Within half a mile of the Susquehanna River a teacher was asking the

class, “Of what is the earth’s surface composed?” “Of land and water,”

was the reply. In answer to a question by the superintendent concerning

the earth’s surface, one boy declared that he had never seen the earth.

He had been acquiring words without the corresponding ideas. Turning to

another boy, this official said, “Will you please show me water?” With

a gleam of satisfaction on his face, the lad raised his atlas, pointed

to the blue coloring around the map of North America, and said, “That

is water.” “Will you please drink it?” The expression on the faces of

teacher and pupils indicated that all felt as if some one had committed

a blunder. Where did the blunder lie? Had the teacher taught what should

not be learned? Surely, every child should learn how water is indicated

on a map. Did the boy use language wrong in idiom? By no means; for, as

every student who has handled a lexicon well knows, many words have both

a literal and a tropical, or figurative, meaning. If, pointing to an

object, the teacher says, “This is a desk,” he uses the word is in its

literal sense. On the other hand, if he points to a division on the map

of the United States, and says, “This is Pennsylvania,” he does not mean

that the colored surface to which he is pointing is the real State of

Pennsylvania (if it were, a political boss could pocket it, and carry it

the rest of his days without further trouble). What is meant is, that

a given space on the map indicates or represents Pennsylvania, the word

_is_ being used, in the latter instance, in a figurative sense. Whether

the word _is_, in the expression, “This is my body,” should be understood

in a literal or in a figurative sense has been discussed for ages in the

Christian church. In the answer of the boy we strike a distinction in

thought that lies at the basis of good teaching in all grades of schools,

from the kindergarten to the university,—namely, the distinction between

thinking in things and thinking in symbols. In one sense of the word, all

thinking is symbolic; for the percepts, concepts, and images of external

objects which the mind employs in the thinking process are symbolic of

the things for which they stand. But in advanced thinking, and especially

in scientific investigations, objective symbols, such as words, signs,

letters, equations, formulas, technical terms and expressions, are

utilized to facilitate the thinking process. Take the age questions in

mental arithmetic that have been prematurely inflicted upon so many

pupils in the public schools. So long as the mind consciously carries

A’s age and the wife’s age, using the clumsy instruments of arithmetical

analysis, the thinking is difficult indeed. As soon as _x_ is made

the symbol of A’s age, and _y_ the symbol of the wife’s age, so that

the conditions of the problem can be thrown into algebraic equations,

the difficulty vanishes. In the algebraic solution the mind drops all

thought of A’s age and the wife’s age while manipulating the signs and

symbols of the equation, and restores the meaning of the symbols only

when their value in figures has been found. The algebraic solution is a

genuine specimen of thinking in symbols, and illustrates the labor-saving

machinery which the human mind employs, more or less, in all the most

difficult scientific investigations.

[Sidenote: Symbol defined.]

What is a symbol? It is a mark, sign, or visible representation of

an idea. The mathematician uses the symbol to represent quantities,

operations, and relations. The chemist uses the symbol to indicate

elements and their groupings or combinations. The theologian applies the

term symbol to creeds and abstract statements of doctrine. The grips,

countersigns, and passwords of a secret society may be spoken of as

symbols of the ideas, aims, and principles of the organization. Often

the symbol is chosen on account of some supposed resemblance between

it and that for which it stands, as when black is made the symbol

of mourning, white of purity, the oak of strength, and the sword of

slaughter. “A symbol,” says Kate Douglass Wiggin, “may be considered to

be a sensuous object which suggests an idea, or it may be defined as the

sign or representation of something moral or intellectual by the images

or properties of natural things, as we commonly say, for instance, that

the lion is the symbol of courage, the dove the symbol of gentleness.

It need not be an object any more than an action or an event, for the

emerging of the butterfly from the chrysalis may be a symbol of the

resurrection of the body, or the silver lining of the cloud typify the

joy that shines through adversity.” Frequently the symbol is chosen

arbitrarily, or because it is the first letter of the word which denotes

the quality, substance, thing, or idea for which the symbol stands.

Generally the symbol is a visible representation, but it may also address

the other senses, notably the ear and the sense of touch. The Standard

Dictionary excludes the portrait from the extent or scope of the symbol,

and confines it to the representation of that which is not capable of

portraiture, as an idea, state, quality, or action. It is well to bear

this limitation in mind during the present discussion.

[Sidenote: Examples.]

A few illustrations will serve to fix the sense of the word symbol. In

some parts of America the tramps have a system of symbols of their own, a

given mark on the front gate indicating a good place to ask for a meal,

another indicating a cross dog in the rear yard. That which the tramp

fears or likes is not the mark which he sees, but a very real thing which

that mark suggests to his mind. A number of the apostles were fishermen

by trade. The fish became a very significant symbol in the days of early

Christianity. The letters in the Greek name for fish are the initial

letters of the expression, Jesus Christ, God’s Son, Saviour. It is one of

many instances showing how the human mind delights in heaping symbol upon

symbol to conceal precious meanings from the uninitiated.

[Sidenote: Symbols for water.]

What was the mental condition of the lad spoken of at the beginning of

this chapter? The boy knew the real thing long before he knew the first

symbol for water. Without doubt he had tasted it, played in it against

his mother’s will, been washed in it against his own will, for months

before he learned the first symbol for water used in common by him and

others, which was probably the spoken word. Up to that time he thought

of water in some mental picture or image which had been formed upon the

eye and then upon mind somewhat as the picture is formed through the art

of the photographer. Up to the time that he learned the spoken word for

water this liquid suggested mental pictures which constituted a thinking

in things[1] rather than in symbols, using the latter term according to

the limitation set by the Standard Dictionary. On entering school he

was taught to read; he added to the ear-symbol the eye-symbol,—that is,

the written or printed word, which he may have associated at first with

the real thing, or with the spoken word; of course, very soon with both,

if correct methods of teaching were followed. Next, he was taught the

map-symbol. The blunder which the teacher on the banks of the Susquehanna

had committed consisted not in teaching how water is indicated on a map,

but in not pointing to the majestic river near the school-house, and

associating the water in its channel with the representations of water

on a map. If the boy studied Latin or Greek, he was taught new symbols

for water in the corresponding words of these languages. If he studied

chemistry, he early learned the composition of water, and was thenceforth

taught to write it H₂O, a symbol enshrining a new truth and lifting him

to higher planes of thought by giving him a new instrument as well as new

materials of thought.

[Sidenote: Sources of error.]

[Sidenote: Elementary instruction.]

Half the errors in teaching arise from the fact that the teacher does not

constantly bear in mind the distinction between the symbol and the thing

for which the symbol stands, thus giving rise to confusion in the mind

of the learner. A class was bounding the different States of the Union.

At the close of the recitation the superintendent suggested that the

class bound the school-house. It was bounded on the north by the roof,

on the south by the cellar, on the east and west by walls. The geography

classes of an entire city were caught in that way. Either the pupils had

not been taught, or else they had forgotten the difference between the

real directions and the ordinary representation of them on the surface

of a wall map. Sometimes the confusion exists in the mind of the teacher

as well as in the minds of the pupils. Then he expects them to learn one

thing while he teaches them another. By the methods formerly in vogue

the pupil was expected to learn the sounds of the letters from their

names; the pronunciation of the word from the names of the letters which

compose it; the names, forms, and sounds of letters from the word taught

as a whole; the musical sounds from the notation on a musical staff; the

ideas of number, of fractions, from the corresponding symbols; the units

of denominate numbers and of the metric system from the names used in

the tables of weights and measures; the flowers of the field from the

nomenclature of the botany; the substances and experiments in chemistry

from the descriptions and pictures of a text-book. Such teaching has

given rise to endless lectures, editorials, and discussions upon the use

of the concrete in teaching, upon the value of thinking in things, upon

the importance of object-lessons, laboratory methods, and the like.

[Sidenote: More advanced instruction.]

But there is another side to the question. There comes a time in the

development of the pupil when he must rise above the sticks and shoe-pegs

and blocks of the elementary arithmetic, and learn to think in the

symbols of the Arabic notation. Later he must learn to think in the more

comprehensive symbols of the algebraic notation. He must learn to think

the abstract and general concepts of science, and, in thinking these, to

use the devices, technical terms, and other symbols which the scientists

have invented to facilitate their thinking.

[Sidenote: A parable.]

Hear a parable. A teacher sat down to dinner. The waiter handed him the

bill of fare. The proprietor followed the waiter to the kitchen, directed

him to cut out the names of the eatables which had been ordered, and to

carry these names on plates to the dining-room. “It is not these words,”

exclaimed the guest, “that I desire to eat, but the things in the

kitchen for which these words stand.” “Isn’t that what you pedagogues

are doing all the time, expecting children to make an intellectual meal

on words such as are found in the columns of the spelling-book and

attached on maps to the black dots which you call cities? My boy gravely

informs me that every State capital has its ring, because on his map

there is always a ring around the dot called the capital of a country.”

The teacher was forced to admit that there is, alas! too much truth

in the allegation. In the afternoon he took revenge. Knowing that the

proprietor had a thousand-dollar draft to be cashed, he arranged with

the banker to have it paid in silver coin. When the landlord saw the

growing heap of coin, he exclaimed, “If I must be paid in silver, can

you not give me silver certificates?” “Did you not intimate to me,” said

the teacher, tapping him on the shoulder, “that it is the real things we

want, and not words and symbols which stand for realities?” The landlord

was obliged to admit that in the larger transactions of the mercantile

world it saves time and is far more convenient to use checks, drafts,

and other symbols for money than it would be to use the actual cash. In

elementary transactions, like the purchase of a necktie, it is better

to use the cash, to think and deal in real money, but when it comes to

the distribution of five and one-half million dollars among the school

districts of Pennsylvania, it is better to draw warrants upon the State

Treasurer, to use checks and drafts, and to think in figures, than it

would be to count so much coin, and send the appropriation in that form

all over a great commonwealth.

[Sidenote: Its interpretation.]

The parable hardly needs an interpretation. Its lesson points in two

directions. On the one hand, it shows in the true light every species of

rote teaching, of parrot-like repetition of definitions, statements,

and lists of words which give a show of knowledge without the substance.

It puts the seal of condemnation on most forms of pure memory work. It

sounds the note of warning to all teachers who are trying to improve the

memory by concert recitations. The boy whose class was taught to define

a point as position without length, breadth, or thickness, and who, when

asked to recite alone, gave the definition, “A point has a physician

without strength, health, or sickness,” is but one of many specimens of

class-teaching condemned by the parable. It says in unmistakable terms

that all elementary instruction must start in the concrete, taking up

the objects or things to be known, and resolutely refusing to begin with

statements and definitions which to the children are a mere jargon of

words.

[Sidenote: Making blockheads.]

On the other hand, the parable indicates how too long-continued use of

the concrete may arrest development, and hinder the learner from reaching

the stages of advanced thinking. It hints that the too constant use of

blocks, however valuable at first, ultimately begets blockheads, instead

of intelligences capable of the higher life of thought and reflection. A

rational system of pedagogy involves proper attention to the materials of

thought and proper care in furnishing the instruments by which advanced

thinking is made easy and effective. In one respect the parable does

not set forth the whole truth. It makes no account of differences in

thinking due to heredity and mental training. The differences in native

ability are, however, not as great as is generally supposed (unless the

feeble-minded enter into the comparison); the differences due to correct

training, or the neglect of it, are far more striking. The work expected

of the pupil should, of course, tally with his capacity; otherwise it

will force him to resort to pernicious helps, beget in him wrong habits

of study, rob him of the sense of mastery and the joy of intellectual

achievement, and destroy his self-reliance, his power of initiative, and

his ability to grapple with difficult problems and perplexing questions.

The power to think grows by judicious exercise. Here better than anywhere

else in the whole domain of school work can we distinguish the genuine

coin from its counterfeit, and discriminate between true skill and

quackery, between the artist and the artisan. It is at this point that

most help can be given to young teachers by a good course of lectures

on learning to think and on the difficult art of stimulating others to

think.

III

THE MATERIALS OF THOUGHT

A vast abundance of objects must lie before us ere we can think

upon them.

GOETHE.

The young have a strong appetite for reality, and the teacher

who does not make use of that appetite is not wise.

J. S. BLACKIE.

The child’s restless observation, instead of being ignored

or checked, should be diligently ministered to, and made as

accurate as possible.

HERBERT SPENCER.

What do you read, my lord?

Words, words, words.

HAMLET.

You have an exchequer of words, and I think no other treasure.

TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA.

III

THE MATERIALS OF THOUGHT

[Sidenote: Words without thoughts.]

The hotel man was right in his criticism of teachers who expect their

pupils to make an intellectual meal on mere words. For three hundred

years educational reformers have been hurling their epithets against

this abuse. Has it been banished from the schools? By no means. It

crops out anew with every generation of teachers and in every grade of

instruction from the kindergarten to the university. During the years in

which a child acquires several languages without difficulty, if it hears

them spoken, the mind is eager for words and often appropriates them

regardless of their meaning. The child learns rhymes and phrases for the

sake of the jingle that is in them, and cares very little for clearly

defined ideas and thoughts. So strong and retentive is the memory for

words that the child finds it easier to learn by heart entire sentences

than to think the thoughts therein expressed. Like a willing and obedient

slave, the verbal memory can be made to do the work of the other mental

powers. The merest glimpse at a picture may recall all the sentences on

the same page, so that the pupil can repeat them with the book closed or

the back turned towards the reading chart. The recollection of what the

ear has heard may thus relieve the eye of its function in seeing words,

degrade the child to the level of a parrot, and thereby greatly hinder

progress in learning to read. Very frequently the memory is required to

perform work belonging to the reflective powers, because the learner

is thereby saved the trouble of comprehending the lesson and expressing

its substance in his own language. Moreover, the accurate statement

of a truth is apt to be accepted as evidence of knowledge and correct

thinking. The average examination tests very little more than the memory.

If the answers are given in the language of the text-book or the teacher,

the examiner seldom supplements the written work by an oral examination.

Thus there is a constant tendency on the part of teachers and pupils to

rest satisfied with correct forms of statement; and the pernicious custom

of feeding the mind on mere words is encouraged and perpetuated. Exposed

in plain terms, this abuse of words is condemned by everybody; yet it

is as easy at this point to slide into the wrong practice as it is to

fall into the sins forbidden by the decalogue. Like Proteus, this abuse

assumes diverse and unexpected forms; instance after instance is needed

to put young teachers on their guard and to expose its pernicious effect

upon methods of instruction and habits of study. To cry “words, words,

nothing but words,” will not suffice to correct the evil, for words must

be used in the best kind of instruction. Line upon line, precept upon

precept, example after example is needed to expose the folly of learning

words without corresponding ideas, of teaching symbols apart from the

things for which they stand. No apology is needed for citing laughable

and flagrant instances in point; ridicule sometimes avails where good

counsel fails.

[Sidenote: Spelling.]

A superintendent who advocates spelling-bees and magnifies correct

orthography out of all proportion to its real value startled a class

in the high school by asking for the spelling of a word of five

syllables. Not receiving an immediate answer, he referred to the Greek.

This made the spelling easy for at least one pupil. A year later he

accosted this pupil, saying, “You are the only person that ever spelled

psychopannychism for me.” “What does it mean?” was the question flashed

back at him in return for his compliment. He could not tell, because

he did not know. For years he had worried teachers and pupils with the

spelling of a word whose meaning he had failed to fix accurately in his

own mind.[2] What more effective method could be devised for destroying

correct habits of thinking?

[Sidenote: Eyesight.]

There is a time in the life of the child when it is hungry for new words.

The habit of seeing words accurately and learning their spelling at first

sight is then easily acquired, provided there is no defect in the pupil’s

eyes. In cases of defective eyesight the first step towards the solution

of the spelling problem, as well as the first condition in teaching the

pupil to think accurately, is to send him to a skilled oculist (not to a

so-called graduate optician or doctor of refraction, who must make his

living out of the spectacles he sells, and whose limited training does

not enable him to make a correct diagnosis in critical cases). Correct

vision will assist the pupil not merely in learning the exact form of the

words which he uses in writing, but also in forming correct ideas of the

things with which the mind deals in the thought-processes. Although great

stress should be laid upon the orthography of such words in common use as

are frequently misspelled,—daily drill upon lists of these should not be

omitted at school while the child’s word-hunger lasts,—yet it is vastly

more important to acquire an adequate knowledge of the ideas, concepts,

and relations for which the words stand. To spend time upon the spelling

of words which only the specialist uses, and which are easily learned

in connection with the specialty by a student possessing correct mental

habits, is a form of waste that cannot be too severely condemned. It is

far better to spend time in building concepts of things met with in real

life.

The meaning of very many words is, of course, learned from the connection

in which they occur. This, however, is not true of sesquipedalian words

like the one mentioned above, nor of the technical terms by which science

designates the things that have been accurately defined or quantified.

[Sidenote: Fundamental ideas.]

Technical terms are used to denote the ideas which lie at the basis of

science. These fundamental ideas are appropriately called basal concepts.

Since basal concepts cannot be transferred from the teacher’s mind to

the pupils’ minds by merely teaching the corresponding technical terms,

they must be developed by appropriate lessons. If this be neglected,

there may be juggling with words and a show of knowledge; but close,

accurate thinking is impossible. This seems to be so self-evident that

one would hardly expect to meet violations of such a simple rule in the

art of teaching. And yet it is related of the professor of physics in

one of our largest universities that he began his course of lectures in

this wise: “A rearrangement of the courses of study deprived you of the

usual instruction in elementary physics. That is your misfortune, and

not my fault.” Thereupon, he began his lectures on advanced physics as

if the preparation of his class to think the concepts at the foundation

of his science could be ignored without detriment to the progress of

the student, as if confused minds and unsatisfactory thinking were not

the inevitable outcome of juggling with technical terms apart from the

concepts which they denote. A master in the art of teaching would have

started on the plane occupied by the students. By development lessons he

would have lifted them to the plane of thought on which he intended to

move. He would have considered their mental progress of more consequence

than the course of lectures which he was in the habit of delivering.

The student, and not the study, should have held the chief place in his

professional horizon.

[Sidenote: Abuse of text-books.]

In another State university the professor of physics applied to an

influential member of the board of trustees for an appropriation for

apparatus. “Teach what is in the text-book; then you will not need

apparatus,” was the reply. It seems almost incredible that a trustee of a

modern university should fail to see the difference between an experiment

actually performed and a description of the experiment in a text-book.

More incredible still does it seem when we hear of professors who see no

difference between an experiment made in the presence of a student and an

experiment made by the student himself.

[Sidenote: Apparatus and experiments.]

[Sidenote: Agassiz.]

Thinking and learning to think · 第 2 / 22 段