Hitler was the exponent of an idea. He was not only the representative
of a Party political program, but also of a philosophy which separated
him and the German people from the ideology of the rest of the world. As
a convinced enemy of parliamentary democracy, and obsessed with the
conviction that this was the true ideology, he was devoid of tolerance
and the spirit of compromise. This produced an egocentric ideology which
recognized as right only his own ideas and his own decisions. It led to
the “Führer State,” in which he was enthroned on a lonely height as the
incarnation of this faith, blind and deaf to all misgivings and
objections, suspicious of all those who he thought might constitute a
threat to his power, and brutal to everything that crossed his
ideological path.
This outline of his character, which has been verified by the evidence,
is incompatible with the Prosecution’s assumption that a partnership of
interests might have existed between Hitler and the defendant. There was
no partnership of interests and no common planning between Hitler and
the men who were supposed to be his advisers. The hierarchy of the
Führer State, in connection with the Führer Order Number 1, which gives
the crudest expression to the separation of work, can only admit of the
conclusion that the so-called co-workers were merely mouthpieces or
tools of an overwhelming will, and not men who translated their own will
into deeds. The only question, therefore, which can be raised is whether
these men were guilty in putting themselves at the disposal of such a
system and in submitting to the will of a man like Hitler.
This problem requires special examination in the case of soldiers,
because this submission to the will of some person, which is contrary to
the nature of a free man, is for the soldier the basic element of his
profession, and of the duties of obedience and allegiance which exist
for the soldier in all political systems.
The legal problem of conspiracy in the sense of the Indictment has been
dealt with by my colleague Dr. Stahmer and by Dr. Horn. In the specific
case of the Defendant Keitel I should only like to refer to two
sentences of the speech as the starting point of my statements:
(1) “It is not sufficient that the plan be common to them all;
they must know that it is common to all of them, and each one of
them must of his own accord accept the plan as his own.
(2) “That is why a conspiracy with a dictator at the head is a
contradiction in itself. The dictator does not enter into a
conspiracy with his followers; he concludes no agreement with
them; he dictates.”
Dr. Stahmer has pointed out that no one acting under or on account of
pressure can therefore be a conspirator. I should like to modify this
for the circle to which the Defendant Keitel belonged. To say that the
defendants belonging to the military branch acted on account of or under
pressure, does not accurately represent the real circumstances. It is
correct to say that soldiers do not act voluntarily, that is, of their
own free will. They must do what they are ordered, regardless of whether
or not they approve of it. Accordingly, when soldiers engage in any
action, their will is disregarded, or at least not taken into
consideration; it will in fact always be disregarded because of the
nature of the military profession, and in applying the Leadership
Principle in the Armed Forces it cannot appear as a causal factor in the
initiation and execution of orders. In this military sphere, therefore,
we are not dealing with an abstract and thus theoretical deduction, but
with a conclusion which is bound to result from the nature and practice
of the military profession, when we maintain that the function of the
Defendant Keitel was based on military orders. The activity of the
Defendant Keitel with regard to the initiation of orders, decrees, and
other measures by Hitler, even insofar as they are criminal, cannot
therefore be considered as common work, that is, as the result of a
common plan within the meaning of the term “conspiracy.” Keitel’s
activity in regard to the execution of orders consists in the proper
transmission of orders in the operations sector and in the proper
execution of orders concerning the administration of the war, that is,
in the so-called ministerial sector.
No matter how this activity in itself might be qualified in terms of the
penal code, the Prosecution have not, I think, so far submitted anything
which could refute this train of thought as to the conspiracy.
This is a soldierly principle, and is valid wherever the military
command system exists. The significance of this statement is
particularly important in the case of the Defendant Keitel. For the
validity of such evidence might be questioned by saying that Keitel’s
functions were not those of a soldier, or at least not only those of a
soldier; and that he is therefore not entitled to claim consideration
purely on the grounds of the existing system of command. The unfortunate
nature of his position and the many and varied assignments, not all of
which can be fitted into the framework of a system, which fell to him as
Chief of the OKW, tend to obscure for us the primary factor with regard
to the Defendant Keitel, namely, that no matter what Keitel did, or with
what authority or organization he negotiated or was in contact, he was
always motivated by his function as a soldier and by some general or
particular order issued by Hitler.
The existence of a conspiracy seems to me incompatible with the theory
of a soldier’s functions and with Keitel’s position as head of the OKW,
and cannot logically be derived therefrom. In all cases in which the
Prosecution has claimed conspiracy to be prejudice, the purpose of this
conspiracy is an activity indulged in by the members in perpetrating
acts which differ from their normal private activity. The _ex contrario_
proposition is that the activity which a man must practice because it
belongs to his profession or office cannot be termed a conspiracy. It
may be added that the soldier does not act on his own initiative, but on
orders received. A soldier may therefore take part in a conspiracy aimed
against the duties he has undertaken as a soldier; but his activity
within the scope of his military functions can on no account be termed a
conspiracy.
The OKW, including the Armed Forces Operations Staff, was relatively
little affected by the conduct of the war in the East. By the OKW I mean
the staff of the OKW. It is well known that Hitler himself as Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, dealt with all matters concerning the
conduct of this—his own—ideological war and took a hand in it. The
Army was in command; but Hitler was in close and constant collaboration
with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of General Staff
up to December 1941 when, after taking over the supreme command of the
Army, he also took over its direct leadership.
This union in one person of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
and Commander-in-Chief of the Army was evidently the cause of the
numerous mistakes which led to the severe incrimination of the OKW as
staff OKW, and of its Chief of Staff, Keitel.
Keitel feels himself to be gravely incriminated by the frank statements
he made in the witness box on the whole question of the Russian war. It
is, therefore, not only an understandable proceeding on the part of the
defense, but in fact its duty, to clarify the extent to which Keitel
bears the responsibility for these entire conditions of most frightful
atrocity and unimaginable degeneration.
To make these matters of competency, which are frequently extremely
complicated, easier of understanding, I refer to the Defendant Keitel’s
affidavit Number K-10, which was submitted to the Tribunal. It seems to
me essential just to emphasize the fact that the war against the Soviet
Union was from the first subject to three effective factors: (1)
Operations and command: High Command of the Army; (2) Economics: The
Four Year Plan; (3) Ideological: The SS Organizations.
These three factors were outside the competency of the OKW, which was
not empowered to issue orders affecting them. It is true, nevertheless,
that as a result of Hitler’s practically anarchic methods, by which he
himself retained entire control of the Government in his own hands, the
OKW and Keitel were sometimes used to transmit Hitler’s orders; but this
fact cannot in itself deflect the basic responsibility.
In view of the mass of material presented by the Soviet Prosecution, I
can refer within the scope of my statement to only a comparatively small
number of the documents. I shall give a brief summary of the documents
which have been dealt with separately, Pages 126 to 136.
To begin with, I referred to Documents USSR-90, 386, 364, 366, 106, and
407, and tried to prove in detail that the charges made against the OKW
and Keitel as the guilty parties have no value as evidence as far as
these documents are concerned.
Then, on Page 130, I referred to a category of documents with which I
have dealt earlier in Part 2 of my presentation on the subject of
official documents. If I refer in this connection to the official
reports of the Investigation Commission, I do so not because of their
actual contents, but because, although they were submitted in order to
implicate Keitel, they are in themselves proof that the charges made
against Keitel and the OKW are not justified as far as these grave
indictments are concerned.
Out of the large number of documents in this connection I have dealt
with USSR-40, 35, and 38. These official reports, which implicate the
High Command of the Armed Forces, do not contain a single concrete fact
referring to the Staff of the OKW—that is, Keitel—as the perpetrator
or instigator of these atrocities.
I make no comment on the contents of the documents; I merely point out
that Keitel in his official position, had neither the authority nor the
opportunity to give orders which resulted in the crimes alleged.
[sm type begins]First of all I shall deal with the Documents USSR-90,
386, 364, 366, 106, 407, submitted by the Prosecution for the specific
purpose of establishing Keitel’s responsibility.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]They will show that not in a single case are they
orders, decrees, or regulations issued by the German High Command of the
Armed Forces and that it has not been proved that the latter was even
informed thereof.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](1) The document Exhibit USSR-90 is a court-martial
sentence against the German Generals Bernhardt and Hamann, and includes
the following sentence:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“During the temporary occupation of the Orlova
area ... German Fascist intruders committed bestial crimes in
huge numbers against the peaceful populations and prisoners of
war on direct orders of the rapacious Hitler Government and the
command of the Armed Forces, thus violating the rules of warfare
established by international law....”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The argumentation leading up to the verdict does not
reveal proof of the claim that the “German Armed Forces command”—if
this means the OKW and the Defendant Keitel—ordered the crimes with
which the court-martial verdict is dealing. This is another of the
frequent confusions as to the status of the High Command of the Army and
the High Command of the Armed Forces. Statements on Page 2 of the
verdict seem to indicate this; it is said there:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“The defendant, Lieutenant General Bernhardt ...
acted according to plans and instructions of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army ...”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]This document, therefore, cannot furnish proof for the
Prosecution’s contention that the Defendant Keitel is connected with the
crime which is described in Document USSR-90.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](2) In connection with the facts in the case dealing
with “compulsory labor,” the Prosecution submitted in proof of its
charge against Keitel Document USSR-36, a letter by Reich Marshal
Göring, in whom Hitler had vested general powers within the framework of
the Four Year Plan for this essential project—Plan
Barbarossa-Oldenburg—as shown in the Green File.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](3) Nor does the report or discussion of the Economic
Staff East (Wirtschaftsstab Ost) of 7 November 1941 (USSR-386) touch
upon the competency and responsibility of OKW, because the Economic
Staff East had nothing to do with the OKW and the Defendant Keitel.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]This is also proved by the Green File, the Thomas
Document 2353-PS, and Keitel’s affidavit, Keitel Document Book 2,
Exhibit Number Keitel-11.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The conclusion drawn by the Soviet Russian Prosecution
that “Proof is established of the OKW commander having been primarily
responsible for the mobilization of labor in the Reich” is erroneous, if
the argument is to establish responsibility on the part of the Defendant
Keitel. If, on the other hand, reference as commander of the OKW is made
to Hitler, this cannot be contradicted.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](4) Document USSR-364 is a document from the OKH (High
Command of the Army), signed by the Quartermaster General of the Army,
Wagner. It can be seen from the distribution of the document that the
OKW was not even informed through the usual channels.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](5) Document USSR-366 mentions the name of the defendant
as having complained because: “OT (Organization Todt) units operating in
the vicinity of Lvov paid local laborers a daily wage of 25 rubles and
because OT availed itself of the services of local factories.”[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]The Prosecution’s argument runs that “Keitel writes to
Minister Todt ...” The document which was submitted does not reveal
this, because it does not make any mention of such a letter. Inasmuch as
the entire economic administration and the exploitation of the Eastern
Territories had been transferred to the Four Year Plan, OKW had no
relevant office for this problem.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]This becomes evident from the Green File just referred
to, and from the Führer order for the “Barbarossa-Oldenburg Plan.”
Presumably, after discussion of the basic question during the conference
on the situation, Keitel once again received orders from Hitler to get
into touch with Reich Minister Todt. This would then be one of the
instances where the defendant merely served as an instrument for the
transmission of a Hitler order to the competent office without the
matter being in any way within the competency of the OKW. In any case,
the information conveyed by the document does not show in how far this
problem should be a charge on Keitel.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](6) Document USSR-106 is a Führer Order of 8 September
1942, dealing with the employment of prisoners of war and the
construction of field fortifications behind the front. The heading of
the Führer order reads:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“The Führer.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“OKH: General Staff of the Army Operations Section
1.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The order was sighed by the Army General Staff and
issued by Halder. This proves conclusively that the Defendant Keitel or
the OKW was not involved.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](7) Nor is it possible to refer to Document USSR-407 for
the establishment of the defendant’s participation. This document deals
with the order given by a local commander, who refers to alleged OKW
instructions.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]It has already been emphasized on several occasions that
the OKW does not mean Keitel. It may however be quite possible, as no
date of the alleged OKW order is mentioned in Document USSR-407, that
this is one of the numerous cases of confusion, especially since even in
Armed Forces circles the exact conception of the OKW was not known.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]In any case the conclusion by the Soviet Russian
Prosecution, after submission of this document, that “OKW and Keitel
have not only ordered the mobilization of labor from the occupied part
of Russia, but have worked directly in the execution of this order” is
incorrect and has not been proved.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Now there is still a category of documentary evidence
which contains official communiqués of the Extraordinary Commission for
the determination and investigation of War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity. I already some time ago dealt with the importance of official
documents in the presentation of evidence, and pointed out their limited
value as evidence.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]If in this connection I discuss the official reports of
the investigating commissions, then I do so because ostensibly they have
been presented in order to incriminate Keitel, while in actual fact they
furnish proof that the accusations against Keitel and the OKW Staff are
not based on any reasoning in these very weighty Prosecution charges.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]From the large number of documents concerning this I
would refer to the following:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Document USSR-4 has been submitted to show that the
Soviet-Russian population was exterminated through intentional infection
with typhus, and that this was a case of a planned spreading of
typhus-epidemics among the Soviet population. For this the following,
among others, are named as the culprits (Page 10 of the document); “The
Hitler Government and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.”[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]Once again it cannot be seen from the document itself on
what concrete facts the commission supports the guilt of the “Supreme
Command of the German Armed Forces” and what military agency is thereby
described. There is no mention made of an order of the “Supreme Command
of the German Armed Forces” in any part of this lengthy document.
However, since the Prosecution have presented this document as proof of
the guilt of the Defendant Keitel and the OKW, I establish that this
document cannot be valid as evidence for an accusation against Keitel in
this horrible charge.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Document USSR-9 bears the heading:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Report of the Extraordinary State Commission
for the determination and investigation of the atrocities of the
Fascist German invaders and the damage caused to citizens,
collective enterprises, social organizations, State plants and
institutions of the Soviet Union.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Regarding the demolitions and bestialities
which the German Fascist invaders have committed in Kiev.”[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]On Page 4 it is stated: By order of the German High
Command German Army units looted, blew up, and destroyed the old
cultural monument, the Lavra of Kiev. The following are described as
responsible: “The German Government and the German High Command and all
officers and officials listed by name.” From the speech of the
representative of the Prosecution and from the term, “the German
Government and the German High Command” it can be seen that the High
Command of the Armed Forces and Keitel are to be accused as having been
responsible. This document lacks any positive statement on which the
Investigating Commission supports this judgment.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]It is also shown here that the judgment of the
investigating commission—in any case with reference to the Defendant
Keitel—is not basically supported.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Document USSR-35 is a report “regarding the material
damage which the Fascist German invaders inflicted on State plants and
institutions, collective industries, and citizens of the Soviet
Union.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]This document states:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“The German armies and occupation authorities
which carried out the directives of the criminal Hitler
Government and the High Command of the Armed Forces, destroyed
and looted the Soviet cities occupied by them....”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]To this it must be stated:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](1) The contents of this document do not show one single
concrete “directive” issued by the OKW or Keitel.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](2) The OKW had no authority to give orders, and
therefore could not issue directives.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](3) Therefore the findings of the State investigation
commission, which for formal reasons would not be binding for the
Tribunal, cannot be considered as justified insofar as the OKW and
Keitel are concerned.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](4) No opinion is going to be expressed as to the
remaining contents of the reports.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Document USSR-38 is entitled:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Communication of the Extraordinary State
Commission for the Determination and Investigation of the
Atrocities of the Fascist German invaders and their Accomplices.
Regarding atrocities of the Fascist German invaders in the city
of Minsk.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]In this document it is stated on Page 1:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Following instructions, which were issued
directly by the German Government, the Hitlerite military
authorities destroyed without any limitation scientific research
institutes, et cetera ... they exterminated thousands of
peace-loving Soviet citizens and also prisoners of war.”[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]Page 13 states:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Responsible for the crimes committed by the
Germans at Minsk ... are the Hitler Government and the High
Command of the Armed Forces.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Nowhere in this document have either concrete or
verifiable instructions or orders by the Defendant Keitel or from the
OKW been given.[sm type ends]
Then, on Page 134, Paragraph 1:
In the documents previously quoted, either Keitel or the OKW is named as
the responsible party. However, during the Prosecution’s presentation
many such official reports were quoted as evidence for Keitel’s guilt,
which do not even mention either the name of the defendant or the OKW.
In this connection, I draw your attention to Documents USSR-8, 39, 45,
46, and 63. I only ask the Tribunal to examine the remaining documents
with equal care in order to ascertain whether, if submitted in
connection with Keitel and the OKW, they allow Keitel’s guilt to be
concluded or whether that is not the case. In this connection I should
like to add that I am not going to read, and am not referring to, the
remarks at the bottom of Page 134 (USSR-3).
I beg the Tribunal to take note of my statements on the economic
exploitation of the occupied territories—Pages 137 to 142—without my
reading them. Since Reich Marshal Göring’s defense counsel has already
dealt with this problem and has clarified the spheres of competency and
responsibility, it would mainly be repetition for me to speak on it.
However, I wish to draw attention to this part of my presentation and
beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
[sm type begins]In the war against Poland as well as later in the West,
extended on the basis of experiences in Poland, expert personnel trained
in military economy were detached from the Armed Forces Economic Office
in the form of small staffs and units to the Army Groups and Army High
Commands as expert advisers and assistants in all military economic
questions which resulted from the conquest and occupation of
economically and industrially valuable territories. The Economic
Armament Office, together with the OKW, prepared the organization of
these groups of experts and technical detachments.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]By and large, they consisted of: (a) Expert advisers
with the unit staffs (at first known as liaison officers of the OKH
Economic Armament Office); (b) Reconnaissance Staffs for factories and
raw materials important to war economy: (c) technical detachments and
formations for security, repairs, and protection from destruction of
essential and vital plants and supply installations.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]This organization was prepared by the OKW (Economic
Armament Office) because it relied on expert research personnel from all
three branches of the Armed Forces and civilian economy with the
“technical emergency aid” (Technische Nothilfe). The Army completed the
set-up itself.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The organization was subordinated to the senior troop
commanders in charge. Their employment took place exclusively on the
orders of the troop command, for which each adviser submitted
suggestions from time to time to the unit staffs (the General Staff Ib
or the Chief Quartermaster).[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The missions of these technical detachments were: (a)
Advising the command concerning the importance and significance of
industrial plants and supply installations (fuel, water, electric
current, repair plants, mines, et cetera); (b) Protection of these
installations from destruction by the enemy and our own forces and the
civilian population; (c) Utilization for the purpose of Germany’s
conduct of the war for troops and population; (d) Examination of
essential and vital plants and establishment of their productive
capacity for German use; (e) Establishment of raw material supplies of
metals, ore, coal, fuel, et cetera, for reindustrialization or Germany’s
conduct of the war.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]All functions, with the exception of those mentioned
under (d) and (e), served exclusively to supply the fighting troops, the
occupational troops, and the native population. The statistical
collections (d) and (e) were reported, through military channels to the
competent offices at home (Plenipotentiary for Economy, Four Year Plan,
Minister of Armaments) who had to make disposition concerning use and
utilization. The Armed Forces itself had no independent right of
action.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]It is correct that (according to the Thomas book,
2353-PS) raw materials and also machines were removed to Germany for the
production of implements of war as the Prosecution charges, since both
had served the enemy’s conduct of the war and had necessarily gone out
of production. No military agency could order the removal to Germany,
because it had no right at all to dispose of “booty” of this sort. Only
the three highest Reich authorities mentioned could effect such a
removal on the basis of a general authority by the Führer or a special
order by him to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The OKW and the
Chief of the OKW, as well as the Economic Armament Office, had no right
of disposition and command outside of their own fields, nor did any
separate chain of command exist from the OKW Economic Armament Office to
these detachments, et cetera. The communications and report chain ran
via the unit staffs to the OKH Quartermaster General, with whom the
highest Reich authorities (Food, Economy, Armament Ministry, Four Year
Plan) had representatives who reported to their departmental chiefs.
Orders by the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW concerning
utilization, use, or seizure of economic goods have not been given; this
follows from Document 2353-PS.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The unified leadership of the entire war economy in
France and Belgium was then centered in Reich Marshal Göring as Delegate
of the Four Year Plan by the Führer Decree of 16 June 1940.[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]For determining the responsibility it is of significance
that the staff of the Economic Armament Office examined the problems
which concerned the armament economy and utilization of economy in the
occupied territories. Their appraisals, which in this respect were
regarded as decisive, are collected in Document EC-344, coming from the
Foreign Department in the OKW (headed by Admiral Canaris).[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]With reference to Articles 52, 53, 54, and 56 of the
Hague Convention of Land Warfare, it is explained therein in connection
with total warfare that “economic rearmament” must be regarded as
forming part of the “belligerent enterprise,” and accordingly all
industrial supplies of raw materials, semifinished and manufactured
goods as well as machinery, et cetera, are to be regarded as serving the
war effort. Therefore, according to the viewpoint of the author of this
opinion, all these goods are liable to be seized and used against
compensation after the conclusion of peace. Furthermore, the problem of
the need for war is examined and Germany’s state of economic difficulty
at that time is already affirmed. For the judgment of the Defendant
Keitel this opinion is of significance insofar as the well-known Foreign
Department under the responsible leadership of Admiral Canaris as late
as November 1941 gave vent to an opinion which justified the economic
utilization of the occupied countries. That was the office which
concerned itself with problems of international law and on which the
Defendant Keitel based his confidence.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]An organization for all economic requirements and
intended to supersede the former organization was created for Russia on
the basis of experiences in the West by Reich Marshal Göring by virtue
of a general delegation of authority by the Führer.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The chief of the Economic Armament Office together with
State Secretary Körner drew up this organization for Reich Marshal
Göring without participation by the Chief of the OKW. The Chief of the
OKW for this purpose put General Thomas at the disposal of Reich Marshal
Göring. The Chief of the OKW did not acquire any influence at all on
this organization, and severed his own and the OKW’s connection with it
after Reich Marshal Göring had received full powers and the OKW had put
General Thomas at his disposal. General Thomas thus acted solely on
instructions by Reich Marshal Göring. The OKW and the Defendant Keitel
were never under Reich Marshal Göring’s orders nor were they bound by
his instructions. The Defendant Keitel was not represented in Göring’s
Economic Staff and had nothing to do with the Eastern Economic Staff
(See Thomas book, Page 366).[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The execution of the work was centrally directed by the
Economic Operations Staff in Berlin as part of the Four Year Plan. The
local higher command in the Eastern district was under the Eastern
Economic Staff. To this organization was also attached the troops’
supply department. The OKW, and the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the
OKW, never issued orders concerning the exploitation, administration, or
confiscation of economic property in occupied territory. This is
revealed in the book submitted by the Prosecution, Document 2353-PS. On
Page 386 of this document, Thomas, in summarizing, correctly stated as
follows:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“The Eastern Economic Operations Staff under the
Reich Marshal or State Secretary Körner was responsible for the
whole economic direction of the Eastern area; the state
secretaries were responsible for departmental instructions; the
Economic Armament Office was responsible for the reconstruction
of the economic organization; the Eastern Economic Operations
Staff was responsible for the execution of all measures.”[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]The same is shown by Document USSR-10:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Directives (of Reich Marshal Göring) for the
unified conduct of economic management in the zone of operations
and in political administrative areas to be subsequently
established.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]This ought to prove that the OKW and Keitel are clear of
any responsibility for the consequences attendant upon carrying out the
measures within the scope of the Barbarossa-Oldenburg operation.[sm type
ends]
I now come to Page 143 and following pages, where I refer to the
assertion made by the French Prosecution regarding the participation of
the OKW and Keitel in the cases of Oradour and Tulle.
The French Prosecution have charged the Defendant Keitel in person with
the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The accusation
concerns in particular the execution of French civilians without a
trial. In this connection the cases of Oradour and Tulle received
special emphasis. They are recorded in a report made by the French
Government—Document F-236. The French Prosecution stated: “Keitel’s
guilt in all these things is certain.”
In this connection it is not my task to discuss the frightful events of
Oradour and Tulle. As defense counsel for the Defendant Keitel I have to
examine whether the Prosecution’s assertion that the Defendant Keitel
bears any guilt or responsibility for these atrocious happenings has any
foundation.
You will understand that the Defendant Keitel attaches particular
importance to the production of evidence to the effect that he is not
responsible for these terrible occurrences, and, further, that when such
things came to his knowledge he took steps to have them cleared up in
order that the actual offenders might be brought to account. It is an
indisputable fact that Keitel had no direct part in these crimes. Any
responsibility and guilt attaching to the defendant can therefore be
derived only from his official position. No orders of any kind bearing
Keitel’s signature have been submitted by the Prosecution, so that,
whoever is guilty, Keitel is not, at any rate, among those directly
responsible.
The terrible sufferings inflicted on a large number of French villages
are recorded in the notes of General Bérard dated 6 July and 3 August
1944. I pointed out, when this document was submitted, that the
submission of these complaints alone—that is, unaccompanied by the
replies, which are also in the hands of the Prosecution—cannot convey
an objective picture of the actual facts, on which to base a
pronouncement on the guilt of the Defendant Keitel. As the Defendant
Keitel, not being empowered to issue orders in the matter, cannot
possibly be taken into consideration as the originator of the orders
which led to the complaint, any responsibility and guilt on Keitel’s
part can therefore be based only on the fact that he did not cause the
necessary steps to be taken on receiving information from the German
Armistice Commission. What Keitel did or did not do can be gathered only
from the reply notes and from the directives issued by the OKW to the
German Armistice Commission.
Here, too, the Defendant Keitel would have been unable to provide proof
to the contrary, had not the French Prosecution themselves submitted a
document, F-673, which was intended to furnish proof of Keitel’s
individual guilt. This document was already read by the French
Prosecution at the session of 31 January 1946:
[sm type begins]“High Command of the Armed Forces; F. H. Qu., 5
March 1945; Secret.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“WFST./Qu. 2 (I) No. 01487/45 g.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Subject: Alleged Killing of French Nationals
without Trial.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“German Armistice Commission; Group Wa/Ib No.
5/45 g.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“1) German Armistice Commission; 2)
Commander-in-chief West.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Received: 17 March 1945.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“In August 1944 the French delegation of the
German Armistice Commission addressed a memorandum to D. W. St.
K. (German Armistice Commission) describing in detail incidents
leading to the alleged shooting without justification of
Frenchmen during the period of 9 to 23 June 1944. Statements
made in the French note were almost entirely made in such detail
that an examination by Germany was possible without any
difficulty.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“On 26 September 1944 the High Command of the
Armed Forces charged the German Armistice Commission with the
handling of the case. Thereupon, the German Armistice Commission
asked the Commander-in-Chief West to investigate the incidents
and to take action with regard to the representation of facts
given in the French memorandum.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“On 12 February 1945 the German Armistice
Commission was informed by the Judge of Army Group B that since
November 1944 the case was in the hands of Army Judge of Pz.
AOK/6 (6th Armored Army Command) and that Pz. AOK/6 and 2. SS
Pz. Division ‘Das Reich’ (2nd Armored SS Division ‘Das Reich’)
had in the meantime separated from the Army Group.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Handling of this matter calls for the following
remarks:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“The Frenchmen, and the delegation of the Vichy
Government, have made the grave charge against the German Armed
Forces of numerous cases of unjustified killing of French
nationals, in other words, of murder. Germany’s interest
demanded a reply to this charge at the earliest possible moment.
Considering the length of time which has elapsed since receipt
of the French memorandum, it should have been possible to take
up at least some of the charges and to refute them through
actual investigation, irrespective of subsequent development in
military matters and the transfer of troops incidental thereto.
If even a portion of the charges made had been refuted at once,
the French people would have been shown that their whole subject
matter is based on doubtful material; but because nothing was
undertaken by the Germans, the opponents’ impression must be
that we are not in a position to answer these charges.[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]“The manner in which this case was handled
indicates that there possibly still exists a great deal of
ignorance as to the importance to be attached to all reproaches
against the German Armed Forces, to counteract any enemy
propaganda, and to refute immediately any purported German acts
of atrocity.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“The German Armistice Commission is hereby
instructed to continue to devote to this matter all possible
energy. It is requested to render any assistance possible, and
particularly to take all steps for expediting matters within its
own sphere of action. The fact that Pz. AOK/6 (6th Armored Army
Command) no longer forms part of the forces of the
Commander-in-Chief West is no reason to hold up the necessary
investigations in order to clarify and refute the French
charges.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“For information: Army General Staff (Gen. St.
d. H.); Headquarters Gen./Qu.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“(signed) Keitel.”[sm type ends]
This document of the OKW, signed by Keitel, shows that:
1. On receiving the French complaint of 26 September 1944, the OKW
issued orders to the German Armistice Commission to investigate and deal
with the matter.
2. The German Armistice Commission thereupon instructed
Commander-in-Chief West to investigate the incidents.
3. On receiving a letter from Army Group B, the OKW expressed itself as
follows:
“It was in the German interest to answer these charges at the
earliest possible moment.
“This case shows that there is still widespread ignorance as to
the importance of combating all imputations made against the
German Armed Forces and all enemy propaganda, and of refuting
immediately any alleged acts of atrocity on the part of the
Germans.
“The German Armistice Commission is hereby instructed to
continue to pursue their investigations as energetically as
possible. It is requested that every possible assistance be
rendered to the commission and that all possible steps be taken
to expedite matters in your own sphere of action. The fact that
Pz. AOK/6 is no longer under the jurisdiction of
Commander-in-Chief West is no reason for discontinuing the
necessary investigation in order to clarify and refute the
French charges.”
It may therefore be considered as proved that in this case the Defendant
Keitel, on receiving information, took energetic steps in accordance
with the range of his competency as Chief of the OKW, and as far as he
was in a position to do so. This eliminates the charge made by the
Prosecution insofar as the Defendant Keitel is concerned. At the same
time, however, the way in which the Defendant Keitel handled this case
suggests that he acted in similar manner in other cases.
Mr. President, before dealing with the problem of hostages which I may
discuss later, I should like to discuss the grave evidence on the Night
and Fog Decree on Page 154.
[sm type begins]War, which is frightful even under orderly international
law, becomes atrocious when the last restraints are removed. Many
terrible things have happened during this war and it is impossible to
tell which chapter of this book of sorrows and tears is the saddest;
but, in any case, one of the most lamentable chapters is that of the
treatment of hostages. In international law the question of treatment of
hostages is controversial. The taking of hostages is almost generally
admitted. Doubtless, although taking hostages is assumed to be
admissible under international law, that has as yet no bearing on their
treatment. The treatment, even more than the seizure, of hostages must
be subject on the one hand to the law of absolute military necessity
which cannot otherwise be met, and, on the other, to the application of
all possible guarantees to prevent the indiscriminate shooting of
hostages as a principle. Any primitive and brutal handling of this very
institution, which is doubtful under international law and is apt to
affect the absolutely innocent, must be rejected.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Unfortunately, this problem which seldom arose in
previous wars between civilized people, acquired considerable importance
during World Wars I and II. The cases previously taken into
consideration and also explained in the Army Manual 2g (H. Dv. 2g)
(Document Book 1, Exhibit Number Keitel-7) resulted from military
necessity of troops in operation. As happened with so many things in
this war, but especially due to the change-over from theater of
operations to rear area, there finally developed a broadening and
degeneration in the application of a principle which originally was
indisputable according to international law.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The immediate connection with military necessity was
absent, that is to say, with military action; its place was taken by
interests which naturally included military safeguards, particularly of
lines of communications between the front zone and home.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]It must be said that this fundamental change ought to
have been recognized, and ought to have been taken into consideration in
the handling of the existing rules governing hostages. The degeneration
in the treatment of hostages was decisively influenced by the fact that
civil administrative and police organizations claimed for themselves one
of the extreme means of soldierly warfare and often made use of it
arbitrarily, wherever they wanted to break resistance, by arresting
people without concrete individual or even presumptive guilt and by
treating them from the viewpoint of reprisals. Collective arrests for
individual offenses come into this category.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]All these cases have nothing to do with the original
facts in the cases of hostages; but since the word “hostage” is used for
all these cases, the Prosecution in many cases has placed on the Armed
Forces a responsibility which they should not bear.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]I request the Tribunal, when judging this complex and
when examining the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel, to take into
consideration:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](1) The concept of hostages, the basic conditions
governing the taking of hostages end their treatment had become known to
all authorities in command and their offices in the Armed Forces by the
Army manual regulations (H. Dv. 2g) before the war, especially before
the campaign in the West. The Documents 1585-PS, submitted by the
Prosecution itself (discussions of the hostage question with the
Luftwaffe), and 877-PS (operation orders of the Army for “Case Yellow”
and the attack in the West, dated 29 October 1939) reveal that special
regulations had originally been issued for the seizure of hostages.
Their application was justifiably transferred to the Army offices and
later to the military commanders who were subordinate to the Army, never
to the Armed Forces High Command (OKW).[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](2) Nobody could be in doubt, according to existing
regulations (H. Dv. 2g), as to what authority Army commanders had and as
to who had to make a decision on a possible shooting of hostages. No
supplementary order or supplementary regulation was ever issued by the
Armed Forces High Command (OKW). The letter from Falkenhausen (Military
Commander in Belgium), dated 16 September 1942 (Document 1594-PS),
mentioned by the Prosecution, and the report of this military commander
(1587-PS) are not addressed to Keitel, but quite correctly to his
superior office, the Army High Command (OKH) Quartermaster General;
Keitel received neither the letter nor the report. Whether Hitler
received them in his capacity of Supreme Commander of the Army and
military superior of the military commanders, Keitel does not know.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins](3) The OKW was not informed of the cases in which
inhabitants of the occupied territories were mistakenly and falsely
described as hostages and treated without legal procedures.[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins](4) Whenever hostages, without being connected with the
plots and terror acts against the occupying power, were held responsible
for them without local or material connection, such practice is contrary
to service regulations.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](5) Insofar as the OKW or the Defendant Keitel was
approached by military agencies in individual cases referring to hostage
problems, for example by the Military Commanders in France and Belgium,
the evidence has shown that the “hostages” to be shot were to be
selected from the circle of persons already sentenced to death by virtue
of the law. However, so that this should not be outwardly
recognized—for producing the desired deterrent effect—it was to be
announced that hostages had been shot.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The French Prosecution has cited the OKW and Keitel in
connection with this complex by means of Document 389-PS, which is the
same as UK-25, a Führer order of 16 September 1941 drawn up by Keitel.
This document, whose contents are monstrous, does not, however, have
anything to do with the question of taking hostages and the treatment of
hostages. The word “hostages” does not appear in the text. From the
subject and from the contents it can be seen that this is an order
designed to combat the resistance movement in the eastern and
southeastern war theaters, and therefore is related to the basic
principles of the so-called ideological war against the Soviet Union,
which has been already dealt with at another place, and condemned. When
the communication of 16 September 1941 was addressed to the Military
Commander in France by the High Command of the Army for information
purposes the latter had already decreed the so-called “Hostages Law”
(Document Number 1588-PS). Accordingly no causal connection existed, as
the French Prosecution has assumed, between the directives signed by
Keitel and ordered by Hitler in Document 389-PS, and the hostage
legislation in the West. The latter had been decreed without
collaboration or consultation of the OKW. The agency to which the
Military Commanders in France and in Belgium were subordinated was the
High Command of the Army (OKH), and not the OKW; the agency which
specialized in this matter was the Quartermaster General (in the OKH).
With regard to this it must also be considered that at this period of
time Hitler himself was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which
explains the above-mentioned references to the OKW. In reality, they
were not references to the OKW, but to Hitler as Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which were
partially routed through Hitler’s working staff (the OKW). This however
establishes no competence and thereby no responsibility of the OKW and
the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]In conclusion I request permission to hand in some
literature to the Tribunal demonstrating present-day opinions pertaining
to international law with regard to the question of hostages for
consideration in the examination of these facts in the case. I limit
myself to reading the summarization of expert opinions and military
practices:[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“In summarizing it must be said, concerning the
question of taking hostages and the execution of hostages, that
according to existing practices and probably also according to
existing rules of international law, the taking of hostages in
occupied territory is permissible under international law
insofar as hostages are taken in order to guarantee the proper
legal behavior of the enemy civilian population. According to
the commentary by Waltzog, which is standard for the German
conduct of warfare, it is also a formal requirement, whenever
hostages are taken according to unwritten international law
(common law), that such taking of hostages, the reasons
therefor, and in particular the threat of their execution must
be brought to the knowledge of those for whose lawful behavior
the hostages are to go bail. The question as to whether it is
permissible to execute hostages cannot be interpreted
unequivocally. The German jurisprudents of international law,
like Meurer, the Englishman, Spaight, and the Frenchmen, Sorel
and Funck, consider this permissible in the extremes of
emergency, and therefore not contrary to international law.”[sm
type ends]
During the whole course of this Trial, no order made such a deep
impression on the mind of the public as did the Night and Fog Decree.
This was an order which originated during the fight waged against acts
of sabotage and against the resistance movement in France. As a result
of the withdrawal of troops in connection with the campaign against the
Soviet Union, the number of plots aimed against the security of German
troops stationed in France, and in particular the acts of sabotage aimed
at the destruction of all means of communication increased daily. This
necessitated increased activity on the part of the counterintelligence
offices, which in its turn led to proceedings being taken and sentences
being passed by military courts against members of the resistance
movement and their accomplices. These sentences were very severe. In
addition to a large proportion of death sentences, sentences of
imprisonment were also passed. The reports made almost daily during the
situation conferences led to violent disputes in which Hitler, in
accordance with his usual habit, tried to find someone on whom to put
the blame; in this instance he fixed upon the far too cumbersome
handling of military justice. In his spontaneous and explosive way, he
ordered directives to be worked out for a rapid, effective, and lasting
intimidation of the population. He declared that imprisonment could not
be considered an effective means of intimidation. To Keitel’s objection
that it was impossible to sentence everyone to death and that military
courts would, in any case, refuse to co-operate, he replied that he did
not care. Offenses found sufficiently grave to necessitate the
imposition of capital punishment without very lengthy court proceedings
would continue to be dealt with as before—that is, by the courts—but
where this was not the case, he would order the suspected persons to be
brought secretly to Germany and all news of their fate to be withheld,
since the publication of prison sentences in occupied territory was
robbed of its intimidating effect by the prospect of the amnesty to be
expected at the end of the war.
The Defendant Keitel thereupon consulted the chief of the Judge
Advocate’s Office of the Armed Forces and the chief of the
counterintelligence office (Canaris), who is also the originator of the
letter of 2 February 1942, Document UK-35, on the procedure to be
followed. When repeated applications made to Hitler to refrain from this
procedure, or at least not to insist upon complete secrecy, had no
effect, they finally submitted a draft which we have before us in the
well-known decree of 7 December 1941.
The staff of experts and the Defendant Keitel had succeeded in
establishing the competency of the Reich Administration of Justice for
the persons removed to Germany (see last paragraph of directives of 7
December 1941). Keitel had guaranteed this stipulation by means of the
first Enactment Decree governing the directives, in which he specified
(last sentence in Paragraph I, IV) that unless orders to the contrary
were issued by the OKW, the case would be turned over to the civil
authorities in accordance with Section 3, Paragraph 2, second sentence,
of the Articles of War. The defendant believed that in this way he had
at least made certain that the persons concerned would have the benefit
of regular court proceedings and that in accordance with the German
regulations for the accommodation and treatment of prisoners on trial
and prisoners serving a sentence, there would be no danger to life and
limb. Keitel and his staff of experts reassured themselves by the fact
that however cruel the suffering and suspense endured by those concerned
might be, the lives of the deported persons had at least been saved.
In this connection, allusion is also made to the text of the covering
letter of 12 December 1941. As the Codefendant General Jodl stated
during his examination, a certain wording was regularly adopted to
indicate that the signatory did not agree with the order submitted. The
covering letter begins with the words: “It is the carefully considered
desire of the Führer ...”
The closing sentence runs: “The attached directives ... represent the
Führer’s views.”
Persons who received such letters knew from that wording that here was
another order of the Führer which could not be evaded, and concluded
that the order should be applied as leniently as possible.
The letter of 2 February 1942 originated with the counterintelligence
office (Amt Ausland Abwehr), and the original which is before you must
have been signed by Canaris. At that time the defendant was not in
Berlin where, after promulgation of the decree of 7 December 1941, the
matter was dealt with further. Keitel, at the Führer’s headquarters, was
not informed of the contents of the letter. In connection with the above
remarks, the possibility of leniency in application, which might be
deduced from the wording of the letter, resided in the fact that
counterintelligence offices were directed “to insure as far as possible
before making the arrest that they were in possession of sufficient
evidence to justify a conviction of the offender.” The competent
military court had also to be approached before the arrest took place
with a view to ascertaining whether the evidence was adequate.
In Germany the persons concerned were to be handed over to the Reich
Administration of Justice. The correctness of the Defendant Keitel’s
assumption in this respect is borne out by the fact that Canaris, in
view of his attitude with which the Tribunal is familiar, would never
have ordered a prisoner to be handed over to the Gestapo. As already
stated, the Defendant Keitel did not know of the letter of 2 February
1942.
Although the Defendant Keitel believed that he had succeeded as far as
possible in safeguarding those in question, the Night and Fog Decree, as
it was later called, weighed heavily on his mind. Keitel does not deny
that this decree is incompatible with international law and that he knew
that.
What Keitel denies, however, is that he knew—or that prior to the
Nuremberg Trial he knew—that on arrival in the Reich the persons
involved were imprisoned by the Police and then transferred to
concentration camps. This was contrary to the meaning and purpose of the
decree. The Defendant Keitel could not know of this because in cases
which did not involve proceedings by a military court, the competency of
the Armed Forces only extended to turning over the persons concerned
through the competent military court officials to the Police to be
transferred to Germany and there turned over to the Administration of
Justice. The Defendant Keitel is unable to say from his own knowledge
why so many persons were brought into concentration camps and there
subjected to the treatment known as “Night and Fog,” as described by
witnesses who have appeared here. The evidence presented to this
Tribunal must lead to the conclusion that all political suspects who, as
a result of political measures, were removed from the occupied
territories to Germany for detention in concentration camps were without
the knowledge of the military authorities designated “NN” prisoners by
the Police, for according to the testimonies we have heard the majority
of persons in “NN” camps had not been formally sentenced by military
courts in occupied territories for transfer to Germany.
It is evident therefore that Police authorities in the occupied
territories made use of this decree as a universal and unrestricted
_carte blanche_ for deportations, exceeding every conceivable limit and
disregarding the exclusive rights exercised by the military authorities
and the rules of procedure imposed upon them.
Such a state of affairs in the occupied territories without the
knowledge of the Armed Forces authorities can only be explained by the
fact that as a result of the appointment of Higher SS and Police leaders
the military commanders of the occupied territories no longer had
executive powers in Police affairs and that these Higher SS and Police
leaders received their orders from the Reichsführer SS.
The Reichsführer SS and the Higher SS and Police leaders were never
authorized by the OKW to apply this decree, which was intended as a
police executive measure to be used only by the Armed Forces. The decree
affected only those offices of the Armed Forces exercising judicial
authority; and it is clear from the wording that it was restricted to
these and drafted to apply to them.
The German Armistice Commission’s letter of 10 August 1944 (Document
843-PS) proves that the OKW really had no knowledge of this improper
application of the decree of 7 December 1941. It says there:
“... that the basis for arrests seems to have undergone a
change, since in the early stages they were only made in
individual cases of attacks on the Reich or the occupation
forces; in other words, those elements were apprehended who had
played an active part in definite cases”—and who were liable to
punishment under those articles of the Hague Convention which
refer to land warfare—“whereas at present ... numerous persons
are also being deported to Germany who, on account of their
anti-German sentiments, are being removed from France as a
precautionary measure ...”
Paragraph 4 of that letter contains the following passage:
“The above-mentioned decree is based on the condition that the
persons arrested will be made the subject of judicial
proceedings. There is reason to believe that on account of the
number of cases—especially those coming within the scope of
precautionary measures—such proceedings are now frequently
dispensed with and prisoners are no longer confined in the
detention or penal institutions of the German legal authorities,
but in concentration camps. In this respect, too, there has been
a considerable change as compared with the original provisions
of the decree ...”
The OKW’s reply of 2 September 1944, which is signed by Dr. Lehmann,
refers expressly to the directives of the Führer decree of 7 December
1941, the so-called Night and Fog Decree. It contains no statement to
the effect that the original conditions for deportation to Germany were
changed by the OKW.
This reply, however, was sent from Berlin without the knowledge of the
Defendant Keitel; and the Armistice Commission’s letter was obviously
also sent to Berlin, where the legal department of the Armed Forces was
situated. Keitel himself was at the Führer’s headquarters and did not
hear of the correspondence.
It must be admitted that failure to reply immediately to the German
Armistice Commission’s letter of 10 August 1944, with the explanation
that this constituted an abuse of the decree of 7 December 1941 and the
directives issued in connection with it, was a grave omission. An
investigation should have been initiated at once in order to find and
punish those responsible for this abuse. Insofar as the Tribunal should
regard Hitler’s military staff as guilty, the Defendant Keitel accepts
responsibility within the scope of his general responsibility as Chief
of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a convenient time to take a recess.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the Prosecution have charged the Defendant
Keitel with participating in the deportations for the purpose of
obtaining forced labor. In this connection Keitel declares that his
competency did not cover the procurement, recruiting, and conscription
of people in the occupied territories nor did it cover allocation of the
labor forces procured in this way for the armament industry. The
Codefendant Sauckel confirmed this in his testimony of 27 May 1946.
Mr. President, I should like to have official notice taken of the
following statements without my reading them. My colleague Dr.
Servatius, according to our agreement, will explain the connection
between the Armed Forces replacement and the procurement of manpower
through the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
[sm type begins]The Codefendant Sauckel gave the following testimony:[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]“Question: You mean by that that the OKW and the
Defendant Keitel had no functions whatsoever appertaining to the
matter of procurement, recruiting, and conscription of labor in
the occupied territories?[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Answer: He had no function whatsoever
appertaining to this matter. I got in touch with Field Marshal
Keitel, because the Führer frequently charged me to ask Field
Marshal Keitel to transmit his orders by phone or by
instructions to the army groups.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Question: Did the OKW, and in particular Keitel
as Chief of the OKW, have any function appertaining to the
question of labor allocation in the homeland?[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]“Answer: No; because the commitment of workers
took place in the economic branches for which they had been
requested. They had nothing to do with the OKW.”[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]During the cross-examination by General Alexandrov
documents were presented which, according to the opinion of the
Prosecution, should prove the participation of Keitel and the OKW. In
this connection it must be examined whether and in what way the OKW and
Keitel had participated in the sphere of duty of Defendant Sauckel as
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (GBA). Document
USSR-365, presented by the Prosecution, contains the basic provisions
concerning spheres of tasks and powers of the GBA, the decree of 21
March 1942 about the appointment of Sauckel as GBA, the order of Göring
as Delegate for the Four Year Plan dated 27 March 1942, the program for
labor allocation, and the task and solution as conceived by Sauckel.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]These documents give expression to the relationships and
contacts of the GBA with many offices. These relationships and contacts
vary in their nature.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The jurisdiction and the official channels in the sphere
of tasks of the GBA are clear: He is the spokesman for the Four Year
Plan (Order Number 3 of 27 March 1942) and he was therefore subordinate
to Reich Marshal Göring and Hitler, who was identified with the Four
Year Plan. The relationships and contacts of the OKW or Keitel with the
GBA and his sphere of tasks, according to the outcome of the evidence
(testimony of Keitel, Sauckel, and the documents) were as follows:[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]The replacement system for the whole Armed Forces was
under the jurisdiction of the Defendant Keitel in his capacity as Chief
of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). Losses at the
front were reported to the OKW by each individual branch of the Armed
Forces and at the same time replacements were requested.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]On the basis of these requests, Keitel submitted a
report to the Führer, according to which replacements had to be procured
for the troops of the various branches of the Armed Forces at certain
designated times by the service commands through their replacement
inspectorates.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]The replacement inspectorates consequently called up the
recruit year group, besides those draftees who had been deferred up to
that time. With the war progressing, the result was almost invariable
that, for instance, the Armament Ministry (for the deferred employees of
the armament industry), the Ministry for Agriculture (for the deferred
employees of agriculture), the Transportation Ministry (for the deferred
employees working for the railroad), et cetera, made the greatest
difficulties with regard to the demands of the replacement authorities,
and protested against them.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]They pointed out that the tasks of the various
departments would suffer dangerously if the deferred employees were
removed without further ado. The competent ministers requested that
before the release of deferred employees new workers should be procured
to make up for those released.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Therefore, the matter was referred by way of the labor
offices to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor
(GBA), whose task it was to procure the necessary manpower for the
domestic labor allocation required. The Defendant Sauckel as the GBA,
who as a special deputy personally did not have at his disposal an
independent organization of his own for the recruiting, procurement, and
possible conscription of labor, was therefore forced to get in touch
with the competent authorities in the occupied territories for the
execution of his task.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](a) In the occupied territories under civil
administration (Holland, Norway, East), it was the Reich Commissioner
who had to assist Sauckel.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](b) In the territories under military commanders
(France, Belgium and the Balkans) it was the Quartermaster General of
the Army.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](c) In Italy, in the highest instance, it was the
Ambassador, Rahn.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]This is obvious from the decree of 27 March 1942.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]Before Sauckel became active in the execution of his
task in the various territories, he invariably turned to Hitler, whose
subordinate he was with respect to the Four Year Plan, in order to
obtain through his instructions the necessary backing by the local
authorities. This was done in such a way that the order was issued to
the local authorities to give Sauckel the assistance which he considered
necessary for the execution of his task. The Defendant Keitel was not
present at such discussions between Hitler and Sauckel, nor did he have
any jurisdiction or competence in these questions. However, somebody had
to inform the local authorities about Hitler’s orders, and the result
was that Hitler, who did not recognize any difficulties of jurisdiction,
told the next best man to inform the local authorities about Sauckel and
to point out Hitler’s wish to grant him all the necessary assistance.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins]These “next best” were Keitel, for the military
administration of the occupied territories, or Dr. Lammers, for the
territories under civilian administration.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]Such was the contact which existed between Keitel and
Sauckel in this matter. How the details of recruiting or otherwise
procuring labor were carried out was not within the competence of the
OKW, nor did they receive any reports on the matter. The interest of the
OKW was limited to the fact that the required number of soldiers were
placed at its disposal through induction by the replacement authorities.
In particular, the OKW and the Defendant Keitel had nothing to do with
the allocation of the labor procured by the Plenipotentiary General for
the Allocation of Labor within war economy; this was solely the business
of the labor offices, where firms requiring labor requested the workers
deemed necessary.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](1) The name of Keitel stands at the beginning of
Sauckel’s activity, as submitted by the Prosecution, because Keitel was
cosignatory to the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General
for the Allocation of Labor (Document USSR-365). From repeated
references of the Prosecution to this fact the conclusion must be drawn
that apparently it sees in this cosignatory act of the Defendant Keitel
the beginning of a chain of developments, at the end of which stood such
frightful happenings as were presented here.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins]In this connection I would refer to the significance,
expounded elsewhere, of the cosignature by Keitel as Chief of the OKW on
such decrees of the Führer. This fact, which penally cannot be
considered as determinative, does not constitute guilt for the reason
that all conception of the events occurring during the further course of
developments was lacking.[sm type ends]
[sm type begins](2) If the Führer’s decree of March 1942 provides the
legal origin of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor
(GBA), the first step in the participation of this official is also
connected with the name of Keitel as head of the OKW, as the personnel
replacements matters were subordinated to him and he made his requests
for replacement of losses at the front to the subordinate military
replacement offices. Here also the same applies as in (1), as neither an
appreciable determinative effect nor criminal guilt was involved.[sm
type ends]
[sm type begins](3) Owing to the situation, as characterized by the
shortage of manpower, there came into being a purely factual connection
between the military personnel requirements and the requirements of the
economic replacement of workers, without Keitel thereby coming in
contact with the GBA either as regards competence or orders.[sm type
ends]
[sm type begins]Sauckel confirmed the statement of Keitel that the OKW
had nothing to do with the recruiting, levying, or any other
mobilization of labor, nor with the allocation of the labor procured for
German economy.[sm type ends]
I have to refer to some documents which the French Prosecution have
submitted to incriminate the OKW and Keitel on account of active
participation in deportation. These are Documents 1292-PS, 3819-PS,
814-PS, and 824-PS.
The first document is a marginal note by the Chief of the Reich
Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, on a conference with Hitler, at which the
question of procuring labor for 1944 was discussed. The Defendant Keitel
took part in this discussion. Annexed to this report is a copy of a
letter from the Defendant Sauckel dated 5 January 1944, in which he sums
up the results of the conference of 4 January and proposes a Führer
decree. I quote the following passages:
“5. The Führer pointed out that all German offices in occupied
territories and countries within the Tripartite Agreement must
become convinced of the necessity of taking in foreign labor, in
order to be able to give uniform support to the Plenipotentiary
General for the Allocation of Labor in carrying out the required
organization, propaganda, and police measures.”