In 1656 for some reason, probably the ef_A history of the administration of the Royal Navy and of merchant shipping in relation to the Navy from MDIX to MDCLX, with an introduction treating of the preceding period

foreign service at their full strength, the guard round the coasts seems

to have been temporarily relaxed, and the result was that ‘the Ostenders

and Dunkirkers begin to grow numerous.’ On the east coast they were so

successful for the moment that, dreaming hopefully that the old times

were about to return, they desired some of their released prisoners to

‘tell the Protector that while he is fetching gold from the West Indies

they will fetch his coals from Newcastle.’[1382] Oliver was not a safe

subject for threats, and their spoon was certainly not long enough to

enable them to enjoy in comfort the meal they proposed sharing with him;

at any rate very shortly afterwards the war was carried into the enemy’s

country by the blockade of Ostend and Dunkirk, and there are no more

lamentations about the number of them at sea, or the mischief they were

doing, until the very eve of the Restoration.

[Sidenote: The Administration:—The Committees.]

The administrative direction of the Navy was, at the beginning of the

Commonwealth, placed in the hands of (i.) the Admiralty Committee of the

Council of State,[1383] (ii.) the Committee of Merchants of Navy and

Customs, and (iii.) the Commissioners of the Navy. The second Committee

took no practical part in the administration, was early requested to

leave the management to the Navy Commissioners, ‘as formerly,’[1384] and

was dissolved in 1654. Warwick’s second appointment as Lord Admiral was

cancelled by a parliamentary ordinance of 23rd Feb. 1649, and the first

Admiralty Committee of the Council of State took over his duties from

that date for the one year for which the Council of State was only itself

existent. This Committee was renewed yearly until the Protectorate,

when ‘Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy’ were nominated by act of

Parliament, and the control of the Ordnance department was also given

them.[1385] Their number varied but was seldom less than twelve or

fifteen; they met at first at Whitehall once a week, during the Dutch war

once a day, and, from January 1655, occupied Derby House at a rental of

£100 a year. Following the fall of Richard Cromwell an act was passed,

21st May 1659,[1386] nominally vesting authority in ‘Commissioners for

carrying on the affairs of the Admiralty and Navy,’ but power really

remained in the hands of Parliament to which the Commissioners had to

submit the names of even the captains they appointed.

[Sidenote: The Administration:—The Navy Commissioners.]

The brunt of administrative work and responsibility fell, however, on

the Navy Commissioners, who, so far as may be judged from the letters

and papers relating to them and their work, laboured with an attention

to the minutest details of their daily duties, a personal eagerness to

ensure perfection, and a broad sense of their ethical relation towards

the seamen and workmen, of whom they were at once the employers and

protectors, with a success the Admiralty never attained before and has

never equalled since. The earliest Commissioners were John Holland, Thos.

Smith, Peter Pett, Robt. Thompson, and Col. Wm. Willoughby;[1387] the

last-named died in 1651, and was replaced by Robt. Moulton, who himself

died the next year. In 1653, Col. Fr. Willoughby, Ed. Hopkins, and

major Neh. Bourne, who, besides being a soldier had also commanded the

_Speaker_, were added to the first four. In 1654 Geo. Payler replaced

Holland, and from then there was no change till 1657, when Nathan Wright

succeeded Hopkins. All the Navy Commissioners, except Holland, had £250 a

year, a sum for which they gave better value than did the members of the

Admiralty Committee for their £400 a year; but for 1653 each was granted

an extra £150 in consideration of the excessive and continuous toil of

that year.

From the first they adopted a tone towards the Admiralty Committee

which would hardly have been endurable but that it was excused by an

obvious honesty, and justified by superior knowledge. Early in 1649

they recommended that the rope-makers at Woolwich should have their

wages increased by twopence a day, but their letter was returned by the

Admiralty Committee, probably with a reprimand. This was not to be borne

in silence, so ‘we have cause to resent that we are so misunderstood

as to be inhibited by you to do our duty.’ If the Committee has not

itself power to make the order it can move Parliament, ‘who will not

see men want, especially as in the sweat of these men’s brows consists

not only their particular living but also that of the republic.... What

interpretation soever may be made of our actions by those that have

the supervision of them we shall not fail to represent the grievances

of those under our charge when they represent them to us.’[1388]

On 22nd May 1649 the admirals and captains at sea were ordered to

address the Commissioners direct on all administrative details, thus

leaving only matters of the highest importance to be dealt with by the

Admiralty Committee. In some ways the relative position of superiors and

inferiors seems to have been reversed, for, on one occasion, we find

the Committee writing to the Commissioners about a course of action the

former had decided on, that, ‘as you disapprove’ of such procedure, it

was not to be adopted; and it frequently happened that the Council of

State communicated directly with the Navy Commissioners, ignoring the

intermediate Admiralty Committee.

During the Dutch war a Commissioner was stationed in charge of each of

the principal yards—Pett at Chatham, Willoughby at Portsmouth, and Bourne

at Harwich, which last place, in consequence of the operations on the

North Sea and off the Dutch coast, had suddenly sprung into importance.

Monk wrote concerning Bourne: ‘It is strange that twenty ships should be

so long fitting out from Chatham, Woolwich, and Deptford, where there are

so many docks ... when there have been twenty-two or more fitted out from

Harwich in half the time by Major Bourne.’[1389] There is a consensus of

evidence as to the way in which Bourne threw his heart into his work, and

the success he obtained under difficulties due to the want of docks and

materials at Harwich and an insufficient number of men. Notwithstanding

Monk’s depreciatory reference to Chatham, Pett was very well satisfied

with his operations there. A few months before he had reported to the

Admiralty Committee that he had graved nine ships in one spring tide,

without injury to ship or man; ‘truly it makes me stand amazed at the

goodness of God in such unparalleled successes.’

Besides their superintendence of the building, repairing, and fitting

out of ships, the purchase and distribution of stores, the control of the

dockyards, and all the diverse minutiæ of administration in war time, the

Commissioners were called upon to maintain the not very rigid discipline

of the service. Hitherto all ranks had been allowed to do much as they

pleased when ships were in port, but henceforth no captain was to leave

his command for more than six hours without the express permission of

either the Admiralty or Navy Commissioners, and during any such absence

the lieutenant, or the master, was to remain on board; for the first

disobedience the penalty was a fine of one month’s pay, for the second

three months’, and for the third to be cashiered. Similar rules applied

to all the officers; and men absent without leave forfeited a month’s

pay. The clerks of the check[1390] were to ‘take an exact account’ how

officers and others performed their duties, and once a week report to the

Navy Commissioners, a regulation which, if loyally obeyed, must have made

the clerks popular. The clerks of the check attached to the dockyards

were to similarly watch the clerks on shipboard, and, in turn, report

on them once a week to the Commissioners.[1391] This system was akin to

that of the sixteenth-century Spanish navy, in which the duties were so

arranged that each officer was a spy on another; admirable in theory, it

did not suit English idiosyncrasies, and these reports never took any

practical shape.

From 2nd June 1649, the Navy Commissioners had occupied rooms in the

victualling office at Tower Hill, but in 1653 they found the annoyance

caused by the proximity of the victuallers’ slaughterhouses there to

be unbearable. It was not, however, till the next year that Sir John

Wolstenholme’s house in Seething Lane was purchased for them for £2400,

and became the Navy Office for a long period;[1392] the Treasurer’s,

now a quite distinct office, was in Leadenhall Street, and its lease

was renewed in February 1657 for eight years at a rental of £49, 6s 8d

a year and a £700 fine. The next request of the Commissioners was that

their number might be increased, as half the members of the Board were

constantly away in charge of dockyards, and for this they ‘desire timely

remedy or dismissal from our employment.’ It has been noticed that three

new men, of whom certainly two—Bourne and Willoughby—were, in their

sphere, amongst the ablest administrators who have ever served the state,

were in consequence added in 1653. Besides the Commissioners, Thomas

White at Dover, captain Hen. Hatsell at Plymouth, major Richard Elton at

Hull, and major William Burton at Yarmouth, acting as Admiralty agents,

had nearly as much work and responsibility, and executed it as ably, as

their more highly placed colleagues.

In 1655 the salaries of subordinates at the Admiralty amounted to

£1740, the secretary, Robert Blackborne, receiving £250. The first

secretary of the Admiralty Committee, Robert Coytmore, had £150 a year,

of which £50 was regarded as an extra given on condition that neither

he nor his clerk received fees—a stipulation probably due to a lively

recollection of the habits of Nicholas and his successor, Thomas Smith.

The Navy Commissioners had no secretary, and until September 1653 each

Commissioner was allowed only one clerk, at £30 a year—scanty assistance,

considering the amount of work thrown into their hands. From September

the number was doubled, and two purveyors were appointed to assist them

in purchasing stores. The total annual cost of the Admiralty, the Navy

Office, and the chief officers of the four dockyards was £11,179, 9s

10d.[1393]

If we may trust a later writer, the sums spent on the Navy Office, which

bore only a trifling proportion to the naval expenses, sometimes reaching

a million and a quarter, were not misapplied. Henry Maydman, who was a

purser under the Commonwealth, and Mayor of Portsmouth in 1710, wrote

long afterwards:—

In all the wars we had in the time of King Charles’s exile the

Navy Office was so ordered that a man might have despatched

any affair almost at one board ... and with the greatest ease

imaginable, and cheapness too. For their public business was

carried on with all imaginable application, and it was a crime

for any one to absent himself from his post.[1394]

So far as the intentions and efforts of the Navy Commissioners were

concerned this was doubtless true, but it is to be feared that the

State Papers do not support the implication that money matters were

settled with the same ease as those relating to the routine of daily

management, although that, of course, was an imperfection for which they

were not accountable, and over which they had no control. To the full

extent of their power they watched not only over the public interests,

but also over those of the men who, for the first time, seem to have

looked up to officials of their position as friends and helpers. Some of

the appeals they listened to are embodied in a letter to the Admiralty

Committee.[1395]

We have complaints daily made unto us by poor seamen pressed

out of merchant ships into the state’s service that they are

grossly abused by their masters and owners in pretending

leakage, damage, or not delivery of their goods, whereby they

keep their pay from them, meanly taking advantage of the poor

men’s forcing away by the state’s press masters and not having

time to get their rights, are by this means defrauded of their

wages. We look upon it as a very great oppression and have

therefore thought good to acquaint your honours therewith.

Shortly afterwards they had to write on behalf of merchants who had

trusted them[1396]:—

It is not pleasing to us to fill your ears with complaints, yet

we judge it our duty, while entrusted with so great a share of

the naval affairs, to again remind you of the emptiness of all

the stores.... We have not been wanting in obtaining supplies

by means of fair promises, and now we are hardly thought and

spoken of by those who cannot obtain their money.

In one instance the ‘fair promises’ resolved themselves into a bill for

£400 on account, which, said the recipient, ‘has hitherto done me no more

good than an old almanac.’ It has been remarked that the position of

all who were in the service of the state became more difficult as time

passed, and money became scarcer and scarcer towards 1660. When, in 1658,

the Navy Commissioners were obliged to pay—or promise—prices from 30 to

50 per cent. above the market standard, it may be supposed that their

situation had its own discomforts.[1397] Besides guarding the material

interests, they had to review the moral conduct, of their subordinates,

and they were evidently shocked to be compelled to report to the

Admiralty Commissioners that captain Phineas Pett, clerk of the check at

Chatham, was the father of an illegitimate child. On another occasion

Willoughby was inquiring whether a boatswain possessed two wives.

After the resignation of Richard Cromwell Parliament interposed more

directly in naval affairs, and the Commissioners exercised less

authority; on one occasion the agent at Chester, who went on board a

man-of-war to muster the men, was refused an opportunity to perform his

duty, and told, in answer to his threats, that ‘the power of the Navy

Commissioners was not as formerly.’ A fact so plainly put must have been

generally recognised, and accounts for the comparative disappearance of

the Commissioners from the papers of the last year of the Commonwealth.

[Sidenote: The Administration:—The Navy Treasurer.]

From 1st January 1651, Richard Hutchinson replaced Vane as Treasurer of

the Navy under circumstances noticed on a previous page. He began with

a salary of £1000 a year, in lieu of all former fees and perquisites,

and the appearance of his name in the State Papers is almost invariably

associated with requests for higher pay, or melancholy wails about the

amount of work thrown upon him by the wars in which we were engaged.

For 1653 he was allowed an extra £1000;[1398] not satisfied with this

he petitioned again in December, and so successfully that, by an order

of the Council, he was to be given, in 1654, £2500, and a further £1000

for every £100,000 disbursed in excess of £1,300,000.[1399] That this

man, who was merely a glorified clerk, who was never required to act on

his own initiative, and whose work demanded neither energy, foresight,

nor talent, should have received over £2500 a year, while the Navy

Commissioners, to whose organising genius was mainly due the rapid and

complete equipment which enabled the English fleets to be of sufficient

strength at the point of contact, were rewarded with £250 a year, and a

gratuity of £150 for one twelvemonth, is one of those incidents which

interest the impartial student of forms of government. From January 1655

his pay was fixed at £1500 a year, with £100 commission on every £100,000

issued above £700,000; a year later he tried to get this commission

doubled, and to have it allowed on his first three years of office, ‘I

having much larger promises at the time.’[1400] A remark like this, the

ease with which he obtained his almost annual increments, and the fact

that he was appointed in spite of Vane’s opposition, taken together, lead

one to suspect that he must have had some potent influence behind him.

[Sidenote: The Commonwealth Captains.]

Among officers, captains were the class who gave most trouble throughout

these years, the number tried for, or accused of, various delinquencies

yielding a much higher percentage of the total employed than that

afforded by the men, or by officers of any other rank. This was, perhaps,

largely due to the rapid promotion necessitated by the sudden increase

of the Navy, commanders being chosen mainly for professional capacity,

and, if considered politically safe, few questions were asked about

their religious or moral qualifications. Many, again, had risen from the

forecastle, and possibly brought with them reminiscences of the habits

existing in the Caroline Navy: others had been privateer captains, an

occupation which did not tend to make their moral sense more delicate.

Professional honour was not yet a living force, and, in some orders

issued by Monk to the captains of a detached squadron, the threat of loss

of wages as a punishment for disobedience came after, and was obviously

intended as a more impressive deterrent than, the disgrace of being

cashiered.[1401]

With one offence, however—cowardice—very few were charged; after 1642

few men wanting physical courage were likely to force their way to the

front. George Wager, who chose to blow up the _Greyhound_ rather than

strike the English flag, had been a boatswain; Amos Bear, a boatswain’s

boy; Robert Clay, a carpenter; Heaton, a trumpeter’s mate; Badiley,

Sansum, and Goodson, cabin boys; and doubtless close inquiry would

reveal many more examples. Four days before the execution of Charles the

Navy Commissioners wrote to Portsmouth, and presumably to other naval

stations, ‘to entreat’ those in charge to take care that all officers

appointed were well affected to the Parliament, and authorising them

to suspend any suspected ones on their own responsibility.[1402] But

the government was not unforgiving; two of Rupert’s captains, Goulden

and Marshall, commanded state’s ships,[1403] and officers who had

deserted in the mutiny of 1648 were received back into the service of

the Commonwealth. The following list, in all probability by no means

complete, will show the large number of captains whose conduct came under

observation, and the character of their misdemeanours:—

+---------------+------------------------------+------------------------+

| Name | Accused of | Result |

+---------------+------------------------------+------------------------+

|John Taylor }| |{ Ordered to enter into |

|Anth. Young }|Neglect of duty in action |{ recognisances to come |

|Edm. Chapman }| of Nov. 1652 |{ up for judgment if |

|B. Blake }| |{ called upon.[1404] |

|Thos. Marriott |Embezzlement, 1652 | Not known |

|John Mead | ” 1653 | ” |

|John Best |Drunkenness and cowardice, | ”[1405] |

| | 1653 | |

|Wm. Gregory |Embezzlement, 1653 | ” |

|Jon. Taylor |Signing false tickets, 1653 | ” |

|Thos. Harris |Neglect of duty, 1653 | Cashiered |

|Jas. Cadman |Killing one of his crew, 1653 | Suspended for 12 months|

|—— |Neglect of convoy duty, 1653 | Not known[1406] |

|Jas. Peacock |Embezzlement, 1653 | ” |

|Sam. Dickinson | ” 1654 | ” |

|Val. Tatnell | ” 1654 | ” |

|J. Clarke | ” 1655 | Cashiered |

|—— | ” 1655 | Wages suspended |

|Robt. Nixon |Cruelty, 1655 | Not known |

|J. Seaman |Drunkenness, 1655 | ” |

|Fr. Parke |Theft from prizes, 1655 | ”[1407] |

|Alex. Farley |Drunkenness and embezzlement, | ” |

| | 1656 | |

|J. Jefferies |Embezzlement, 1656 | Fined £60[1408] |

|Thos. Sparling | ” 1656 | ” £160 |

|J. Lightfoot |Fraud and violence, 1656 | Not known[1409] |

|J. Smith |Embezzlement and drunkenness, | ” |

| | 1656 | |

|Rich. Penhallow|Making out false tickets, 1656| Amount to be deducted |

| | | from his wages |

|Jas. Cadman |Embezzlement, 1656 | Fined[1410] |

|W. Hannam |Cowardice, cruelty, and | Not known |

| |incapacity, 1656 | |

|John Best |Drunkenness, 1656 | ” |

|Robt. Nixon |Cruelty and embezzlement, | ”[1411] |

| | 1657 | |

|Hen. Powell |Embezzlement, 1657 | Severely admonished |

|—— |Drunkenness and blasphemy, | Not known |

| | 1657 | |

|J. Vasey |Drunkenness, 1658 | Charge withdrawn[1412] |

|— Davis |Selling prize goods, 1658 | To refund |

|Robt. Saunders |Came home without leave, 1658 | Cashiered |

|Thos. Whetstone|Drunkenness and theft, 1658 | Not known |

|Rowland Bevan |Embezzlement and carrying | ” |

| | cargo, 1658 | |

|—— |Carrying cargo, 1659 | ” |

|Pet. Foote. | ” 1659 | ”[1413] |

|Robt. Kirby |Drunkenness and theft, 1659 | ” |

|—— |Carrying cargo, false tickets,| ” |

| | 1660 | |

+---------------+------------------------------+------------------------+

It is curious to find that, in 1657, two ex-captains, Mellage and Baker,

were in prison as Quakers. In cases of embezzlement the sentence of a

court-martial, where ascertainable, appears to have been usually confined

to fining the accused the value of the stores stolen, or stopping the

amount from his wages. The custom was commencing of trying commanders,

who lost their ships by misadventure, before a court-martial, instead

of accepting their explanations, or holding an informal investigation

at Whitehall, as had previously been done; and once a captain was sent

before a court because his ship went ashore, although she came off

without damage.[1414] This must be almost the first occurrence of that

form of inquiry. Log books were now compulsory, and were sent up to the

Navy Commissioners on the return of the ship; by an order of 2nd Feb.

1653 an advocate, who conducted prosecutions in courts-martial, was

attached to the fleets. It will be noticed how often drunkenness is an

article in the foregoing charges, and this weakness seems to have been

common in all ranks, from captains down to ships’ boys. Among these

naval papers there are very few indications of the existence of Puritan

fervour or even of ordinary religious feeling; the great mass of men

and officers aimed at pay and prize money, gave strenuous service when

the former was punctual and the latter plentiful, and became heedless

and indifferent when they failed. Sailors have been always much more

interested in their material prosperity in this world than the prospects

of their future welfare in the next. Nor does the rule of the saints

appear to have spiritualised the proverbial hard swearing of the service.

[Sidenote: Inception of Class Feeling.]

It is, however, from this period that dates that sense of solidarity

among officers and men which is at once the sign and consequence of an

organised and continuous service. Hitherto the permanent executive force

in peace time had consisted of a few subordinate officers and some 200

or 300 shipkeepers, many of whom were not even seamen. When a fleet was

prepared, the ships were commanded by captains for whom sea service was

only an episode, and officered and manned by men who came from, and were

immediately sent back to, the merchant service on the completion of their

cruise. But between 1642 and 1660 every available English sailor must

have passed a large portion of those years on the state’s ships; and the

captains and officers were kept in nearly continuous employment, with the

result of the formation of a class feeling, and the growth of especial

manners and habits, characteristic of men working under conditions which

removed them from frequent contact with their fellows. The numerous

notices in Restoration literature of the particular appearance, modes of

expression, and bearing, stamping the man-of-war officer—references never

before made—show how rapidly the new circumstances had produced their

effect.

[Sidenote: The other Officers.]

When captains showed themselves so ready to steal it might have been

expected that officers of lower rank would follow, and even improve upon,

the pattern set them, but this did not prove to be the case. Although, of

course, there are many flagrant cases recorded, the number of officers

charged with fraud or theft is not only relatively less, considering

the much larger aggregate employed, than under Charles I, but also

absolutely smaller for any equal series of years. Experience, gained

during the civil war, had led to closer inspection and the introduction

of safeguards which made theft neither so easy nor so free from risk,

and further precautions were taken under the Commonwealth. Embezzlement

by a captain could not be prevented, it could only be punished: but

the regulations which made it easy for him might make it difficult for

his gunner or boatswain. The first step, taken in 1649, was to raise

the wages of those officers who were in charge of stores, a measure

recommended long before by Holland and every other reformer. In 1651

the Navy Commissioners were directed to consider how the frauds, still

numerous among officers, might be best dealt with, and this was probably

the cause of an order the next year that sureties should be required

from pursers, boatswains, and others for the honest performance of their

duties.[1415] These sureties were usually entered into by two persons,

and were sometimes as high as £600.

That some such method was necessary, at least with the pursers, is

evident from the following catalogue of their ‘chief’ abuses, drawn up

by the Navy Commissioners in 1651:[1416] (1) They forge their captains’

signatures; (2) make false entries of men; (3) falsify the time men have

served; (4) sign receipts for a full delivery of stores and compound with

the victualling agents for the portion not received; (5) do not send in

their accounts for one voyage till they are again sailing; (6) charge

the men with clothes not sold to them; and (7) execute their places by

deputy while they stop on shore. The principal reforms suggested by the

Commissioners were that bonds should be required, that stewards should

be employed for the victualling, that pursers should in future sail as

clerks of the check, with limited powers, and that all their papers

should be countersigned by the captain. These measures were all adopted,

but a further recommendation that a pillory should be erected near the

Navy Office for their especial use was not, apparently, acted upon. When

one purser openly declared that he cared not how the seamen starved if

he could ‘make £500 or £600 a year out of their bellies,’ it was full

time to apply to his kind the treatment exercised by governments on such

dangerous idealists as constitutional reformers.

The Commissioners had set themselves a hard task in the inculcation of

honesty, for that sentiment which still regards lightly cheats on a

government was strongly against them. When Dover was searched, in 1653,

large quantities of stolen cordage, sold from the ships, were discovered,

and Bourne found that ‘these embezzlements are so common that the people

declare that they think it no wrong to the state.’ Still in the long

run they were more successful than their predecessors had been, and the

trials for embezzlement became fewer after 1653. Their treatment of the

pursers had the best results, judging from the small number of those

officers who came up for judgment; these gentlemen did not at all like

the new rules and at first mostly refused to sail as clerks of the check.

For reasons unknown, unless it was that they had become more trustworthy

and that the new system was in some respects cumbrous, the clerks

were abolished in 1655 and the pursers reinstated in their old powers,

pecuniary guarantees in the shape of the bonds still being required

from them.[1417] It must have been a very new and unpleasant experience

to some of these men, who many of them remembered the free hand they

were allowed before 1640, to find themselves before a court-martial for

acts they had come to look upon as natural to their places. One steward

attempted to evade an accusation of embezzlement by declaring that the

rats had eaten his books; he might have improved his defence by producing

some of the victuallers’ ‘salt horse,’ and showing that his books, being

tenderer and more nutritious, were more likely to tempt the rats. In

the trial of another we have some account of the mode of proceeding.

The prisoner, Joshua Hunt, was tried under the twenty-eighth article of

war before Lawson and twelve commanding officers, and was himself sworn

and examined. By the twenty-eighth article the character of the penalty

is left to the decision of the court, and Hunt was given the option of

making restitution or of undergoing punishment. In making his report,

Monk remarked that the prisoner had only been found out in that which

most stewards did, and that he would be sent up to London to give his

friends or sureties the opportunity of making amends; if they failed to

do this he was to be returned to the fleet for corporal punishment at the

decision of a further court-martial.[1418] This form of sentence was very

frequent, and gunners, boatswains, and stewards were ordinarily fined the

value of the stores stolen, and committed to prison until it was paid.

The wide discretion left to the courts-martial led to great inequality

in the sentences, especially when an example could be made without

losing the stores or their money value. A carpenter was tried for theft;

he confessed to the intention, and partly to the act, but returned the

articles before arrest. He was, however, ordered to be taken from ship

to ship in the Downs, with a paper describing his offence affixed to his

breast, the paper being read at each ship’s side, to be thrice ducked

from the yardarm, and to be cashiered. Obviously it was more profitable

and less dangerous not to stop halfway in theft. In 1653 is found a

rather remarkable sentence: Wm. Haycock, carpenter’s mate of the _Hound_,

was, for ‘drunkenness, swearing, and uncleanness,’ ordered, among other

things, ten lashes at the side of _each_ flagship. Haycock has the

distinction of being the first recorded victim of the form of punishment

which afterwards developed into the devilish torture known as ‘flogging

round the fleet.’ It became comparatively common during the reign of

Charles II.

At Chatham, in 1655 the authorities appear to have discovered and broken

up a gang of receivers, of whom one had an estate of £5000 obtained

from thefts from the ships and yards. A hoyman, Dunning, confessed to

having conveyed 500 barrels of powder from the men-of-war at Chatham and

Deptford within four years. When pressed for particulars, he exclaimed,

‘Alas! shall I undo a thousand families? Shall I undo so many? I did

not think you would put me upon it to do so!’ Finding that this appeal,

instead of silencing, only whetted his examiners’ curiosity, he had

at last to name eighteen ships whose gunners had given him powder to

remove.[1419] The Admiralty employed detectives of their own to find

out thefts, but on more than one occasion these men turned thieves

themselves. The aforesaid Dunning bought a cable from one of them;

another was found ‘to have unduly abused his trust,’ but a third was

granted £15 for proving the larcenies of captain Cadman. Sometimes,

when the amount was small, the Admiralty, instead of bringing offenders

to trial, deducted the estimated value of their embezzlements from

wages;[1420] evidently punishment was very uncertain in extent, but the

practical impunity of former times could no longer be reckoned on.

In some few instances the Admiralty had to deal with difficulties of

another nature among the officers. Richard Knowlman, a gunner, and

described as a Quaker, wrote to the Commissioners that he had served by

sea and land from 1641, and was still willing to continue in any other

capacity, since ‘I would be free to act against all deceit ... for I see

most men, especially those in the navy and of most rank and quality,

are corrupted.’ Knowlman could not have expressed less respect for the

average official had he enjoyed access to the State Papers, but on the

whole his was one of the very rare eras when such doubts were unjust.

Another master gunner had, for two months, refused to fire a gun, ‘lest

blood might be spilt,’ and a third insisted on preaching to the crew of

the _Fame_, who by no means appreciated his amateur ministrations. In

three instances chaplains are found accused of drunkenness, but their

presence on board ship was not invariable, and their influence appears to

have been very slight. One was tried for forging Monk’s signature.

[Sidenote: The Commissioners’ Success.]

The habits of half a century were not to be at once overthrown, but after

1655 references to thefts became far fewer; and the Navy Commissioners

could congratulate themselves on having done much to extinguish customs

which had gone far to destroy the vitality of the former Royal Navy.

The want of trust, that long experience had shown to be justifiable

in gunners, carpenters, and boatswains, who had been, and were still

to a certain extent, treated as officers, may have been one reason

why lieutenants were now always attached to ships, except fifth- and

sixth-rates. Another may probably be found in the growing demand for

scientific seamanship, an accomplishment the former class had little

opportunity of acquiring. Whatever the cause, the effect was to thrust

the gunners and their compeers lower down in the social scale, to lose

them that respect on shipboard they had hitherto possessed, to lessen

their authority, and so quicken the downward movement. We are told that,

a generation later, it was as usual to strike them as to strike the men,

and that they had to ‘fawn like spaniels’ on the lieutenants to retain

favour or position. The lieutenants must have been found much more

satisfactory; in the whole series of papers relating to this period there

is no instance of one being tried by court-martial, and only one in which

such an officer got into any trouble. His captain put him in irons, but

the reason is not given. Lieutenants were occasionally appointed to the

naval service in the reign of Elizabeth, but the Dutch war may be taken

as the period where their position became permanent. In June 1652, Sir

Wm. Penn, then vice-admiral, writing to Cromwell, gave expression to the

unanimous desire of his colleagues that such a rank should be allowed in

all ships carrying 150 men.

Another difficulty the Commissioners had to contend with was the

forging of seamen’s tickets, an old form of crime which grew in extent

with the employment of so many more men. The Navy Commissioners, in

advance of their time, recognised that the only legal penalty, death,

was too severe, and practically prevented any punishment.[1421] The

Navy department was not the only one which suffered from these forgers,

who were all more or less connected with each other; in the same

year forgeries of public faith bills to the amount of £115,000 were

discovered. Some of these men were in league with clerks in the Navy

and prize offices, and obtained the necessary papers and information

from them. At a later date one of the gang confessed, when in prison,

that the total of the public faith bill and other forgeries was nearly

£500,000.[1422] In 1656 a new plan was tried: ‘to prevent the many frauds

and deceits formerly practised,’ the Commissioners were ordered to send

the Treasurer, daily or weekly, an abstract of all the bills or tickets

they signed authorising payment of money. Subsequently the Admiralty

Commissioners obtained power to themselves commit offenders to prison.

Nicholas Harnaman, for instance, was sent to Bridewell with hard labour

’till further order,’ for counterfeiting tickets.[1423]

[Sidenote: Officers’ Pay.]

Officers’ pay was raised in March 1649, and again in 1653, after which

latter date there was no alteration.[1424] It then stood per month at:—

+-----------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+

+-----------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+

| | £ s d | £ s d | £ s d | £ s d | £ s d | £ s d |

|Captain |21 0 0 |16 16 0 |14 0 0 |10 0 0 | 8 8 0 | 7 0 0 |

|Lieutenant | 4 4 0 | 4 4 0 | 3 10 0 | 3 10 0 | | |

|Master | 7 0 0 | 6 6 0 | 4 13 8 | 4 6 2 | 3 7 6 | [1425] |

| pilot | 3 6 0 | 3 0 0 | 2 16 2 | 2 7 10 | 2 2 0 | 2 2 0 |

|Midshipman | 2 5 0 | 2 0 0 | 1 17 6 | 1 13 9 | 1 10 0 | 1 10 0 |

|Boatswain | 4 0 0 | 3 10 0 | 3 0 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 5 0 | 2 0 0 |

|Boatswain’s mate | 1 15 0 | 1 15 0 | 1 12 0 | 1 10 0 | 1 8 0 | 1 6 0 |

|Quartermaster | 1 15 0 | 1 15 0 | 1 12 0 | 1 10 0 | 1 8 0 | 1 6 0 |

| mate | 1 10 0 | 0 10 0 | 1 8 0 | 1 8 0 | 1 6 0 | 1 5 0 |

|Carpenter | 4 0 0 | 3 10 0 | 3 0 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 5 0 | 2 0 0 |

|Carpenter’s mate | 2 0 0 | 2 0 0 | 1 16 0 | 1 14 0 | 1 12 0 | 1 10 0 |

|Gunner | 4 0 0 | 3 1 0 | 3 0 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 5 0 | 2 0 0 |

|Gunner’s mate | 1 15 0 | 1 15 0 | 1 12 0 | 1 10 0 | 1 8 0 | 1 6 0 |

|Surgeon | 2 10 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 10 0 |

|Corporal | 1 15 0 | 1 12 0 | 1 10 0 | 1 10 0 | 1 8 0 | 1 5 0 |

|Purser | 4 0 0 | 3 10 0 | 3 0 0 | 2 10 0 | 2 5 0 | 2 0 0 |

| Trumpeter[1426]| 1 10 0 | 1 8 0 | 1 5 0 | 1 5 0 | 1 5 0 | 1 4 0 |

|Cook | 1 5 0 | 1 5 0 | 1 5 0 | 1 5 0 | 1 5 0 | 1 4 0 |

+-----------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+

[Sidenote: Guns and Ordnance Stores.]

When Parliament began the rapid construction of new ships some of its

members may have had misgivings about getting the crews to man them,

but few probably anticipated the future difficulties in procuring the

guns wherewith to arm them. Geo. Browne, for so many years the royal

gunfounder, was still almost the only maker, and his works were unequal

to the increased demands.[1427] In March and April 1652, when war

appeared certain, 335 guns were immediately required to equip only part

of the Navy,[1428] but the authorities were already reduced to such

straits as to be compelled to send searchers about London to try to

find ordnance.[1429] A month later some of the inland strongholds were

disarmed, and 84 brass and 544 iron guns thus obtained; the sale of

ordnance taken in prizes was strictly prohibited, and, in the course of

the year, guns were hired at ten and twelve shillings each a month. In

December the ordnance officials announced that 1500 iron pieces, weighing

2230 tons, at £26 a ton, were required, the same number of carriages

at from 21s to 31s 3d each, 117,000 round and double-headed shot, 5000

hand grenades at 2s 6d each, 12,000 barrels of corn powder at £4 10s a

barrel, and 150 tons of breechings and tackle at £50 a ton.[1430] To meet

these wants they had in store only 121 guns and 34,000 rounds.[1431] In

February 1653 the contracts were made for these guns, but, very soon

after they were entered into, the officials saw that the deliveries would

be at ‘a vast distance from our pressing occasions,’ for not only was

the Tower empty but the ports were also destitute of munition, and, at

Portsmouth, they were in April ‘at a stand’ for powder and shot.

All that Browne and Foley could promise was to deliver 140 guns in

October, 190 in February 1654, 254 in June, 230 in October, and 86 in

June 1655; but, as 500 were still to be sent in on old contracts, their

engagements could hardly be relied on. Fifty tons of shot and 5000 hand

grenades they promised for June, 50 tons in September, and 100 more by

March 1654. In the meantime ships intended to serve as armed merchantmen

were actually waiting uselessly for 117 guns, which the Ordnance

department could not procure anywhere.[1432] The immediate outlook for

powder was no better, since there was instant demand for 2780 barrels and

only 500 in store, while the contractors were only bound to supply 660

barrels a month. Here, however, the further prospect was more favourable,

as there were many powder-makers at work and the government could

purchase quantities at Hamburg.

The staff of the Ordnance office was very much larger, proportionately,

than that of the Admiralty. It employed, at yearly salaries, a surveyor,

£194; clerk, £215; storekeeper, £216; clerk of the delivery, £166;

master gunner of England, £121; keeper of the small gun office, £66;

messenger, £60; two furbishers, £12 each; and twenty labourers at £21

each.[1433] Its management had mended considerably since 1640, but the

improvement did not avail to save its independence in 1653 when it became

a department of the Admiralty. In February 1654 matters were so far

better that there were 2359 barrels of powder and 38,000 round and other

shot in hand, but still no guns in reserve. There are no complaints about

the quality of the powder supplied during the Dutch war, but, in 1655 and

1656, accusations against the makers, who were said to ‘use some sleight

to make it Tower-proof on delivery, but it does not long continue good

nor abide change of weather,’ became numerous. All that the authorities

could do was to call upon the manufacturers to make it good, or, if they

preferred, take it back with a licence to export it abroad; 6827 out of

15,098 barrels recently furnished were defective, and, by an order of 2nd

April 1656, the Council gave the contractors the choice between these

courses and being committed to prison. The makers, however, had something

to say on their side. Like most other naval purveyors they had not been

paid, and even to get any money on account were sometimes compelled,

under threats of still longer postponement, to repair Hamburg powder at

17s a barrel when the real price should have been £2, naturally with

unsatisfactory results. Some attributed all the mischief to the Hamburg

importations, but most of them seem to have gone into the business

without any expert knowledge, simply with a view of profiting by the

sudden demand for war material.[1434]

The form of reparation exacted was manifestly unfair: instead of each

maker being required to substitute good for whatever bad powder he had

sent in they were called upon to replace it in proportion to their

contracts. Thus Josias Devey was made liable for 461 barrels instead of

the 141 which were faulty in the number he had supplied, and apparently

he would have fared just as badly if his powder had been excellent down

to the last pound.[1435] As some of the manufacturers had delivered 50

per cent., or more, of inferior quality, the probable explanation of

this not very honourable proceeding is to be found in the fear of the

Council that the worst culprits would be pecuniarily unable to make

amends if assessed at their full liability. Wapping seems to have been a

manufacturing district, since, in July 1657, there was an explosion of

powder mills, or stores, there which injured many people and damaged 846

houses to the extent of £10,000.

[Sidenote: The Dockyards.]

The enlargements and improvements of the dockyards were not as

considerable as might have been expected in view of the increased

number of ships, and the space required for their accommodation. These

requirements were partly met by the greater use made of Plymouth, and

making Dover and Harwich stations where ships might obtain provisions

and minor repairs. Harwich, largely used for a few years in the middle

of the sixteenth century, had been found of some service during the

civil war, but the movements of the fleets in the North Sea, and off

the coast of Holland, brought both it and Dover into prominence. The

latter port was not utilised till 1653, and was never very freely used,

although the quarterly accounts sometimes reached £700 or £800; both it

and Portsmouth were supplied with stores from Deptford. Bourne, from

the date of his appointment as Navy Commissioner, took up his residence

at Harwich, and remained there till March 1658. Monk’s testimony to his

ability and success has already been quoted, although he had none of the

appliances available in the older yards. But in 1657 ground was rented

from the corporation, for a permanent government yard and wharf, on a

ninety-nine year lease at £5 a year.[1436] Plymouth was employed mainly

for victualling the ships on the western Channel station, as Dover was

for those eastwards, and, to a certain extent, for repairs, although

its exposed roadstead was no favourite with captains whose vessels were

fit to put to sea. Blake evidently did not like it; ‘the unsafeness and

hazard of this road, which to us is worse than a prison, is enough to

scare us hence.’

One way of gauging the relative importance of the dockyards is to compare

the stores in hand at a given date. We are enabled to do this for

February and June 1659, as follows:—[1437]

+----------------------+-----------+----------+-----------------+

+----------------------+-----------+----------+-----------------+

| Anchors | 108 | | 129 |

| Masts | 356 | 724 | 269 |

| Cables | 106 | 29 | 272 |

| Loads of timber[1438]| 1500 | 322 | 416 |

| Tree-nails | 80,000 | 122,000 | 93,000 |

| Compasses | | 180 | 144[1440] |

| Noyals canvas | | | 23,000 yds. |

| Hammocks | 900 | 1200 | 700 |

+----------------------+-----------+----------+-----------------+

+----------------------+-------------+------------+-----------+

+----------------------+-------------+------------+-----------+

| Anchors | 62 | 17 | 13 |

| Masts | 498 | 95 | 67 |

| Cables | 70 | 42 | 63 |

| Loads of timber[1438]| 508 | [1439] | 79 |

| Tree-nails | | 2000 | |

| Noyals canvas | 10,600 yds. | 2000 yds. | 4850 yds. |

| English ” | 7650 yds. | 370 yds. | |

| Hammocks | 2020 | | |

+----------------------+-------------+------------+-----------+

Owing to want of money the magazines were very low at this date, but the

relation shown here would doubtless always exist. Harwich and Plymouth

can refit ships which have suffered in spars, fittings, or canvas;

Chatham, Woolwich, and Deptford build or repair, while Portsmouth is

equipped for all purposes. Hitherto all masts had been obtained from the

Baltic, but in 1652 the government tried the experiment of sending two

vessels to New England for them, and the results were so satisfactory

that henceforth a proportion of masts from the colonies is found in all

the lists of dockyard stores. The English canvas is elsewhere described

as west country canvas, and was principally made in Somersetshire;

its manufacture was due to Geo. Pley, afterwards government agent at

Weymouth and governor of Portland, who successfully urged its use upon

the Admiralty. It cost 1s 7d or 1s 8d a yard, and was dearer than French

canvas, but considered better.[1442]

In 1653 there was a double dry dock at Chatham, Woolwich, and Deptford

respectively,[1443] and one at Blackwall, probably in the East India

Company’s yard; these were the only docks directly belonging to, or

available by, the state. No addition appears to have been made to Chatham

yard except the purchase of a wharf and storehouse adjoining the old

dock in 1656.[1444] In October 1653 a contractor from Chatham was either

repairing an old, or constructing a new, dock at Deptford;[1445] and

in 1657 some wharves were built there along the waterside.[1446] A new

dry dock was ordered for Woolwich in 1653[1447] and completed the next

year;[1448] storehouses were built in 1656;[1449] and two years later

a lease was taken from John Rymill, butcher, of London, of one acre of

land, known as Chimney Marsh, on the east side of Ham Creek, ‘next to

the state’s yard,’ for ten years, at £4 a year.[1450] The sizes of the

yards may, perhaps, be inferred from the number of watchmen attached to

each—Chatham, 32; Deptford, 18; Woolwich, 16; and Portsmouth, 13.

[Sidenote: Dockyards:—Portsmouth.]

Portsmouth, if the smallest of the chief yards, became under the

Commonwealth one of the busiest and most important. In June 1649 one

of five new frigates was ordered to be laid down there; this vessel,

the _Portsmouth_, was duly launched in 1650, and, with the doubtful

exception of the _Jennett_, in ‘new making’ at Portsmouth in 1559, was

the first man-of-war of the modern Royal Navy built at that place since

the _Mary Rose_ and _Peter Pomegranate_ of 1509 were first floated in

the harbour.[1451] The dry dock so often recommended and ordered under

Charles I was, however, not yet existent. It was urged that one-third

of the Navy ought to be permanently stationed at the port, but in 1652

the Commissioner in charge complained that there was not room for the

stores required for the few ships usually there. From a survey of 1653

we obtain, so far as names go, a statement of the number of buildings in

the dockyard; they are upper and lower storehouses, upper and lower hemp

houses, block loft, old rope-maker’s house, office and nail loft, canvas

room, hammock room, kettle room, iron loft, tar house, oil house, sail

loft, and top-makers’ and boat-makers’ house.[1452]

Less than twenty years earlier Russell had found that work done at

Portsmouth was 100 per cent. dearer than at the other yards, but

Willoughby had altered that, and now boasted that he could build 20

per cent. cheaper than elsewhere, although all the skilled artisans

required in naval work had to be sent down, there seeming to be as yet

no population attached to or living on the dockyard. He desired that

five and a half acres of adjoining ground should be purchased, a rope

yard erected, and the whole yard surrounded by a brick wall 73 perches

in length.[1453] Therefore in 1653 and 1654 the Navy Commissioners were

directed to take a lease of an acre and a half of the ground recommended,

to set up a rope-yard, and to build the wall.[1454] In December 1655

Willoughby put before the Commissioners the difficulty in carrying on the

ordinary work, ‘we wanting the benefit of a dock,’ and at this time the

staff, recently reduced in strength, numbered 180 men. In the following

April Bourne and captain John Taylor, a shipwright of Chatham, were sent

down to consult with Willoughby as to the best position for a dry dock

which was to be ‘forthwith made.’[1455] On their report an order issued

in August that one of sufficient capacity to take third-rates was to

occupy the situation of the existing graving dock, and that it was not

to cost more than £3200, of which the town, presumably in the hope of

attracting trade and inhabitants, was willing to contribute £500.[1456]

In November Taylor was instructed to go to Portsmouth and superintend its

construction, but he energetically protested that he knew nothing about

dock-building and would, under such circumstances, only make himself

ridiculous. It was therefore put in the hands of Nicholas Poirson, who

signed the contract on 24th November, by which he undertook to complete

it by the following 20th July, for £2100, the government providing the

materials and the corporation £500 of this sum.[1457]

[Sidenote: Shipwrights and Workmen.]

There were still a sufficient number of abuses in connection with the

dockyards, but the flagrant thefts customary under Charles I had been

largely diminished. Members of the Pett family occupied responsible

positions in the three home yards, and either they used their power to

ill purpose, or their favour with the authorities was no passport to

the love of their subordinates. In 1651 there was what would now be

advertised as a great scandal at Chatham; all the chief officers, and

many of the workmen, were accusing each other of misdeeds in a way which

necessitated a governmental commission of inquiry, empowered to take

evidence on oath. The light in which the Petts were regarded is shown

by a remark made by one man to another that he dared not speak, ‘for

fear of being undone by the kindred ... they were all so knit together

that the devil himself could not discover them except one impeached the

other.’ The result of the inquiry was a resolution that all the accused,

on both sides, should retain their places, a decision more likely to be

due to the impossibility of displacing experienced officers when war was

imminent than to any inability to form an opinion.

The yearly salary of the master shipwright at Chatham was £103, 8s 4d,

Deptford the same, and Woolwich £70. The building programme of the

government naturally tempted these men to add to their salaries the

profits to be made by having private yards for the construction of

men-of-war. Holland pointed out that this led to the shipwright’s absence

from the state’s yard, to the exchange of good government workmen for bad

of his own, and that usually a frigate turned out from a shipwright’s

yard cost the country twice as much as one from a dockyard.[1458]

Holland commented on another evil, the existence of beerhouses in the

dockyards, ‘necessary at first, now one of the greatest abuses in the

Navy.’ At least one ‘searcher’ was employed to prevent theft from the

dockyards; but, judging from the small number of such cases reported, the

precautions taken or the higher standard induced in the men, had greatly

altered former conditions for the better. In one instance, however, the

want of honesty shown by two men was attributed—it is painful to have

to confess here—to their habit of reading ‘histrye books.’ The wages of

shipwrights and caulkers were raised in April 1650 from 1s 10d to 2s 1d

a day, and again in 1652 to 2s 2d; they appear to have been punctually

paid to a later date than the seamen, but in 1656, when they also were

beginning to suffer from the emptiness of the treasury and their wages

to fall into arrear, the Council, with the dry humour of officialism,

ordered ‘an exact and punctual inspection and examination’ quarterly of

their accounts. By 1658 they had, mostly, twelve months’ wages owing, but

their murmurs were not nearly so loud as those of the seamen. Frequently

during 1659 they were working half-time or less, for want of materials.

In March 1660 there were not 100 yards of canvas remaining at either

Woolwich or Deptford, the contractors would not supply more without

ready money; and we may assume that other necessaries were equally

lacking.[1459] During part of 1659 there was only one forge going at

Portsmouth, John Timbrell, the anchor-smith, having received no money for

two years, and having been compelled to dismiss his men, being unable to

procure iron on credit. Timbrell was mayor of the town in 1662, so that

the Restoration apparently relieved him of his troubles.

In September 1658 the _Happy Entrance_ was destroyed by fire at Chatham,

a mishap attributed to carelessness on the part of the men at work on

her, and the absence of supervision of the superior officials. This

caused the promulgation of an order the following month that no member

of the superior dockyard staff should absent himself without leave

from the Commissioner, and he only by permission of the Admiralty

or Navy Commissioners, with a general penalty of dismissal for

disobedience.[1460] This order was to be framed and hung up in each yard.

White’s invention of 1634 of iron mooring chains, noticed previously,

was now taken up by the government, and some were laid down at Chatham,

Deptford, and Woolwich for ships to ride at, two to a chain. Mooring

places for the use of merchantmen were granted to White, Bourne and

others at a rental of £5 a year.[1461] The dockyard chains weighed 2 cwt.

2 qrs. 14 lbs. to a fathom, cost fivepence a pound, and were guaranteed

for two years.[1462] In 1658 a boom was ordered to be placed across the

Medway at Upnor, but there is reason to believe that the order was not

carried out.

[Sidenote: Dean Forest.]

Among the Commonwealth experiments was that of using the wood and

iron ore of Dean Forest for the manufacture of iron for the supply of

the dockyards and private purchasers. As a ton of iron could be made

there for £3, 10s, and a ton of shot for £4, and sold respectively at

£7 and £9, the enterprise was more profitable than most government

undertakings.[1463] In 1656 the stock in hand was valued at £9446, which

stood as net gain, all expenses being cleared;[1464] but, as Major Wade,

who was in charge, thought that one or two hundred tons of iron thrown

upon the market ‘would surfeit the whole country,’ it was rather a book

profit than an actual one. However, from September 1654 to March 1659

Dean Forest supplied the Navy with 701 tons of shot and 88 tons of iron

fittings; and from Sept. 1656 to April 1660 with 2300 tons of timber

and 123,000 tree-nails,[1465] the saving thus effected being alone a

sufficient justification of the new department. The plentiful yield of

timber suggested the advisability of building frigates on the spot, and

the _Grantham_ was launched at Lidney in 1654; she was followed by the

_Forester_, and then the _Princess_ remained long in hand, since Furzer,

the master shipwright, was receiving only £2 a week of the £15 necessary

to meet expenses. In October 1659 he wrote to the Navy Commissioners that

instead of attending to his duties he was forced to be away two or three

days in the week trying to borrow money.

[Sidenote: Naval Expenditure.]

The following table, drawn up from the _Audit Office Declared Accounts_,

shows the general expenditure for this period in round figures:—

+-----------+-----------+---------------+--------------+--------------+

| | | | | |

+-----------+-----------+---------------+--------------+--------------+

| | £ | £ | £ | £ |

|1649[1467]}| | | | |

|1650 }| 432,000| 233,500 | 149,000 | 8700[1468]|

|1651 | 446,000| 129,000 | 51,000 | 10,163 |

|1652 | 629,000| 238,000 | 88,000 | 10,900 |

|1653[1469] | 1,445,000| 335,000 | 269,000 | 12,600 |

|1654 | 1,117,000| 450,000 | 230,000 | 11,700 |

|1655 | 587,000| 466,000 | 70,000 | 8700 |

|1656 | 791,000| 473,000 | 209,000[1470]| 8000 |

|1657 | 746,000| 506,000 | | 9000 |

|1658[1472]}| | | | |

|1660 }| 1,442,000| 714,000 | | 11,800 |

|1660 | |1,056,000[1473]| | |

+-----------+-----------+---------------+--------------+--------------+

+-----------+--------+-------+----------+-------------+

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

+-----------+--------+-------+----------+-------------+

| | £ | £ | £ | £ |

|1649[1467]}| | | | |

|1650 }| 8786| 23,768| 5292| |

|1651 | 7776| 19,089| 3783| |

|1652 | 8381| 22,744| 6860|304,000 |

|1653[1469] | 12,500| 29,000| 13,700|227,000 |

|1654 | 13,500| 22,500| 15,700|225,000 |

|1655 | 7600| 21,800| 7700| |

|1656 | 7000| 20,000| 7000| |

|1657 | 10,300| 19,400| 6200|311,000[1471]|

|1658[1472]}| | | | |

|1660 }| 18,000| 25,000| 9000|447,000 |

|1660 | | | | |

+-----------+--------+-------+----------+-------------+

The Commonwealth began its naval administration hampered by a debt of

£233,000, and it will be seen that, with the exception of 1650, during

which year the arrears were partly paid off, it steadily grew in amount.

But comparing the national revenue, which had also to support a standing

army, with the sums devoted to the Navy, the wonder seems to be that

the debt was not larger. For the financial year ending 29th September

1657 the total public income was £1,050,000, and of this £809,000 was

assigned to naval purposes; for 1658 £951,000, of which the Navy took

£624,000.[1474] The receipts for 1659 were put at £1,517,000,[1475] and

the Navy estimates at £848,000[1476].

The strain began to be most seriously felt from 1653, when, in September,

the Navy Commissioners warned their chiefs that £1,115,000 was required

before 31st December, without including the cost of the vessels on

the stocks or that of the winter fleet; no provision, they said, had

been made for this and ‘we find it necessary to lay before you the

daily clamours we undergo for want thereof.’[1477] In October 1654

the Admiralty Commissioners apprised the Protector that the credit

of the Government was so greatly impaired that stores could not be

obtained except for ready money; yet £1,117,000 in cash passed through

the Treasurer’s hands in this year. This sum was procured from many

sources—excise, £262,000; treasurer-at-wars, £424,000; customs, £162,000;

‘profits arising by probate of wills,’ £1163; commissioners for Dutch

prizes, £2029; commissioners for prize goods, £44,000; treasurer at Drury

House, £16,000;[1478] Col. Barkstead,[1479] £44,000; from the exchequer,

£131,000; and defalcations and sale of stores, £31,000. Notwithstanding

these receipts the Admiralty Commissioners wrote in April 1655 to the

Council that they had only been able to pay seamen’s wages, that all

other debts remained unpaid, and that the yards were exhausted of

stores.[1480] Straitened as they were, the Council, two months later,

were not deterred from ordering 2000 Bibles for the soldiers in the West

Indies, although the fact that the commissioners of the treasury had to

‘consider’ how they could be paid for seems to imply that Bibles were

no more to be obtained on credit than cordage. On at least one occasion

Oliver appears to have himself advanced £10,000 to the Navy Office.[1481]

The debt increased, but the revenue did not show the same elasticity;

all that the Admiralty Commissioners could do, themselves almost daily

invoked by the Navy Commissioners, was to carry on the appeal to the

Council, ‘finding every day a sad increase of the just complaints of

several persons for money long since due.’ This was in 1658, but in

March of the following year they wrote bitterly to the Council that,

while such large debts were contracted and they were struggling with

difficulties, it made them ‘exceeding unhappy’ to see that even their

assignments on the customs were not handed over to them in full.[1482] In

May 1659, among other items, £330,000 was owing for seamen’s and £43,000

for dockyard wages, and the £735 a week paid by the Navy Treasurer to

the Savoy and Ely House hospitals was six months over-due.[1483] In

September the army commissioners were directed to hand over £60,000

for naval purposes, although the soldiers’ pay was months in arrear.

When the Commonwealth accounts close on 7th July 1660 the debt was

£1,056,000.[1484] For this large sum every year from 1640 furnished its

quota, thus detailed:—1640-9, £10,200; 1650, £71,000; 1651, £25,000;

1652, £16,000; 1653, £11,000; 1654, £5000; 1655, £50,000; 1656,

£229,000; 1657, £218,000; 1660, £421,000. That the earlier amounts were

not merely book debts carried forward for want of claimants is shown by

the existence of a petition, of April 1658, begging for the settlement

of a bill for freight incurred between 1643 and 1651.[1485] These

liabilities, belonging to only one branch of the public service, help

to explain why many classes of society, not actively royalist, may have

welcomed a restoration which promised a settlement of debts and a more

stable financial system.

[Sidenote: Flags and The Salute.]

When the St George’s cross was made the national flag in February 1648-9,

it was also ordered that an escutcheon should be carried on the stern of

each man-of-war, containing a red cross in one compartment and a harp in

another. In 1653 the three Generals at sea used, besides their standards,

a pendant of red, white, or blue, at the main, and their vice- and

rear-admirals their respective colours at the fore and mizen. From 18th

May 1658 the standard of the General of the fleet was to bear the arms of

England, Scotland, and Ireland, ‘with his Highnes’ escutcheon of pretence

according to the great seal of England.’ The jack flag for admirals

was to consist of the arms of England and Scotland united, ‘according

to the ancient form,’ with the harp added, ‘according to a model now

shown.’[1486] All saluting, whether from ships or forts, was strictly

forbidden in 1652, except in honour of ambassadors; but the salute to the

flag from foreigners was firmly upheld under all circumstances. By the

treaty of 5th April 1654, the Dutch formally acknowledged the English

right to the salute in the ‘British seas.’ In 1657 Opdam, with thirty

Dutch sail, passing Dover struck his flag and saluted the castle; shortly

afterwards he met the _Dragon_ and the _Colchester_, whose captains

ordered him again to strike. He refused, saying that he was not expected

to pay this mark of respect to every ship he met, whereupon they replied

that if he did not they would engage him till they sank alongside. Then

‘he struck in a great rage,’ and kept his flag down till out of sight of

the Englishmen. Man-of-war captains sometimes displayed the same feeling

of pride in their position at the expense of English ships. In 1654 a

Virginiaman was run down and sunk in the Channel by the _Ruby_. In the

subsequent inquiry the master of the merchantman held that the _Ruby_

should have gone astern of his vessel, to which her captain retorted by

asking, ‘How many men-of-war have you known go under a merchantman’s

stern?’

[Sidenote: Prices.]

The prices of naval stores varied greatly, according to the confidence

felt in the treasury and conditions of peace or war; the following are

the rates for some of the principal articles:—

IRON ORDNANCE

1650, £20 a ton

1653, £26 ”

CANVAS

Noyals, 1652, £15 to £17 a bale[1487]

Noyals, 1654, £19, 7s a bale

Vitery, 1654, 1s a yard

Vitery, 1655, 1s 4d an ell

Ipswich, 1654, £1, 12s a bolt

Ipswich, 1655, £1, 7s 9d a bolt

HEMP

1653, £32 a ton (English)

1655, £38, 10s a ton (Riga)

1657, £44 a ton (Riga)

1658, £46 a ton (Riga)

1658, £33 a ton (English)

1658, £38 a ton (Russia)

ANCHORS

1656, £34 a ton

” £37 ”

POWDER

1650, £3, 16s a barrel

1652, £4 ”

1653, £4, 10s ”

PLANK

1653, £2, 18s a load

1655, £3, 7s ”

1657, £3, 5s ” (oak)

1659, £3, 15s ” ”

SMALL ARMS

Snaphaunces, 1658, 11s 6d each

Matchlocks, 1658, 10s 6d each

Carbines, 1658, 11s each

Pistols, 1658, 14s a pair

BLACK ROSIN

1655, £10, 10s a ton

1657, £10 a ton (Mar.)

1657, £9, 5s ” (Aug.)

COMPASS TIMBER

1656, £2, 5s a load

1658, £3 ”

CORDAGE

1649, £30 a ton

1656, £44 ”

1657, £48 ”

1658, £44 ”

SHOT

1652, £11, 10s a ton

1653, £14 a ton

TAR

1654, £1, 15s a barrel

1655, £10, 12s a last

1656, £12 a last

1657, £12, 10s a last

1658, £13 a last

PITCH

1654, £1, 16s a barrel

1655, £15, 5s a last

BEER

1654, £1, 15s a tun

1659, £2, 5s ”

SPRUTIA[1488] DEALS

1656, 12s 6d each

1659, 14s ”

ORDINARY DEALS

1657, £4, 3s per 100 of six score

WHALE OIL

1659, £26, 15s a ton

ENGLISH TALLOW

1658, £2, 3s per cwt.

LIGNUM VITÆ for blocks

1656, £6, 15s a ton

Examples of that incongruity of expression usually associated with

Puritan fervour are not frequent among the Navy papers, but they do

occasionally occur. On one occasion Lawson writes, ‘All that look towards

Zion should hold Christian communion—we have all the guns aboard.’

Major Robert Sedgwick, starting for the West Indies, asks the Navy

Commissioners, after official details, for ‘your prayers that we may be

sent out with a blessing and be a blessing where we go.’ Major Sedgwick’s

duties were to kill Spaniards, plunder their property, and annex their

territory. These men were too grimly earnest in the work they set their

hands to do to trouble themselves about fine phrases. They lacked humour,

and the court of Charles II was, we are taught, very witty; but when, in

1667, the roar of foreign guns was, for the only time in English history,

heard in London, even that majority which always loves a royal jest must

have begun to appreciate the distinction underlying Stewart wit and

Puritan dulness.

APPENDIX A

CHAPTER HOUSE BOOK VOL. XIII

Here ensuyth An Inventorie or boke of All such Stuff, tacle, apparell,

Ordynaunce, Artillarie and habillamentes for the warre as Remayned in

our soveraigne lord the kynges shippes the xxvij day of July the vjᵗʰ

yere[1489] of his reign, By a vewe taken by Sir Henry Wyat, Sir Andrewe

Wyndsore, knightes, George Dalyson, and Thomas Tamworth, commissioners

in that behalf appoynted, Whuch Stuff, tacle, apparell, Ordynaunce,

Artillaries, and habillamentes for the warre Was delyvered into the

charge and kepyng of severall persons hereaftyr particlerly named to our

seid soveraigne lord the kynges use by Indentures thereof made and also

billes signed with the handes of the seid commissioners in the custodie

of the seid persones remaynyng, That is to Sey

The kynges Shippe called the _Henry Grace de Dewe_:—Stuff, Tacle, and

apparell of the seid shippe delyvered by the seid Commissioners into the

charge of John Hopton by Indenture, that is to sey

ffyrst the foremast of the seid shippe j

Shrowdes to the same xvj

Dedemens hyes[1490] to the same xvj

Tacles to the foremast iiij

Doble polles[1491] with Shyvers[1492] of Brasse iiij

Single polles with Shyvers of Brasse iij

Single polles with a colk[1493] of Brasse j

Swyfters to the foremast vj

Doble polles with colkes of Brasse iij

polles whuth Shyvers of wode iij

polles with v colkes of Brasse and oone of wode vj

Garnettes to the foremast with iiij poles[1494] ij

Garnet with ij polles and shyvers of Brasse j

Garnet with a shever of Brasse and another of tymbre j

Trusses to the foremast ij

Drynges[1495] to the same j

Doble polles for the trusses with colkes of brasse ij

Single poles of tymbre ij

Drynges with a doble pole with a colk of brasse and oone

single pole of wode j

halyers to the foremast ij

Shyvers of Brasse to the brest[1496] of the forecastell iij

Ramehedes with ij shevers of Brasse j

Shetes to the foresayle ij

pollies with shevers of Brasse to the same ij

lyftes to the foresayle ij

Doble polies with shyvers of Brasse to the same ij

Single polies with colkes of Brasse ij

Shetes to the toppe Sayle ij

Single polies with woden pynnes to the same ij

Tackes to the foresayle ij

Stodynges[1497] to the foreyerd ij

pollies to the same with woden pynnes ij

cranelynnes to the foremast j

Single poles with shyver of Brasse j

Bowelynnes to the foreyerd with the poleis and dedemanes

hies and oone doble pole with a shever of brasse j

Stayes to the foreyerd with iiij dedemens heies ij

Sprete sayle yerdes ij

halyers to the same ij

Single poleis with shyvers of Brasse to the same ij

lyftes to the Sprete Sayle with iij single polies and woden

pynnes j

Grapilles[1498] with the cheyne hangyng apon the bowspret with

a pole havyng a colk of brasse j

knyghtes[1499] longyng to the lyftes of the foresayle with ij

shevers of brasse ij

The fore topmast j

Shrowdes to the same xij

halyers with a doble polie and a colk of brasse ij single poleis

with woden pynnes ij

Bowlynes to the foretop Sayle yerd with pawes[1500] and dedemens

hyes to the same ij

Brasses[1501] for the foretop sayle yerd ij Single poles with

pynnes of wode ij

lyftes to the foretopsayle yerd with iiij poleis with wooden

pynnes ij

Shetes to the foretopsayle with ij woden poles ij

Steyes to the foretopmast j

Sayle yerdes to the foretop j

Toppe Galant apon the foretopmast j

mastes to the same j

Shrowdes to the same viij

halyers with ij single poles with woden pynnes ij

Brasses to the same with ij single poleis and wodepynnes

and dedemens hyes to the same ij

Bowlynes to the topgalant yerd the power and dedemens

hies to the same ij

lyftes to the foretopgalant yerd with iiij single polies with

woden pynnes ij

Shetes with ij single poles with woden pynnes ij

Stayes to the foretopgalant mast j

Shevers of Brasse for the cattes in the forecastell iiij

Davettes[1502] with iiij shevers of Brasse ij

Smale davettes with oone shever of Brasse j

The mayne mast[1503] j

Shrowdes with cheynes of yron and dedemenes hies to the same xl

Bote tacles of sterebord syde with iiij doble poles and viii

single poleis with xvj shyvers of Brasse[1504] iiij

Swifters on the same syde with vij doble poleis and vii single

polees with colkes of Brasse and ij poles of tymbes[1505]

pynnes viij

Garnettes with ij single poles with shivers of Brasse j

Garnettes with ij single polies with colkes of Brasse j

Garnettes with oone single pole with a shever of Brasse and

an other pole with a colk of Brasse j

Stodynges with a single polie with a Shever of Brasse j

Bote tacles oon ladbord syde with iiij doble polies and viij

single polies with xvj Shevers of Brasse iiij

Bretayn tacles[1506] with ij single polies and Shevers of Brasse

to the same j

Swyfters with vij doble polies with colkes of Brasse and viij

single poles with colkes of Brasse viij

Garnettes whereof oone with ij single polies and ij shevers

of Brasse an other with ij single poleis with ij colkes

of Brasse and an other with a shever of Brasse iij

Stodynges with a shever of Brasse j

tymber polies for the Shuts[1507] ij

The mayne yerde with the mayne parell j

Single poleis with a shever of Brasse to wynde up the mayne parell j

Trusses with iiij doble polleis and iiij single polies with xij

shevers of Brasse iij

Drynges with ij doble polies and iiij shevers of Brasse ij

Single poleis of tymbre to the same ij

Tyes j payer

Whele Ropes[1508] j

Geers with vj single poleis whereof iiij with shevers of

Brasse and ij of tymbre iij

knyghtes belonging to the same with iij Shevers of Brasse iij

Single poles for the topsayle iiij

Shutes with iiij shevers of Brasse ij

knyghtes with ij shevers of Brasse ij

The mayne yerd j

lyftes with ij doble poleis and ij single with vj Shevers of

Brasse to the same ij

Knyghtes with ij Shevers of Brasse ij

Shutes ij

Tackes ij

bowlynes with Brydelles and Dedemens hies ij

poleis to the mayne Bowlyne with ij Shevers of Brasse j

mayne Stayes with viij dedemens hies iiij

Brasses with ij single poles and colkes of Brasse ij

The mayne top j

The mayne top mast and a coler of yron j

Shrowdes to the same with dedemens hies xiiij

The mayne top Sayle yerd j

Tyes j

halyers with a doble and a single polie with ij shevers of Brasse j

Brases with iiij poles ij

lyftes with iiij polies and colkes of Brasse ij

Cranelynnes with a single pole and a colk of Brasse j

Steyes to the mayne top mast j

bowlynes with dedemens hies ij

The top Galant apon the mayne topmast j

mastes for the same j

Rynges of yron for the same j

Shrowdes to the same with dedemens hies x

Sayle yerdes to the same j

Stayes to the same j

Bowlynes ij

Brases with ij poles to the same ij

Shutes ij

Grabulles with cheynes to the same ij

poleys apon the mayne yerd for the grabulles ij

Spare knyghtes standyng by the mast with ij shevers of Brasse ij

The mayne meson mast j

Shrowdes with xj doble poles and xj single poles, a doble

and single polee with colkes of Brasse xij

Swyftyers with vj doble poles and vj single poles with colkes

of Brasse vj

Tacles with ij doble poles of tymbre ij

Single poles oone of tymbre the other with a colk of Brasse ij

Steyes j

Shutes j

Single poles oon of tre[1509] the other with a colke of Brasse for

the same Shutes ij

cranelynes with a single polie and a colk of Brasse j

Brases with ij single poles ij

Teyes[1510] ij

halyers ij

The Rame hede j

knyghtes with iij Shevers of Brasse j

The yerd to the meson Sayle j

lyftes with iij poles and dedemens hies j

Trusses with a double and a single polie with colkes of Brasse j

Toppe j

Topmast to the same j

Rynges of yron j

Shrowdes with dedemens hies x

The Sayle yerd j

Tyes j

poles to the same ij

lyftes with iij poles and dedemens hies j

The top Galant of the mayne meson j

The mast to the same j

Shrowdes to the same vj

lyftes with iij poleis and dedemens hies j

The Sayle yerd j

Tyes to the same j

halyers j

The boneaventure mast j

Shrowdes with x Doble poles and x syngle poleis x

Sayle yerdes j

Tyes j

halyers with a doble pole ij

knyghtes with iiij Shevers of Brasse j

Shutes with ij poleis to the same j

The boneaventure top j

mastes to the same j

Sayle yerdes j

Shrowdes viij

Steyes j

In the storehouse of the Shipp viij single pendaunt polies

with shevers of Brasse viij

Smale single garnet poleis with shevers of Brasse j

Doble lyft poleis with shevers of Brasse iiij

Doble poleanker[1511] poleis with shevers of Brasse iiii

Snach polleis with gret Shevers of Brasse iiij

Single poleis with Shevers of Wode xiiij

Doble poleis with Shevers of Wode ij

Doble poleis with a colk of Brasse j

Single poleis with a colk of Brasse j

pottes called piche pottes j

ketilles to melt in pyche j

boyes for ankers x

boy Ropes x

Shevers of Brasse without poleis iij

leddern[1512] bokettes xij dossen

love[1513] hokes iiij

lynch[1514] hokes iij

Copper ketill not sett in furnes weying by estimacon ccc[1515] j

CABLES AND CABLETTES OF

xiij ynch compas j

xvij ynch compas ij

xv ynch compas ij

ix ynch compas j

viij ynch compas j

--------------

vij

HAWSERS OF

iiij ynch compas iiij

vj ynch compas iij

vj ynch di[1516] compas j

v ynch compas j

viij ynch compas j

iiij ynch compas j

iij ynch compas j

v ynch compas j

iiij ynch compas vij

iij ynch compas j

iij ynch di compas j

--------------

xxij

Smale lyne ij peces

Bygger lyne for lanyers[1517] ij peces

Brayle Ropes with iij poles to the same j

Grete doble Blockes ether of them ij Shyvers of Brasse ij

Single blokes with ij Shevers of Brasse ij

long Ores for the Grete bote lx

Tarre ij barelles

Ores for the Cocke bote xxiij

Standart Staves[1518] lix

Stremers viij

lytle flagges c

Top Armours vii

Targettes xx dossen

large fflagges lx

To the mayne Sayle Acorse[1519] and ij bonettes doble j mayne sayle

mayne topsayles j

Topgalant Sayle j

The meson Sayle j

The boneaventure Sayle j

The foresayle Acorse and a bonet doble and bonet single an other

corse and iij bonettes single in all ij foresayles

The fore topsayle j

The foretopgalant Sayle j

The Bowspret Seyle j

The mayne Sayle for the gret Bote, a corse and ij bonettes single j sayll

The foreseyle acorse and ij bonettes single j

Top Seyle j

The meson Seyle j

The boneaventure Sayle j

An old corse of a hulk Sayle j

ANKERS CALLED

Sterbord bowers ij

ladbord bowers ij

Destrelles[1520] of Sterbord ij

Destrelles on ladbord ij

Shot[1521] ankers j

Caggers[1522] j

Spare ankers ix

--------------

xix

Trene[1523] platters iiij dossen

Trene cuppes v dossen

Tankerdes iij dossen

lantrons[1524] vj

grete lantrons j

middellantrons ij

Copper ketilles in furnes iij

lede in oone pece by estimacon D[1525]

Grete belles in the seid Ship of Brasse j

The grete botes mayne mast j

Shrowdes to the same xiiij

polles to the same xxviij

Tacles oone with a doble pole and colkes of Brasse the

other with a single pole and a Shever of tymbre ij

Single poles with a shever of Brasse j

mayne yerdis and the parell j

Trusses with ij poleis and Shevers of tymbre j

Tyes j

halyers with a doble pole and Shever of Brasse j

Single poleis on of them with a Shever of brasse and other of tymbre ij

Shutes ij

Tackes ij

bowlynes with a pole and Shever of tymbre ij

lyftes with ij Single poleis ij

Topsayle Shotes with ij single poleis ij

yerde Ropes ij

The meyne Stey with ij doble poleis j

The toppe j

The topmast j

Shrowdes to the same vj

Sayle yerdes j

Tyes j

parell to the sayle yerd j

Bowlynes ij

lyftes ij

Cranelynes j

Brases ij

The foremast j

Shrowdes to the same vj

The Sayle yerd j

The parell j

Teyes j

Syngle halyers with a polie to the same j

Shetes vj

tackes j

lyftes with ij poleys ij

Steyes j

bowlynes with a polie j

Single Trusses with a polie j

Bowspretes j

mayne meson mast j

Shrowdes to the same vj

The Sayle yerd j

the parell to the same j

The Tye j

Single halyers with a pole j

Trusses with ij poles j

lyftes with iij poles j

Brases with ij poles ij

Steys with ij Smale poles j

The boneaventure mast j

Shrowdes to the same iiij

Tyes j

Single halyers with oone pole j

The sayle yerd j

The parell to the same j

Ankers for the said bote iij

Cablettes of v ynch compas ij

Cocke bote j

mastes to the same j

Sayle yerdes j

Shevers of Brasse ij

Ores to the same xij

bote hokes j

The skyff otherwise called Jolywatt j

mastes to the same j

Sayles j

Ores to the same vj

Shevers of Brasse j

Shevers of Brasse called a Wyndyng Shever for the j Rame hede j

hawsers of v ynch compas j

hawsers of vj ynch di compas di hawser[1526]

hawsers of v ynch compas iij

Cables of ix ynch compas j

hawsers of vj ynch compas di hawser

Soundyng ledes vj

Ordynaunce Artillarie and habillamentes for warr delyvered to the charge

and custodie of Thomas Spert, master, and William Bonython, purser of the

seid shipp by Indenture as aforeseid, that is to sey

Serpentynes of yron with miches[1527] boltes and forelockes cxxij

Chambers to the same ccxliiij

Stone gonnes of yron Apon trotill wheles and all other Apparell iiij

Chambers to the same iiij

Serpentynes of Brasse apon wheles shod with yron iij

Serpentynes of Brasse apon wheles unshodd j

Grete peces of yron of oon makyng and bygnes xij

Chambers to the same xxiiij

Grete yron gonnes of oone sort that come owt of fflaunders

with myches bolts and forelockes iiij

Chambers to the same viij

Grete Spanysh peces of yron of oone sorte ij

Chambers to the same iiij

Stone gonnes apon Trotill wheles with miches boltes and

forelockes to the same xviij

Chambers to the same xxxiiij

Smale vice peces of Brasse apon shodd wheles of

Symondes makyng j

long vice peces of Brasse of the same makyng iij

ffawcons of Brasse apon Trotill wheles vj

a fayre pece of Brasse of Arragows makyng j

A Slyng of yron Apon Trotill wheles j

Chambers to the same with other apparell j

grete Stone gonnes of yron ij

chambers to the same iiij

Grete culverynes of Brasse apon unshodd wheles of Symondes makyng ij

Grete bumberdes of Brasse apon iiij trotill wheles of

herberd[1528] makyng j

Grete curtalles of Brasse apon iiij wheles and of the same

makyng[1529] j

hakebusshes of yron hole clxxxxiij

hakbusshes of yron broken vjj

Shott of yron of Dyverse Sortes Dclx shott

Stone Shott of Dyverse Sortes in the balist of the ship

A grete nomber not told

In the Grete Bote of the seid ship Remaynyng fyrst

Serpentynes of yron with myches boltes and forelockes viij

Chambers to the same xxv

Serpentynes of Brasse apon shodd wheles j

ffawcons of Brasse apon Shodd wheles ij

In the Storehouse of the shipp

Bowes of Ewe cxxiiij

chestes for the same ij

hole chestes of Arrowes iij

Billys cxliiij

moryspykes lxxx

Backes and Brestes of Almyne Ryvettes of ether cc

Splentes[1530] clxxxxviii payer

Salettes[1531] cc

Standardes of mayle cc

chargyng ladylles for Gonnes with staves vj

staves withowt ladelles viij

Spare miches for Gonnes xiiij

Spare boltes ij

Javelyns ix dossen

Dartes lvij dossen

hamers for Gonnes xiiij

Crowes of yron iiij

Stokepykes of yron xiiij

lynch pynnes iiij

APPENDIX B

THE MUTINY OF THE _GOLDEN LION_

On the 19th April 1587, Drake with the _Bonaventure_, _Lion_,

_Dreadnought_, _Rainbow_, and _Spy_, of the Queen’s, and some twenty

armed merchantmen attacked Cadiz, with results disastrous to Spain.

Borough was vice-admiral and in command of the _Lion_. The fleet left

Cadiz harbour on 21st April, and on the 30th Borough addressed a long

and vigorously worded letter to Drake[1532] protesting that the councils

of war called were only nominal consultations where the admiral declared

his will, or else merely entertained his visitors who departed ‘without

any consultacyon or counsell holden.’ Drake’s answer was to supersede

him. All we know further is that on 27th May the _Lion’s_ company put

their new captain, Marchant, on the _Spy_, and sailed away for England

with Borough who afterwards declared that he was in daily fear of his

life, and therefore had no great reason to try and stop their action. If

Borough did not incite them to mutiny the men of the _Lion_ must have

been for some time full of discontent and ready to desert. The chase of

the Bark of Lyme, which took them from under the guns of the rest of

the fleet, gave them their opportunity. On 30th May, Drake constituted

a court-martial on the _Bonaventure_, of himself and the other superior

officers, at which most of the mutineers were condemned to death in their

absence. The account of this inquiry gives a vivid picture of the modes

of thought among the men, and their ideas of their rights and duties.

Although time has settled the historical perspective in which we view

Drake and Borough, it must be said for the latter that, in 1587, the

admiral was only to him, one of half-a-dozen great seamen with whom

Borough, and doubtless his contemporaries, thought he could claim

equality. He was an experienced commander and one of the four Principal

Officers of the Navy; he was, here, second in command to Drake, and it

was contrary to all the traditions of the service that the admiral should

undertake any enterprise without the advice and consent of his captains.

In this matter Drake was one of the first expedition leaders to strike

out a line of his own, and Borough, tenacious of custom and what he

considered his rights, at once came into collision with him. It was long

before Drake’s principle of accepting sole responsibility was generally

followed. In a private note of farewell to Burghley in 1596, and perhaps

with this incident in his mind, Howard, when leaving for the Cadiz voyage

wrote,

‘I have no meaning to ronne any rash or unadvysed course nor to

settell any thyng for Her Maiesties servyce upon my own jugment

but to yeald to those that shall show best reson.’[1533]

After their return an inquiry was held at which the vice-admiral was

charged with neglect of duty at Cadiz.[1534] No actual result followed,

but Borough came off with the honours of war since he was not disgraced,

and remained one of the chief Officers of the Navy. Burghley appears to

have been on his side, and Borough wrote subsequently an effusive letter

thanking him ardently for his support.[1535] From one passage in this

letter in which he says that he had hoped that after the inquiry his

innocence would be proclaimed, but that ‘I have suppressed my greefe

in respect of the comandment and charge given me,’ it may be inferred

that the finding was actually favourable to Borough but not made public,

perhaps from a desire not to offend Drake. One other point is worth

noticing: if the crew of the _Lion_ voiced the general feeling among

English seamen, Drake was certainly not loved by them.

ADD. MSS., 12,505, f., 241.[1536]

=A generall courte holden for the service of her Maᵗⁱᵉ abourde

the _Elizabeth Bonaventure_ the xxxth day of Maye before Sir

Ffrauncis Drake, knighte, generall of Her Maᵗⁱᵉˢ fleete; Thomas

Fennard, Vice-Admirall; Anthony Plotte, Leivetenant-generall;

John Marchant, serjant-major, and the reste of the captaines

and masters of the fleete as followeth,=

The generall, att this courte, called in question and

judiciallye demaunded of Captayne Merchaunt howe he colde

discharge himselfe to answere the departure of Her Maᵗⁱᵉˢ

shippe the _Golden Lyon_ which he latelye gave him in charge?

Captayne Marchaunt protestinge, with all earnest affeccon,

his innocencye alledged and declared,—That there was a great

Mutynie growen amonge the Company of the _Lyon_ the 27 of this

month; as sone as we had given over the chase undertaken,

understandinge that she was the Barke of Lyme,[1537] when I

requyred the Master that we mighte lye close by the wynde to

recover our generall, the Master answered, ‘Well, Captaine,

we will.’ But presentely one of the quartermasters came and

delivered me a lettere in the behalfe of the whole company as

followeth:—

‘Captayne Marchaunt, Captayne of the _Golden Lyon_ appoynted

by Sir Ffrauncis Drake, generall of this fleete,—Wee, the

Quenes, and yours at this tyme desyre that, as you are a man

and beare the name of a captayne over us, so to weighe of us

like men, and lett us not be spoyled for wante of foode, for

our allowaunce is so smale we are not able to lyve any longer

of it; for when as three or foure were wonte to take a charge

in hande, nowe tenne at the leaste, by reason of our weake

victuallinge and filthie drinck, is scarce able to discharge

it, and yet growe rather weaker and weaker; which suerly if

it be not loked into, will growe to greate dishonour on your

parte, and to a lastinge shame on our sydes, by reason of

the moste worthie and the moste honorable challendge of our

generall at Caste Calleys[1538] in daringe the kinges deputie,

or the kinge himselfe if he were in place, or the proudest

champyon he had to come fourthe and chaunge a Bullett with him;

but none durste once adventure to come forthe unto him, but

the Cowardlike knightes sayde they were not readye for him: a

moste worthye enterprise, deservinge lastinge fame to come to

the gates of his Courte, yea the strongest holde of his lande,

and dare him fourthe. Our hartes were then so boldened and our

stomackes so coragiouslye bente, that if theye had byn Tenne to

one we rather wished to fighte than to goo to dynner. But nowe,

most unfortunate and unluckie chaunce fallen amongest us by

weakeninge of our Lymes, and feblenes of our bodyes, we are not

able to abyde the force of them as nowe, and thoughe they be

but one to one, the more is our greife; for what is a piece of

Beefe of halfe a pounde amonge foure men to dynner or halfe a

drye Stockfishe for foure dayes in the weeke, and nothing elles

to helpe withall—Yea, wee have helpe, a litle Beveredge[1539]

worse than the pompe water. Wee were preste by her Maᵗⁱᵉˢ

presse to have her allowaunce, and not to be thus dealt

withall, you make no men of us, but beastes. And therefore wee

are not determyned to goe any further, but as we broughte the

_Lyon_, with our Master’s helpe, fourth, so wee will carye her

home agayne by the helpe of God, for as the wynde is faire and

home we will. And thus Captayne Marchaunt thinke of us as you

will and lett us have more victualles to bringe us home, for as

longe as it please God this wynde to blowe we will not alter

our corse, but home straighte and so thinck of us as you please.

The Quenes men and yours homewardes to our powers.’

* * * * *

And there withall came the Master unto me sayinge, That there

was not a man that wolde sett his handes to the saylles.

Noe Master, quoth I, what is it you can not comaunde them to

doe, beinge Master of the shippe! Strike the sayles, but it

colde not be don for the yeardes weare alonge[1540] before

hande, and the Toppes and Shrowdes manned, and the Master sayde

they wolde doe nothinge for him.

* * * * *

To appease this Mutanie I came amonge them myselfe saying,

My masters, what soden Mutaine is this amonge you? colde not

this have byn spoken of when we were neare the generall, yf any

thinge had byn amys there yt had byn redressed; I wolde wishe

you take a better corse then this for yt will not be answered.

Wherewith for the whole company spake one Crowe, that they

wolde not loose the wynde which was fayre and further theye

wolde not goe.

I showed them also that for theire victualles there was in the

shippe by the confession of the Pursur sufficient for 30 dayes,

assuringe them also on my life that as sone as they came to the

generall they sholde have a monthes victuall put abourde them

presentlye.[1541] But theye cryed alowde they wolde all home,

excepte some xii or xvi gentlemen and officers.

To perswade them the rather to staye I said moreover unto

them, My Masters, I will nowe imparte unto you a matter which

I thoughte to have secreyted untill another tyme, That there

is an Island of greate ritches promysed to be delivered to our

generall without the losse of one man, I praye you therefore

staye and talke with him, and he will laye you downe such

reason as shalbe to the contentacon of you all. Whereat one

Cornelius one of the gunners said, Well, Captayne, at your

requeste we will staye till nighte to speake with the generall,

for the which I thanked them all hartylie; howbeit they

presentely layde theire heades togither agayne and came with

one voyce sayinge, the wynde is good, we will not staye, we

will awaye, all! all! all! When I sawe the Mutaine so farre

growen I requested Mr Boroughes that he wolde worke a meane

with them to cause them staye, untill they cam to the generall

that they might acknowledge him and departe in good order from

him. They answered presentely that they wolde not staye for the

generall for they knewe what order he wolde take with them.

In the moste of their mutanie I saide unto them, What! is there

no honest man will acknowledge their generall, and therewith

willed as many as wolde so doe to holde up their hands, which

aboute xii or xvi gentlemen and officers did; the reste cryed,

home! home!

Then I said, My masters, this plate[1542] hath byn layde before

now by the principalles, not by the common sorte which will not

be answered. Why, quoth Mr Boroughes, howe speake you that,

meane you me? I answered, I wolde I knewe it were you, then

wolde I sone tell you of it, but I am suer it is don by the

principalles.

Whereupon I requested then I mighte be sett aborde the Quenes

pinnis. They tolde me, Noe, that they colde carye me as safe

into England as Sir Ffrauncis Drake colde. I answered I wolde

never be caryed into England by such a company of unhonest

persons as theye were.

Then I requested Mr Borughes that he wolde deale with the

Company that I mighte departe for I knewe he might do it. My

masters, said he, what unreasonable men are you, will you

neither staye for the admyrall nor lett the man departe! Lett

him departe for shame or elles staye for the admyrall, doe one

of the two. Then said Crowe, well Captayne, if you saye the

worde you shall goe; with that theye were contente.

Then once more I requested Mr Borughes as he was a gentleman

and tendred the accon[1543] that he wolde deale once more with

the company, for I knewe he might doe it, and promysed as I was

a Christian that there sholde not one here of theire heddes

perishe, Soe as theye wolde staye and speake with the generall.

He retorned to me agayne this answere, Captaine Marchaunt I

have talked with them and theire answere is this, They have had

many promises and little performance, therefore they will staye

noe longer.

When I sawe them so bent I called to Captaine Clifforde who was

in the Quenes pynnis desyringe him to take me in and bringe me

to the generall, for that I wolde not be caried into England by

a company of such unruly persons.

He cryed unto me that he wolde have me in or elles come abourde

for me himself, but theye manned theire Boate and sett me

aboarde, which, when one of those in the toppe perceaved, he

cryed with an othe, What! will you let him goe! Yf he fetche

up the Admyrall before nighte he will overtake us and then you

shall see what worke he will make with us.

In the middest of the mutinie I callid the Pursur unto me and

demaunded of him for what cause the company had stinckinge

beveredge to drincke, as there were in the shippe 15 tounes

of beare, sayinge, that if theye had any such theye sholde

have it in thende and drincke the beare as longe as it lasted.

Whereupon the company with one voyce cryed, Yea, Captaine, God

save your life, yt is your will we knowe that we sholde have

it; but we have it not.

The daye before theis matters brake forthe I ymparted my

mynde to Mr Borughes, tellinge him that scince the generall

is bounde for the Ilandes the next fayre daye that cometh, I

will goe abourde him and geve him to understand in what case

we stande for victualles that we maye be the better provyded

whatsoever befall. Nay, said he, the pursur hath byn with him

and he understandeth it alreadye for that wilbe a meane yf he

be not mynded to goe for the Ilandes to make him goe thither.

And therefore if he will runn into the Indies lett him run,

he knoweth alreadye what we want, never goe to him at all for

any thinge. Then, I said, when the Pursur was with him he was

so busie as he cold not have any leasure and therefore willed

him to resorte unto him at another tyme. He[1544] answered as

he did at the firste. The same tyme that the _Raynebowe_ had

her mayne sayle taken from the yearde by weather the Captaine

of her desired me to beare up with the generall to give him

to understand of his distres. Then quoth Mr Boroughes, The

generall seeth in what case he is and beareth all the sayle he

can and stayeth not for him, let us staye by him and helpe him.

But his desyre is, quothe I, that the generall sholde knowe it

presentlye and that his foremast is spent. Thereto Mr Boroughes

answered, The Captaine is a foole and he knoweth not what

belongeth to it so well as I doe.

* * * * *

Captaine Clifford sayth and testifieth that a such tyme as he

came nere the _Golden Lyon_ to take in Captaine Marchaunte he

callid to the master of the same shippe, wishinge him to have

care of himselfe, to bringe backe the shippe to the generall

and to appease the companye, for that he knewe he was a man

colde doe much amonge them, addinge further that he was not

able to answere it at his cominge home. He answered he colde

not doe withall and the company were resolved to goe home. The

master of the same pinnisse spake unto him in like manner, or a

greate deale more.

Then Captaine Clifforde called to the company and tolde them

that if theye wente awaye with her Maiesties Shippe some of

them wolde be hanged, upon which wordes Captayne Marchaunt hard

them call Capteine Clifforde, Arrant villane.

* * * * *

Upon dewe consideracon whereof the generall sayde:—Althoughe

I am not dobtefull what to doe in this case, or yet want any

aucthoritie, but myselfe have from Her Maiestie sufficient

Jurisdiccon to correcte and punnishe with all severitie as

to me in discretion shalbe meete, Accordinge to the Qualitie

of the offences, all those sceditious persons which sholl be

in the whole fleete, yet for the confidence I have in your

discretions, as also to wytnes our agreament in Judgement in

all matters, I praye you lett me heare your severall opynions

touching this facte which hath byn declared in your hearinge

this daye; In my judgement it was as fowle and untollerable a

mutanye as ever I have knowne. Captyne Marchant hath discharged

his dutie faythefull as a true servitor unto her Maiestie; all

the rest of that shippe, exceptinge only those 12 or 16 which

helde up theire handes to wytnes theire wyllingnes to retorne

to our company have deserved a shamfull deathe in that theye

have forsaken her Maiesties standerd and conyssyon and forsaken

her Maiesties Shippes Royal beinge distressed, and as much as

in them lyeth hindreth the service in hande for the honor and

saffetye of her Maiesties realmes and domynyons. And therefore

my fiynall and diffinityve sentence is this—That the master of

the said Shippe, the boteswaine, and Mr Boroughe, and Crowe,

the pryncipall contryvers and workers of this mutanie, shall,

assone as I come by them, wheresoever I find them within my

power, abyde the paynes of Death; yf not theye shall remayne

as deade men in lawe. All the rest shall remayne also at her

Maiesties mercye as accessaryes to this treacherous defection.

And thoughe it shall please her Majestie to looke upon them

with mercye, yett my sentence is theye shall all come to the

Corte gate with halters aboute theire neckes for an example of

all such offendours. The whole Councell approved this sentence

as iuste and necessarye for avoydinge the like hereafter,

which elles muste needes growe to the utter dissolucon of all

her Maiesties service for the sea hereafter.

God save the Quene.

The next paper (f. 243, et seq.), is endorsed

=‘The voluntary confession of William Bigatt, Master of the

_Lion_, under Captain Wm. Burrowes, June 1587.’=

Bigatt, of course, desired to clear himself and Borough; but the paper

is of interest from the side-lights it throws on naval customs and

discipline. Modern punctuation has been inserted where necessary.

The xxvii of Maye 1587 beinge Satterdaye assone as yt was

dayelighte wee sawe a sayle a heade of us, which was north

northeaste from us as farr as wee coulde well see her; unto

the which we gave chase by the comaundement of our captaine,

captaine Marchaunte, for that wee thought her to be a Spanierd

or Portingall, the winde beinge at weste southweste, our

generall with those shipps which were with hime beinge then

in sighte of us, and not then farr from us; but the generall

kepinge nearer the winde then wee did, for that wee followed

chase after the sayle which we sawe as aforesayd, wee lost the

sight of the generall with the reste of those that were with

him, then beinge abowte eighte of the clocke in the morninge,

then beinge with us in companie the _Spie_ of her Maiesties,

both of us still followinge the chase. And abowte eleven of the

clock before none, beinge then but three houres after wee had

lost sight of the generall, wee sett up the sayle and spake

with him, yt was one of our owne companie, a Barke of Lyme, but

shee departed from us a five dayes before with others for to

come home for England.

As sone as wee had spoken with this Barke I called unto

the companye as yt is the use of sea menn for to doe, and

willed them to take in our sprett sayle but they awnswered

me not that I hearde anie thinge att all at that time; but

I thinkinge that it had bin doun according as I willed them

which was that they should gett yt in. A little while after I

came forewardes againe to the mayne maste, and asked, What?

is your sprett seyle in? but none awnswered, neither that yt

was in, nor that it was not in, and John Terrye, beinge one

of our quartermasters, walkinge afore the maste, I called

unto him and willed that the Sprett Sayle shoulde be got in

that wee might kepe our loofe;[1545] he awnswered me that the

companie said theye would not take yt in. No! said I, what is

the cawse? Whoe be they that saye they will not? He awnswered,

they all in generall saye soe; I demaunded, Whie will they not?

he awnswered that the captaine, captaine Marchaunt, knew the

cawse, and that the cawse whie was delivered him in writinge.

Then I went unto the captaine, he, with his lieftenaunte Mr

Nicholls, beinge then readinge the letter which was delivered

the captaine; I also seinge parte of the bill read, wente

forwarde againe to the maste and called unto them and willed

them that they should gett in theire sprett sayle and haile

afte our shoowtes[1546] that wee might goe unto our generall

and the reste of the fflete, but none of them would goe abowte

to doe yt by anie sayinge that I coulde saye unto them. Then I

wente unto the captaine, captaine Marchaunte, and toulde him

that I had willed the companie to gett in the Sprett Sayle

and hale after our showttes, but I could gett none of them

to doe yt by anie meanes; he himself then goinge forwarde to

the mayne maste, demaunded, whie they did not as the master

comaunded them, and, as yt will be proved he comaunded them

in her maiesties name to doe yt. The moste parte of them

awnswered hime that they would not, but that they would goe for

England, for the winde is nowe good, and that they would not

goe backe againe and be starved for wante of victualls; the

captaine awnsweringe them againe sayd, Contente yourselves,

what victualls soever are in the shipp you shall have yt, and

therefore holde yourselves contente untill wee mete with our

generall. They said againe, they have had manye faire woordes,

but nothing performed in dedes. Then I myself, perswaded them

that theye would contente themselves and that they woulde hale

afte the showttes, that wee might tarrye and not goe home,

but that the generall shoulde knowe of theire goinge, and not

for to goe awaye in that sorte, not makinge him acqueinted

of the departure of the shipp, and soe likewise did captaine

Marchaunte requeste them that if theye woulde nedes goe that

they would stay but untill nighte to see yf wee coulde possible

mete with the generall, yf not that then they might doe as

they thought good; and Mr Burrowes did likewise intreate with

them that they, would staye and not goe awaye in that order;

then Cornelius the Gonner intreated with the reste of the

Gonners and parte of the companie to tarrie untill nighte to

see yf wee could mete with the generall, and with mutch adoe

had almoste gott them to staye. And then I willed them to hale

afte our showttes, and willed hime to putt the healme to Lee,

and keep his Loofe, but yt was not donn as I willed them; then

I wente afte to see yf the helme were a Lee as I willed hime

to putt yt, and looked downe at the Skuttle, and there I sawe

one bearinge the helme on the contrarye syde which was on the

weather syde which was one Crowe. Then I called unto him and

willed him to putt on the Lee, but he would not doe yt by anie

meanes; then I called unto him againe and asked him, Whie

doest thou not as I bidd thee, you wilbe Master belike, will

you! said I unto him, whoe awnswered me, Yea, that I will, and

Captaine to for a tyme, untill there be other order taken! so

that neither the helme was putt alee not yet I coulde gett the

showttes haled afte.

Then I wente and certified the Captaine what awnswer was made

me by Crowe: and then saide the companie we will not staye

to speake with the generall; the cawse was asked by me whie

the would not staye, (of Cornelius the gonner because he did

saye unto the captaine that he would perswade them to tarrye

untill nighte to speake with the General), then Cornelius

awnswered that they said theye would not staye for feare that

the generall would take them owte of the _Lyon_, and shifte

them into other shipps, and then use suche punishemente unto

them as he thought good, and therefore they would not tarrie

but go home for England, for they would rather truste to the

Quenes mercye then unto the curteseye of the generall, and

that they would awnswer yt at home that they had donn. When

Captaine Marchaunte sawe that by no perswasioun they would

alter there mynds he was verye angrye, and said that this was

no newe matter begonn, but that yt bin begoon to have bin

practised before this tyme by somme of the beste and not of the

worste. Then I replied againe and said that I, for my part,

am ignoraunte and never knewe of the matter before this tyme,

nether did I ever knowe whoe did beginn yt, and therefore Sir

I praye you doe not chardge me with anie suche thinge, ffor

tryall whereof I called the companie and certified them of the

woorde that Captaine Marchaunte spake, and they generallie (I

meane those men that were at this broyle) confessed and saide

that as God shoulde iudge them that neither I nor Mr Burrowes

was ever consentinge unto the matter, but that yt was theire

owne doinge and that theye would awnswer yt.

Then Captaine Marchaunt and I fell to perswadinge them again

to tarrie but by no meanes they woulde at our requeste yelde

unto yt; then the captaine tolde them that he would not goe for

England but that he would rather leape into the sea then goe

home. Then John Tippett standinge by the mayne maste drewe oute

his kniffe and cutt the halliardes of the mayne Toppsayle that

yt might comme downe but theye had slonge the yarde alofte soe

that the sayle coulde not comme downe. Then Captaine Marchaunte

prayed them that yf by noe meanes theye would staye for the

Generall untill nighte that theye would sett him aboorde of

the _Spie_ her Maiesties pinnase who was all this while with

us, and with mutche adoe gott them at the laste to doe yt, and

I myself did offer the captaine to goe with hime aboord the

generall but he was not willinge that I shoulde, and yett I

offered to goe with hime twise.

And Captaine Clefforde, captaine of the _Spie_ sawe all this

broyle in our shipp; he called unto me and said, Master, have

a care of your creditt; I awnswered him againe, Alack sir! I

am but one mann, I have donn as muche as I can to perswade

them but by noe intreatye can make them to tarrie. Then

Captaine Clefforthe called unto them and saide, Take hede

what you doe for you wilbe hanged all of you! Then one of our

gouners standing uppon our poope awnswered Captaine Clefforthe

againe, and saide, Cutt hose! cutt hose! where were you when

the _Samaritane_ was aground uppon the rock? And one of our

quartermasters did saye, I thancke you Sir for your sharpe

judgmente, yt is a harde fought feeld were none escapethe! And

when our captaine was in the boate at shipp sterne Mr Burrowes

fell to perswadinge them againe to staye untill nighte but

theye would not in anie case staye. Then our captaine, captaine

Marchaunte went aboord of the _Spie_ and soe she went awaye

from us, and wee laye by the Lee for our boate; and in the

meane tyme, whyle the boate was awaye, I said unto them, Sirs,

what have you donn, you have donn you knowe not what, you care

not, but I knowe that I and Mr Burrowes shalbe brought to be

in all the faulte; yf you would have donn thus and goe awaye

in this order, whie did you not tell neither the captaine nor

me the other daye when as we spake with the Generall, that wee

might have given him to understand that you woulde goe for

England, that he might have provided more victualls for you

yf that you shoulde staye, and not thus to goe awaye? But noe

perswasiouns woulde serve but home they would and soe they

haled abowte the sayles and homewards theye came. And this was

not the doinge of one or twoe of them but the consente of them

in generall, or the moste parte of them, as well souldiers as

maryners excepte those that were sicke at that tyme; and this

is the trewithe and nothinge but the trewithe as yt shalbe

proved.

APPENDIX C

SIR JOHN HAWKYNS

The question whether Hawkyns was dishonest is not in one sense of much

importance, since it is admitted that he was skilful as a seaman, and

efficient as an administrator. In another sense the good or ill fame

of a national worthy is of the highest importance as interwoven with

national history, and therefore a factor in the memories which make

for the self-respect of a nation. As in the _Dictionary of National

Biography_, a work which will be the standard authority for posterity,

Hawkyns is considered to have been guilty, it is fitting that, in a study

of Elizabethan naval administration, the charges should be examined

somewhat minutely. His memory has suffered from his reputed introduction

of the slave trade into English commerce, and from the cumulative effects

of accusations brought against him, which have been accepted without

investigation of their nature or of the character of the accusers. His

reputation has also suffered from the indiscriminate praise lavished upon

him by ill-advised panegyrists. In view of his environment it must be

admitted there is a strong _prima facie_ probability that he or any other

Elizabethan official was a thief; ‘the spacious times of Great Elizabeth’

included much more than literary excellence, colonising genius, and naval

success. Sufficient evidence has been given in this work to show the low

standard existing among all ranks of naval officials, and more, relating

to other classes of society, could be extracted from the State Papers.

The court was proverbially corrupt, and a recent writer[1547] gives

striking illustrations of the lax morality characterising all grades of

the Elizabethan social system.

It was said that Hawkyns neither built nor repaired the ships according

to his contract, that he used old cables and rotten oakum, that he

blackmailed shipwrights and workmen, and that he was in partnership

with a private builder, in whose yard he built ships for himself with

government timber, and fitted them out with government stores. If these

things were true the whole naval administration must have been in a state

in which the least strain would have brought it down in ruin, but the

more serious allegations are sufficiently disproved[1548] by the fact

that when the fate of England depended on the condition of the fleet, it

was found, in the hour of need, to be absolutely efficient in all the

many details for which Hawkyns was responsible. If, however, we are to

suppose that he confined his malpractices to matters not likely to injure

the _matériel_ of the Navy, it can only be remarked that they can have

been but very small in extent, and that fraudulent officials are not

usually so considerately and judiciously patriotic. In considering what

may or may not have been true, it is only fair to Hawkyns to emphasise

the fact that these anonymous indictments—and many of those urged against

him were anonymous—were levelled against nearly every person holding an

administrative position in the service of the crown; delation, whether

religious, political, or social, was a recognised occupation requiring

no capital, offering the possibility of large rewards, and welcome to

the government and the Queen. Hawkyns, when he was appointed, made a

clean sweep of many naval abuses of long standing, and had certainly

made enemies in Sir William Wynter[1549] and others, with whom at least

one informer,[1550] who also had personal reasons for disliking the

Treasurer, appears to have been on very friendly terms.

Hawkyns not only received no help from his brother Officers, but had

to contend with their open or secret hostility.[1551] Wynter was the

person to whom everyone who had a grievance against Hawkyns, went for

help and advice; and if we may judge of Wynter’s hopes and intentions

by his capacity for treachery he must have been a dangerous antagonist.

In 1585, he wrote to Burghley, of Hawkyns and his work, ‘As I desier

compfort in Gods handes there is nothinge in it but cunninge and crafte

to maynteine his pride and ambision and for the better fillinge of his

purse ... he careth not to whom he speaketh nor what he sayeth, blushe

he will not.’[1552] But in 1587, he wrote,[1553] ‘Wee are thorowlye

perswaded in our conscience that he hath for the time since he took that

bargaine[1554] expended a farre greater somme in carpentrie uppon her

Majesties shippes then he hath had eny wage allowance for;’ the moorings,

shipkeepers’, and clerks’ wages, ‘have byn payde and sufficientlye done

by him.’ As a commentary on this last letter, we have a statement of the

same year, not it is true, by Wynter, but by Wynter’s servant, that the

friendship now shown was only a pretence, and that ‘You knowe howe many

wayes my master hath sought against him and could never prevaile and

therefore he closeth with him to catch him at a suer advantage.’[1555]

As Surveyor Wynter was a brother Officer of equal rank, and nearly equal

power, with whom Hawkyns had to work. But putting aside any criticism of

the code of honour here shown, it may fairly be asked why should Wynter

have displayed this eagerness to ruin Hawkyns, at all costs and by any

means. There could be only one of two reasons; either an honest desire to

save the Queen and state from deceit and robbery, or a selfish desire

to regain the position and perquisites of which the reforms initiated by

Hawkyns, and the latter’s masterful personality had deprived him. I do

not think that any student of Elizabethan history will hesitate as to

which reason moved him. As for Borough, he wrote to Burghley, in 1584,

that Hawkyns deserved hanging; but that did not prevent his joining

Wynter in the letter of 1587, doubtless with the same intentions.[1556]

In another paper of 1587, and endorsed by Burghley as being by Thos.

Allen, the writer, after a long arraignment, kindly offers to undertake

Hawkyns’ duties.[1557] It is an extremely important fact that most of

these men obviously hoped to gain some personal advantages by displacing

him. Allen was ‘Queen’s merchant,’ or purchaser of Dantzic cordage

and, according to another informer, had been so friendly with Hawkyns

as to receive a bribe of £60 from him out of the first contract of

1579.[1558] He eventually quarrelled with the other Officers he was now

supporting, and in 1592, complained of them to Burghley. The internal

history of the Navy Office at this period is a perfect maze of intrigue,

and there was not one of these men who, at some time, was not doing

his best to supplant others with whom before and afterwards he was, or

became, friendly, perhaps to quarrel again in due course. No doubt the

appointment of Hawkyns was regarded as a piece of family jobbery, and,

as a fact, was very likely more due to influence than merit. By both

seniority and reputation Wynter had, in 1578, a much better claim to such

an important post.

That Hawkyns used his official position to obtain discounts, commission

on contracts, and other such emoluments, is quite possible; such things

are not unknown even now, are distinct from deliberate embezzlement, and

would hardly be condemned by public opinion in the sixteenth century. It

can hardly be made an article of accusation against him that he became a

wealthy man, even if there were much left after the expenses were paid

of his last unlucky voyage. The yearly fee of the Treasurer was not

large—£220, 18s 4d, out of which he had to pay his travelling expenses

when on the Queen’s service—and it was expected and permitted, in both

his contracts, that he should keep any outstanding balance as profit,

provided the work was properly done; and there was nothing in the ethics

of his position, as then understood, debarring him from shipping and

other mercantile transactions. The best proof that both Elizabeth and

Burghley were satisfied that his gains were not too great lies in the

fact that both contracts were determined at his own request, and that,

notwithstanding his supposed peculations, their knowledge of them, and

the efforts made to remove him, he held his post till the day of his

death. He is accused of being in partnership with Richard Chapman, the

master shipwright. Chapman appears to have had a private yard, but there

is no warrant for the precise statement beyond the words of another

anonymous writer that he ‘used Richard Chapman’s yard.’[1559] There

is no guide to the year or years in which he is said to have had work

done by Chapman. This man did not become a crown shipwright till about

1582, and it may very well be that Hawkyns employed him before he was

taken into the service of the crown. Another reflection is that in these

transactions with Chapman there must have been witnesses, in the shape

of workmen and others, not one of whom was ever brought forward. In all

these papers we are only given the statements of the writers; there is

never a suggestion of corroborative evidence. The anonymous writer just

quoted says, among many other things, that the ships are in such bad

condition that ‘they are brought to their last end and dangerous state.’

This was in October 1587, and the events of the next year proved that

to be a peculiarly unfortunate assertion. This particular delator was

ignorant of that necessity for verisimilitude which is one of the first

requirements of his business. He charges Hawkyns with illicit profits

on the remains of victuals returned from sea, not apparently knowing

that the Navy Treasurer had as little connection with, and as little

control over, the victualling as over Westminster Abbey. Again, he goes

on to say, ‘the shipwrights are his instruments to serve his purpose

and cloak for his dissembling,’ and thereupon it is to be observed that

some of these writers represent him as sharing dishonest gain with the

shipwrights, while others pathetically deplore the shipwrights’ hard fate

in being subjected to his terrorism; some represent him as quarrelling

with the men with whom others maintain he was secretly in league for

underhand purposes. We know, however, that Hawkyns possessed vessels of

his own and the circumstance that he had them repaired in a private yard,

when he might have used the government slips is really a strong point in

his favour, although used by his enemies as the basis of truth on which

to build up the liberal superstructure of ‘unjust and deceitful dealings.’

It is said that, although there was no formal inquiry made into the truth

of the allegations against Hawkyns, Burghley satisfied himself that they

were not unfounded, and drew up a set of stringent regulations intended

to prevent their recurrence, noting on the rough draft, ‘Remembrance

of abuses past, John Hawkyns was half in the bargain with Peter Pett

and Mathew Baker.’ Nothing exists but this rough draft[1560] which

includes notes relating to the other Officers as well as to Hawkyns, to

shipwrights, and a memorandum on the increased scale of wages recently

come into operation. There is no evidence that any inquiry was held,

other than which took shape in the explanations Hawkyns offered in

his numerous letters to Burghley still existing. Moreover if these

regulations were issued with an especial reference to Hawkyns it is to be

noticed that it would be his duty as the chief administrative Officer of

the Navy to enforce them and apply them to himself. Was Burghley usually

so confiding?

In January 1587-8 Pett and Baker were called upon to report on the

second contract and how far it had been accomplished.[1561] Their

report was unfavourable, but it will be remembered that, by this second

‘bargain,’ Hawkyns had undertaken, at a cheaper rate, the work they

did under the first one, and reduced them from an independent to a

subordinate position.[1562] Their feeling in the matter is shown by the

way they dealt with the third article, on the repair of ships, which

Hawkyns had taken out of their hands. They remarked that it was done

better before—that is when they were doing it—‘for before the master

shipwrights did direct but now they are to be directed.’ This was the

grievance. Not only were they both displaced competitors, but Baker had

long been connected with the Wynter faction; and Pett and Hawkyns had,

in 1587, fallen ‘at variance upon accomptes.’ In 1585 Pett had joined

Hawkyns in condemning Baker; now his interests brought him into line

with Baker.[1563] Burghley cannot have believed that, in 1587 at any

rate, Hawkyns was in confederacy with these two men, or it is hardly

likely that they would immediately afterwards have been chosen to sit in

judgment upon him, especially as Burghley must have known that Pett was

a new, and Baker an old enemy. Further, there is a curious similarity

between Burghley’s note and a passage in Allen’s attack before referred

to,—‘Mathew Baker sayeth that when Peter Pett and he did the repayringe

of her Maties Shippes Hawkyns would needes be hallfe with them.’ The

resemblance between Burghley and Allen suggests the possibility that the

former paraphrased his note from the latter without independent inquiry;

but, in any case, it may be pointed out that it is an indirect report of

what Baker said, that according to this account Baker permitted himself

to be blackmailed although he had for years been at enmity with Hawkyns,

and that he concealed his woes from all his superiors until he poured

them into the sympathetic ear of Mr Allen. There was nothing to prevent

his petitioning Burghley as everyone else did; and it is still more

strange that, so far as we know, he was never called up and examined on

this statement made to Allen. The two lines in Burghley’s handwriting

comprise in truth the only evidence of any weight against Hawkyns, but

they are mysterious as they stand for they imply that he put himself

in the power of avowed enemies, and we are left quite ignorant of the

proofs—if there were any—on which they are based, or how far Burghley

subsequently modified his opinion. That he did so modify it, or perhaps

altogether change it, is, I think, proved by the letter quoted _supra_

p. 147. There is significance in the fact that, so far as rivals and

inferiors were concerned, these attacks practically ceased after 1588; it

must have become known that Burghley no longer received them trustingly.

The supervision Elizabeth exercised over his accounts, the ‘mystrust’

of which he complained, has been attributed to the good reason she

had for doubting his integrity. That Elizabeth haggled over his

accounts proves nothing by itself, for it would be difficult to name

any one of her officials whose figures were not subjected to the same

suspicions and distrustful scrutiny. But it has yet to be shown that

his contemporaries, other than the subordinates whose perquisites he

had extinguished, and the rivals whom he had displaced, doubted his

integrity. Sir Robert Mansell is quoted as saying that Hawkyns combined

‘malice in dissimulation, rudeness in behaviour, and was covetous in

the last degree.’ Hawkyns may have been rude—he was not so successful

at court as Mansell, though he was more successful at sea. But, without

going into Mansell’s value, as a witness—and he, on evidence of a very

different order, has been shown to have stolen hugely as Treasurer—it

will be noticed that, although moved by evident animus, he makes no

accusation of dishonesty. Again, Sir Robert Cotton in his report (1608)

on the then abuses of naval administration has, in referring to previous

conditions, occasion to mention Hawkyns frequently, and invariably takes

the period of his control as a standard during which the business of the

Navy was well and honestly done. Monson’s opinion is important as that of

an undoubtedly competent and trustworthy observer, and one of unstained

repute as a commander. He commenced his naval career in 1588, so that it

was in part contemporaneous. He desires, when criticising the Navy Office

of the reign of Charles I, to ‘bring it to the state of Hawkyn’s and

Burrough’s time who were perfect and honest men in their places, the one

Treasurer and the other Comptroller.’[1564] There is matter for further

consideration in the circumstance that all the men who depose against

Hawkyns—Peter Pett, Baker, Wynter, Mansell, Sir Peter Buck, the writers

in the State Papers and the _Lansdowne MSS._—are persons of tarnished

honesty, or interested motives, and at least four of them known to have

been his personal enemies; while on the other side we have Cotton,

Monson, Nottingham, and—after 1588—Burghley, witnesses of very different

force. In the absence of a verdict proceeding from a judicial inquiry,

their evidence must be allowed more weight than that made up of the stabs

of anonymous slanderers, jealous rivals, and envious subordinates.

Hawkyns was doubtless a rough, masterful man, readier with the iron hand

than with the velvet glove, more popular with the seamen whose ranks he

had left than with the officials whose ranks he had joined. He was not

a great man, but his services to England were great, and entitle him to

kindly consideration at the hands of all Englishmen. But, before branding

his memory with the stain of systematic fraud, it is well to examine

closely the doubtful shreds and tatters of scandal on the strength of

which he is to be condemned, or—worse still—offered the contemptuous

charity of condonation.

APPENDIX D

A PRIVATEER OF 1592

The two prizes taken by the _Amity_ were the _St Francisco_ of 130, and

the _St Peter_ of 150 tons, laden with 112 tons of quicksilver, and

28 tons of Bulls, 1,458,000 in number, for ‘lyvinge bodyes’ and ‘dead

bodyes,’ which were to be sold in New Spain at two reals apiece. The

ships also carried some wine, and the freightage paid to the owners was

40 ducats a ton. The armament of the _St Peter_ is not given, but was

probably little more than that of the _St Francisco_ which carried[1565]

three iron guns, two copper pieces of 20 quintals[1566] each, and one

of 14 quintals. There were 90 round, and 40 chain shot for these guns

with nine quintals of powder. Twenty muskets, and other arms of offence

and defence, were also carried. Her crew numbered 28 men and two boys

and she was licensed to take twenty passengers; if therefore 126 living

persons were found in the two ships after the action, the _St Peter_ must

have furnished a much larger proportion or there must have been, as was

common enough, a number of unlicensed passengers.[1567] If a loss of two

killed and three wounded, in an action lasting five hours and with two

antagonists, was an ordinary one, fighting at sea cannot be considered,

in view of the normal mortality from disease on shore in the sixteenth

century, to have added materially to the risks of life.

According to Malyne[1568] these Bulls were laded by Sixtus V. When they

came to England Dr Lopez, the Queen’s physician, who was afterwards

executed on a charge of being concerned in a plot to murder her, obtained

them by purchase or as a gift. He and a partner started them again for

the West Indies but the Pope’s agent stopped their sale, alleging that

they had lost their virtue by having been in heretic possession. The

factor representing Lopez, not to be outdone, said that they had been

miraculously saved, but the speculation was a failure.

LANSDOWNE MSS., 70-23

The ordre and mannour of the takinge of the twoo Shippes laden

with Quicksilver and the Pope’s bulles bound for the West Indas

by the _Amitie_ of London, Master, Thomas Whytte.

The 26th of July 1592 beinge in 36 degrees[1569] or

thereaboutes, about 4 of the clocke in the morninge, wee had

sight of the said Shippes beinge distaunte ffrom us about 3

or 4 leagues; by 7 of the cloke we ffeatched them up and were

within goonn shotte whose boldnes (havinge the kinges armes

dysplaide) did make us conceave them rather to be ships of

warr then laden with merchandize. And as yt dothe appeare by

some of theire owne Speeches they made full accompte to have

taken us, and was Question amongst them whyther they should

carrye us to St Lucar or Lishebonn. Wee wayfed eche other

amaine,[1570] they havinge placed themselves in warlyke ordre,

thone a cabolles lenght before thoother, we begonne the fight

in the which we continued so faste as we were able to chardge

and dyschardge the space of fyve houres, being never a cabells

lenght dystaunte eyther of us the one from the other, in which

tyme wee receaved divers shottes both in the hull of our ship,

mastes and sayles, to the number of xxxii greate shotte which

we told after the ffighte, besydes fyve hundreed muskett

shotte and harquebuye acroke[1571] at the least. And for that

wee perceaved they were stoute, we thought good to boorde

the byskaine[1572] which was a heade the other, where lyinge

aboord aboute an houre plyinge our ordenaunce and small shotte

with the which we stowed[1573] all his men; now they in the

flybotte makinge accompte that wee had entreed our menn, bare

Roome[1574] with us, meaninge to have laide us aboorde, and so

to have entrapped us betwene them both, which we perceavinge,

made redy ordenaunce and fytted us, so as wee quitted ourselves

of him, and he boorded his ffelowe, by which meanes they

both fell from us. Then presently we kepte our looffe,[1575]

hoysed our topsayles, and weathered them, and came hard aboord

the flibotte with our ordenaunce prepared, and gave her our

whole broadeside with the which wee slewe divers of theire

menn, so as wee might perceave the bloud to Runne out at the

Scoopers; after that wee caste aboute, and new chardged all our

ordenaunce and came upon them againe and wylled them Amaine,

or else wee would synke them, whereupon the one would have

yelded which was shotte betweene wind and watter, but the other

called him traytour; unto whom we mad answere that if he wold

not yeld presently also we would synke him first. And thereupon

he undrestaundinge our determinacon, presently put out a whyt

fflagg and yelded, howbeyt they refused to stryke theire owne

Sayles, for that they were sworne never to stryke to any

Englishmann. Wee then commaunded the captaines and masters to

come aboorde of us which they dyd and after examinacon and

stowinge them, wee sent aboord them, strooke theire sayles and

manned theire shipps, findinge in them bothe one hundreed and

twenty and six soules lyvinge, and eight deade, besides those

which they themselves had caste overboorde, so yt pleased God

to geve us the victorye, being but 42 menn and a boye, of the

which ther were two killed and three wounded, ffor which good

succeasse wee geve the onely prayse to Allmightye God.

FOOTNOTES

[1] _United Service Magazine_, October 1880.

[2] But that the public have yet much to learn was shown by the ignorant

complacency, ludicrous if it were not so dangerous, with which the

mobilisation of six ships and six destroyers was received in January,

after twelve days of official and some weeks of unofficial preparation.

[3] The history of the early navy till 1423, will be found treated

minutely by Sir N. H. Nicolas in the _History of the Royal Navy_,

Lond. 1847, a work of great research. Here, down to that date, points

left somewhat obscure by Nicolas, or upon which more than one view is

possible, are shortly touched upon.

[4] According to some writers, the organisation of the Cinque Ports dates

from before the Conquest; it was not, however, until after that event

that their services became of national importance.

[5] R. G. Marsden, _Select pleas of the Court of Admiralty_, Selden Soc.

1894.

[6] The mention of the word galley in the records is, taken by itself,

often misleading. Frequently it meant a small, but fully rigged, sailing

vessel, supplied with sweeps for occasional use. Sometimes it appears

to have been applied to a sailing ship of particular build, and on one

occasion the _Mary Rose_, a ‘capital ship’ of Henry VIII, is called ‘the

great galley,’ showing how loosely the word was used.

[7]

‘For foure things our Noble sheweth to me

King, Ship, and Swerd, and power of the See.’

_Libel of English Policie_, supposed to be by De Moleyns, Bishop of

Chichester, and written in 1436 or 1437.

[8] That his subjects at one time called him the ‘King of the Sea,’ shows

how the fact of his having been the first English king to command a naval

battle impressed popular imagination; towards the end of the reign the

phrase must have sounded bitter in the ears of the inhabitants of the

coast towns.

[9] King and sword were not new on coins, and the ship was usual enough

on the seals of the port towns; in them, as doubtless in the noble, it

referred to mercantile traffic.

[10] ‘The shifty, untrustworthy statecraft of an unprincipled,

light-hearted king, living for his own ends, and recking not of what came

after him.’ (Stubbs, _Const. Hist._ ii, 510).

[11] _Rot. Parl._ ii, 311, 319.

[12] The expression ‘ton-tight’ is somewhat obscure, but probably meant

complete or measured tons. (Cf. Holloway, _Dict. of Provincialisms_, s.v.

_tight_, and Halliwell’s _Dictionary_ s.v. _thite_.) In Latin papers it

is rendered by such a form as ships ‘ponderis 80 doliorum;’ in 1430 it

is described as ‘le tonage autrement appelle tounetight,’ (_Exchequer

Warrants for Issues_, 9 Feb). It was not necessarily restricted to ship

measurement since, in 1496, stone and gravel for dock building were being

purchased by the ton-tight. It is therefore possible that it referred to

weight as distinguished from the cubic space occupied by a tun of wine,

the original standard of tonnage capacity.

[13] At various times, from the thirteenth to the first quarter of the

sixteenth century, the phrases, ‘of Westminster,’ ‘of the Tower,’ and

‘of Greenwich,’ were successively equivalent to the later ‘H.M.S.’ The

meaning, here, is that there were 150 vessels fit for use as men-of-war.

[14] _Ancient Petitions_, 5477 (R.O.) ‘A tsnobles et tssages seigneurs

diceste present parlement supplient tres humblement toutz les

possessoures des niefs dedens ceste roialme q come en le temps du noble

Roi Edward et ces predecessours q a chescun fois qaunt ascun nief furent

ordeigne de faire ascun viage q le possessour de tiel nief prendrent del

ton-tight 40d en le quart par regard damender la nief a lappaill dicell

et la quart part del prise par eux fait sur la mer par quelle regard

la naveie diceste roialme alors fust bien mayntene et governe si q a

icelle temps furent tondez prestz dens la roialme 150 niefs del Toure et

puis la deces du noble roi Edward en le temps de Richard nadgaiez roi

Dengleterre le dit regard eston demenise jesqs 11s le ton-tight et cci

estee tsmalement paie si q les possessours des tielx niefs mount ils null

volunte de sustener et mayntener lour niefs mais ils onct lesses giser

desolat pur quel cause la navie diceste roialme est ency dimennise et

empeire q ne soienct en tout la roialme outre 25 niefs del Tour.’

[15] _Le Compte du Clos des Galées_, 1382-4. Soc. de l’histoire de

Normandie, Mèlanges, Ser. II, Rouen 1893.

[16] 5 Rich. II, c. 3.

[17] In view of the difficulty owners of impressed ships experienced

in obtaining payment it may be suggested that it was possibly due to

the influence of that class that it was bestowed for a specifically

named purpose; if so, the hope of obtaining prompter settlement was not

realised.

[18] For proofs that notwithstanding wars, taxation, feudal rights, and

every other drawback, the towns, as a whole, were steadily growing in

wealth, see Mrs J. R. Green’s, _Town Life in the Fifteenth Century_.

[19] There was a contemptuous Continental saying, ‘We buy the foxskins

from the English for a groat, and resell them the foxes’ tails for a

guilder,’ which is expressive enough.

[20] _Exch. Accts._ (Q.R.), Bdle. 49, No. 29, and _Roll of Foreign

Accounts_, No. 8. The tonnage of the _Grace Dieu_ is only mentioned

twice, and, in one of those two mentions, is given as 1400. This must be

a mistake on the part of the Treasury clerk. The 1000 tons of the _Jesus

of the Tower_ seems very suspicious, but as in nearly every instance, the

tonnage is only once given there is no opportunity for collation.

[21] Rebuilt.

[22] With the exception of the _Agase_ taken in Southampton water; a

French fleet having visited the English coast in May, before the Duke was

ready for sea.

[23] Spanish, _ballenere_, long low vessels for oars and sails introduced

in the fourteenth century by the Biscayan builders (Fernandez Duro, _La

Marina de Castilla_ p. 158.)

[24] _Rot. Pat._

[25] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. 8.

[26] Foremast. French, _mât de misaine_.

[27] _Exch. Accts._ (Q.R.), Bdle. 49, No. 29. ‘Turris ligni vocat Bulwerk

... super introitu portus de Hamell per salva custodia naves.’

[28] ‘Unius fabrice.’

[29] Binnacle.

[30] _Somerhuche_ is derived from old English _Somer_, a bedstead, and

old French _huche_; it was originally, therefore, a sleeping place.

[31] _Acts of the Privy Council_, 3rd Mar. 1423. Nicolas says

(Introduction, vol. v, cxxxvi), that the whole of the navy was ordered to

be sold, but the wording of the entry does not support this authoritative

statement. The later records prove clearly that they were not all sold;

but whether because no such wholesale clearance had been intended, or

from want of purchasers, there is no conclusive evidence to show.

[32]

Where bene our shippes?

Where bene our swerdes become?

Our enemies bid for the shippe sette a shepe,

Allas oure reule halteth, hit is benome;

Who dare wel say that lordeshippe should take kepe?

I will asaye thoughe mine herte ginne to wepe,

To doe thys werke yf wee wole ever the (thrive)

For very shame to kepe aboute the see.’

If Adam de Moleyns was the author his death by violence at the hands of

seamen, in 1450, had an especially tragic unfitness.

[33] ‘Per contrarotulacionem.’

[34] _Exch. War. for Issues_, 26th Jan. 1430.

[35] _Rot. Parl._ iv, 402.

[36] _Ibid._ iv, 489.

[37] _Debate of Heralds_, p. 49 Lond, 1870.

[38] 2 Henry V, c. 6.

[39] _Rot. Franc._ sub annos.

[40] _Fœdera_ xi, 77.

[41] _Fœdera_ xi, 258.

[42] _Rot. Franc._ 12 Mar. 1444-5.

[43] _Rot. Parl._ v, 59.

[44] _Exch. Accts._ (Q.R.), Bdle. 53, No. 23.

[45] ‘Tenggemouth.’

[46] Port of origin not given.

[47] _Exch. Accts._ (Q.R.), Bdle. 54, No. 14.

[48] The large ship is the _Trinity_; there was a _Christopher_ of

Dartmouth in 1440 also of 400 tons.

[49] Considering that the lists of Elizabeth’s reign are much more nearly

complete.

[50] _The Debate between the Heralds of France and England._ Lond. 1870.

Assigned to 1458-61, and supposed to have been written by Charles, Duke

of Orléans, for twenty-five years a prisoner here and therefore qualified

by opportunity to form an opinion.

[51] Bishop Stubbs (_Const. Hist._ iii, 268) says ‘The French

administration of the Duke of Bedford was maintained in great measure

by taxing the French, rather than by raising supplies from England.’

This may be true of the civil administration but there are innumerable

warrants for the whole reign directed to the English Exchequer for the

Payment of English and French captains who undertook to provide bands of

men-at-arms or archers.

[52] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. xiv.

[53] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. x.

[54] _Ibid._

[55] _Ibid._ No. x.

[56] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. x.

[57] _Ibid._ No. xi.

[58] ‘Cabanes,’ deck structures.

[59] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. xi.

[60] ‘Valecto de corone.’ In 1455 there were twenty-three attached to the

household. The title implied the premiership of that class of society.

[61] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. xii.

[62] _Ibid._ No. xiii.

[63] _Rot. Parl._ iv, 439.

[64] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. xi.

[65] _Rot. Parl._ v, 59.

[66] _Exch. War. for Issues_, 27th June, 1442.

[67] _Roll of Foreign Accounts_, No. xiii.

[68] _Ibid._

[69] _Exch. War. for Issues_, 28th May 1454. The Rolls of Parliament only

name the first four Earls and Lord Stourton.

[70] _Rot. Parl._ v, 244.

[71] ‘And as men sayne ther was not so gret a batayle upon the sea this

xl wyntyr.’ (_Paston Letters_, i, 429, Ed. Gairdner.)

[72] Genoa.

[73] _Exch. Accts._ (Q.R.), Bdle. 53, No. 5.

[74] ‘De novo.’

[75] ‘Sepis vocatæ hegge.’

[76] Mud.

[77] ‘Sede.’

[78] Blank in MS.

[79] _Sic._

[80] _Infra_, p. 39.

[81] Or 270 tons burden, and 276 ton and tonnage, that is 207 tons in

cask, or 276 tons of dead weight cargo.

[82] _Exch. War. for Issues._

[83] _Ibid._, 4th Aug. 1463.

[84] _Ibid._, 7th Feb. 1467.

[85] _Ibid._, 6th Apr. 1465.

[86] But the Duke of Burgundy had prepared a fleet to intercept Warwick;

at the critical moment it was dispersed by a storm. (_Grafton’s

Chronicle_, p. 686.)

[87] Thomas Nevill, illegitimate son of Lord Fauconberg.

[88] Iron or stone shot.

[89] _Exch. War. for Issues_, 20th July 1461.

[90] _Ibid._, 5th July 1463.

[91] _Ibid._, 14th Dec.

[92] _Ibid._, 18th July.

[93] _Ibid._, 27th Ap. 1473.

[94] Elsewhere she is called a King’s ship, _Fœdera_, xx, 139.

[95] _Exch. War. for Issues_, 16th Aug. 1480. The then largest ship of

the French navy, burnt by accident at Havre 6th July 1545, was called the

_Carraquon_.

[96] _Exch. War. for Issues_, 8th June 1468.

A history of the administration of the Royal Navy and of merchant shipping in relation to the Navy from MDIX to MDCLX, with an introduction treating of the preceding period · 第 4 / 6 章

In 1656 for some reason, probably the effort to keep the fleets on