“In my opinion the decree should in the first place be sent to
the following offices ...
“3. The Chief of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, for the
information of the Military Commanders in France and Belgium,
the Military Commander Southeast, the General accredited to the
Fascist Republican Government of Italy, the chiefs of the army
groups in the East.”
The document therefore proves that Field Marshal Keitel took part in a
conference, without, however, stating his point of view on the problem
of labor procurement; and that he was to be informed of the Führer
decree so that the military commanders might be informed. This confirms
what the Defendant Keitel stated in the passages which I have not read
as to how he came to be concerned with this question. The second and
third documents refer to a conference in the Reich Chancellery on 11
July 1944, in which Field Marshal Keitel did not take part.
Now the French prosecutor has made the statement that the teletype is an
order issued by Field Marshal Keitel to the military commanders to carry
out the decisions of the conference of 11 July. M. Herzog has said in
this connection that Keitel’s order was dated 15 July 1944. A brief
examination of the document, a photostat, shows it to be a teletype
dated 9 July, containing an invitation from the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, to a conference on 11 July, which invitation
Keitel transmitted to the military commanders.
This was, therefore, an error. The conclusions based by the Prosecution
on this document are therefore also invalid, but the document is
interesting from another point of view as well. It contains the
following statement:
“The following directives will govern the attitude of military
commanders or their representatives:
“... I refer to my directives for the collaboration of the Armed
Forces in the procurement of labor from France (OKW/West/ku
(Verw. 1 u. 2 West) Nr. 05210/44 geh.).”
The Defendant Keitel requested me to call the attention of the Court to
this method of expression for the following reasons: Numerous documents
bearing the signature “Keitel” have been submitted here. In accordance
with his position, which has already been described and which excluded
all powers of command, Keitel never used the first person in
communications or transmissions of orders. Apart from this document,
only one other teletype was submitted by the Prosecution in which the
first person is used. In consideration of the large number of documents
which bear out Keitel’s statement, his claim that he was transmitting an
order from the Führer must be believed; and, indeed, the whole style of
wording is that of a Führer order.
General Warlimont (Document 3819-PS) also expressly refers during the
conference of 11 July to a “recently issued Führer order,” the contents
of which as reproduced by him are exactly as contained in the teletype
directive bearing the signature “Keitel.”
The newly-submitted Document F-824 (RF-1515) is also significant and
confirms the evidence given by the Defendant Keitel. This is a letter
written on 25 July 1944 by the Commander-in-Chief West, Von Rundstedt,
who in the meantime had become the Chief of the Military Commanders in
France and Belgium. It states that “by order of the Führer the demands
of the GBA and of Speer are to be fulfilled”; further, that in the event
of evacuation of the battle area measures must be taken to secure
refugees for labor and finally, that reports on the measures taken must
be sent to the OKW.
This reference to the Führer’s order shortly after 11 July 1944 shows,
as does Warlimont’s statement, that no directives from Keitel or the OKW
existed. It may therefore be considered proved that neither Keitel
himself nor the OKW had any part in measures for the recruitment or
conscription of labor. The OKW was the office responsible for
transmitting the orders which Hitler as Sauckel’s superior wished to
forward to the military commanders; it had no competence and no legal
responsibility.
Nor is this complex in line with subjects within the ministerial scope
of the OKW, where at least there functioned a team of experts providing
an opportunity for voicing objections.
In the sphere of labor procurement and labor commitment Keitel was in
contact with Sauckel’s activities at the following points:
(a) He was cosignatory of the Führer’s decree of 21 March 1942
concerning the appointment of the GBA;
(b) He transmitted Hitler’s orders to support the activities of the GBA
by special instructions to the local military authorities in the
occupied territories.
Now, the French Prosecution, at the session of 2 February 1946, made the
following statement in regard to the deportation of the Jews, within the
scope of the Defendant Keitel’s responsibility:
“I shall discuss the order for the deportation of the Jews
later; and I shall prove that in the case of France this order
was the result of joint action on the part of the military
government, the diplomatic authorities, and the Security Police.
This leads to the conclusion that: (1) the Chief of the High
Command, _et cetera_; (2) the Reich Foreign Minister, and (3)
the Chief of the Security Police and Reich Security Main Office
(RSHA) must necessarily have been informed of and have agreed to
this action, for it is clear that through their official
functions they must have learned that such measures concerning
important matters were taken, and also that the decisions were
invariably made jointly by the staffs of three different
administrations. These three persons are therefore responsible
and guilty.”
If you examine the very detailed treatment of this point of the
Indictment you will find that the High Command of the Armed Forces is
not mentioned and that no document is produced which originates either
with the OKW or with the Defendant Keitel. It appears from the Keitel
affidavit, Document Book 2, that the military commander for France, who
is mentioned several times, was not subordinated to the OKW. In handling
this question the Prosecution have attempted to prove that the “Army” as
M. Faure says, co-operated with the Foreign Office and the Police, and
is endeavoring to place responsibility for this co-operation upon the
highest authorities, that is, in the case of the Army, on the OKW, and
therefore on Keitel. This deduction is erroneous. In order to make that
clear, I must point out that there was a military commander in France.
This military commander was invested with civil and military authority
and represented the defunct state authority, so that in addition to
military tasks he had police and political functions. The military
commanders were appointed by the OKH and received their orders from the
latter. It follows that on this question they had no direct relations
with the OKW. Since the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW was not
superior to the OKH, there is likewise no direct relation either of
subordination or seniority.
M. Faure’s statement in this connection is unfortunately true. In France
there existed a large number of authorities who worked along different
lines, contradicted each other, and frequently encroached upon each
other’s spheres of competency. The OKW and the Defendant Keitel had
actually nothing to do with the Jewish question in France or with the
deportations to Auschwitz and other camps; they had no powers of command
or control, and therefore no responsibility.
The fact that the letter K in the telegram of 13 May 1942 (Document
RF-1215) was interpreted to mean Keitel is characteristic of the
attitude adopted by the prosecuting authorities, all of whom assumed
that the Defendant Keitel was implicated. The French Prosecutor has
fortunately cleared up the error.
The Prisoner-of-War Question.
The fate of prisoners of war has always aroused considerable feeling.
All civilized nations have tried to alleviate the fate of soldiers who
fell into the hands of the enemy as far as was possible without
prejudicing the conduct of the war. The reaching of an agreement to be
adhered to even when the nations were engaged in a life and death
struggle has been considered one of the most important advances of
civilization. The torturing uncertainty with regard to the fate of these
soldiers seemed to be ended; their humane treatment guaranteed; the
dignity of the disarmed opponent assured.
Our belief in this achievement of human society has begun to waver, as
in the case of so many other instances. Although the agreement was
formally adhered to originally owing to the determined resistance of the
general officers, we must nevertheless admit that a brutal policy
oblivious of the nation’s own sons and of anything but its own striving
after power, has in many cases disregarded the sanctity of the Red Cross
and the unwritten laws of humanity.
The treatment of the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel in the
general complex of the prisoner-of-war system comprises the following
separate problems:
(1) The general organization of the treatment of prisoners of war, that
is, the German legislation on the prisoner-of-war system; (2) the power
of command over prisoner-of-war camps, which are classified under Oflag,
Stalag, and Dulag; (3) the supervision and control of this legislation
and its application; (4) the individual cases which have been brought
before the Court in the course of the indictment.
Since the organization of the prisoner-of-war system has been set forth
as part of the presentation of evidence, I can restrict myself to
stating that Keitel was, by order of Hitler and within the scope of his
assignments as War Minister, in accordance with the decree of 4 February
1938 competent and to that extent responsible: (a) for the material
right to issue ordinances within the entire local and pertinent sphere,
restricted in part by co-operation and co-responsibility regarding the
utilization of prisoner-of-war labor; (b) for the general allocation of
prisoners of war arriving in Germany to the corps area commander,
without having powers of command over prisoner-of-war camps and
prisoners of war themselves; (c) for the general supervision of the
camps in the OKW area not including those within the zone of operations,
the rear Army area, or the area of the military commanders, nor the Navy
and Air Force prisoner-of-war camps.
The competent office in the OKW was the “Chief of the Prisoner-of-War
Organization,” who was several times made personally responsible by the
Prosecution. The Defendant Keitel attaches importance to the fact that
the Chief of the Prisoners of War Organization was his subordinate
through the Armed Forces Department. Hence the responsibility of the
Defendant Keitel in this domain is self-evident, even in those cases in
which he did not personally sign orders and decrees.
The basic regulations for the treatment of prisoners of war were: (1)
The service regulations issued by the Chief of the OKW within the scope
of normal preparations for mobilization, and laid down in a series of
Army, Navy, and Air Force publications; (2) the stipulations of the
Geneva Convention, to which special reference was made in the service
regulations; (3) the general decrees and orders which became necessary
from time to time in the course of events.
Apart from the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war who were
subject to regulations on an entirely different basis, to which I shall
later make particular reference, the provisions of the service
regulations in accordance with international law, that is the Geneva
Convention, held good. The OKW exercised supervision over the strict
observance of these Army service regulations through an Inspector of the
Prisoners of War Organization and, from 1943 on, through a further
control agency, the Inspector General of the Prisoners of War
Organization.
The representatives of the protecting powers and the International Red
Cross may be considered as constituting an additional control agency,
which no doubt submitted to the various governments reports on
inspections and visits to the camps, in accordance with the provisions
of the Geneva Convention. No such reports have been submitted here by
the Prosecution; I shall come back to the charges made here by the
French prosecutor. But the fact that the British and American
prosecutors, for instance, have not submitted such reports may well
permit the conclusion that the protecting powers did not discover any
serious violations with regard to the treatment of inmates of
prisoner-of-war camps.
The treatment of prisoners of war, which led to no serious complaints
during the first few years of the war with the Western Powers—I except
isolated cases like that of Dieppe—became more and more difficult for
the OKW from year to year, because political and economic considerations
gained a very strong influence in this sector. The Reichsführer SS tried
to get the Prisoners of War Organization into his own hands. The
resulting struggles for power caused Hitler to turn over the Prisoners
of War Organization to Himmler from October 1944 on, the alleged reason
being that the Armed Forces had shown itself to be too weak and allowed
itself to be influenced by doubts based on international law. Another
important factor was the influence exerted on Hitler, and through him on
the OKW, by the labor authorities and the armament sector. This
influence grew stronger as the labor shortage increased.
The Party Chancellery, the German Labor Front, and the Propaganda
Ministry also played a part in this question, which was in itself purely
a military one. The OKW was engaged in a constant struggle with all
these agencies, most of which had more influence than the OKW.
All these circumstances must be taken into consideration in order
properly to understand and evaluate the responsibility of the Defendant
Keitel. As he himself had to carry out the functions “by order,” and
since Hitler always kept the problem of the Prisoners of War
Organization under his personal control for reasons previously
described, the Defendant Keitel was scarcely ever in a position to voice
his own, that is, military, objections against instructions and orders.
The Treatment of French Prisoners of War.
As a result of the agreement of Montoire, the keynote to apply to
relations with French prisoners of war became “collaboration.” Their
treatment moved in the direction indicated by this; and discussions with
Ambassador Scapini brought about a considerable improvement for them. In
this connection I refer to the affidavit of Ambassador Scapini, who
states among other things:
“It is correct that General Reinecke examined the questions at
hand objectively and without hostility, and that he attempted to
regulate them reasonably when this depended on his authority
alone. He took a different attitude when the pressure exercised
on the OKW by the Labor Service—that is by the Allocation of
Labor—and sometimes by the Party made itself felt.”
The prisoners of war used for labor were scarcely guarded, and those
employed in the country had almost complete freedom of movement. By
virtue of the direct understanding with the Vichy Government there were
considerable alleviations in comparison with the rules of the Geneva
Convention, after repatriation under the armistice provisions had very
considerably lessened the number of the original prisoners of war.
To mention just a few ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is there anything very important in these next
few pages, until you get to Page 183?
DR. NELTE: It is the treatment of the French ...
THE PRESIDENT: If you would only deal with it in a very general way. I
should have thought there was nothing very important until you get to
Page 183 where you begin to deal with the accusation in reference to the
Sagan case. You see, it is 12 o’clock now.
DR. NELTE: I believe that by 1 o’clock I shall be through. Or am I to
understand your remark to mean that you are limiting my speech to a
certain time? I asked you to grant me 7 hours for my speech, and my
request ...
THE PRESIDENT: That is what the Tribunal’s order was.
DR. NELTE: I submitted my request to the Tribunal, and believed I could
assume that in this particular case my request was granted, but if that
is not the case ...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will give you until 12:30 on account
of any interruptions which I may have made. But I again suggest to you
that there is really nothing between 178 and 183 which is of any real
importance.
DR. NELTE: I hope, Mr. President, that that does not mean that these
statements are to be considered irrelevant. I think my subjective
opinions ...
THE PRESIDENT: I said “of real importance.”
[sm type begins]DR. NELTE: (1) Release of all prisoners of war born in
or before 1900; (2) release of fathers of families with numerous
children and widowers with children; (3) considerable alleviation of the
mail and parcel facilities; increased German support for officers’ and
enlisted personnel camps by establishing institutions for entertainment
and physical welfare of the prisoners of war; (4) for officer
candidates, facilitation of their further training in their civilian
occupation and care by a French General, Didelet.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]As Ambassador Scapini himself has testified, he and the
members of his delegation had complete freedom of correspondence with
and access to all camps and labor detachments, except for special
military reasons in isolated cases. The members of the delegation were
able to speak to their prisoner comrades privately, like every
representative of a protecting power, and they were particularly able to
make detailed inquiries about conditions with the French camp leader or
the trustees, who were elected by the prisoners of war themselves. In
addition to this, officers who had been selected by him personally were
placed at his disposal as his assistants.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The subsequent regrettable occurrences, as presented by
the French Prosecution here, resulted from the deterioration of the
political and military situation. One of these occurrences was the
escape of General Giraud, which Hitler, in spite of all arguments
brought by the OKW, used to have measures against the French generals
and officers increased in severity. The second decisive incident was the
Allied invasion of Africa, which led to general unrest and to numerous
attempts at escape. Finally, at the time of the last stage of the war,
measures were applied which can only be explained by the—I would call
it catastrophic—morale.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]In examining the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel
it must be considered that he did not possess any direct influence on
the occurrences in the camps and workshops. His responsibility can only
be determined if it is proven that he had caused a lack of necessary
supervision, or that no intervention had taken place after learning of
such occurrences. In this respect, however, there is no proof of guilt
of the OKW.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The French Prosecution, in the charges against the
Defendant Keitel, have presented a note from Ambassador Scapini to the
German Ambassador, Abetz, of 4 April 1941 under a collective number,
F-668. This refers to the retaining of French civilians in Germany as
prisoners of war. This document states on Page 5:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“In order to facilitate the examination of the
categories to be released, I am transmitting enclosed a
summarized chart. I am also enclosing a copy of the note of the
German Armistice Commission Number 178/41 of 20 January 1941,
which refers to the decision of the OKW to liberate all French
civilians who are being treated as prisoners of war.[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]“I hope that the execution of this decision will
be expedited through this report, which I have the honor to
submit to you.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]I have asked the French Prosecution to pass on to me the
note of the German Armistice Commission Number 178/41 of 20 January
1941, in which this decision of the OKW is mentioned. I believe that the
copy of this note, which was attached to the communication of 4 April
1941 (Document F-668) should have been handed over with this document,
because it was part of this document. Unfortunately this has not been
done.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]From the reference it can be seen that the OKW, and
thereby the Defendant Keitel, held the view that things would have to be
dealt with in a correct manner in accordance with the agreements with
France, and that the OKW, which was the proper authority for these
fundamental orders with regard to the prisoners of war, had decided to
release all French civilians who were being treated as prisoners of
war.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]It is difficult to recognize how this document can serve
as evidence of guilt of the Defendant Keitel. Rather will this document
have to be regarded as symptomatic of the fact that the Defendant
Keitel, when violations against existing agreements came to his
knowledge, saw to it that they were stopped.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The Treatment of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]Hitler already regarded the prisoner-of-war problem as a
personal domain of his legislation, and the more time passed, the less
he regarded it from the points of view of international law and military
needs, but rather from a political and economic angle. The problem in
the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war from the very beginning
was also subject to ideological considerations which for him was the
primary motive in the war against the Soviet Union. The fact that the
Soviet Union was not a member of the Geneva Convention was exploited by
Hitler, in order to obtain a free hand in the treatment of Soviet
Russian prisoners of war.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]He stated to the generals that the Soviet Union felt
equally free from all stipulations which had been created by the Geneva
Convention for the protection of prisoners of war. One must read the
decrees of 8 September 1941 (Document Number EC-338, Exhibit Number
USSR-356) in order to understand clearly Hitler’s attitude. In the
official document of the counterintelligence office (Amt Ausland Abwehr)
of 15 September 1941, rules were laid down, which were to be observed
according to international law, concerning the treatment of prisoners of
war where the Geneva Convention did not apply between belligerents.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]The Defendant Keitel has testified on the witness stand
that he had accepted the viewpoints laid down in this document and had
presented them to Hitler. The latter strictly refused to rescind the
decree of 8 September 1941. He told Keitel:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Your doubts originate from the soldierly
conception of a chivalrous war. Here we are concerned with the
destruction of an ideology.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Keitel noted this passage down word for word and added
to his written statement of 15 September 1941: “I therefore approve and
countenance these measures.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]It was a typical example of Keitel expressing his doubts
and Hitler taking his final decision. Keitel stood up for these
decisions and did not let his subordinate offices know that he was of a
different opinion. Such was his attitude. For this also he is, within
the limits of his official position, taking responsibility.[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]What Keitel actually thought is revealed in the excerpt
submitted as Document Keitel-6, Document Book 1, from the book
_Employment Conditions for Eastern Workers and Soviet Russian Prisoners
of War_. The Codefendant Speer has testified in cross-examination that
he over and over again told the Defendant Keitel that any employment of
prisoners of war of any enemy country in enterprises prohibited by the
Geneva Convention was out of the question. Speer further testified that
Keitel several times rejected any attempt to employ prisoners of war of
any western nation in actual war plants.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The defense counsel for the Defendant Speer will also
deal with this question in detail.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]In addition, I just want to submit certain individual
cases charged against the Defendant Keitel personally by the
Prosecution, that is to say, cases where, in the opinion of the
Prosecution, he is supposed to have exceeded the limits of the general
responsibility inherent in his position.[sm type ends]
I should not like to omit that case which was repeatedly mentioned—and
rightly so—in the course of the evidence, the case of the 50 Royal Air
Force officers, the shameful case of Sagan.
It particularly affects us as Germans, because it shows the utter lack
of all restraint and proportion in the orders and the character of
Hitler, who did not allow himself to be influenced for an instant in his
explosive decisions by any thought of the honor of the German Armed
Forces.
The cross-examination of the Defendant Keitel by the representative of
the British Prosecution has determined how far his name too has been
implicated in these abominable facts. Although the evidence clearly
establishes the fact that Keitel neither heard nor transmitted Hitler’s
murderous order, that he and the Armed Forces had nothing to do with the
execution of this order and, finally, that he did everything in his
power to prevent the escaped officers from being handed over to Himmler
and did at least succeed in saving the officers who were taken back to
the camp, he is painfully conscious of his guilt in not realizing at the
time the terrible blow which such a measure must inflict on German
military prestige throughout the world. In connection with the treatment
of the Sagan case the French Prosecution confronted the Defendant Keitel
with Document 1650-PS, which deals with the treatment of escaped
prisoners of war.
This, Mr. President, is the so-called “Bullet Decree.” Considering the
lack of time, I should like to deal shortly with this case, but I must
deal with it because it is one of the most significant and gravest
accusations against my client; I shall only summarize.
During his cross-examination, Keitel made the following statement:
“This Document 1650-PS emanates from a police agency and
contains a reference to the OKW by the words: ‘The OKW has
decreed the following ...’”
Keitel says:
“I have certainly neither signed this order of the OKW nor seen
it; there is no doubt about that.”
He cannot explain it; he can only assume how this order came to be
issued by the Reich Security Main Office.
In his examination he mentions the various possibilities whereby such an
order could have reached the office which issued it. Then he refers to
another document, 1544-PS, which contains all the orders and directives
concerning prisoners of war, but not this order referring to the escaped
officers and noncommissioned officers.
The witness Westhoff has confirmed that the concept “Stufe III” and its
meaning were unknown to him and to the office of the OKW Prisoners of
War Organization. He also stated that on assuming office on 1 April 1944
he found no order of this nature, not even a file note.
The meaning of that Bullet Decree was completely obscure. I believe this
obscurity has been cleared up by the evidence given by the Codefendant
Kaltenbrunner, who on his part had never before spoken to the Defendant
Keitel on the matter.