

no general theory of government. I distrust all general theories of

government. I will not positively say, that there is any form of polity

which may not, in some conceivable circumstances, be the best possible.

I believe that there are societies in which every man may safely be

admitted to vote. Gentlemen may cheer, but such is my opinion. I say,

Sir, that there are countries in which the condition of the labouring

classes is such that they may safely be intrusted with the right of

electing Members of the Legislature. If the labourers of England were

in that state in which I, from my soul, wish to see them, if employment

were always plentiful, wages always high, food always cheap, if a large

family were considered not as an encumbrance but as a blessing, the

principal objections to Universal Suffrage would, I think, be removed.

Universal Suffrage exists in the United States, without producing any

very frightful consequences; and I do not believe that the people of

those States, or of any part of the world, are in any good quality

naturally superior to our own countrymen. But, unhappily, the labouring

classes in England, and in all old countries, are occasionally in a

state of great distress. Some of the causes of this distress are, I

fear, beyond the control of the Government. We know what effect distress

produces, even on people more intelligent than the great body of the

labouring classes can possibly be. We know that it makes even wise men

irritable, unreasonable, credulous, eager for immediate relief, heedless

of remote consequences. There is no quackery in medicine, religion, or

politics, which may not impose even on a powerful mind, when that mind

has been disordered by pain or fear. It is therefore no reflection

on the poorer class of Englishmen, who are not, and who cannot in the

nature of things be, highly educated, to say that distress produces on

them its natural effects, those effects which it would produce on the

Americans, or on any other people, that it blinds their judgment, that

it inflames their passions, that it makes them prone to believe those

who flatter them, and to distrust those who would serve them. For the

sake, therefore, of the whole society, for the sake of the labouring

classes themselves, I hold it to be clearly expedient that, in a

country like this, the right of suffrage should depend on a pecuniary

qualification.

But, Sir, every argument which would induce me to oppose Universal

Suffrage, induces me to support the plan which is now before us. I am

opposed to Universal Suffrage, because I think that it would produce a

destructive revolution. I support this plan, because I am sure that it

is our best security against a revolution. The noble Paymaster of the

Forces hinted, delicately indeed and remotely, at this subject. He spoke

of the danger of disappointing the expectations of the nation; and for

this he was charged with threatening the House. Sir, in the year 1817,

the late Lord Londonderry proposed a suspension of the Habeas Corpus

Act. On that occasion he told the House that, unless the measures which

he recommended were adopted, the public peace could not be preserved.

Was he accused of threatening the House? Again, in the year 1819, he

proposed the laws known by the name of the Six Acts. He then told

the House that, unless the executive power were reinforced, all the

institutions of the country would be overturned by popular violence. Was

he then accused of threatening the House? Will any gentleman say that

it is parliamentary and decorous to urge the danger arising from popular

discontent as an argument for severity; but that it is unparliamentary

and indecorous to urge that same danger as an argument for conciliation?

I, Sir, do entertain great apprehension for the fate of my country. I do

in my conscience believe that, unless the plan proposed, or some similar

plan, be speedily adopted, great and terrible calamities will befall us.

Entertaining this opinion, I think myself bound to state it, not as a

threat, but as a reason. I support this bill because it will improve our

institutions; but I support it also because it tends to preserve them.

That we may exclude those whom it is necessary to exclude, we must admit

those whom it may be safe to admit. At present we oppose the schemes of

revolutionists with only one half, with only one quarter of our proper

force. We say, and we say justly, that it is not by mere numbers, but

by property and intelligence, that the nation ought to be governed. Yet,

saying this, we exclude from all share in the government great masses

of property and intelligence, great numbers of those who are most

interested in preserving tranquillity, and who know best how to preserve

it. We do more. We drive over to the side of revolution those whom we

shut out from power. Is this a time when the cause of law and order can

spare one of its natural allies?

My noble friend, the Paymaster of the Forces, happily described the

effect which some parts of our representative system would produce

on the mind of a foreigner, who had heard much of our freedom and

greatness. If, Sir, I wished to make such a foreigner clearly understand

what I consider as the great defects of our system, I would conduct

him through that immense city which lies to the north of Great Russell

Street and Oxford Street, a city superior in size and in population to

the capitals of many mighty kingdoms; and probably superior in opulence,

intelligence, and general respectability, to any city in the world. I

would conduct him through that interminable succession of streets and

squares, all consisting of well built and well furnished houses. I

would make him observe the brilliancy of the shops, and the crowd of

well-appointed equipages. I would show him that magnificent circle of

palaces which surrounds the Regent's Park. I would tell him that the

rental of this district was far greater than that of the whole kingdom

of Scotland, at the time of the Union. And then I would tell him that

this was an unrepresented district. It is needless to give any more

instances. It is needless to speak of Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds,

Sheffield, with no representation, or of Edinburgh and Glasgow with a

mock representation. If a property tax were now imposed on the principle

that no person who had less than a hundred and fifty pounds a year

should contribute, I should not be surprised to find that one half in

number and value of the contributors had no votes at all; and it would,

beyond all doubt, be found that one fiftieth part in number and value of

the contributors had a larger share of the representation than the

other forty-nine fiftieths. This is not government by property. It

is government by certain detached portions and fragments of property,

selected from the rest, and preferred to the rest, on no rational

principle whatever.

To say that such a system is ancient, is no defence. My honourable

friend, the Member for the University of Oxford (Sir Robert Harry

Inglis.), challenges us to show that the Constitution was ever better

than it is. Sir, we are legislators, not antiquaries. The question for

us is, not whether the Constitution was better formerly, but whether we

can make it better now. In fact, however, the system was not in ancient

times by any means so absurd as it is in our age. One noble Lord (Lord

Stormont.) has to-night told us that the town of Aldborough, which he

represents, was not larger in the time of Edward the First than it is at

present. The line of its walls, he assures us, may still be traced. It

is now built up to that line. He argues, therefore, that as the founders

of our representative institutions gave members to Aldborough when it

was as small as it now is, those who would disfranchise it on account

of its smallness have no right to say that they are recurring to the

original principle of our representative institutions. But does the

noble Lord remember the change which has taken place in the country

during the last five centuries? Does he remember how much England has

grown in population, while Aldborough has been standing still? Does

he consider, that in the time of Edward the First, the kingdom did not

contain two millions of inhabitants? It now contains nearly fourteen

millions. A hamlet of the present day would have been a town of some

importance in the time of our early Parliaments. Aldborough may be

absolutely as considerable a place as ever. But compared with the

kingdom, it is much less considerable, by the noble Lord's own showing,

than when it first elected burgesses. My honourable friend, the Member

for the University of Oxford, has collected numerous instances of the

tyranny which the kings and nobles anciently exercised, both over this

House and over the electors. It is not strange that, in times

when nothing was held sacred, the rights of the people, and of the

representatives of the people, should not have been held sacred. The

proceedings which my honourable friend has mentioned, no more prove

that, by the ancient constitution of the realm, this House ought to be

a tool of the king and of the aristocracy, than the Benevolences and the

Shipmoney prove their own legality, or than those unjustifiable arrests

which took place long after the ratification of the great Charter

and even after the Petition of Right, prove that the subject was not

anciently entitled to his personal liberty. We talk of the wisdom of

our ancestors: and in one respect at least they were wiser than we. They

legislated for their own times. They looked at the England which was

before them. They did not think it necessary to give twice as many

Members to York as they gave to London, because York had been the

capital of Britain in the time of Constantius Chlorus; and they would

have been amazed indeed if they had foreseen, that a city of more than

a hundred thousand inhabitants would be left without Representatives in

the nineteenth century, merely because it stood on ground which in

the thirteenth century had been occupied by a few huts. They framed

a representative system, which, though not without defects and

irregularities, was well adapted to the state of England in their time.

But a great revolution took place. The character of the old corporations

changed. New forms of property came into existence. New portions of

society rose into importance. There were in our rural districts rich

cultivators, who were not freeholders. There were in our capital rich

traders, who were not liverymen. Towns shrank into villages. Villages

swelled into cities larger than the London of the Plantagenets.

Unhappily while the natural growth of society went on, the artificial

polity continued unchanged. The ancient form of the representation

remained; and precisely because the form remained, the spirit departed.

Then came that pressure almost to bursting, the new wine in the old

bottles, the new society under the old institutions. It is now time for

us to pay a decent, a rational, a manly reverence to our ancestors, not

by superstitiously adhering to what they, in other circumstances, did,

but by doing what they, in our circumstances, would have done. All

history is full of revolutions, produced by causes similar to those

which are now operating in England. A portion of the community which had

been of no account expands and becomes strong. It demands a place in the

system, suited, not to its former weakness, but to its present power.

If this is granted, all is well. If this is refused, then comes

the struggle between the young energy of one class and the ancient

privileges of another. Such was the struggle between the Plebeians and

the Patricians of Rome. Such was the struggle of the Italian allies for

admission to the full rights of Roman citizens. Such was the struggle

of our North American colonies against the mother country. Such was

the struggle which the Third Estate of France maintained against the

aristocracy of birth. Such was the struggle which the Roman Catholics

of Ireland maintained against the aristocracy of creed. Such is the

struggle which the free people of colour in Jamaica are now maintaining

against the aristocracy of skin. Such, finally, is the struggle which

the middle classes in England are maintaining against an aristocracy

of mere locality, against an aristocracy the principle of which is to

invest a hundred drunken potwallopers in one place, or the owner of

a ruined hovel in another, with powers which are withheld from cities

renowned to the furthest ends of the earth, for the marvels of their

wealth and of their industry.

But these great cities, says my honourable friend the Member for the

University of Oxford, are virtually, though not directly, represented.

Are not the wishes of Manchester, he asks, as much consulted as those

of any town which sends Members to Parliament? Now, Sir, I do not

understand how a power which is salutary when exercised virtually can

be noxious when exercised directly. If the wishes of Manchester have as

much weight with us as they would have under a system which should give

Representatives to Manchester, how can there be any danger in giving

Representatives to Manchester? A virtual Representative is, I presume,

a man who acts as a direct Representative would act: for surely it

would be absurd to say that a man virtually represents the people

of Manchester, who is in the habit of saying No, when a man directly

representing the people of Manchester would say Aye. The utmost that

can be expected from virtual Representation is that it may be as good

as direct Representation. If so, why not grant direct Representation to

places which, as everybody allows, ought, by some process or other, to

be represented?

If it be said that there is an evil in change as change, I answer that

there is also an evil in discontent as discontent. This, indeed, is the

strongest part of our case. It is said that the system works well. I

deny it. I deny that a system works well, which the people regard

with aversion. We may say here, that it is a good system and a perfect

system. But if any man were to say so to any six hundred and fifty-eight

respectable farmers or shopkeepers, chosen by lot in any part of

England, he would be hooted down, and laughed to scorn. Are these the

feelings with which any part of the government ought to be regarded?

Above all, are these the feelings with which the popular branch of

the legislature ought to be regarded? It is almost as essential to the

utility of a House of Commons, that it should possess the confidence of

the people, as that it should deserve that confidence. Unfortunately,

that which is in theory the popular part of our government, is in

practice the unpopular part. Who wishes to dethrone the King? Who wishes

to turn the Lords out of their House? Here and there a crazy radical,

whom the boys in the street point at as he walks along. Who wishes to

alter the constitution of this House? The whole people. It is natural

that it should be so. The House of Commons is, in the language of Mr

Burke, a check, not on the people, but for the people. While that check

is efficient, there is no reason to fear that the King or the nobles

will oppress the people. But if the check requires checking, how is it

to be checked? If the salt shall lose its savour, wherewith shall we

season it? The distrust with which the nation regards this House may

be unjust. But what then? Can you remove that distrust? That it exists

cannot be denied. That it is an evil cannot be denied. That it is an

increasing evil cannot be denied. One gentleman tells us that it has

been produced by the late events in France and Belgium; another, that

it is the effect of seditious works which have lately been published.

If this feeling be of origin so recent, I have read history to little

purpose. Sir, this alarming discontent is not the growth of a day or of

a year. If there be any symptoms by which it is possible to distinguish

the chronic diseases of the body politic from its passing inflammations,

all those symptoms exist in the present case. The taint has been

gradually becoming more extensive and more malignant, through the whole

lifetime of two generations. We have tried anodynes. We have tried cruel

operations. What are we to try now? Who flatters himself that he can

turn this feeling back? Does there remain any argument which escaped the

comprehensive intellect of Mr Burke, or the subtlety of Mr Windham? Does

there remain any species of coercion which was not tried by Mr Pitt and

by Lord Londonderry? We have had laws. We have had blood. New treasons

have been created. The Press has been shackled. The Habeas Corpus Act

has been suspended. Public meetings have been prohibited. The event has

proved that these expedients were mere palliatives. You are at the end

of your palliatives. The evil remains. It is more formidable than ever.

What is to be done?

Under such circumstances, a great plan of reconciliation, prepared by

the Ministers of the Crown, has been brought before us in a manner which

gives additional lustre to a noble name, inseparably associated during

two centuries with the dearest liberties of the English people. I will

not say, that this plan is in all its details precisely such as I might

wish it to be; but it is founded on a great and a sound principle. It

takes away a vast power from a few. It distributes that power through

the great mass of the middle order. Every man, therefore, who thinks as

I think is bound to stand firmly by Ministers who are resolved to

stand or fall with this measure. Were I one of them, I would sooner,

infinitely sooner, fall with such a measure than stand by any other

means that ever supported a Cabinet.

My honourable friend, the Member for the University of Oxford, tells us,

that if we pass this law, England will soon be a republic. The reformed

House of Commons will, according to him, before it has sate ten years,

depose the King, and expel the Lords from their House. Sir, if my

honourable friend could prove this, he would have succeeded in bringing

an argument for democracy, infinitely stronger than any that is to be

found in the works of Paine. My honourable friend's proposition is in

fact this: that our monarchical and aristocratical institutions have no

hold on the public mind of England; that these institutions are regarded

with aversion by a decided majority of the middle class. This, Sir, I

say, is plainly deducible from his proposition; for he tells us that the

Representatives of the middle class will inevitably abolish royalty and

nobility within ten years: and there is surely no reason to think that

the Representatives of the middle class will be more inclined to a

democratic revolution than their constituents. Now, Sir, if I were

convinced that the great body of the middle class in England look with

aversion on monarchy and aristocracy, I should be forced, much against

my will, to come to this conclusion, that monarchical and aristocratical

institutions are unsuited to my country. Monarchy and aristocracy,

valuable and useful as I think them, are still valuable and useful as

means, and not as ends. The end of government is the happiness of

the people: and I do not conceive that, in a country like this, the

happiness of the people can be promoted by a form of government in which

the middle classes place no confidence, and which exists only because

the middle classes have no organ by which to make their sentiments

known. But, Sir, I am fully convinced that the middle classes sincerely

wish to uphold the Royal prerogatives and the constitutional rights of

the Peers. What facts does my honourable friend produce in support of

his opinion? One fact only; and that a fact which has absolutely nothing

to do with the question. The effect of this Reform, he tells us, would

be to make the House of Commons allpowerful. It was allpowerful once

before, in the beginning of 1649. Then it cut off the head of the King,

and abolished the House of Peers. Therefore, if it again has the supreme

power, it will act in the same manner. Now, Sir, it was not the House of

Commons that cut off the head of Charles the First; nor was the House

of Commons then allpowerful. It had been greatly reduced in numbers by

successive expulsions. It was under the absolute dominion of the army. A

majority of the House was willing to take the terms offered by the King.

The soldiers turned out the majority; and the minority, not a sixth part

of the whole House, passed those votes of which my honourable friend

speaks, votes of which the middle classes disapproved then, and of which

they disapprove still.

My honourable friend, and almost all the gentlemen who have taken the

same side with him in this Debate, have dwelt much on the utility of

close and rotten boroughs. It is by means of such boroughs, they tell

us, that the ablest men have been introduced into Parliament. It is

true that many distinguished persons have represented places of this

description. But, Sir, we must judge of a form of government by its

general tendency, not by happy accidents. Every form of government has

its happy accidents. Despotism has its happy accidents. Yet we are not

disposed to abolish all constitutional checks, to place an absolute

master over us, and to take our chance whether he may be a Caligula or

a Marcus Aurelius. In whatever way the House of Commons may be chosen,

some able men will be chosen in that way who would not be chosen in any

other way. If there were a law that the hundred tallest men in England

should be Members of Parliament, there would probably be some able men

among those who would come into the House by virtue of this law. If the

hundred persons whose names stand first in the alphabetical list of the

Court Guide were made Members of Parliament, there would probably be

able men among them. We read in ancient history, that a very able king

was elected by the neighing of his horse; but we shall scarcely, I

think, adopt this mode of election. In one of the most celebrated

republics of antiquity, Athens, Senators and Magistrates were chosen by

lot; and sometimes the lot fell fortunately. Once, for example, Socrates

was in office. A cruel and unjust proposition was made by a demagogue.

Socrates resisted it at the hazard of his own life. There is no event in

Grecian history more interesting than that memorable resistance. Yet who

would have officers appointed by lot, because the accident of the lot

may have given to a great and good man a power which he would probably

never have attained in any other way? We must judge, as I said, by

the general tendency of a system. No person can doubt that a House of

Commons chosen freely by the middle classes, will contain many very able

men. I do not say, that precisely the same able men who would find

their way into the present House of Commons will find their way into

the reformed House: but that is not the question. No particular man

is necessary to the State. We may depend on it that, if we provide the

country with popular institutions, those institutions will provide it

with great men.

There is another objection, which, I think, was first raised by the

honourable and learned Member for Newport. (Mr Horace Twiss.) He tells

us that the elective franchise is property; that to take it away from

a man who has not been judicially convicted of malpractices is robbery;

that no crime is proved against the voters in the close boroughs; that

no crime is even imputed to them in the preamble of the bill; and that

therefore to disfranchise them without compensation would be an act of

revolutionary tyranny. The honourable and learned gentleman has compared

the conduct of the present Ministers to that of those odious tools of

power, who, towards the close of the reign of Charles the Second, seized

the charters of the Whig corporations. Now, there was another precedent,

which I wonder that he did not recollect, both because it is much more

nearly in point than that to which he referred, and because my noble

friend, the Paymaster of the Forces, had previously alluded to it. If

the elective franchise is property, if to disfranchise voters without a

crime proved, or a compensation given, be robbery, was there ever such

an act of robbery as the disfranchising of the Irish forty-shilling

freeholders? Was any pecuniary compensation given to them? Is it

declared in the preamble of the bill which took away their franchise,

that they had been convicted of any offence? Was any judicial inquiry

instituted into their conduct? Were they even accused of any crime? Or

if you say that it was a crime in the electors of Clare to vote for

the honourable and learned gentleman who now represents the county of

Waterford, was a Protestant freeholder in Louth to be punished for

the crime of a Catholic freeholder in Clare? If the principle of the

honourable and learned Member for Newport be sound, the franchise of the

Irish peasant was property. That franchise the Ministers under whom the

honourable and learned Member held office did not scruple to take away.

Will he accuse those Ministers of robbery? If not, how can he bring such

an accusation against their successors?

Every gentleman, I think, who has spoken from the other side of the

House, has alluded to the opinions which some of His Majesty's Ministers

formerly entertained on the subject of Reform. It would be officious in

me, Sir, to undertake the defence of gentlemen who are so well able to

defend themselves. I will only say that, in my opinion, the country will

not think worse either of their capacity or of their patriotism, because

they have shown that they can profit by experience, because they have

learned to see the folly of delaying inevitable changes. There are

others who ought to have learned the same lesson. I say, Sir, that there

are those who, I should have thought, must have had enough to last them

all their lives of that humiliation which follows obstinate and boastful

resistance to changes rendered necessary by the progress of society, and

by the development of the human mind. Is it possible that those persons

can wish again to occupy a position which can neither be defended nor

surrendered with honour? I well remember, Sir, a certain evening in the

month of May, 1827. I had not then the honour of a seat in this House;

but I was an attentive observer of its proceedings. The right honourable

Baronet opposite (Sir Robert Peel), of whom personally I desire to speak

with that high respect which I feel for his talents and his character,

but of whose public conduct I must speak with the sincerity required

by my public duty, was then, as he is now, out of office. He had just

resigned the seals of the Home Department, because he conceived that the

recent ministerial arrangements had been too favourable to the Catholic

claims. He rose to ask whether it was the intention of the new Cabinet

to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts, and to reform the Parliament.

He bound up, I well remember, those two questions together; and he

declared that, if the Ministers should either attempt to repeal the

Test and Corporation Acts, or bring forward a measure of Parliamentary

Reform, he should think it his duty to oppose them to the utmost. Since

that declaration was made four years have elapsed; and what is now the

state of the three questions which then chiefly agitated the minds of

men? What is become of the Test and Corporation Acts? They are repealed.

By whom? By the right honourable Baronet. What has become of the

Catholic disabilities? They are removed. By whom? By the right

honourable Baronet. The question of Parliamentary Reform is still

behind. But signs, of which it is impossible to misconceive the import,

do most clearly indicate that unless that question also be speedily

settled, property, and order, and all the institutions of this great

monarchy, will be exposed to fearful peril. Is it possible that

gentlemen long versed in high political affairs cannot read these signs?

Is it possible that they can really believe that the Representative

system of England, such as it now is, will last to the year 1860? If

not, for what would they have us wait? Would they have us wait merely

that we may show to all the world how little we have profited by our own

recent experience?--Would they have us wait, that we may once again hit

the exact point where we can neither refuse with authority, nor

concede with grace? Would they have us wait, that the numbers of the

discontented party may become larger, its demands higher, its feelings

more acrimonious, its organisation more complete? Would they have us

wait till the whole tragicomedy of 1827 has been acted over again?

till they have been brought into office by a cry of 'No Reform,' to be

reformers, as they were once before brought into office by a cry of

'No Popery,' to be emancipators? Have they obliterated from their

minds--gladly, perhaps, would some among them obliterate from their

minds--the transactions of that year? And have they forgotten all the

transactions of the succeeding year? Have they forgotten how the spirit

of liberty in Ireland, debarred from its natural outlet, found a vent

by forbidden passages? Have they forgotten how we were forced to indulge

the Catholics in all the license of rebels, merely because we chose

to withhold from them the liberties of subjects? Do they wait for

associations more formidable than that of the Corn Exchange, for

contributions larger than the Rent, for agitators more violent than

those who, three years ago, divided with the King and the Parliament

the sovereignty of Ireland? Do they wait for that last and most dreadful

paroxysm of popular rage, for that last and most cruel test of military

fidelity? Let them wait, if their past experience shall induce them to

think that any high honour or any exquisite pleasure is to be obtained

by a policy like this. Let them wait, if this strange and fearful

infatuation be indeed upon them, that they should not see with their

eyes, or hear with their ears, or understand with their heart. But let

us know our interest and our duty better. Turn where we may, within,

around, the voice of great events is proclaiming to us, Reform, that

you may preserve. Now, therefore, while everything at home and abroad

forebodes ruin to those who persist in a hopeless struggle against the

spirit of the age, now, while the crash of the proudest throne of the

Continent is still resounding in our ears, now, while the roof of a

British palace affords an ignominious shelter to the exiled heir of

forty kings, now, while we see on every side ancient institutions

subverted, and great societies dissolved, now, while the heart of

England is still sound, now, while old feelings and old associations

retain a power and a charm which may too soon pass away, now, in this

your accepted time, now, in this your day of salvation, take counsel,

not of prejudice, not of party spirit, not of the ignominious pride of

a fatal consistency, but of history, of reason, of the ages which are

past, of the signs of this most portentous time. Pronounce in a

manner worthy of the expectation with which this great debate has been

anticipated, and of the long remembrance which it will leave behind.

Renew the youth of the State. Save property, divided against itself.

Save the multitude, endangered by its own unpopular power. Save the

greatest, and fairest, and most highly civilised community that ever

existed, from calamities which may in a few days sweep away all the rich

heritage of so many ages of wisdom and glory. The danger is terrible.

The time is short. If this bill should be rejected, I pray to God that

none of those who concur in rejecting it may ever remember their votes

with unavailing remorse, amidst the wreck of laws, the confusion of

ranks, the spoliation of property, and the dissolution of social order.

*****

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. (JULY 5, 1831) A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF

COMMONS ON THE 5TH OF JULY 1831.

Miscellaneous Writings and Speeches — Volume 4 · 第 1 / 45 段