the crimes mentioned in Article 125 of the Penal Code; it is
a policy of devastation, pillage, and assassination. [The
speaker (I quote from the Parliamentary report of the Belgian
papers of that date) then read some correspondence published
in the Antwerp newspaper _La Métropole_, in which a series of
executions, murders, and expeditions against the Bundjas are
mentioned.] ‘Are we,’ he continues, ‘to have another edition of
the severed hands incident?’
“M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE: That is not the question.
“M. LORAND: Indeed. But it happens precisely to be the
question. (M. DE BROWNE DE TIÈGE interrupts.)
“M. VANDERVELDE: Your interest, M. de Browne, is so direct
a one in this matter that you might refrain from any
participation in this debate.”
The cutting-off of hands item is a constantly recurring charge. I have
in my possession at the present moment a photograph from the Upper Congo
of three natives, a woman and two boys; the woman and one of the boys
have their right hands severed at the wrist, the other boy has both
hands severed. The correspondent who sent it me—and whom I know to be an
honourable man—saw the victims himself, and was satisfied that soldiers
of the State were the culprits. I fully believe him, but the photograph,
of course, does not prove it.[269]
[Illustration: THE VICTIM OF A RUBBER RAID
A LIVING ILLUSTRATION OF THE “MAIN COUPÉES” DEBATES IN THE BELGIAN
CHAMBER. THE BOY HERE PHOTOGRAPHED IS NOW CARED FOR BY A BRITISH
MISSIONARY IN THE UPPER CONGO]
In November last, an American ex-agent of the _Société Anversoise_, Mr.
Canisuis, who served for some time under the amiable ex-Major Lothaire,
who, as already stated, was appointed Director in Africa of this company
_after_ the murder of Stokes, in a Press interview said: “Last year I
was on a rubber expedition with Major Lothaire, and during the six weeks
it lasted 900 natives were killed and scores of villages were burnt.”
According to this gentleman, the natives receive the equivalent of one
penny per pound of rubber, paid in merchandise valued at 100 per cent.
above cost price. We knew that before. As things go in the Congo State,
that particular rate of pay is even generous. But you cannot get rubber
in Africa at even the munificent sum of one penny per pound, and sell
it in Europe from 3s. to 4s. per pound, without those gently persuasive
methods which find favour in quarters where the “regenerating” instinct
is properly developed!
I trust I shall not be unduly troubling my readers if I pass another
of King Leopold’s _Domaine Privé_ companies under review. It is not my
fault that the whitewash has been laid on so thickly, and the process
of scraping is bound to take some little time—and, from the author’s
point of view, no little trouble. What company could be better singled
out than the _Abir_, the most powerfully equipped of all—the “Queen” of
Congo companies as it has been called? Originally the Anglo-Belgian India
Rubber Company, founded in August 1892, and in which Colonel North was at
one time largely interested, it was, like the _Anversoise_, reconstructed
under “Congo law” in 1898 with a capital of 1,000,000 francs, divided
into 2000 shares without designation of value, “giving right of 1/2000
of the _avoir social_.” King Leopold has conferred upon this company
the monopoly of exploitation in the Lopori and Maringa districts of the
_Domaine Privé_. The administrative seat of the _Abir_ is 48 Rempart
Klipdorp, Antwerp; its headquarters in Africa are at Bassankusu. The
President is M. A. van den Nest; administrators, A. Mols and Count H.
van de Burgh; _Commissaires_, Jules Stappers and F. Reiss; Director, Ch.
de Wael; Director in Africa, Ch. Sterckmans. I am under the impression
that the British interests in the company ceased when it ceased to be
a company in the ordinary acceptation of the term, viz. in 1898, as
aforesaid. At any rate, I can find none but Belgian shareholders in the
documents I have been able to obtain. First and foremost comes the Congo
State with its 50 per cent., viz. 1000 shares, the inevitable M. A. de
Browne de Tiège being _mandataire_ for the State; then M. A. de Browne
de Tiège has 60 shares in his own name, and M. C. de Browne de Tiège 50,
while our old friend the _Société Anversoise_ has 150 shares represented
by M. de Browne de Tiège, President, and M. Bunge, Administrator; Bunge
& Co. (whom we have seen hold 100 shares in the _Anversoise_) have 50
shares; other shareholders are Alexis Mols, Charles de Wael, F. Reiss,
&c.[270] I have used the word _clique_ to describe the handful of persons
who are running the Congo State (and as much more of Africa as they can
lay hands on) with the king as Managing Director. It is an appropriate
term, as the particulars given for these two “Companies” show. I may add
that M. A. van den Nest, President of the _Abir_, is the original holder
of 120 shares in the _Comptoir Commercial Congolais_, of which company M.
Alexis Mols is President, while Messrs. Charles de Wael and F. Reiss are
also holders, the one to the extent of 100, the other to the extent of 60
shares.[271] Baron Goffinet’s name crops up again in the _Lomami_,[272]
and so it goes on.[273] These men are the king’s bodyguard. I know
nothing of them personally. They may in private life be the most
blameless of men, but the extraordinary thing is that Europe should be
content to allow 1,000,000 square miles of African territory to be run
by this _clique_ with its royal head, entirely for their own ends, and
to fill their own pockets! Why, in the name of common sense and common
decency, should hundreds, if not thousands, of natives of Africa be slain
annually on account of this _clique_? It would be grotesque, were it not
so horrible; so monstrous as to seem more like a nightmare than a reality.
But to return to the _Abir_. Its net profits in 1897 were 1,247,455
francs; in 1898, 2,482,697 francs; in 1899, 2,692,063 francs. The figures
for 1900 I am unable to give, I regret to say. In 1901 the net working
profits (_bénéfices nets d’exploitation_) were 2,455,182 francs, and
the “profit and loss account” was closed with 2,614,370 to the good.
A dividend[274] of 900 francs was declared on each share, and “the
State” being the possessor of 1000 shares, it follows that its august
Sovereign raked in the nice little sum of 900,000 francs, or say £36,000,
for one year’s working of this eminently satisfactory “subsidiary” of
the _Domaine Privé_. In four years the _Abir’s_ net profits amounted,
therefore, to 8,877,397 francs, nearly nine times as much as its total
capital! In June 1899 the shares stood at 17,900 francs per share, and
the total value on the Antwerp Stock Exchange of this concern, whose
capital is one million, was 35,800,000 francs! But since that date the
shares have been up to over 25,000 francs per share! In June of this
year they had fallen to a little over 11,000 francs per share. For a
considerable time past they have been quoted _in tenths_; that is to
say, one-tenth shares are bought and sold, and give rise to a great
deal of speculation on the Bourse. Imagine the fortune which a holder
of 1000 _full_ shares has had the opportunity of making during the last
few years! Those 1000 shares, at 25,000 francs per share, were worth a
million sterling! What it is to be a royal rubber merchant in the Congo!
It will have been noticed that the shares of the _Abir_ have dropped.
The fact is that there have been “indiscretions,” and several Belgian
newspapers published in October of last year some unpleasant details with
regard to the circumstances under which these enormous stocks of rubber
find their way to Europe. Amongst other revelations published—all of
which purported to come from “a most honourable and esteemed agent” of
the _Abir_—were the following: (1) In September 1897, the whole of the
Upper Bolombo country was devastated (“_mis à feu et à sang_”) by the
Dikila factory to compel the natives, with whom contact had not before
been established, to make rubber. (2) “On Aug. 24, 1900, I met at Boyela
two young women, one of whom was _enceinte_, with their right hands cut
off. They told me they belonged to the village of Bossombo, and that the
soldiers of the white man of Boyela had cut off their hands, because
their master did not produce enough rubber!” These statements appear to
have had the effect of depreciating the market value of the shares. But,
really, the “bulls” might have been prepared for them. Possibly, they had
not read the evidence given a year before by M. de Lamothe, ex-Governor
of French Congo, before the Commission of Colonial Concessions held in
Paris. M. de Lamothe, who had just returned from five months’ sojourn in
the Upper Congo, remarked in the course of his deposition that:
“The Belgians have recently had insurrections in their
territory. It is but right to add, however, that they sometimes
make use of proceedings towards the natives that Frenchmen
would never use.... The _Abir_, for instance, possesses a
considerable territory and has even police rights (_sic_)
over the natives. From that point of view the rights which
its charter confers upon it are exaggerated. _Its agents have
applied this so well that they have succeeded in inducing
30,000 natives to leave their territory and take refuge on the
French bank of the Congo._”
Is it necessary to plunge yet deeper into this garbage of human
villany and greed? The entire system is based upon terrorism. No man
in his senses can really believe otherwise. A volume might be filled
with misdeeds which since the days of Cortès and Pizarro have never
been equalled, much less surpassed. The habitual _modus operandi_ in
the Mongalla territory was tersely put by one of the agents of the
_Anversoise_:
“When natives bring rubber to a factory they are received by
the agent surrounded by soldiers. The baskets are weighed.
If they do not contain the 5 kilos. required the native
receives 100 blows with a _chicotte_.[275] Those whose
baskets attain the correct weight receive a piece of cloth,
or some other object. If a certain village contains, say, 100
male inhabitants (a census is always taken of the village
before operations begin) and only fifty come to the factory
with rubber, they are retained as hostages, and a force is
despatched to shoot (_sic_) the fifty recalcitrant natives and
burn their village.”
There are some districts which do not produce rubber: such a district,
for instance, as the Bangala country proper, where hardly any rubber
grows. Let it not be imagined that the people of that district are the
gainers thereby. They are not subject, it is true, to either the rubber
tribute or the rubber-collecting operations of the _Domaine Privé_
companies. But their lot is little better for all that. The Bangala
country is one of the great recruiting centres of the State for its
army.[276] The Bangalas are cannibals, and good fighters. It is also
a victualling centre for the State posts. A great deal of information
has been reaching me from this district of late. It may be usefully
epitomised. First, as to the recruiting. The method adopted is this: A
general order is sent from Boma to the Commissaires of Districts to the
effect that so many recruits must be sent down. Each Commissaire then
sets to work to obtain recruits. There is no system in the demands. Towns
are dropped on according to the whim of the Commissaire. A particular
village is summoned to supply a certain number of young men. The summons
is rarely communicated by a white officer: almost invariably by native
soldiers. The summons once made, it has to be obeyed, or the usual
punishment is meted out. Nevertheless there has, upon occasion, been
active opposition to this forced recruiting. There is always passive
opposition. Both men and women object and complain very bitterly, but
they have to submit. Mothers, wives, and relatives have been seen crying
and protesting against their children, husbands, and relatives being sent
away as recruits, for very few ever return; which is not astonishing,
seeing that they serve twelve years. Secondly, as to the victualling-tax.
Every month, and sometimes every fortnight, goats, fowls, palm-oil, eggs,
and cassava bread have to be supplied to the State troops. The burden is
increasingly heavy, because since it was first assessed the population
has very much decreased. When accused of extortion the State replies
that it pays for its produce. It does pay, at about one-twentieth of
the market value. The natives have not infrequently to purchase produce
themselves, in order to meet the demands of the State, which they are
compelled to dispose of to the State soldiers at a much lower price than
they have paid themselves:
“Every two or three miles a sentry, with a subordinate or two,
and two or three servants from the locality, are stationed. It
is part of the sentry’s duty to see that the tax is taken up
regularly, and if he does not do so he is severely reprimanded
by his chief. Now a keen-witted soldier will see to it that
he is not reprimanded, and an unprincipled soldier will do
anything to the people to wring the tax out of them, rather
than run the risk of being a marked man in the Commissaire’s
book.”
The oppression and misery which ensue can be imagined. The result of this
double pressure for men and foodstuffs has been, naturally, to bring
about a great decrease in the population. A correspondent who knows the
Bangala country well, tells me that between 1890 and 1895 there was no
perceptible decrease in the population. The taxes were first levied in
the latter year, and in five years (1895-1900) there has been a reduction
of one-half of the population. This appalling ratio of reduction is
partly to be accounted for by the fact that sleeping sickness is endemic
in the country, and that the withdrawal of the strongest and most virile
elements of the population to serve in the army is naturally followed
by a decline in the birth-rate. Those that are left have “the heart
wrung out of them” by the food-tax. The people along the river are
fast dying out, and the State “is forcing the backwood folks to start
towns on the river the better to exploit them.” In one relatively small
area my correspondent says, “Since 1890, one town half a mile long has
disappeared; another, a quarter of a mile long, has also gone; and up a
creek where there were 1500 people, there are scarcely 400 now.”
So long as Europe tolerates the _Domaine Privé_, so long will these
things be—just as long as the regenerator of Africa and his friends can
make money out of their philanthropic undertaking and can count upon
dishonest, interested, or infatuated friends in Europe to throw dust in
the eyes of the public.
There is one other feature of this unsavoury business which must be gone
into before we can close the chapter on the _native_ aspect of Congo
State rule. The Congo State invariably attempts to wriggle out of the
responsibility for these horrors, by attributing their perpetration
to the “excesses” of individual agents; and M. Jules Houdret, the
Consul-General of the Congo State for England, had the effrontery the
other day to point to the punishment of some of the _Anversoise’s_
people as affording a justification for the State’s claim to be what
it professes, viz. solicitous of the welfare of the natives! It is
a barefaced attempt to bamboozle public opinion, as impudent as the
proposal made by the representatives of the Congo State at the Mansion
House meeting last May to “inquire” into specific acts of cruelty
brought forward. We know what these “punishments” mean. Occasionally,
with a grand flourish of trumpets, the State announces that an agent
has been punished. The announcement generally follows each fresh crop
of revelations. One or two sub-agents are, for the time being, made
scapegoats, and everything goes on as before. How could it be otherwise
when the SYSTEM ITSELF is what it has been shown to be? The time has
gone by when the public can be deceived by these sophistries, by these
perpetual and frivolous excuses and denials.
The edicts of the Congo State administration, coupled with certain
material facts as to which there can be no dispute, show the main
factors, if one may say so, of the system of African tropical
development, which it has instituted, to be these:
(1) Alienation of native ownership in land.
(2) Monopoly over the products of the soil.
(3) Natives forbidden to collect those products for any one but the
State, or the subsidiary trusts (_Domaine Privé_ companies, if that
appellation be preferred) created by the State, and in whose profits the
State shares, generally to the extent of 50 per cent.
(4) Natives compelled to bring in rubber and ivory, and also recruits for
the native army (and for labour in the cocoa and coffee plantations), to
the State as tribute, and to supply the subsidiary trusts with rubber and
ivory.
(5) The existence of a regular army of fifteen thousand[277] men armed
with Albini rifles, and an unnamed number of irregulars to enforce the
rubber and ivory tribute and to “facilitate the operations” of the
subsidiary trusts.
(6) White officials in receipt of instructions to devote all their
energies to the exploitation of rubber and ivory; in plain words, to
get as much rubber and ivory out of their respective districts as they
possibly can.
(7) The financial existence of the State dependent upon the rubber and
ivory tribute, and upon the profits it derives from its share in the
subsidiary trusts.
When on the one side you have the factors already enumerated, and on
the other a primitive and—in the face of coercion backed by rifles
of precision—helpless population, common sense asserts that gross
oppression, violence, and every form of tyranny and outrage must be the
infallible outcome of such a system; and it is that _system_ which the
Powers are morally bound to put a stop to, seeing that it is they who are
morally responsible for its existence.
CHAPTER XXXII
THE “TRADE” OF THE CONGO STATE
It is a little surprising to find that M. Cattier, the Belgian
Imperialist, whose masterly indictment of King Leopold’s administration
does him infinite honour, should attempt to defend, not the outcome of
the system of the _Domaine Privé_ in the shape of compulsory military
service for twelve years, forced labour in Government plantations, &c.,
all of which he condemns, but the legality of the system itself. He
states his case as follows. Article V. of the Berlin Act, which forbade
monopoly and privilege in the Congo Basin in matters of trade, was meant
to apply internationally, and the Congo State was thereby bound not to
grant commercial advantages to the subjects of any one nation which it
denied to the subjects of another nation. M. Cattier says:
“The Government of the Congo State could not, therefore, adopt
any legislative measure, nor establish any _régime_ conceding
international monopolies or privileges.... All facilities
granted to its subjects in trade matters should be legally
extended to the subjects of other nations.... But this does
not prevent the Congo State from establishing the commercial
_régime_ which it thinks advisable, and no objection can be
raised against its legislative action, when the measures
adopted apply, under the same conditions and in the same
manner, to the subjects of other nationalities, including the
Congo nationality.”
It follows, therefore, according to M. Cattier, that in attributing to
himself all vacant lands in the Congo Basin, from which action arose the
_Domaine Privé_, and in farming out portions of the _Domaine Privé_ to
his financial friends, upon whom he has conferred an absolute monopoly of
exploitation in the regions affected, the Sovereign of the Congo State
has not violated the Act of Berlin; although M. Cattier admits that by
so doing he has committed “a violation of the rights of the natives.”
This curious theory of M. Cattier’s has been dismissed by Dr. Anton
(_Professeur agrégé à l’Université d’Iéna_) as a legal quibble, in which
opinion I entirely concur. M. Cattier’s views are mutually destructive.
Admitting, for the sake of argument merely, that the interpretation he
gives to Art. V. of the Berlin Act is, from the strictly legal aspect
of the matter, accurate; once M. Cattier attempts to put his case in
language that laymen, unversed in legal subtleties, can understand, it
breaks down hopelessly. For what does M. Cattier tell us in the passage
above? “No objection can be raised against its (the State’s) legislative
action when the measures adopted apply under the same conditions and
in the same manner to the subjects of all nationalities, including the
Congo nationality.” But the measures adopted do not apply equally to
all nationalities! Three-fourths of the Congo State is the State’s—that
is, the king’s—private property, and is closed to the trade of all
nationalities, except the Belgian and “Congo nationality;” not in theory
but in fact. Can an Englishman, or a German, or a Chinaman if you like,
import European merchandise in the territory, for example, acquired by
the _Société Anversoise_, and barter that merchandise against the raw
products of the soil, on a basis of a legitimate commercial transaction?
Of course they may not. Was not an Austrian arrested—on Lake Moëro, and
on, it appears, a British steamer—only a few months ago for trading with
the natives in the Katanga region, although he actually had a permit to
trade from the Katanga Company, given to him prior to the arrangement
arrived at by the Congo State and the Katanga Company to work those
territories on joint account? And arrested, too, in such a way that
his removal from this world was a matter of moral certainty—handed
over to the merciful treatment of King Leopold’s cannibal soldiery,
to be transported 2000 miles away; he a white man and unarmed![278]
What pitiful sophistries are these which attempt the squaring of the
Congo circle! The Congo State, which undertook not to trade directly or
indirectly in its dominions, has become not only the largest “exploiter”
within it, but in the major portion thereof the exclusive “exploiter.”
The king has translated Article V. of the Berlin Act, which reads that
“no Power which exercises or shall exercise sovereign rights in the
above-mentioned regions, shall be allowed to grant therein a monopoly or
favour of any kind in matters of trade,” by conferring upon himself an
absolute monopoly, which has made of him the biggest ivory and rubber
merchant in the world. In this capacity he can export his produce under
special conditions, free of dues, which come out of one of his Majesty’s
pockets to go in at the other. All this is diametrically opposed to the
provisions of the Berlin Act.
My object is principally to prove that King Leopold’s intervention in
the Dark Continent has from first to last been due to selfish motives,
and has resulted in the most appalling consequences; whether we confine
ourselves to the past and present merely, or whether we look into the
future. I must crave forgiveness for having dwelt so largely upon matters
of trade. It was, however, necessary, because the king’s native policy is
the inevitable sequel of his commercial policy. I must, indeed, revert
again to this aspect of the question in order to refute once and for
all the untruths so sedulously fostered, that the Congo State is in a
nourishing condition and that independent trade is flourishing within
it; and in refuting it to show—which is more important—that, were it not
for the ivory and rubber which the natives of King Leopold’s preserve
are forced to produce at the cost of constant warfare, massacres, and
atrocities innumerable, the export returns, and consequently the whole
trade of the Congo State, would be practically _nil_, or so small as to
be unworthy of attention. This can best be done by giving facts and
figures which all the ingenious theorising in the world cannot overcome.
The following table shows the relative proportion of the rubber and ivory
exports from the Congo to the total exports:
TABLE I
Total of Total of
Year. Rubber. Ivory. both Exports. all Exports.
Francs. Francs. Francs. Francs.
1898 15,850,987 4,319,260 20,170,247 22,163,481
1899 28,100,917 5,834,620 33,935,537 36,067,959
1900 39,874,005 5,253,300 45,627,305 47,377,401
1901 43,965,950 3,964,600 47,930,550 50,488,394
If the rubber and ivory exports are deducted from the total exports, it
will be seen that—apart from these two products—the exports only amounted
in 1898 to 1,993,234 francs, in 1889 to 2,132,422 francs, in 1900 to
1,750,096 francs, and in 1901 to 2,557,844 francs, about 97 per cent. of
which was represented in each year by kernels and palm-oil shipped almost
exclusively from the Lower Congo[279] to Rotterdam, by the Dutch House
_Die Nieuwe Afrikaansche Handels Vennootschap_.
The next table provides statistics of the rubber and ivory shipped home
by the Congo State, as shipper, being the proceeds of the taxes—_impôts
de nature_—levied upon the natives of the _Domaine Privé_. As will be
observed, the Congo State is at pains to conceal the real proceeds. Ever
since 1893, when the actual returns exceeded the estimates by one-half,
the State has never published the former. The correct figures may,
however, approximately be arrived at by comparing the estimates with the
rubber and ivory disposed of by the State, as vendor, on the Antwerp
market. The enormous difference during these last few years between the
estimates _and the produce actually sold by the State_, possesses a
significance which will not be lost upon my readers. Into whose pocket
does the surplus go? But need we ask the question?
TABLE II
VALUE OF PRODUCE (IVORY AND RUBBER) DERIVED FROM THE
“DOMAINE PRIVÉ” IN THE SHAPE OF TAXES (IMPÔTS DE NATURE).
Produce (ivory and
rubber) from the
Year. Published returns. Actual returns. _Domaine Privé_, sold
on the Antwerp market
by the State’s brokers.
Francs. Francs. Francs.
1893 237,057 347,396 Unobtainable.
1894 300,000 } _Ibid._
1895 1,250,000 } 5,500,000
1896 1,200,000 } Withheld 6,000,000
1897 3,500,000 } from public 8,500,000
1898 6,700,000 } knowledge. 9,000,000
1899 10,000,000 } 19,130,000
1900 10,500,000 } 14,991,300[280]
It will thus be seen that, out of a total rubber and ivory export from
the Congo State in 1898 amounting to 20,170,247 francs (see Table I.),
the _Domaine Privé_ taxes produced 9,000,000 francs, or close upon
one-half; and that out of a total rubber and ivory export in 1899,
amounting to 33,935,537 francs, the _Domaine Privé_ taxes produced
19,130,000 francs, or not far short of two-thirds. The illustration is
in itself sufficient to destroy the theory of commercial prosperity so
assiduously propagated by King Leopold and his friends, in order to
deceive public opinion. Such “prosperity” entails the death of many human
beings. What could, indeed, be more eloquent of the true condition of
affairs! The total exports from the Congo State in 1899 are found (see
Table I.) to amount to 36,067,959 francs, of which 33,935,537 francs are
represented by rubber and ivory, in which the Congo State’s share as
tax-gatherer is no less than 19,130,000 francs. The Congo State asserts
that it does not trade. It merely imposes taxes which every “civilised”
Power (Heaven save the mark!) has the right to do; yet it incorporates
in its so-called trade figures the yield of its taxes! What becomes,
then, of this flourishing trade we hear so much about? On the evidence
produced, it sinks for 1889 to 16,937,959 francs (36,067,959 minus
19,130,000) instead of 36,067,959 francs, which the world is invited
to believe. In reality it does not amount to anything like 16,937,959
francs, for the simple reason that there is no “trade” at all in the
Congo State north of Leopoldville; and that, if we extract from the
remaining figures the exports from the Lower Congo, where genuine trade,
sadly hampered by taxation, alone exists, the balance is represented by
the shipments of the _Domaine Privé_ subsidiary monopolies in which the
Congo State benefits to the extent of 50 per cent.; and by the shipments
of the Thys Trust, which is a monopoly within a monopoly, although
conducted, it is but right to add, on different lines. Such is the
“trade” of the Congo State, the most gigantic fraud which ever came into
being to work misery upon mankind.
It would be unjust not to recognise that all this sordid history
has aroused loathing and distress in the hearts of many honourable
Belgians—not confined to the Party which opposes Colonial policy for
Belgium—mainly, as I believe, on the ground that King Leopold, in the
course of his illegalities and intrigues, will end by compromising
the neutrality of his country. It would be as equally unjust not to
express admiration for the indomitable energy displayed by Colonel
Thys in constructing the railway to Leopoldville, as to include in the
condemnation of King Leopold’s POLICY in Africa all the Belgians who
have been employed at one time or another in the State service. Sir
Harry Johnston has recently lent the weight of his name in favour of the
Congo State, in respect to the “very small portion” of the State which
he has visited. Sir Harry Johnston might have added that the rubber laws
are not in full operation in the “very small portion” of the country
he visited, and that the Belgian officers with whom he came in contact
have not been employed in that degrading business, their duties in that
particular region being confined to strengthening the obscure political
aims which King Leopold is pursuing in the Nile Valley. For a description
of the state of affairs prevailing south of the “very small portion”
of the Congo State alluded to, Mr. Grogan’s volume, and Mr. Robert
Codrington’s recently published “Travel and Trade Routes in Northern
Rhodesia and adjacent Parts of East Central Africa,”[281] together with
the revelations attending the treatment meted out to the late Mr. Rabinek
by the officials of the State, may be consulted with advantage. It would
be an insult to Sir Harry Johnston—who has himself condemned the system
of territorial concessions—to suggest that he desires in any way to
bolster up the Congo State; but it is certainly a thousand pities that
he has committed himself, even partially, to statements which, however
accurate in themselves, cannot fail to exercise an unfortunate influence,
without making himself acquainted with the general system under which
the Congo State is run. When the nature of that system is understood, it
becomes an outrage upon common sense and common decency to write one word
in extenuation of the system, or of the man who has originated it.
M. Cattier, to whose work I have several times alluded, represents the
type of Belgian who, convinced of the necessity of a colonial programme
for Belgium, has sufficient perspicacity to realise, and sufficient
courage to assert, that the policy of King Leopold in the Congo State
carries within it the germs of death. How true this is, the reader must
judge for himself; but it is at least significant that among a section
of French Colonial writers who think they see in the recent abandonment
of M. Beernaert’s Annexation Bill, at the king’s dictation, the final
postponement by Belgium and the consequent assertion—at some future
date—of France’s right of pre-emption, are beginning to ask themselves
whether the king’s ultimate aim is not to continue for some years longer
his “ruinous exploitation” of the Congo State; and then, when uprisings
have reached such a scale that the king’s cannibal army, however large it
may by that time have become, is powerless to cope with them; and when
whole tracts of the richest and most easily accessible rubber districts
have been irretrievably impaired, to offer the squeezed lemon, for a
consideration, to his Gallic neighbours. If the pernicious _régime_
which King Leopold has inaugurated in Africa were confined to the Congo
State, it would still be sufficient, one might have thought, to stir the
conscience of Europe, if not for the sake of her own dignity outraged in
the violation of solemn obligations, if not for the sake of humanity,
then for the sake of the future relations of black man and white man in
Central Africa. But, as we have seen, the _régime_ is spreading, and with
every year that passes it threatens more acutely all legitimate European
enterprise in Africa.[282]
This accursed _Domaine Privé_, and all the evils it has brought with it,
cannot last for ever. Like all such “negations of God” it will perish.
But what will remain behind for Europe, when the Congo State has passed
away, to deal with? A vast region, peopled by fierce Bantu races, with an
undying hatred of the white implanted in their breasts; a great army of
cannibal levies, drilled in the science of forest warfare, perfected in
the usage of modern weapons of destruction[283]—savages whose one lesson
learned from contact with European “civilisation” has been improvement
in the art of killing their neighbours; disciplined in the science of
slaughter; eager to seize upon the first opportunity which presents
itself of turning their weapons against their temporary masters; rendered
more desperate, more dangerous, more debased than before the advent of
King Leopold’s rubber collectors, who, by way of regeneration, have
grafted upon the native’s failings, born of ignorance, the worst vices
of the Africanised civilisation of modern Europe—cupidity, hypocrisy,
cruelty, and lust.
In their own most obvious interests, for the sake of humanity and right,
in the name of enlightened statesmanship and political common sense,
the Powers cannot allow the disease introduced into West and Central
Africa by King Leopold of Belgium to be farther extended. Nor do their
responsibilities end there. The source of the disease must be dealt with.
The canker must be rooted out and cast upon the dunghill. The Congo State
must be called to account for its crimes against civilisation; for its
outrages upon humanity; for the unparalleled and irreparable mischief it
has committed.
And what a warning lies here for the Western nations! The Congo State is
the living embodiment of the evil counsels, so lavishly, so thoughtlessly
given in connection with native policy in West Africa. In the Congo
State we see what these counsels lead to when put into practice. All
this talk about the puerility of preserving land tenure, the futility of
maintaining native institutions, the efficacy of punitive expeditions,
the necessity of teaching the native “the dignity of labour,” the cry for
territorial concessions, the advocacy of monopoly, and all legislative
acts framed in accordance with these views, or with some of them, tend to
produce in greater or less degree a state of affairs in Western Africa
similar to that which prevails on the Congo. In the case of the Powers,
the motives may be of the very best, the intentions honest and sincere;
but if once the thin end of the wedge be driven home; if once legislation
be passed or acts sanctioned which are founded upon a repudiation of
the inherent right of the native to his land and the fruits thereof; if
once it be officially admitted that it is legitimate to force the native
to give under compulsion that which is purchasable on fair terms, we
are committed to a policy of reaction of which no man can prophesy the
consequences or the end. To those conceptions Tropical Africa opposes her
vastness, her climate, and the prolific nature of her peoples. They can
be tried; apparent success may attend them for a time; lasting success
they will never secure. Tropical Africa _cannot permanently be held
down by force_, and in attempting to do so by placing modern engines
of destruction in the hands of Africans, Europe will be but digging the
grave of her ambitions on African soil.
But Europe can achieve a great work in Tropical Africa for good,
and benefit her own peoples in doing so. To divorce the two is
impossible. Evil wrought in Tropical Africa will have its aftermath
in Europe. The European has need of the Negro, and the Negro of the
European. In occupying the country of the Negro, Europe has assumed
a great responsibility. It is well, perhaps, European statesmen
should occasionally be reminded, that for Europe to forget the moral
responsibility in pursuing the material ends is to invite a certain
Nemesis. These pages cannot be more fittingly closed than by recalling
the words of a wise and good woman, who understood the nature and
immensity of the problem:
“Not only do the negroes not die off in the face of white civilisation
in Africa, but they have increased in America, whereto they were taken
by the slave trade. This fact urges on us the belief that these negroes
are a great world race—a race not passing off the stage of affairs, but
one that has an immense amount of history before it. The moulding of
that history is in the hands of the European, whose superior activity
and superior power in arts and crafts give the mastery; but all that
this mastery gives is the power to make the future of the negro and
the European prosperous, or to make it one of disaster to both alike.
Whatever we do in Africa to-day, a thousand years hence there will be
Africans to thrive or suffer for it.”[284]
E. D. M.
APPENDIX
SIERRA LEONE
EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORT TRADE, RAILWAY
Expenditure Export Trade
1897-1902. 1897-1902.[285]
1897 £112,000 £361,747
1898 121,000 267,156
1899 145,000 307,929
1900 156,000 317,980
1901 173,457[286] 265,433
1902 177,882[287]
RAILWAY
Railway Expenditure
1899-1902.
(Included in total
expenditure.)
1899 £10,493
1900 23,320
1901 19,642
1902 23,606[288]
LOANS FOR RAILWAY
Amounts advanced to end 1900 £307,539
Loan authorised 631,000
First section, 32 miles, formally opened May 1st, 1899.
Second section, 23¼ miles, “taken over by the open line,” end 1900.
Third section, 80½ miles, in course of construction.
According to the statement forwarded by the Local Traders’ Association of
Freetown to Sir A. King-Harman in 1901, the third section of the railway
(to Bo) will entail an annual charge on the Colony of £11,000, plus a
further sum of £6000 for “increased cost of administering and operating.”
FOR MILITARY PURPOSES
Annual charge of £6000 for eight years from 1899 on account of the sums
advanced by the Imperial Treasury for the Hut-tax war.
THE PROTECTORATE
Expenditure 1898-1902. Revenue 1898-1901.
Civil. Military. Total.
1898 £10,455 £20,634 £31,089 £7,754
1899 14,124 25,672 39,796 21,943
1900 17,000 23,499[289] 40,499 33,468
1901 25,767[290] 23,707[291] 49,474 38,347
1902[292] 24,807 24,911 49,718
GOLD COAST
EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORT TRADE, RAILWAY
Expenditure Liabilities incurred Export trade
1897-1900 1897-1902. 1897-1900.
(Inclusive.)[293] (Incomplete.) (Inclusive.)[294]
1897 £406,370 1897 £ nil.
1898 377,976 1898 265,000 1897 £857,793
1899 309,656 1899 100,000 1898 992,998
1900 272,303 1900 928,300 1899 1,111,738
1902 1,035,000 1900 885,446
Total £1,366,305 Total £2,328,300 Total £3,847,975
Expenditure, £1,366,305; Liabilities incurred (incomplete), £2,328,300
Export trade, £3,847,975.
The Gold Coast Report for 1901 has not yet been published. According
to the statement made this year before the Legislative Council of the
Colony by Sir Matthew Nathan, the Imperial Government advanced £400,000
on account of the last Ashanti expedition, but whether this sum includes
the £202,300 advanced for the same purpose in 1900 is not clear. Assuming
that it does, the liabilities incurred by the Colony from 1897 to 1902
inclusive will amount: (1) Loans by Imperial Government, £1,491,000; (2)
Gold Coast Government Loan, £1,035,000; Total, £2,328,300.
The Ashanti Blue Book (1901) estimated the total cost of administrating
Ashanti at about £60,000 per annum. According to Sir Matthew Nathan’s
statement referred to above, the expenditure in 1902 may be set down at
£107,148. Assuming these figures to be correct, the total expenditure in
Ashanti from 1897 to 1902 (reckoning an expenditure of £60,000 in 1901)
works out at the very large figure of £319,385, entirely exclusive of
grants-in-aid (assuming the £202,300 in 1900 to be incorporated in the
£400,000 advance), amounting to £695,000. Up to and including 1900, the
revenue of Ashanti was £3406. In the Ashanti Blue Book already mentioned,
the annual revenue for Ashanti is estimated at £14,600, less 10 per cent.
to the Chiefs (_i.e._ less £1460). Assuming this amount to have been
collected in 1901 and 1902, the total revenue for Ashanti from 1897 to
1902 inclusive amounted to £29,686, against an expenditure of £319,385,
and grants-in-aid to the amount of £695,000.
These figures should be borne in mind when examining the following
tables, which do not go farther than 1900, that is to say, as far as the
last issued Colonial Office Report.
EXPENDITURE, GRANTS-IN-AID, AND REVENUE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES AND
ASHANTI
1897-1900 inclusive
TOTALS
Expenditure. Grants-in-Aid. Revenue.
Northern Territories £213,338 £195,000 £7,736
Ashanti 175,450[295] 202,300 3,406
DETAILED
NORTHERN TERRITORIES
Expenditure. Grants-in-Aid. Revenue.
1897-98 £121,022 1898 £45,000 1897 Nil.
1899 54,875 1899 100,000 1898 ”
1900 37,441[296] 1900 50,000 1899 ”
1900[297] £7,736
ASHANTI
Expenditure. Expenditure. Revenue. Grants-in-Aid.
Ordinary. Extraordinary.
1897 £13,723 1897 £151,614[298] 1897 Nil.
1898 4,304 1898 603 1898 ”
1899 2,608 1899 20 1899 ”
1900 2,578 1900 Not given. 1900 £3,406 1900 £202,300
RAILWAY
Position December 31st, 1901: Completed, say, 45 miles;[299] sum
expended, £389,869.[300]
Loans from the Imperial Treasury: 1898, £220,000 (Railway
Ordinance);[301] 1900, £676,000 (“certain public works, railway
construction,” etc.)[302]
Future: Officially expected to reach Obuassi end 1902.
Gold Coast Loan: 1902, £1,035,000, “to defray cost of constructing a
railway 169¼ miles from Sekondi to Kumasi.”
LAGOS
EXPENDITURE, LOANS, EXPORT TRADE, RAILWAY
EXPENDITURE, 1891-1902-03 LIABILITIES INCURRED
1891 £66,388 “The amount of the debt of the
1892 86,513 Colony on 31st March 1901 was
1893 101,251 £972,902. This debt has been
1894 124,829 incurred solely for the building
1895 144,483 of the railway from Lagos to
1896 168,444 Ibadan, the tramway from Lagos
1897 182,668 to Iddo, the Abbeokuta branch of
1898 203,802 the railway, and the bridges from
1899 223,289 Lagos Island to the mainland.
1900-1901 187,124 “The Legislature has sanctioned
1901-1902 231,597[303] the borrowing of £1,053,700 for
1902-1903 240,718 these purposes.”[304]
It is recognised that the above
amount will not be sufficient to
defray the entire cost.
EXPORT TRADE
(These figures include the export of specie.)
1891 —
1892 —
1893 £836,295
1894 821,682
1895 985,595
1896 975,263
1897 810,975
1898 882,329
1899 915,934
1900-1901 831,257[305]
Owing to the intelligent way in which the Report for 1900-1901 is
prepared, it is possible to separate the specie from the total exports
for the years 1896-1900, 1901, as given in that Report. The total
exports, less specie, for the above-mentioned period were as follows:
EXPORT, LESS SPECIE
1896 £906,393
1897 740,179
1898 821,112
1899 834,358
1900-1901 705,237
There are special reasons to account for the heavy fall in 1900-1901.
Nevertheless, a glance at the expenditure and export columns cannot fail
to accentuate the fact that the growth in expenditure is incommensurate
with the increase in the purchasing power of the Colony. The financial
future of Lagos now depends entirely on the railway. When the entire sum
authorised has been expended, which will be this year, I believe, and
other expenses are added thereto, it is estimated that the railway will
have cost about £9000 to £10,000 per mile. In this connection the Dahomey
figures should be consulted.
The notes in the expenditure column include, of course, moneys expended
on public works. The growth in expenditure and the relation it bears to
the producing capacity of the country would, perhaps, appear even more
clearly if the expenditure totals were given, minus the expenditure on
public works. It has not been possible to satisfactorily separate them in
every case; but, as a simple illustration, 1893 and 1900 may be compared.
Ordinary expenditure. Export trade.
1893 £75,207 £836,295
1900 131,742 831,257
It will thus be seen that whereas, within the period given—eight
years—ordinary expenditure has nearly doubled, the producing power of
the country is found, at the close of the eighth year, to be stationary.
It may be argued, and justly, that the area of the Protectorate has been
extended since 1893. But the point is, _the way these dependencies are
managed_. Is not the management carried out upon altogether too elaborate
and expensive a scale? Does this increase in ordinary expenditure
correspond with an increase in the production, that is to say, in the
prosperity of the colony and the people of the colony? If it does not,
no special knowledge of political economy is required to predict that,
if the system be not modified in the future, the steadily increasing
expenditure will, before very long, act as a positive deterrent upon the
producing power of the country. In fact, there is sufficient evidence
to justify the fear that in some instances this stage has already been
reached.
COMPARATIVE TABLES OF IMPORT DUTIES IN VOGUE IN LAGOS AND DAHOMEY
DAHOMEY. LAGOS. In favour of
Tobacco (manufactured) 2⅙d. per lb. 8d. per lb. Dahomey.
” (unmanufactured) 2⅙d. ” 4d. ” ”
Gunpowder 2⅙d. ” 6d. ” ”
Trade guns 1s. 7⅕d. each 2s. 6d. each ”
Kerosene 0⅜d. per gallon 2d. per gallon ”
Salt rock 11s. 4½d. per ton 20s. per ton ”
” sea 4s. 10½d. ” 20s. ” ”
Lead ⅑d. per lb. 1d. per lb. ”
Coal Free of duty Pays duty 10% ”
Fresh fruit and seeds ” Pay ” ”
Tools of all kinds
(_i.e._ mechanical,
agricultural, etc.) ” [306]Pay ” ”
Furniture ” [307]Pays ” ”
SILKS, VELVETS, COTTONS AND PRINTS
In Dahomey these articles pay duty on their weight; in Lagos the tax is
an _ad valorem_ one. How these different duties work out in practice can
only be ascertained by giving specific instances. The following examples
are taken from actual shipments:
DAHOMEY. LAGOS.
50 c. per 10 per cent.
kilo. _ad valorem._ In favour of
£ s. d. £ s. d.
Silk shipment of £50 value—
38 kilos weight 0 15 3 5 0 0 Dahomey.
Velvet shipment of £90 value
—384½ kilos 7 13 9 7 0 0 Lagos.
Cottons shipment of £52 value
—659 kilos 13 3 7 5 4 0 ”
Prints shipment of £100 value
—979 kilos 19 12 0 10 0 0 ”
SPIRITS
DAHOMEY. LAGOS. In favour of
Brandy, rum, &c., 18/20
under proof, equals 46°
Tralles, at 1f. 20c. per
hectolitre per degree
plus 5c. for bottles 2s. 1d. per gallon 3s. per gallon Dahomey.
Gin 0° to 20° Tralles 1s. 9½d. ” ” ”
Gin 20° to 50° ” 2s. 8⅖d. ” ” ”
Gin 57° proof (Sykes) 3s. 1d. ” ” Lagos.
Alcohol:
68 over-proof—96° Tralles 4s. 2¼d. 5s. 0¼d. Dahomey.
60 ” —91° ” 4s. 4s. 9⅗d. ”
THE DAHOMEY RAILWAY
LENGTH—ESTIMATED COST—FINANCE—PRESENT POSITION—GENERAL REMARKS
KOTONU-TCHARU (TCHAOUROU)
Length, 605 kilometres, or 377 miles, in two sections. First section,
Kotonu-Acheribe (Atcheribe). Second section, Acheribe-Tcharu.
Length of first section, 186 kilometres, or say 115 miles. Estimated cost
of first section, 63,000 francs per kilometre. Estimated total cost of
first section, 11,718,000 francs.
In English figures[308]—Total estimated cost of first section, 115 miles
long, £468,740, or say £4076 per mile.
It is intended to subsequently carry on this line from Tcharu to Karimama
on the Niger.
RESULTS AS FAR AS AT PRESENT KNOWN
Actual work commenced May 1, 1900. In March 1902, 82 kilometres, or
say 51 miles, of embankment, earthworks and “ouvrages d’art” complete,
were handed over to the Concessionnaire, who is called upon to provide
and lay down sleepers and rails, provide rolling-stock, &c. Fifty more
kilometres, or say 32 miles, similarly complete, were ready at the date
mentioned to be handed over to the Concessionnaire. The Colony, which
has itself undertaken the work, has thus prepared in less than two years
132 kilometres, or say 82 miles of line. The chief difficulties met with
have been in crossing the swamps between Kotonu and Godomey, the marshy
streams of Whydah and the Pahu lagoon, where the earthworks are 26 feet
high. To fill up a depression of 16 feet in the centre of the lagoon
40,000 cubic metres of sand and earth were required. A distance of 12
kilometres between Wagbo (Ouagbo) and Taffo required 75,000 cubic metres
of embankment. In the crossing of the Lama 2500 workmen were continuously
employed for five months in placing 80,000 cubic metres of gravel. All
the labour was found in the Colony. The number of natives continuously
employed has varied from 3500 to 5000, _entirely recruited through the
Chiefs_. There has been no trouble with the workmen, and no police force
has been employed on the works. The export trade of the Colony has not
suffered during the process, notwithstanding the withdrawal of so large
a quantity of labour from the farms; but, indeed, has increased,[309] a
tribute to the wisdom of leaving the _recruiting entirely in the hands of
the Chiefs_.
FINANCE
The Colony undertakes the cutting embankment, earthworks, &c., everything
but the laying of the rails, sleepers, the providing of the same,
rolling-stock, stations and so forth.
It has undertaken to advance for five years _out of its own local
resources_ a sum of one million francs, say £40,000 annually. For 1901
the Colony undertook to provide £60,000, instead of £40,000.
GENERAL REMARKS
The French accurately claim that their railway will carry them much
farther inland for a given distance covered than the Lagos railway with
the big curve eastward which it takes from Abbeokuta; whereas they
are pushing their line almost due north, and at their present rate of
progress, in comparison with the time taken over the British line, their
iron horse will have penetrated very much farther into the interior than
Ilorin, long before the British line creeps up to that place. Upon this
premise they base a number of conclusions, the first and foremost of
which is that the French line will thus be able to capture the inland
traffic which finds its way into the Lagos hinterland from the Niger,
along the Nikki road (the French have a “post” at Nikki, which is a great
centre for the caravan traffic), and to drain the western portion of
Sokoto, to the detriment naturally of Lagos and Northern Nigeria. Well,
in Northern Nigeria we do not seem to care much about trade, the military
and political policy being more showy, albeit a nice little bill will
have to be met presently, for the showy policy cannot be indulged in in
West Africa without having to pay the piper some day. But in the case of
Lagos it is a different affair, and the French argument is worth looking
into. There can be no doubt that if the Concessionnaire of the Dahomey
line lays his rails and provides his rolling-stock at the same ratio of
speed as the Colony has performed its share of the work, the contention
that the French rail-head will in a couple of years be carried deeper
into the interior is correct. That the Concessionnaire will do so is,
of course, an assumption. He has been engaged in quarrelling with his
contractors for a considerable time, but now it appears he is seriously
setting to work; at least, that is the information I get from Lagos. It
is equally true that the French line, when it has reached its terminus
at the 377th mile, will plunge into a network of trade roads, branching
eastwards to Lagos and westwards to Togo, and will have an excellent
chance of diverting the flow of the internal commerce from both those
Colonies. To that extent Lagos will probably be a loser, because the
African is very conservative and will cling to his old trade routes
rather than abandon them for new ones, and naturally the French railway
will benefit him. But the French, perhaps, forget that the Lagos line,
as far as Ibadan, at any rate—as far, that is to say, as it goes at
present—does not rely upon inland traffic for its existence. It will
be fed locally by the increased production which will accrue along its
line of march by the conversion of thousands of carriers of produce,
into cultivators and reapers of produce. Between Ibadan and Ilorin, it
cannot hope to do much anyhow. Beyond Ilorin again, increased local
production will feed it, Nupe being a rich and well-populated country. If
the British line remains stationary at Ibadan for many years, however,
the danger from its French competitor, supposing the latter to follow a
progressive construction, would certainly become more acute. Here, again,
the question of finance comes in, and the French Colony is decidedly
better off. What greater contrast could, indeed, be imagined?—Lagos
in debt to the tune of over a million, burdened for all time with an
annual drain of £50,000, while Dahomey is not in debt to the extent of
one penny, and cheerfully advances £60,000 in one year to the works of
construction out of its surplus funds! As for the _cost_ of construction,
if the French estimates hold good, or anywhere near it, the French line
will be built at about half the cost of its British competitor.
* * * * *
Since the above remarks were written news has been received that 65
kilometres of the railway were opened to traffic in September, and that
rail-head is expected to reach Abomey in January next.
FRENCH GUINEA RAILWAY
LENGTH. ESTIMATED COST. FINANCE. PRESENT POSITION
KONAKRY-KURUSSA _viâ_ TIMBO
Length, 550 kilometres, or 342 miles.
Highest estimated cost of line, 80,000 francs per kilometre.
Highest estimated total cost, 44,000,000 francs.
First section, Konakry-Kandia, 150 kilometres, or say 92 miles.
In English figures: Total estimated cost of line, 342 miles long,
£1,700,000; or say, roughly, about £5140 per mile.
RESULTS UP TO DATE, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF
FRENCH WEST AFRICA IN JUNE LAST
The earthworks have reached Kandia at the 149th kilometre (say 92nd
mile).
With the exception of two places, between the 27th and 44th kilometre,
and between the 90th and 107th kilometre, the earthworks and embankment,
&c. are finished and in good condition. One steel bridge thirty-three
yards long is already fixed up, and two others are in process of being
so. The 34 kilometres which remain are being proceeded with rapidly.
Seventeen hundred workmen are continuously engaged thereon. Rails and
sleepers are being regularly landed at Konakry. The first locomotive
has arrived. By October the rolling-stock complete for the first 150
kilometres, say 92 miles, will have arrived in the Colony.
FINANCE
For the first section the Colony borrowed from the “Caisse des
Retraites,” on its own guarantee, eight million francs (£320,000), at 4
10% in August 1899; and four million francs (£160,000) at 4% from the
“Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations” in March 1901. The first loan is
to be paid back in forty annual payments, and the second in twenty-five
annual payments, the two annuities together amounting to 430,000 francs,
or say £17,200.
These loans will be further supplemented by drafts upon the Colony’s
local funds.
WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY TRADE
IMPORTS OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO EUROPEAN PORTS IN THE YEARS
1898-1901
1898 40,167 tons
1899 48,902 ”
1900 55,959 ”
1901 44,582 ”
DESTINATION OF IMPORTS IN 1901
Liverpool 29,312 tons
London 6,998 ”
Glasgow 278 ”
Germany 4,735 ”
France 3,259 ”
IMPORTS, IN SUPERFICIAL FEET, OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO LIVERPOOL FOR
THE PAST 13 YEARS
Sup. ft. 1889 68,000
” 1890 259,000
” 1891 1,600,000
” 1892 3,000,000
” 1893 4,984,000
” 1894 4,700,000
” 1895 3,400,000
” 1896 5,098,000
” 1897 8,134,000
” 1898 10,519,000
” 1899 13,508,000
” 1900 14,034,000
” 1901 11,652,000
IMPORT, CONSUMPTION AND STOCK OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO LIVERPOOL
1898-1901
1898. 1899. 1900. 1901.
IMPORT 10,519,000 ft. 13,508,000 ft. 14,034,000 ft. 11,652,000 ft.
CONSUMPTION 10,571,000 ” 13,496,000 ” 13,764,000 ” 11,978,000 ”
STOCK 633,000 ” 645,000 ” 915,000 ” 589,000 ”
IMPORTS OF WEST AFRICAN MAHOGANY INTO LIVERPOOL FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS
OF 1901 AND 1902 RESPECTIVELY
LOGS
January. February. March.
1901. 1902. 1901. 1902. 1901. 1902.
Lagos 1558 799 767 184 386 120
Benin 202 599 62 376 69 —
Sapeli 65 49 44 44 58 —
Other West African Ports 2373 626 505 1130 264 198
April. May. June.
1901. 1902. 1901. 1902. 1901. 1902.
Lagos 311 42 210 43 72 114
Benin 121 181 56 66 77 —
Sapeli 87 89 36 42 77 —
Other West African Ports 604 617 206 502 320 114
THE GOLD COAST MINING INDUSTRY
Having but casually referred to the Gold Coast mining industry, it has
been suggested to me that a few remarks might be contributed to the
subject in an Appendix. I am somewhat reluctant to write anything on the
point, because I know absolutely nothing about mining; and the opinions
I have formed, such as they are, are the outcome (1) of conversations
with a number of men who are more or less experts, and have formed their
views of the prospects of the Gold Coast mining industry from personal
investigation on the spot; (2) the perusal of a quantity of reports by
Companies which are operating and prospecting ... and by Companies which
are doing nothing at all but squander their shareholders’ money; (3)
historical research and study of the past performances of the Gold Coast
as a gold producer. Beyond that I have no knowledge whatever; nothing but
opinions, which perhaps the reader will kindly bear in mind when perusing
the following notes.
There is not the slightest doubt that gold exists in considerable
quantities in West Africa. The earliest records we have of any trade at
all being done on the West Coast of Africa is a trade in gold dust. The
external trade of West Africa dates back to the period when the Negroes
beheld the Carthaginian galleys bearing down upon their shores. The
internal gold trade of West Africa is probably even more remote—but there
we enter the domain of conjecture.
There is not the slightest doubt that the Portuguese, Dutch, English,
French, and so on, obtained enormous quantities of gold from the Gold
Coast.
For many years the gold _trade_ in the Gold Coast has practically been a
thing of the past. The gold _trade_, as a trade, is long since dead.
At the beginning of last century the great gold store—which had been
accumulating for ages—of the Coast peoples of the Gold Coast became
exhausted. At that period the Ashantis, farther inland, still retained
large quantities of gold ostentatiously displayed. James, Bowdich,
Dupuis, Hutton, and Hutcheson bear witness to that. With the gradual
undermining of the Ashanti Kingdom this store also disappeared.
Coming to more recent times, we find that the geological formation known
as “banket” was discovered in 1878 in the Takwa district by a French
traveller called Bonnat. That seems to have been the basis of the future
modern mining industry in the Gold Coast, replacing the extinct trade.
Many years of disappointment and failure followed Bonnat’s discovery,
due in a very large measure to the absence of transport facilities and
to mortality. However, some of the mines which had come into existence
subsequent to the discovery refused to be discouraged, and went on
working, more or less half-heartedly, notably in the Wassau and Takwa
districts.
In January 1900 the scene changed, as though by a magician’s wand.
The man who waved it was a Mr. Stanley Clay, an engineer reputed of
considerable ability, in the employ of the Consolidated Goldfields of
South Africa, which Corporation had been approached by the men who owned
the Wassau and Takwa mines. This gentleman reported in effect that the
banket formation of the district he had been despatched to examine was
so like the banket formation of the Rand as to be hardly distinguishable
from the latter. Although some years previous to that report the Ashanti
Goldfields Corporation, Limited—the parent, so to speak, of the Ashanti
mines—had come into existence, I believe I am correct in stating that the
remarkable “boom” in Gold Coast mining undertakings practically dates
from the favourable report above alluded to.
Be that as it may, the last two years have witnessed the extraordinary
movement with which every one is familiar. According to “Wallach’s West
African Manual” for June 1901, 321 companies had at that time been
created, with a total nominal share capital of £25,567,170. “The issued
share capital will amount to approximately £15,750,000, if all is fully
paid up.”[310]
This is truly colossal. But all is not gold that glitters. The boom,
prematurely, and to a large extent, dishonestly engineered, collapsed.
Deep distrust has taken the place of sanguine anticipations, and public
confidence, greatly shaken, is apt to rush to the opposite extreme. The
Gold Coast mining industry has many enemies and many unwise friends. The
“boom” was, of course, thoroughly unjustified. The public lost their
heads completely. Company after company was formed, a large proportion
of which hardly knew where their territory lay, let alone whether it
contained any gold. But the public did not care twopence so long as it
was a Gold Coast venture, and a great many rascals have done excellently
well out of the British investor. Finally, this constant flotation of
companies got to be in the nature of a scandal; and the Governor of the
Gold Coast, in a courageous speech, which has remained famous, before the
local Chamber of Commerce, and for which Sir Matthew Nathan deserves the
greatest possible credit, denounced the abuses which the movement was
giving rise to. Mr. Chamberlain promptly endorsed the Governor’s views,
and caused a public statement to be made which fell like a bombshell on
the market-riggers. Flotation of new companies after that was an almost
impossible task, and the market received a staggering blow from which it
has not yet recovered. There is pretty certain to be renewed activity at
some not very distant day. Let us hope that the next time it will rest on
something more tangible than fairy tales.
That gold exists in the Gold Coast is demonstrated beyond a shadow of
doubt. That it can be worked at a profit has yet to be satisfactorily
proved, even in the case of the properties which are, or will be, in
close proximity to the railway now in course of construction. For the
purposes of illustration the Gold Coast may be divided into three
portions. First, where gold exists in such quantities—other conditions
being favourable—that it is reasonable to believe the mines, if
economically and wisely administered, will become dividend-producing.
Secondly, where gold exists, but not in sufficient quantities—the
conditions of mining in West Africa being what they are—to enable the
mines ever to become dividend-paying. Thirdly; where no gold exists at
all.
Now when it is borne in mind that options have been acquired by
individuals pretty well all over the country, and companies have been
formed to work those options, it will be easily understood that shares of
a considerable number of existing companies are not worth the paper upon
which they are inscribed. In my opinion, if Mr. Wallach’s “321” companies
were divided by six, the residue would be an optimistic prophecy as to
the number of Gold Coast mining companies existing ten years hence.
This number would be amply sufficient to allow of the Gold Coast to
become, what I believe it will become, a gold-producing region of very
considerable value. Personally, I am as equally convinced that some of
the mines will become good dividend-payers, as I am that the majority are
rubbish. The two main difficulties which the mining industry in the Gold
Coast have to face are climate and transport.
The first is a very real difficulty, and the public would do well to
treat with the utmost scepticism reports emanating from directors of
Gold Coast companies, especially those whose properties are situate near
the coast; who pooh-pooh the danger of the climate. If Major Ross’s
indefatigable efforts are backed up by the authorities and the mining
companies, we shall see a better state of things before many years are
past. But that the climate will always be an adverse element to contend
against is positively certain. Those who say the contrary are not dealing
honestly with the public.
Many people imagine that transport difficulties will vanish when this
crawling single line to Kumasi has been completed. Let those who are
inclined to that belief study one of the excellent maps of the Gold Coast
mines now available, and see how many of the properties, out of the total
of companies floated, approximate sufficiently to the line to feel its
usefulness. Before transport difficulties can be said to be overcome, the
Gold Coast must be a network of railways. That may come, but the time is
not yet by a long, a very long way.
The alleged labour difficulty I have dealt with elsewhere. It is largely
fictitious, as the most reputable companies and the most experienced
Europeans will bear witness. The boot, the stick; abuse; inadequate pay;
dishonest dealing—so long as these incentives to labour exist on the
Gold Coast, and they exist to-day, so long will certain people endeavour
to make the British public believe that labour is improcurable in West
Africa save by measures of coercion, or by Asiatic emigration, or by
draining the other West African colonies of their able-bodied men. Decent
wages; just treatment; tactful dealing; a high type of representative—the
mining companies which supply these have not, and will not have,
occasion to complain. The Administration might play a useful part in
imitating the French policy of obtaining labour for the Guinea Railway,
viz. through the Chiefs, and through them alone, and refuse to allow
authorised or unauthorised recruiting agents.
From the point of view of the investing public, those who contemplate
putting any money into the Gold Coast mines should carefully weigh
the difficulties mentioned against the counterbalancing reasons for
optimism in the facts (1) that some undoubted experts, and some men of
undoubted integrity and ability who have a reputation to lose, have
staked that reputation upon the existence of “paying” gold in the Gold
Coast; (2) that a powerful corporation has undertaken a heavy liability
in guaranteeing a certain sum for a number of years to the Gold Coast
Railway; (3) that a very large sum of money has been sunk in the
country for the purpose of mining enterprise; (4) that the past history
of the Gold Coast is all in its favour. Finally, the investor should
discriminate carefully between the companies and “groups” which are
justifying, or honestly seeking to justify, their existence and those
that are not.
APPROXIMATE AREA AND POPULATION OF THE BRITISH WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
GAMBIA. Population, 14,260.
SIERRA LEONE. Colony, 4000 square miles; population, 136,000.
Protectorate, 30,000 square miles; population,
750,000.
GOLD COAST. Gold Coast Proper, 40,000 square miles; population,
1,500,000.
Ashanti proper. Neither area nor population known.
Northern territories, 38,000 square miles[311];
population, 317,964 (C.O. Report, July 1902).
LAGOS. Colony, 3460 square miles } Population,[312]
Protectorate, 25,450 square miles } 1,500,000.
NIGERIA. 500,000 square miles; population, 25 to 30
millions.[313]
THE RABINEK CASE
(See Chapter xxxii.)
On October 27th, Sir Charles Dilke, having asked the Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs if he could say whether, in the Rabinek case, the
prisoner was taken by the Congolese authorities from a British ship
in British waters, and, if so, what course his Majesty’s Government
proposed to adopt, Lord Cranborne, in a printed answer, said: “It is at
present uncertain whether Mr. Rabinek was actually on board a British
vessel when arrested, or whether the ship was at the time in British
waters. Inquiries are, however, being made, and on receipt of definite
information his Majesty’s Government will be in a position to consider
what action should be taken in the matter.”
Since the above question by Sir Charles Dilke, the doubt as to the
actual place of Mr. Rabinek’s arrest has been removed. The Congo State
authorities can no longer evade the point. Here is a copy of the
_Procès-verbal d’arrestation_, showing conclusively that Mr. Rabinek was
arrested _on board a British vessel_.
PROCÈS-VERBAL D’ARRESTATION.
Le soussigné, Saroléa, Louis, Sous-Lieutenant de la Force
Publique, commandant la colonne mobile du Tanganyka, stationnée
à Mpueto, officier de police judiciaire, a procédé le 15 Mai
1901, à 3 heures de l’après-midi, à l’arrestation du sieur
Rabinek en exécution du mandat d’arrêt délivré le 17 Décembre,
1900, à charge du dit Rabinek par le tribunal territorial
d’Albertville. _Le prénommé se trouvait à bord du steamer
anglais “Scotia,” ancré dans le port de Mpueto._ Le Sieur
Rabinek a été remis à M. Chargois ff du représentant du Comité
Spécial du Katanga à Mpueto.
Fait à Mpueto, le 15 Mai 1901.
(L.S.) Lieutenant Commandant la
Colonne mobile du Tanganyka.
(Sig.) SAROLÉA.
The British Government has now a copy of the above.
FOOTNOTES
[1] _Journal of the African Society_, October 1901.
[2] Among the principal exceptions may be mentioned gum arabic from
Senegal, pepper, spices, &c., from the Guinea Coast.
[3] The totals here given do not, of course, include foreign and Colonial
merchandise shipped to British West Africa from British ports.
[4] The total volume of trade—British and foreign and coastwise—in each
of the West African Colonies in the five years 1896-1900, including
specie, has been as follows:
Gambia £1,797,916
Sierra Leone 4,646,503
Gold Coast 10,393,850
Lagos 8,853,461
Niger Coast Protectorate (and for 1900, “Nigeria”) 8,183,288
-----------
Gross total £42,728,479
The trade of the former territories of the Niger Company, from 1896 to
1899 inclusive, is not reckoned in this total, no public figures being
available.
[5] The totals given are, of course, exclusive of foreign and Colonial
merchandise shipped to these foreign possessions from British ports.
[6] Due to exceptional imports of coal and telegraph apparatus.
[7] German imports, like British imports, are largely for re-exportation
to other European and American ports.
[8] The chief town in Borgu on which the Lugard and Decœur expeditions
were directing their efforts.
[9] _Journal of the African Society_, January 1902.
[10] This document is published _in extenso_ in the annual report of the
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce for 1901.
[11] The Foreign Office lost us the Cameroons, the French Congo littoral,
Futa-Jallon, and heaven knows what besides. In doing so it showed itself
the indifferent servant of an indifferent public.
[12] See, more particularly, Appendices and the chapter on the Finances
of Nigeria.
[13] “By the end of April 1900,” says the report for Southern Nigeria for
1900, “twenty proclamations were passed.” I should be afraid to say how
many have been passed since.
[14] The activity of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine has been
phenomenal, and the useful work performed by it is internationally
recognised. To the splendid enterprise of Sir Alfred Jones, its initiator
and President, is due the astonishingly strong financial position which
the School has attained—entirely the outcome of private benevolence.
[15] In the remarkable speech he made at the Lagos Literary Institute—the
most able and statesmanlike oration ever delivered by a British official
in West Africa—Sir William MacGregor said in reference to the extension
of the Lagos Railway: “It would require probably not much greater
expenditure than would a number of military campaigns, it would save many
valuable lives to open up the country in that way, and it would leave a
permanent valuable asset. In this the locomotive would be preferable to
the Maxim.”
[16] That admirable German Institution, the _Kolonial Wirtschaftliches
Komitee_ (Agricultural Committee) might also be imitated with advantage
by our Government. Attached to the German Colonial Society, the
Agricultural Committee devotes its exclusive attention to a study of the
economic resources of the German possessions, giving special notice to
cocoa, rubber, gutta-percha, cotton, &c. Experts have been despatched
by the Committee to the South Seas to study gutta-percha, to the States
for cotton, to Central and South America for cocoa, &c. The Committee
is really composed of a trained body of agricultural and botanical
specialists working in the joint interests of the Government and the
merchants.
[17] M. Empain has lately been granted by King Leopold a huge concession
in the Aruwimi region of the Congo State in connection with the promotion
of a railway to the Great Lakes.
[18] The London Chamber being mainly—although not exclusively—concerned
with Gold Coast trade and mining developments.
[19] It was entirely owing to the assistance of the African Association’s
agents that the people of the Niger Delta were induced to accept British
protection and consular jurisdiction. By the merchants’ good offices,
Consuls Johnston and Hewett were enabled to ascend the rivers to places
where they would not have dared to enter unaccompanied by representatives
of the merchants.
[20] Chairman of the African Section.
[21] Report of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 1900.
[22] Messrs. Shelford’s estimate is £7000 per mile. But this cannot be
reconciled with the amount expended. It leaves out of account the cost of
bridges between Lagos Island and the mainland, which are part and parcel
of the railway scheme. In March of this year the Colony had already
expended its loan of £1,053,700, which works out at £8430 per mile. But
although the railway has reached its present terminus it is not yet
properly finished. Speaking in March, Sir W. MacGregor foreshadowed a
further expenditure of £60,000, and added, “the probability is, however,
that this will not be sufficient.” On the same occasion the Governor,
reviewing the state of the Colony, said that one of the two “principal
causes of anxiety” was “the difficulty experienced in getting the railway
into working order.”
[23] French Guinea borrowed £480,000 at the rate of 4.10 per cent. and 4
per cent. respectively.
[24] 14_s._ 8_d._ per head of the whole population of the territory.
[25] Another incident of the kind is referred to by Sir W. MacGregor in
one of his speeches before the Legislative Council. Plans were sent home
for a steam-hopper or tramway to remove refuse. The plans were rejected
by the “consulting engineers.” The Governor sarcastically remarked: “It
is doubtful that any remedy that would cost less than £100,000 will ever
be approved by the engineers.”
[26] The same belief was entertained, curiously enough, by the
inhabitants of the Niger Basin itself even in Clapperton’s day, as
witness Sultan Bello’s map, drawn for Clapperton at the latter’s request,
referred to farther on.
[27] Lyon subsequently gained Timbuctoo from Murzuk, being the second
European to visit the mysterious city. It has always remained an open
question whether Horneman did not actually cross the Desert and reach
the Chad. Denham, indeed, believed that he did so, but no trace of the
unfortunate German has ever been discovered from the time he left Murzuk,
nearly a quarter of a century before Denham arrived there himself.
[28] Caffre—_i.e._ unbeliever.
[29] For instance, the Bahr-el-Ghazal, Bahr-el-Asrek, Bahr-el-Abiad, &c.,
all rivers.
[30] Some authors consider the Hausas to be a branch of the Mandingo
race. According to this theory, the Mandingoes are the parent stock,
and the Hausas, Songhays, Bambarras, &c., are all offshoots of the
same great family. Although there would appear to be a certain basis
of probability—especially as regards the Bambarras—in the plea of a
common Mandingo origin, our historical and ethnological knowledge of the
different races of West Africa, which is still in the embryonic stage,
precludes anything in the nature of a positive assertion.
[31] Subsequent to the final overthrow of the Berbers, under Kuseila, by
the Arabs in 688 A.D.
[32] “Historical Account of the Kingdom of Tek-roor.” By Sultan Mohammed
Bello of Hoosa. Denham & Clapperton. Vol. ii., Appendix xiii.
[33] “Hausaland.” By the Rev. Charles Robinson. P. 179.
[34] The _Hausa bokoy_, or seven States, as distinct from the _Banza
bokoy_ or Bastard States, representing the seven other provinces where
the Hausa language had partly spread.
[35] “A Mission to Central Africa.” By James Richardson. 1850-51.
[36] “L’Annamite mère des langues.” Le Colonel Frey. 1892.
[37] Lieutenant-Colonel Monteil’s estimate, 1891.
[38] For hours you may wander about noting industrial scenes like these,
showing to what a length their advance in civilisation has increased
the wants of the people, and produced a necessary division of labour
into weavers, dyers, blacksmiths, brass-workers, saddle-makers, tailors,
builders, horse-boys, agricultural labourers, domestic servants,
shoe-makers, shopkeepers, traders, and others.—Joseph Thompson, in _Good
Words_, 1886.
[39] Leo Africanus tells us that Gober “had a good trade and considerable
industry, especially in leather-work” (beginning of sixteenth century).
[40] Since the above was written, Mr. Consul Jago’s report (No. 578)
on the “Trade and economic state of the vilayet of Tripoli during the
past forty years” has been published by the Foreign Office. It is a most
interesting document. The Consul gives a table of the value of Tripoli’s
trade with the Central Sudan States (Sokoto, Bornu, Wadai) for the period
1862-1901 as follows: 1862-71, £318,000; 1872-81, £1,846,300; 1882-91,
£1,283,000; 1892-1901, £1,141,700; annual average, £114,725.
[41] Consul Jago appears to favour this view. I venture to suggest that
the paragraphs (pp. 7 and 8) in which he refers to the point are open to
criticism. Take, for instance, the cost of transport. Notwithstanding
that, at first sight, the assertion may appear strange, I believe that,
if any one cares to take the trouble to work out the cost of transport of
a ton of European merchandise from London to Kuka (1) _viâ_ Tripoli and
by caravan across the desert, (2) _viâ_ Burutu, the Niger and overland,
the former route will be found the cheaper of the two. Things do not
always appear to be what they are in Africa. If France can come to a
working understanding with the Senussis, the caravan trade will revive.
[42] According to Lieutenant-Colonel Pilcher, who commanded the West
African Frontier Force in 1898, the Hausa is more quarrelsome than the
Yoruba or Nupe, gets into trouble more often, and is not so quick at
picking up drill or musketry (Colonial Office Report, No. 260, West
African Frontier Force, June 1899). Other officers eulogise the Hausas,
and among military men they are, I think, believed to be superior
fighters to either the West Indian or Mendi Negro, while about equalling
the Yoruba. The Negro seems to fight more fiercely and recklessly when he
has Islam to fall back upon.
[43] “Géographie Universelle,” livre xii. p. 587. 1887.
[44] “The Colonisation of Africa,” p. 282. 1899.
[45] “Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa.”
[46] “The Language of Bornu.”
[47] “Magana Hausa.” By J. F. Schön, D.D., F.R.G.S.
[48] “Hausaland; or, Fifteen Hundred Miles through the Central Sudan.”
1897.
[49] “Specimens of Hausa Literature.” “A Hausa Grammar.” “A Hausa-English
Dictionary.” “The Gospel of St. John in Hausa.”
[50] Full details are supplied in Canon Robinson’s book.
[51] Apart from the question whether the Hausas can claim to have
“attempted the production of a literature” any more than the Fulani or
Kanuri, there remains the fact—which goes to confute Canon Robinson’s
somewhat sweeping generalisation—that the language of the Tuareg—the
Tamashek—has been reduced to literature in _Tamashek characters_, and
that both sexes among the Tuareg are regularly instructed therein.
[52] “Kanuri Proverbs and Kanuri-English Vocabulary.” By the Rev. S.
N. Koelle. On page 9 of the introduction to his book, Koelle speaks
of the system of orthography followed by him as that of Professor
Lepsius, of Berlin, in the pamphlet entitled “Standard Alphabet for
Reducing _Unwritten Languages_ and Foreign Graphic Systems to a Uniform
Orthography in European Letters.”
[53] Baikie gives nine Hausa dialects, viz.: “Katshena, the purest and
best; (2) Kano; (3) Gober; (4) Daure; (5) Zamfara; (6) Zuzu; (7) Biranta
Goboz; (8) Kabi; (9) Shira, or Shura.”—“Narrative of an Exploring Voyage
up the Rivers Kwora and Binue.” By William Balfour Baikie. 1856.
[54] It is found in French Guinea, north of Sierra Leone, but is not
there the staple product, rubber taking its place.
[55] Southern Nigeria, or rather the Niger Delta, is commonly known as
“the rivers.”
[56] The figures for 1900 include the whole of Nigeria—that is, the
former Niger Company’s territories in the Lower Niger, and the Niger
Coast Protectorate, now incorporated into Southern Nigeria.
[57] _Idem._
[58] Germany has a protective tax on kernel or other foreign crushed
oil, which enables her to keep the home market to herself, and she
has made a profitable use of the cake for feeding cattle, whilst our
farmers—largely, I understand, through the operation of the tenant-right
conditions of tenure, or perhaps through mere prejudice—refuse to use it
to any extent.
[59] In Senegal and the Gambia the ground-nut industry, which is also
essentially a native industry, takes its place, the number of palm-trees
in those possessions being very scanty—not worth mentioning, in fact.
[60] It is also used for lubricating mixtures for the axles of railway
carriages.
[61] Giving out trust is not invariably confined to the European. Native
chiefs have been known to give trust to Europeans up to 1000 cases of
palm-oil, in days, too, when palm-oil was worth £15 per puncheon. This
would represent a credit of £15,000.
[62] In point of fact, palm-oil from the Congo district is the richest in
stearine.
[63] The first West African kernels were imported in 1860 by Mr. A.
Mackenzie Smith and the late Mr. Charles Lane, of Liverpool. The Old
Calabar district led the way in Southern Nigeria. The trade was begun
there in a small way in 1864. Benin was the next place in Southern
Nigeria to follow suit, and by 1867 the trade was fairly large. By 1880
the trade had spread to the other rivers, New Calabar, Bonny, Brass, and
Opobo.
[64] The average crushing of the African Oil Mills is, I believe, about
600 tons weekly.
[65] The exception is the machine erected at the Brass River in 1877 (by
the Count de Cardi, I believe) and used to this day by the firm which has
the principal trade of this district. It can produce, I believe, forty or
fifty bags of clean kernels per day of ten hours. It would require 600 or
700 pairs of hands to give this result in the same time.
[66] I am given to understand that efforts to use hand-crushing machines
are being made by a merchant firm in French Guinea.
[67] An interesting account of this most valuable experiment is given by
M. Pierre Mille in the _Journal of the African Society_ for October 1901.
[68] Various types of hand-ploughs are now being experimented with
in Senegal for the purpose of quickening production.—See _Journal
d’Agriculture Tropicale_, September 1901.
[69] Many people, on the other hand, will consider the somewhat elaborate
judicial machinery set up in Northern Nigeria as distinctly premature.
The administration of English law in West African Protectorates (see
p. 16, Northern Nigeria Report), even when modified by native law
and custom, is a feature of the Crown Colony system which has little
to recommend it. Dr. Ballay’s plan in French Guinea was infinitely
preferable. In all matters affecting the relations of natives with
natives Ballay insisted that native law should be the basis. He declined
to introduce all the technicalities of European law among a people whose
own laws are founded upon just principles, and, given security in their
application, work effectively and well.
[70] August 1, 1891. It was first called Consular Jurisdiction.
[71] Sir Ralph Moor has since declared that Southern Nigeria is in
“a very sound financial position.” The test of sound finance must be
different in West Africa from any other part of the world.
[72] Colonial Office Report, No. 315.
[73] In that year Southern Nigeria spent £30,196 on military expenses
and £8236 only on the “Aborigines” department. Under “Political
and Administrative” expenses, £20,327 was absorbed; under “Marine
Department,” £32,531; £24,654 only was spared for public works, but
“Prisons” necessitated £7200, against £1171 under “Botanical” and £1147
under “Sanitary”!
[74] In 1890 the value of exports from the Delta was estimated at over
£1,300,000.
[75] The Nupe campaign was undertaken after great provocation, and is
understood to have been carried out with the approval, tacit or avowed,
of the Emir of Sokoto, who had reason to complain of the Emir of Nupe’s
conduct.
[76] Similarly Nupe refused to have anything to do with Herr von
Puttkamer in 1889 without consulting the Company, although the German (or
his interpreter) passed himself off as the “Queen of England’s messenger.”
[77] Northern Nigeria.
[78] “The Foundation of British East Africa.”
[79] Colonial Report, No. 346, page 11, par. 2.
[80] Lord John Russell’s Instructions to Captain Henry Dundas Trotter,
Commander William Allen, Commander Bird Allen, and William Cook, Esquire,
Commissioners for making and concluding agreements with the Chief Rulers
of the Western Coast of Africa for the suppression of the traffic in
slaves and the establishment of a lawful commerce, 1840.
[81] The absence of any wish to “act otherwise” on the part of the native
is invariably assumed in Europe, and but too often by Europeans in
Africa. In this connection the following passage from Clapperton (when
travelling in Nigeria) is worth noting: “It was with feelings of the
highest satisfaction that I listened to some of the most respectable of
the merchants, when they declared that; were any other system of trading
adopted, they would gladly embrace it in preference to dealing in slaves.”
[82] Archibald Constable & Co. 1898.
[83] Not to be confounded with the King of Benin who massacred
Consul-General Phillips.
[84] Referring to domestic slavery in the Northern Territories of the
Gold Coast, the late Lieut.-Colonel Northcott, C.B., whose death was a
sad blow to the Empire and to West Africa particularly, in his report
on those territories (Report on the Northern Territories of the Gold
Coast—published by the Intelligence Division of the War Office in 1899),
says: “The every-day life of slaves differs in no respect from that
of the free men. Ground is allotted to them, on which they are free
to work for their own benefit, the rule generally being that they may
take two days out of every five for work on their own account. With the
accumulated results of this labour they are at liberty to purchase their
freedom. The price demanded is not excessive, and ranges from £2 to £5,
according to locality; but so lightly does the yoke of slavery bear
that only a comparatively small proportion seek their emancipation by
this means. Slaves may marry, and are encouraged to do so, the children
becoming the property of the master. The apparent hardship of liability
to sale is in reality not oppressive. The march to the new owner’s place
of abode is free from any suggestion of cruelty or force; the slave
partakes of his master’s food and shares his lodging, and he is certain
of kind treatment on arriving at his destination.”
[85] This is pidgeon-English, the Hausa for ivory tusk (_i.e._ piece of
ivory) being _hakorin_, or _hauwin giwa_.
[86] Named in honour of Park, who is supposed to be the first European to
have noticed it.
[87] And Lagos again since the opening of the railway.
[88] Up to the present, however, shipments of this prepared latex have
met with scant success.
[89] In the “Report of the Sierra Leone Company” (London: James Phillips,
printer, 1794) the following passage occurs, which most probably refers
to the _Pendatesma butyracæ_. “Butter and tallow tree. This is common in
low lands about Freetown; it abounds with a juice resembling gambodge
in taint and durability, which exudes after the least laceration, and
becomes more coagulated, viscous, and of a darker colour. The wood of
this tree is firm, and seems adapted to various economical purposes. The
fruit is nearly oval, about twice the size of a man’s fist; the rind is
thick, pulpy, and of a pleasant acid; in the inside are found from five
to nine seeds of the size of the walnut, containing an oleaginous matter,
extracted by the natives and used with their rice and other food.” A
gentleman of my acquaintance who knows this tree, tells me he has seen it
growing in Sierra Leone, so that there seems no reason why experiments
similar to those undertaken in French Guinea should not be made in our
colony, which adjoins that French possession.
[90] Known as “piassava” in the trade. Large quantities are imported from
Liberia. It is used in brush-making.
[91] Benni seeds crushed yield a fine edible oil.
[92] On the right bank of the Binue: in the Mitchi or (Munshi) country.
[93] Stone potash used to be a monopoly of the Igarras, who sold it to
the down-river tribes, but the Niger Company has taken the monopoly from
the Igarras of late years and disposes of it at Lagos, realising, it is
said, considerable profit—from 2 to 300 per cent.
[94] He will sometimes cut the vine down and chop it into pieces of about
one foot in length the more readily to extract the sap.
[95] Or even 20 per cent.
[96] There are many other ways of preparing rubber: this is one of them.
[97] “A Short Account of the Invasion of Hausa by the Phulas.” By
Bashima, a Hausa-Fulani, in the “Magana Hausa” (J. F. Schön. 1815).
[98] About 1840.
[99] And by no one so well as Joseph Thompson, “Mungo Park and the Niger.”
[100] “Othman established the severest punishment upon whoever committed
the slightest violation of the law.”—“Travels of Sheik Mohammed of Tunis”
(Bayle St. John. London: 1854).
[101] One of the numerous designations of the Fulani.
[102] “Journal of a Second Expedition into the Interior of Africa,” &c.
1829.
[103] Under the old Hausa _régime_ the inhabitants of the Northern
Hausa States paid direct taxes to the Kings. According to the curious
and interesting records of Assid-el-Haji-Abd-Salam Shabiny, a Tunisian
merchant, the Sultan of Hausa imposed a tax of 2 per cent. on all
products of the land. The people also paid a land tax, and certain duties
were exacted on all goods sold in the market-place (“Relation d’un voyage
à Timbuctoo vers l’année 1787”).
[104] A missionary has recently admitted that “To the Hausa what is in
the Koran is of God, and what is not in the Koran is not worth knowing.”
[105] To-day, _Guinée française_.
[106] This is explained by the unwillingness of the Fulani to allow
unions between their women-folk and their Negro neighbours.
[107] Recently translated into French by M. O. Houdas (Paris: Ernest
Leroux. 1900).
[108] Leo Africanus.
[109] At one time Melle ruled over Songhay and Timbuctoo. In 1329 the
Mellians were driven from Timbuctoo by the pagan Mosis (the most powerful
pagan kingdom which ever arose in West Africa). The people of Melle
reconquered the place, but were finally expelled by the Tuareg in 1433.
Melle was subsequently overcome by the Songhay and fell to pieces.
[110] Published by the Hakluyt Society.
[111] We are indebted to M. Dubois for the first complete copy.
[112] The reigning family says the _Tarik_ were white and their subjects
Wakoris (Mandingoes). This strengthens the Fulani argument, the
complexion of the pure-blood Fulani inclining to white by comparison with
their neighbours. In his “Notice Géographique sur la Région du Sahel”
(which includes Bakunu, the former Baghena), Commandant Lartigue says of
the Fulani still inhabiting that district, “Quelques-uns sont presque
blancs; leur cheveux sont à peine crépus, et ils ont les traits fins et
réguliers des Européens de bonne race.”
[113] The language of the Fulani.
[114] The Empire which, as we have observed, was raised upon the ruins of
Ghanata by the Mandingoes, the subject race at the time of the latter’s
foundation.
[115] D’Eichtal’s assertion (“Les Foulahs.” Paris: 1842), that the
Fulani “to this day” call the whole of Senegambia “Melli,” I do not find
confirmed, but it is worth mentioning, nevertheless.
[116] The first map in which Melle figures is a Spanish one (1375 A.D.).
In the map of Mathias de Villadestes, the Venetian (1413 A.D.), the word
“Toucuzor” is written by the side of that of the King of Melli, “Mussa.”
For “Toucuzor” read “Toukulor” (Tukulor), the cross race of Fulani-Joloff
and Fulani-Mandingo.—“Considérations sur la Priorité des Découvertes
Maritimes sur la Côte Occidentale d’Afrique.”—Binger.
[117] Barth’s chronological table of the Songhay.
[118] Marmol—born in Granada, 1580—translated by Nicholas Perot
d’Ablancourt.
[119] The _Tarik’s_ statement that Salta Tayenda fled into “Futa” affords
substantial indication of the presence of Fulani in that country at a
previous date, which we know, of course, from other sources.
[120] This tradition obviously refers to Fulani pressure—the root of the
word (Pul, or Ful) signifying red, or reddish.
[121] A correspondent of a Paris paper, _La Dépêche Coloniale_, writing
from Kunde, on the Sangha River, on December 10, 1901, says: “Our
clothes, which are ragged from bush travelling, do not convey a great
idea of our influence, especially when compared to the Fulbes (Fulani)
in their embroidered cloths and leather riding-boots. They are all on
horseback and we are on foot. _There are thousands of them_, and all are
armed.”
[122] Their presence in Omdurman—that is to say, in the heart of the
Eastern Sudan in the Nile valley—has already been noted by Father
Ohrwalder. On page 300 of “Ten Years’ Captivity in the Mahdi’s Camp”
(Major Wingate, R.A. London: 1895), we read, “Several of the Fellata, who
came from distant parts of Bornu, Wadai, &c., were stopped at Omdurman on
their way to Mecca”; and again, on page 305, “The inhabitants of Omdurman
are a conglomeration of every race and nationality in the Sudan—Fellata,
Takruris, natives of Bornu, &c.”
[123] Dr. Barth’s estimate as to the date of the foundation of Ghanata
is certainly not exaggerated, in view of the _Tarik’s_ statement that
twenty-two kings had reigned before the Hejira.
[124] Ernest Flammarion, Paris. English edition: W. Heinemann.
[125] Toledo was wrested from the Moors in 1085; Saragossa in 1118;
Valencia, 1238; Seville, 1248; the Beni-Nasr held Granada until 1492.
[126] De Barros, Barth, _Tarik_.
[127] Makrizi, de Barros, Barth.