Pictures of apparatus and descriptions of experiments should, of course,

not be despised or neglected. They are helpful in forming concepts of

that which cannot be brought before a class. When made by the learner

himself, as a result of his own work, they serve to clarify his thinking,

and furnish a sure test of the pupil’s progress and of the teacher’s

skill as a guide and instructor. A drawing, or even a statement in the

pupil’s own words, is often an astonishing revelation of the crude

notions which pictures give. The city lad who said that a cow was no

bigger than a finger-nail because he had often measured its size in the

First Reader is a typical example. The ability to interpret pictures

and descriptions comes from actual knowledge of things similar to what

is depicted or described. The noted teacher, Agassiz, made a difference

in his directions to beginners and advanced students. To the former he

would give specimens, with directions to study them without referring

to a book. Having taught them how to use their eyes, he would gradually

lead them to the method of interpreting and verifying the statements of

an author. And when the advanced student was set to work at original

investigations, he was told to study certain books, as it would save

much valuable time. One of his pupils writes, “I shall never forget a

forceful lesson given me by the great Agassiz, when I studied with him

in the Museum of Cambridge. I worked near a young man from Cleveland,

Ohio, who has since achieved distinction as a teacher of biology. I

was comparatively a beginner, however, while he was well advanced in

his studies. On a certain day Agassiz came sauntering by, and stopped

long enough to tell me not to use the library so much, but to confine

myself to observations of the specimens on hand and the writing of my

observations and comments. Passing on a little farther, he spoke to my

friend and said, ‘Albert, when you go home, this summer, to Cleveland, I

wish you would make a special study of a certain kind of fish found in

the harbor there. It is not found plentifully anywhere else in the world.

Take a row-boat and go three hundred yards northeast of the point of the

breakwater, and you will find them in abundance. Before going home, get

the only three books ever written on this fish from the library here and

read them. It will save your time to read them before beginning to study

the fish itself.’”[3] Agassiz was as anxious to teach the right use of

books as is the professor of literature; but he adapted his directions

to the degree of advancement which his students had attained, and did

not neglect the formation of the basal concepts and the habits of study

needful in the sciences he taught.

[Sidenote: Botany.]

How little the exhortations of our educational reformers have been

taken to heart by some teachers is evident from the recent experiences

of a normal school principal, who had great difficulty in finding a

satisfactory teacher of botany. The students could invariably answer

the questions of the State Board of Examiners by filling pages of

manuscript with technical terms. In the field they could not distinguish

one plant from another. In despair, the principal said to his teacher

of psychology, “Why can we not apply common sense to the teaching of

botany? Can we not plant seeds, watch their growth, and study the growing

specimens instead of the pictures in a text-book?” “If you will give me

the class in botany, I will try it,” was the reply. Before the next class

took up botany, every chalk-box was emptied and every flower-pot utilized

in the planting of seeds. In no long time there appeared on the fences

of neighboring farms sign-boards with the inscription, “Trespassing on

these fields is forbidden, under penalty of the law.” The members of the

class were traversing the country, studying the real flowers, the growing

plants, instead of the technical terms of a text-book. At the next final

examination, the herbarium which each one had prepared, together with the

accompanying analysis and drawings of parts which could not be described,

including colorings in imitation of the actual colors of the flowers,

gave evidence of real knowledge, and served to satisfy the examiners,

although the array of technical terms was far less formidable.

If violations of the fundamental laws of teaching occur in our higher

institutions of learning, what may we not expect in the lower schools

where the teaching is intrusted to young people of limited education?

Nevertheless, it is a notorious fact that the worst forms of teaching

are found in our higher institutions of learning, where many of the

professors seem to know as little of the science of education as the

motorman knows of the science of electricity; otherwise they would make

impossible the use of “ponies, coaches, and keys,” by means of which the

student taxes the memory rather than the understanding, and ultimately

loses all power of independent thought and investigation. Such helps

arrest mental development, destroy the power of original thinking, and

do more harm than the practice of feeding the mind with mere verbal

statements which in course of time may acquire content and meaning. The

study of the sciences which classify minerals, plants, insects, birds,

fishes, and other animals may degenerate into a mere study of words,

even when the student acquires some familiarity with the specimens to

be classified. The scientific name is the one thing about a flower with

which the Creator has had nothing to do, and if the recognition of the

scientific name is the chief or sole aim of the student of botany, it is

a genuine case of feeding the mind on words.

[Sidenote: Words as material for thought.]

[Sidenote: Geometry as thought-material.]

By those who are fond of scientific pursuits the dead languages are

sometimes despised as though the study of them were learned playing with

mere words. Among people who begin their education somewhat late in life

there is a strong temptation to estimate linguistic studies very far

below their true value as a means for disciplining the reasoning faculty.

When pursued in the right way, the study of the classical languages

furnishes as much good material for thought as the natural sciences.

Huxley may charm an audience by a lecture on a piece of chalk; the

philologist can excite equal interest by a lecture on the word chalk.

Words grow and undergo changes according to well-defined laws which

furnish as much food for thought as the laws governing the union of atoms

or the motions of the heavenly bodies. The words of a lexicon contain

as much of precious interest in the sight of man as the manufactured

gases or the plucked leaves and dissected flowers of the laboratory.

Greek and Latin roots have more vitality in them than the collections of

stones, stuffed birds, and transfixed bugs in the museum. The endings

of nouns, adjectives, pronouns, and verbs furnish ample opportunity for

observation, comparison, and reflection; their functions in the syntax

of the sentence furnish splendid exercises in formal and qualitative

thinking. If, however, the time of the pupil is entirely consumed in

mastering the hundreds of exceptions to the rules of gender and case,

of declensions and conjugations, of syntax and prosody, it is another

sad instance of feeding the mind on mere words. The pupil who begins the

study of any foreign language before he has reached his teens should

acquire the power to read the language at sight; otherwise there has been

something faulty in the methods of teaching or of study, or in both. A

man is as many times a man as he knows languages; and the comparison of

the idioms of two or more languages furnishes most excellent material

for careful and accurate thinking. In translating an author like Plato

the student must think the thoughts of a master mind, weigh words so as

to detect the finer shades of meaning, and arrange them in sentences

that shall adequately express the meaning of the original. The value

of pure mathematics, especially the Euclidian geometry, as a means for

the cultivation of thinking, lies in the limited number of fundamental

concepts which must be clearly fixed and in the nature of the reasoning

by which the truth of the theorems is established. The axioms are few

in number and easily grasped; the quantities to be defined can, without

difficulty, be set in a clear light before the understanding; the chain

of proof compels the mind to join ideas by their logical nexus, and if

the learner persists in memorizing the demonstration, he is at once

detected. And yet when, as sometimes happens, he goes over several books

of geometry without clearly perceiving the difference between an angle

and a triangle, it must be a genuine specimen of acquiring words without

the corresponding ideas.

[Sidenote: S. S. Greene’s views.]

The words of S. S. Greene deserve the attention of every teacher anxious

to prevent the formation of vicious habits of thought by the pupils

in our schools and colleges. Years ago he wrote as follows: “While an

external object may be viewed by thousands in common, the idea or image

of it addresses itself only to the individual consciousness. My idea or

image is mine alone,—the reward of careless observation, if imperfect;

of attentive, careful, and varied observation, if correct. Between mine

and yours a great gulf is fixed. No man can pass from mine to yours, or

from yours to mine. Neither, in any proper sense of the word, can mine

be conveyed to you. Words do not convey thoughts; they are not vehicles

of thought in any true sense of that term. A word is simply a common

symbol which each associates with his own idea or image. Neither can

I compare mine with yours, except through the mediation of external

objects. And, then, how do I know that they are alike; that a measure

called a foot, for instance, seems as long to you as to me? My idea of

a new object, which you and I observe together, may be very imperfect.

By it I attribute to the object what does not belong to it, take from

it what does, distort its form, and otherwise pervert it. Suppose, now,

at the time of observation we agree upon a word as a sign or symbol

of the object or the idea of it. The object is withdrawn; the idea

only remains,—imperfect in my case, complete and vivid in yours. The

sign is employed. Does it bring back the original object? By no means.

Does it convey my idea to your mind? Nothing of the kind; you would be

disgusted with the shapeless image. Does it convey yours to me? No; I

should be delighted at the sight. What does it effect? It becomes the

occasion for each to call up his own image. Does each now contemplate

the same thing? What multitudes of dissimilar images instantly spring

up at the announcement of the same symbol!—dissimilar not because of

anything in the one source whence they are derived, but because of

either an inattentive and imperfect observation of that source, or some

constitutional or habitual defect in the use of the perceptive faculty.”

[Sidenote: J. P. Gordy’s statement.]

[Sidenote: Pestalozzi’s reform.]

Dr. J. P. Gordy, to whom credit is due for the preceding quotation,

further says, “Words are like paper money; their value depends on

what they stand for. As you would be none the richer for possessing

Confederate money to the amount of a million dollars, so your pupils

would be none the wiser for being able to repeat book after book by

heart, unless the words were the signs of ideas in their minds. Words

without ideas are an irredeemable paper currency. It is the practical

recognition of this truth that has revolutionized the best schools in

the last quarter of a century.... In what did the reform inaugurated

by Pestalozzi consist? In the substitution of the intelligent for the

blind use of words. He reversed the educational engine. Before his time

teachers expected their pupils to go from words to ideas; he taught

them to go from ideas to words. He brought out the fact upon which I

have been insisting,—that words are utterly powerless to create ideas;

that all they can do is to help the pupil to recall and recombine ideas

already formed. With Pestalozzi, therefore, and with those who have been

imbued with his theories, the important matter is the forming of clear

and definite ideas.”[4]

[Sidenote: Sight and insight.]

It was a remark of Goethe that genius begins in the senses. With equal

truth we may say that thinking begins in the senses. Like unto the

genius, the thoughtful man perceives and interprets what has escaped

the notice of other people. To sight he adds insight. That which he

sees is subsumed under the proper class or category, and is viewed from

different sides until its significance is discovered, and a place is

assigned to it in the intellectual horizon and in the external world.

Every fact thus seen in its relation to other facts serves as a basis for

further observation, reflection, and comparison. Not merely the genius,

but every other person whose thinking is above the average in vigor and

accuracy, has the power to perceive things which escape the eyes and

ears of other people. Through habits of careful and correct observation

he fills his mind with images, ideas, concepts of the objects of thought

and of the relations which exist between these objects, and thereby

acquires the materials for the comparisons which constitute the essence

of good thinking. If the strength of a student is exhausted in gathering

and storing the materials for thought, his mind becomes a wilderness of

facts; if he reasons without the facts, his conclusions are more unreal

than the figments of the imagination.

[Sidenote: Truth the proper thought-material.]

Truth is the best thought-material for the mind to act upon. The

possession of truth is the aim and the goal of all correct thinking.

Knowledge of the truth implies the conformity of thinking with being. The

world within should be made to correspond with the world outside of us.

[Sidenote: The laboratory and the library.]

[Sidenote: Aristotle.]

Fortunately, the self-activity of children is towards the objective world

of things which they can see, hear, smell, taste, and handle. From inner

impulse their thinking is directed towards the cognition of objects.

One of the functions of nature study is to beget habits of careful and

accurate observation. This is a characteristic feature of the laboratory

method as distinguished from the library method. A training in both is

essential to a complete education. The library stores the treasures of

knowledge which the human race has gathered and makes them accessible to

the learner. The laboratory shows him by what methods truth is discovered

and tested and verified. The German professor who declined to visit a

menagerie, asserting that he could evolve the idea of the elephant from

his inner consciousness, may have spent much time in reading books and

in speculation; but he certainly never worked in a laboratory; nor had

he taken to heart the lessons which he might have learned from the sages

of antiquity. Aristotle knew the importance of asking nature for facts,

and he induced his royal pupil, Alexander the Great, to employ two

thousand persons in Europe, Asia, and Africa for the purpose of gathering

information concerning beasts, birds, and reptiles, whereby he was

enabled to write fifty volumes upon animated nature. After teachers had

forgotten his methods they still turned to his books for the treasures

which he had gathered. In the ages in which men hardly dared to ask

nature for her secrets, fearing that they might be accused of witchcraft,

they turned to Aristotle as if he were an infallible guide—so much so

that when Galileo announced the discovery of sun-spots a monk declared

that he had read Aristotle through from beginning to end, and inasmuch

as Aristotle said nothing about spots on the sun, therefore there are

none. This book-method of studying science has not entirely disappeared

from the seats of learning. Books like Tyndall’s “Water and the Forms

of Water,” Faraday’s “Chemistry of a Candle,” and Newcomb’s “Popular

Astronomy” may, indeed, be read or studied as literature, and thus prove

a means of culture; but to accept the facts and statements of a text-book

without verification is the lazy man’s method of studying science; and as

a method it fails to lay the foundation upon which a solid superstructure

can be built. The correct method starts with observation of the things

to be known, develops the basal concepts which lie at the foundation of

the science under consideration, ends by teaching the pupil how to make

independent investigations, how to utilize the treasures which have been

preserved in our libraries, thereby furnishing an adequate supply of

proper materials for thought.

[Sidenote: Productive minds.]

The habits of men who have surprised the world by their intellectual and

professional achievements are very suggestive. Spurgeon kept his mind

filled by constant reading. Goethe was fond of travel and utilized what

he learned from others. Emerson visited the markets regularly, conversed

with the men and women from whom he bought, and sought to learn their

views on current events. Study the greatest thinkers the world has

known, and you will find their memories to have been a storehouse of

thought-materials which they analyzed, sifted, compared, and formulated

into systems that win the admiration of all who love to think.

IV

BASAL CONCEPTS AS THOUGHT-MATERIAL

Thought proper, as distinguished from other facts of

consciousness, may be adequately described as the act of

knowing or judging of things by means of concepts.

MANSEL.

We cannot learn all words through other words. There is a

large and rapidly increasing part of all modern vocabularies

which can be comprehended only by the observation of nature,

scientific experiment,—in short, by the study of things.

MARSH.

The question we ask of each thing (and of the whole experience)

is, What _are_ you? You have qualities which I find everywhere

else; your color I find in other things; your texture and

hardness and odor and form I find in other things; but they

are combined in you in such a way as to make you a thing by

yourself, and not anything else. And I want to know what you

truly _are_,—in short, what is your essence, which is also your

idea, and the purpose or τέλος of your existence.

LAURIE.

IV

BASAL CONCEPTS AS THOUGHT-MATERIAL

[Sidenote: Building concepts.]

The head may be likened unto a walled city, with comparatively few

building materials on the inside, and with a limited number of gate-ways

through which all other materials for building purposes must pass.

The walls are not made of brick or stone, but of bone; the gate-ways

are the different senses through which knowledge enters the mind. The

building materials on the inside are intuitive ideas which take shape in

conjunction with the entrance of materials from without. The structures

which are built up out of the ideas within and the sense-impressions

from without are individual and general concepts. Take an orange. Its

shape, color, parts, are known through the eye. Its flavor, as sweet

or sour, is ascertained through taste; its odor through smell; its

temperature, shape, and some other qualities through touch. These

various sense-impressions, giving the mind a knowledge of essential

and accidental qualities and attributes, are combined in the idea of

a particular orange. If the object were a bell, its sound, parts,

uses, and qualities would make impressions through different gate-ways

of knowledge; the builder inside would combine them into the more or

less complete idea of the object presented to the senses. From each

sense-impression the mind may get a percept; the synthesis of these

percepts produces the individual concept or notion.

It is helpful at this point clearly to distinguish between essential

and accidental attributes. The orange may have been kept in the open

air when the temperature is low. To the hand it feels cold, and this

quality enters into the idea of the first orange which the child has. As

other oranges which have been in a warmer atmosphere are brought to the

child, the attribute cold is seen to be accidental,—that is, it is not a

necessary quality of oranges in general. On the other hand, the qualities

which are found in every orange—many of them hard to describe in

words—become fixed in the mind as essential attributes of the orange. In

course of time many objects of the same kind are presented to the senses,

cognized by comparison so as to retain the essential attributes and to

omit the accidentals. By this process the general notion or concept is

formed.

[Sidenote: Gate-ways of knowledge.]

It is self-evident that the mind’s comparisons and conclusions are

unreliable in so far as the gate-ways of knowledge are defective. Few

persons have perfect ears; many can never become expert tuners of pianos

or reliable critics of musical performances. The man who is color-blind

is not accepted in the railway service or as an officer in the navy. The

man who is totally blind is never selected as a guide in daylight. On the

other hand, the blind girl spoken of by Bulwer could find her way better

in the darkness of the last days of Pompeii than other people, because

she was accustomed to rely upon the data furnished by the other senses in

making her way through the city, and had improved these as gate-ways of

knowledge beyond the needs of those gifted with sight.

[Sidenote: From things to symbols.]

[Sidenote: From sign to thing or idea.]

[Sidenote: The sense to be addressed.]

In building concepts of objects in nature it would be a great mistake to

begin with the word instead of the thing. Just as little as a blind man

can conceive the qualities color, light, darkness, through mere words,

so little can children conceive classes of objects which have never

addressed the senses. Hence great stress has been laid by educational

reformers upon the cultivation of habits of observation, upon the supreme

necessity of teaching by the use of objects, or so-called object-lessons.

First, things, then words, or signs for things, was at one time a

favorite maxim in treatises on teaching. Consistent application of

the maxim would have banished the dictionary from the school-room, or

at least its use as a means for ascertaining the meaning of words. In

consulting the dictionary for the meaning of a word, we pass not from the

thing to its sign, but in the opposite direction,—that is, from the sign

to the thing signified, from the symbol to the idea for which the symbol

stands. The main essential in good instruction is that the words be made

significant. In primary instruction this is best accomplished by passing

from the idea to the word; but in advanced instruction it is of less

importance whether we pass from the word to the idea or from the idea to

the word. The meaning of very many words is acquired from the connection

in which they are used. For the meaning of the larger number of words

in our vocabulary we never consult a dictionary. The finer shades of

meaning we get not from definitions, but from quotations taken from

standard authors. This fact should never tempt the teacher to trust to

words, definitions, and descriptions in the formation of basal concepts.

He should seek to give unto himself a clear and full account of the

things or ideas which cannot spring from mere words, however skilfully

arranged in sentences. The music-teacher who complained of the public

schools because a seven-year-old child did not grasp his meaning when

he spoke of half-notes, quarter-notes, eighth-notes, sixteenth-notes,

should have known that many children of that age have never been taught

fractions, and that the idea of a fraction is obtained not from sounds

(who distinguishes between half a noise and a whole noise?), but from

objects which address the eye. Instead of complaining about the school

which the pupil attended, a teacher acquainted with the mysteries of his

art would have started with the comparison of things visible; and after

having developed the idea of halves, quarters, eighths, sixteenths, by

the division of visible objects into equal parts, he would have applied

the idea to musical sounds.

[Sidenote: Different gate-ways for different ideas.]

[Sidenote: Integers.]

In seeking to build in the mind of the learner the concepts which lie

at the basis of a new branch of study, it is a legitimate question to

ask by which of the gate-ways of knowledge the materials or elements

for the new idea can best be made to enter the mind. At the basis of

arithmetic lies the idea of number,—an idea that is evoked by the

question of how many applied to a collection of two or more units. Taste

and smell must be ruled out from the list of senses which can be utilized

to advantage. Three taps on the desk are as easily recognized as three

marks or strokes on the black-board. The sense of touch is helpful in

passing from concrete to abstract numbers. To think a number when the

corresponding collection of objects is not visible, but is suggested by

tactile impressions, helps to emancipate the thinking process from the

domination of the eye; in other words, it helps to sunder the thinking of

number from a specific sense, and thus aids in the evolution of the idea

of number apart from concrete objects.

[Sidenote: Fractions.]

As already indicated, there are some basal concepts, like that of a

fraction, in the development of which only one sense can be utilized to

advantage. Whilst imparting the idea of a whole number, the appeal may

be to the eye, the ear, and the sense of touch; the instruction designed

to impart the idea of fractions to the normal child is limited to visible

objects. In the instruction of the blind the other senses are addressed

from necessity. The extent to which touch can supply the function of

sight is full of hints to teachers in charge of pupils possessing all the

gate-ways of knowledge.

[Sidenote: Teaching decimals.]

Thinking and learning to think · 第 3 / 22 段