THE NATAL CAMPAIGN FROM THE INVESTMENT OF LADYSMITH THROUGH THE BATTLE
OF COLENSO
The severing of communications, by rail and telegraph, between
Ladysmith and the outer world, was the first step in a preliminary
process of attack and of defence; after which only the opponents
settled down to the relatively permanent conditions that constitute
the monotonous endurance of a siege. The British, prior to accepting
the investment, struck out right and left from day to day, by
skirmishing and reconnoitring parties; the Boers on the 9th of
November delivered an assault described as determined in character,
which will be more particularly mentioned later, but concerning which
details are singularly meagre. This no doubt is owing, partly, to the
habitual reticence of the Boers concerning {p.178} their reverses,
and partly to the isolation of the British garrison and correspondents
until a time when nearer and more exciting events engrossed the
columns of the press, crowding out this affair, already become past
history.
Unless the author has greatly misconceived the general utterances, the
occupation of Ladysmith has been in popular estimation merely an
unfortunate accident forced upon the British as a result of the
original faulty dispositions of the campaign. This view is scarcely
correct; and even if it were in part well founded, the natural
inference, that the investment was a misfortune, pure and simple,
would not follow. Probably no single incident of the war has been more
determinative of final issues than the tenure of Ladysmith. Therefore,
an examination of the relation borne by this single factor to the
whole, of which it was a part, may very fitly precede immediately the
narrative of the particular occurrences which locally centred around
it.
The considerations of any and every nature which made Ladysmith a
railroad junction, a cross-roads, at which met three important
{p.179} lines of communication--one with Durban, one with the
Transvaal, and one with the Orange Free State--constituted it at the
same time, necessarily and consequently, a position of strategic
importance. Even had a mistake been made in selecting it as a railroad
centre--which I have never seen asserted--the decision alone would
have given it value; but, if the choice was sound, all the
considerations which dictated it go to increase that value. It does
not follow, of course, that such a position must under no
circumstances be abandoned, that something better than its tenure
might not have been done for the British campaign; still less is it to
be concluded that the only, or the best, way to hold the place was by
occupying the town itself, or the particular lines ultimately
established around it by Sir George White.
These are questions of detail, which, however important, are separable
in thought and in decision from the general fact stated--that
Ladysmith, being a railroad crossing, the only very important one on
the Natal theatre of operations, was necessarily a strategic point not
lightly to be surrendered.
Nor {p.180} was Sir George White, in deciding to hold the place,
constrained only by the demands of an immediate emergency. The
thoughts and reasonings of that gallant and distinguished officer have
been sequestrated from public knowledge by the same causes that
obscure most of the early happenings of the siege; but, from speeches
made by him shortly after his return to England, it is clearly
apparent that not only a present military exigency, but also the
considerations above mentioned, were present in his mind, as indeed
they could not fail to be with any instructed and intelligent officer.
"Natal was the object on which the Boers had set their hearts. It was
not only the actual point which they attacked, but it was also their
sentimental object. They had the idea that they had a right in Natal,
and their plan of campaign was framed from the very idea that they
should have the territory from Majuba to the sea. But Ladysmith stood
in their way, and he might say that Ladysmith was a most important
town in northern Natal. From its geographical position it became of
great strategical importance. It was at Ladysmith that {p.181} the
forces of the Transvaal, pouring over the northern and north-eastern
passes of Natal, first joined with the forces that came in from the
west and the Orange Free State, and there the two South African
Republics combined in their strength under the late Commandant-General
Joubert--a man who, he would like to say there, was a brave and a very
civilised man. Ladysmith was also a railway centre of great
importance, and it was therefore of great value to them to keep it out
of the possession of the enemy."[14]
[Footnote 14: London _Weekly Times_, May 18.]
Nor was this all, as touching the place itself. That similar
reasonings had led the Imperial authorities, antecedent to the
hostilities, to choose Ladysmith as a depot and _place d'armes_, is
shown by the reproaches addressed to the Government by the London
_Times_, November 21, 1899: "There is no need to inquire just now into
the balance of political and military considerations which determined
the policy of making a stand at Ladysmith. It is enough that that
policy was definitely adopted in ample time to allow of providing
Ladysmith with the long-range guns which its {p.182} position renders
peculiarly necessary, dominated as it is by hills on three sides. Why
were such guns not provided? Why was it left to fortunate accident to
furnish the garrison at the very last moment with the means of
defence"--by the arrival of the naval guns?
In like manner the prime minister of Natal, some months later,
challenged the following statement of the _Times_ in its issue of
March 2, 1900: "From November 2, when, owing to the subordination of
military to local political considerations, a British force of 10,000
fine soldiers was shut in Ladysmith, a great fear has hung over us."
Upon this the premier comments: "It is true that the Governor, when
asked by Sir George White to give his opinion, pointed out the serious
political consequences which might follow the evacuation of Dundee.
But as far as Ladysmith was concerned the abandonment or evacuation of
that town was never, to my knowledge, even hinted at. For two years or
more previous to the outbreak of the war, Ladysmith had been made the
principal military station in Natal; large quantities {p.183} of
commissariat stores and ammunition had been accumulated there; and the
troops stationed at Ladysmith, comprising the larger portion of the
Natal garrison, had been permanently hutted instead of being retained
under canvas. Of one fact I am certain, and that is that no suggestion
of any kind was ever made to the Government of Natal that, for
military or any other reasons, it was undesirable that Ladysmith
should be defended."
Intrinsically, therefore, Ladysmith presented strong claims, inherent
and acquired, against abandonment. But there were further reasons,
exterior to herself, to be found in the particular condition of the
military problem. In all campaigns, and especially in those which are
defensive in character, as this then was, it is an accepted principle
that the front of operations should be advanced, or, in case of
retreat, should be maintained, as far forward as is possible
consistent with general considerations of safety. Prominent among the
latter is always the securing of the lines of communication, by which
alone supplies and reinforcements can be received, or {p.184} further
retreat made in case of necessity. By detaining the enemy in such an
advanced position, security--partial or total--is obtained for the
various interests in the rear, whether public or private. The question
of such detention, however, if to be effected by an inferior army, is
difficult and complicated; for which reason, as well as because of
other disadvantages inherent in inferiority, a defensive campaign
really great--great, that is, in a military sense--makes the highest
demand upon military skill.
It was the defensive stage of Napoleon's Italian campaign of 1796 that
illustrated his greatness, even more conspicuously than the offensive
movements which preceded it, extraordinary exhibitions though they
were of his military genius; and the same distinction attends his
resistance of the allied invasion in 1814.
In certain conditions of country, in certain relative degrees of
numerical strength, under certain political conditions--for it is a
grave mistake to think that military and political considerations can
be dissevered practically, as they can logically--an inferior force
can contest {p.185} step by step, content to delay only, not to
arrest. It is, for instance, evident that, politically, one may more
readily thus abandon hostile country than uncover one's own
territory--as in Natal--even though the military conditions in the two
cases be identical. But, under different circumstances of position or
of numbers, such dilatory field operations may be impracticable. If
the country through which retreat is to be made be open, if numbers be
so small that the enemy can overlap--that is outflank--if the ground
does not afford positions where the flanks may be protected by natural
obstacles that make outflanking impossible or exceedingly arduous, if
the enemy be greatly superior in mobility, in such conditions retreat
from each successive stand is apt to be precipitate--dependent less
upon one's own will than upon the enemy's energy--and the retiring
army may reach its ultimate goal under an accumulation of retrograde
impulse not far distinguishable from rout, deteriorated in _morale_
and diminished in numbers.
Where such unfavourable conditions obtain, the principle which
dominates all correct defensive action {p.186} receives a special
application. The principle is that every defensive disposition should
look to offensive action--or at the least to offensive effect. Mere
defence is ultimate ruin. "In the long run," said Napoleon, "no
position whatever can be defended if it does not threaten the
enemy."[15] Consequently, the force that for any, or several, of the
reasons above given cannot safely keep the field must establish itself
solidly in some place where, for whatsoever advantages, it is as far
as possible itself secure; but whence at the same time--and this is
the more important of the two considerations--it most effectually
menaces the enemy. This it does by applying again, but in another
manner, the flanking, or turning, idea--by placing itself across or to
one side of the line of communications upon which the enemy will
depend, if he ventures to advance in the direction which the defendant
has not felt himself strong enough otherwise to contest. Of {p.187}
such offensive-defensive positions there are many historical examples.
Among these the most recently conspicuous was the occupation of Plevna
by the Turks in 1877, and the long consequent arrest of the Russian
progress; but Mantua, in 1796, in like manner and for the same
reasons, effectually stopped Bonaparte for eight months, and Genoa, in
1800, so long delayed the Austrians as to reverse the issues of the
campaign signalised by the name of Marengo.
[Footnote 15: I should greatly like here to take up
my parable against those who base their
calculations for the numbers and kinds of naval
vessels upon the idea of "a navy for defence only";
but space and relevancy both forbid.]
From the simply defensive point of view, a line of works arranged
consecutively around such a stationary centre has no flanks to be
turned, but resembles a circle or other continuous curve which returns
into itself. Like a straight line, such a curve may be broken by
superior force; but until that is done the weakness of flanks does not
exist. Moreover, succour can be more quickly sent from a centre to
every threatened point of the circumference than from the middle of a
line of equal length to its extremes. A circle, therefore, is the most
compact disposition for defence, and so most ideal for smaller
numbers. It is concentration in its most effective {p.188} form,
while sacrificing nothing in elasticity and flexibility of motion.
These are the intrinsic defensive advantages--as distinguished from
the offensive threat to the enemy's communications--secured to the
weaker party by a permanent position, and these are its compensations
for the loss of open communications which have been deliberately
abandoned.
In Natal, at the end of October, 1899, the British army was much
inferior to the enemy in both numbers and mobility; and while several
lines of defence were to be found in the region behind, as was shown
by the stubborn resistance which the Boers, when in turn outnumbered,
made at the Tugela, these positions were open to the danger of being
turned by superior numbers or superior rapidity; still more when these
two were combined. In fact, much of the subsequent Boer success in
defence resulted from the fact that, acting on the inside of an arc,
with the advantage of interior--shorter--lines, they also moved over
the latter with greater speed, owing to their distinguishing
characteristic as mounted troops. They had particular facilities, in
{p.189} a word, for accumulating successful numbers at a threatened
point of a stationary defence, which the British would not have had in
an active campaign of retreat.
It became therefore advisable, if not imperative, for the British
commander in Natal to resort to a stationary defence for the
preservation of his division, and to place himself for offensive
purpose upon the flank of the enemy's possible line of invasion, in
order to deter him from further advance. As to situation, Ladysmith
was clearly indicated by the reasons before stated, and especially
because there was there accumulated a great quantity of ammunition,
provisions, and other supplies, which not only should not be allowed
to fall into the hands of the Boers, but also would be essential to
the maintenance of the garrison, if relief were long delayed, as it
proved to be. That this contingency was foreseen, and as far as
possible provided for, has been shown by subsequent utterances of Sir
George White. "From the moment I saw the situation in Natal, I was
certain I should be pressed back by superior numbers, and have to hold
Ladysmith, and I knew that {p.190} the enemy had guns with which I
could not hope to cope with my 15-pounder field guns. Therefore I
telegraphed for the naval guns. It was a question of a race for them,
and Captain Lambton was the right man to win that race. He won only by
a short head."[16]
[Footnote 16: London _Weekly Times_, June 1, 1900.
Captain the Hon. Hedworth Lambton, Commander of the
"Powerful," accompanied the naval guns to
Ladysmith, and was there throughout the siege.]
This, then, was the function which the current of events assigned to
Ladysmith, and the part which it bore to the subsequent development of
the war. Discussion has been thus long because, in the author's
judgment, White's action in shutting himself up in the place, and the
admirable tenacity of himself and of the garrison in their resistance,
were the shaping factors in a contest the ultimate result of which was
probably certain in any event, but which in feature and occurrence
would have been very different had Ladysmith either not been occupied
or proved incapable of protracted resistance. As so often markedly
happens, when a correct decision {p.191} has been made, circumstances
seemed to work together to favour the consequences. The respite given
to the garrison by Joubert, who did not attack until November 9,
allowed opportunity to regularize and further to develop the system of
defence, so that on November 6 a press censor telegram, brought out
successfully by a Kaffir runner, read, "Position here now believed to
be entirely safe; greatly strengthened in the last twenty-four hours."
The opportune arrival of the naval guns also, though by so narrow a
margin of time, decisively influenced the outcome. "Had it not been
for these guns," said Sir George White, after his return to England,
"the guns of the Boers would have been brought up very much nearer to
my defences of Ladysmith, and it would enormously have embarrassed my
powers of resistance and would have added enormously to the mortality
of my garrison. Not once or twice in our rough island story have the
naval officer and his men come in the nick of time, and the siege of
Ladysmith was but one instance added to these happy advents."
As {p.192} before said, Ladysmith is surrounded on three sides by
hills which overtop it; railroad lines and stations, indeed, do not
commonly prefer summits to valleys. On the 30th of October the Boers
had already mounted a 40-pounder gun on Peppworth's Hill, north of the
town, with which on that day they opened fire at a distance of over
6,000 yards, much outranging the army field artillery. It was in
connection with the general sortie of the garrison to seize that
position that the disaster of Nicholson's Nek was incurred.
This first threatening outlook was materially modified by the arrival
the same day of the six naval guns from Durban, two of which were of
power equal to the Boers' heavy pieces, and all of a range superior to
those previously at White's disposal. By the 3rd of November a second
long gun had been placed by the besiegers some 8,000 yards--between
four and five miles--south-east of the town, upon Mount Umbulwani;
from which, and from an eminence known indifferently as Lombard's Kop
and as Little Bulwana, three miles to the northward, and also east of
{p.193} the place, the worst of the heavy gun fire upon the town
itself, as distinguished from the lines of defence, seems to have
proceeded. On the 28th the Boers had established within 5,000
yards--less than three miles--of the western defences a third
40-pounder, to which, we learn from Joubert's despatches, his gunners
with grim military humour gave the name of "Franchise"--in mockery,
doubtless, of the British Government's demands on behalf of the
Uitlanders. It may be mentioned here that throughout the war the Boers
have shown a remarkable facility in transporting these heavy cannon,
placing them with surprising rapidity in positions unexpected by their
opponents. On the 29th the besieged could count twenty-six guns in
place upon the lines of attack; but of these, at that time, only the
three specified were guns "of position," to be reckoned as units of a
siege train. The British defensive works, when finally established,
measured in circuit some sixteen miles. The range of the heavier
hostile guns, as revealed by their early practice, compelled an
extension to this degree, in order to hold them back beyond easy
{p.194} command of the town. Fortunately this perimeter, which would
indicate the enclosed area to have a diameter of from five to six
miles, could be manned without overtaxing the numbers of the garrison.
At the moment of investment the British force fit for duty was 572
officers and 12,924 men; total, 13,496. Of these, during the siege, 88
officers and 732 men were killed or wounded; but sickness and want of
food had so far further reduced the numbers that on the day of relief
there were of effectives only 403 officers and 9,761 men, and of these
it was significantly added that "they are the only troops fit to do
even a two-miles march."[17]
[Footnote 17: London _Weekly Times_, April 27,
1900. Some other interesting siege statistics will
be found in the same number.]
Long before this condition of destitution and debility was reached the
besiegers found their hands so occupied by the British relieving
forces that the besieged had little more to do than to hold on. When
the danger to Ladysmith had decided the British authorities to depart
from the original plan, of a single forward movement in mass through
the Free State, and to organise instead a double advance, with
{p.195} divided forces, for the simultaneous relief of Ladysmith and
of Kimberley--as well as certain other subsidiary operations by French
and Gatacre--heavy reinforcements were at once directed upon Natal.
Hildyard's brigade, which had left England before the news of Talana
Hill was received, went on at once from Cape Town without
disembarking, reaching Durban before November 17. Lieutenant-General
Sir Francis Clery continued on to the same port from his original
destination, Port Elizabeth, and upon arrival, November 18, took
command of all the forces in the colony south of Ladysmith. He was
followed exactly a week later by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Redvers
Buller, drawn in person by the irresistible logic of events to the
scene which his own action, or that of the Government, had determined
to be the chief among several centres of active operations.
Meantime, since the day of investment, much had been happening, and
conditions were rapidly taking shape. Upon the 9th of November Joubert
directed an attack upon the defences of Ladysmith. This delay of a
week {p.196} has not yet been explained, and is to be justified only
upon grounds of necessity, in the Boer commander's inability, however
occasioned, sooner to get his numbers together, concentrated and
disposed for so grave an enterprise. The solution is probably to be
found partly in his own natural temperament, which his previous
career, though political rather than military, indicates to have been
cautious, and lacking in the aggressive quality that has given
President Kruger, in civic contests, a continuous triumph over his
more cultivated and progressive, but less combative, rival.
It is to this trait of wariness, seeking to compass ends by
indirection and compromise rather than by open conflict, that
Joubert's failure to achieve success in public life has been plausibly
attributed, and from it arose the nickname "Slim (crafty) Piet"
attached to him by his countrymen. "It was this want of assertiveness
and of determination in following any marked line of action which
prevented Joubert from playing a great part in the fortunes of the
Republic. Opportunities occurred again and again after the advent of
the {p.197} Uitlanders when a vigorous assertion of himself would
have placed him in a position to defeat Mr. Kruger. But the habit of
indolence, so often found associated with a big physical frame, and a
certain element of Scotch 'canniness,' which led him to refuse to
accept risks, prevented his offering serious opposition to the Kruger
clique."
This estimate of Joubert's characteristics is recently confirmed by
two sympathetic observers from within the Boer lines. "Mr. Davitt, in
a letter from Kroonstad to the Dublin _Freeman's Journal_, declares
that the Boers were not at all dismayed by the death of General
Joubert, which they agreed was in no sense a misfortune. He was too
merciful in his notions of warfare. Ladysmith could easily have been
taken on more than one occasion had Joubert not vetoed the proposed
assaults."[18] The second correspondent relates that General Joubert
overruled the desire of the burghers to assault Ladysmith, saying "at
a War Council that the city was not worth to the Boers the lives of
500 burghers." If Joubert really said that, he ought unquestionably
to {p.198} have been at once relieved from command; but as the
incident is preceded by the statement that "the burghers were
confident of their ability to take it in a hand-to-hand fight,
_notwithstanding that the English outnumbered them more than two to
one_,"[19] the source of the correspondent's information is open to
some question.
[Footnote 18: London _Times_, June 25, 1900.]
[Footnote 19: _Harper's Monthly Magazine_, July,
1900, p. 174.]
To make war without running risks--not mere risk of personal danger,
but of military failure--has been declared impossible by the highest
authority. Yet such a temperament, betrayed in politics, being
constitutional, will enter into all actions of life, and one is not
surprised to read that "this characteristic of caution was the chief
mark of Joubert's conduct in the field as a military commander. His
idea of warfare was to act ever on the defensive." Let this be
qualified so far as to say that his idea appears always to have been
to act within limits of safety, to consider self-preservation--the
preservation, that is, of his own forces--more important than the
destruction of the enemy, and we have a view, not of Joubert only, but
of his race, which goes {p.199} far to explain the failures at
Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and likewise the inefficient
action at that early period of the war when alone success was locally
possible, and, if locally attained, might have even compassed an
ultimate victory. If to this idea be linked that which is closely akin
to it--of attaining results, not by superior dexterity in the use of
means, but by subtlety and ambush--and we have the explanation both of
the numerous artful traps into which British detachments were led,
like game into the snare of the hunter, and yet also of the sure
failure to achieve success in war, for the craft of the hunter is not
the skill of the warrior.
The cognate words "stratagem" and "strategist" sufficiently indicate
that craft and wile are part of the professional equipment of great
warriors, but with them these are not, and cannot be, predominant.
Their skill is not so much to contrive success by deceiving an enemy
as to command it by local superiority of force, either exerted in
violence, or imposing submission by mere evidence of overpowerment.
Circumvention with them aims at permanent results which it alone
cannot obtain. It {p.200} is but a means to the end, which is the
crushing, the military annihilation, of the enemy. That can be
accomplished only by force, not by mere guile. In his temperament, as
shown by his action, Joubert reflected the fighting characteristics of
his people, of whom he has been the most conspicuous military
representative, honoured by friend and foe alike for his fearlessness,
his intelligence, and his humanity. Courage of the highest proof as
regards personal danger, but not the courage that throws away the
scabbard, much less that which burns its ships. The hunter, meeting
superior strength with superior cunning, without even the very least
willingness to lose his life in order to carry his end, may be brave
even to recklessness; but he rejects habitually the tone of mind
distinctive of the soldier, who counts life naught if only by its
sacrifice the end may be attained, or honour preserved. In so far,
that element of stupidity which has been somewhat lavishly attributed
to the British officers' too single-minded attention to their end, to
the exclusion of care for their own persons and those of their men,
has a military value not only great, but decisive. The {p.201}
quality needs direction and control, certainly; but, having been
reproached for now two centuries, the question is apt--Where has it
placed Great Britain among the nations of the earth?
The assault of November 9 began, as is usual in such cases, with a
heavy artillery fire, intended to shake the endurance of those
subjected to it. The Boer guns opened at 4 A.M., and under their cover
the assailants moved forward. The attack was made from all sides, but
the principal effort came from the northward, between the railroads
leading north-east to Glencoe and north-west to the Free State. As
before said, particulars are wanting; but the British had only to hold
their own, except when by a rush, after a repulse of the enemy, they
gained ground over which the latter had passed; whereas the Boers,
having to break cover frequently in order to advance, underwent
necessarily the greater burden of exposure and of loss. How large this
was is still uncertain. Sir Redvers Buller, on the 5th December,
telegraphed to the War Office that it was "very difficult to make any
statement as to the {p.202} enemy's losses. For instance, at Belmont,
81 of their dead were accounted for; they gave 15 as the number of
killed. There is every reason to believe that in the fight at
Ladysmith, on November 9, the enemy's loss was over 800 killed and
wounded." The Boer practice of removing or concealing their slain has
already been noted. The British casualties on this occasion were at
the time reckoned at about 100. Whether subsequent estimates
materially changed this figure is not particularised; but probably it
is nearly correct, for the total losses during the investment,
exclusive of the great assault of January 6, were only 355. The enemy
were effectually repulsed all along the line, and the fighting was
mostly over by 11 A.M. At noon a salute was fired, in honour primarily
of the Prince of Wales's birthday; but, incidentally, doubtless, it
expressed exultation over the garrison's own achievement.
Nearly two months elapsed before the attempt to carry the works by
storm was renewed, and then, doubtless, because it had been recognised
that there was at least a dangerous probability that the place might
hold {p.203} out, until it was relieved by the immense forces known
to be accumulating. But the immediate result of the failure of the 9th
was to dispose the Boer authorities not to risk further slaughter, but
to trust rather to the slow process of famine for overcoming an
endurance which neither they, nor probably the British outside, then
thought could be so long protracted.
Joubert therefore settled down to an investment and bombardment.
Immediately following this determination, and probably consequent upon
it, there were organised a number of raids upon the Natal territory to
the southward. These, though simultaneous in execution, and therefore
mutually supporting, were made by bodies apparently individually
independent; sharing in this a characteristic commonly met in the Boer
operations, and facilitated at once by their individualistic habits of
life, their knowledge of the country, and their freedom from the
organic interdependence which to regular troops becomes a second
nature. Every Boer organisation seems susceptible of immediate
dissolution into its component units, each of independent {p.204}
vitality, and of subsequent reunion in some assigned place; the
individuals passing easily as innocent wayfarers or peasants among the
population, with which they readily blend. The quality has its
strength; but it has also its weakness, and the latter exceeds. This
capacity for undergoing multifold subdivision, with retention of
function by the several parts, is characteristic, in fact, of the
simpler and lower forms of life, and disappears gradually as evolution
progresses to higher orders. In all military performance, it is not
the faculty for segregation that chiefly tells. It is the
predisposition to united action, the habit of mutual concert and
reliance. By this, concentration of purpose, subordination to a common
impulse, ceases to be an effort, becoming the second nature of the
man; and concentration of action, not merely in great operations but
in the inner spirit, is the secret of success in war. Individual,
intelligent self-direction is not, however, thereby excluded. The two
are complementary elements of the highest personal efficiency; but
they must be regarded in their due relations and proportions. The
individualistic {p.205} tendency is that of the natural man, of the
raw material, of the irregular trooper. Educated in the trained
soldier into due subordination to the superior demands of military
concert, it remains an invaluable constituent of military character;
but where existing in excess, as it does prior to training, it is far
more harmful than beneficial. In considering the experiences of a war
of the kind before us, these facts should be kept clearly in mind; for
under the peculiar conditions of countries partly or wholly
unredeemed, as the American wilderness of a century or so ago, or
South Africa to-day, the special experience of the inhabitant confers
local aptitudes which the trained soldier needs to acquire, which
place him for the moment, and in so far, in a position of inferiority,
and in consequence of which hasty impression lightly reaches the
erroneous conclusion that greater military efficiency resides in
individual liberty of action, than in imposed habits of subordination
and concert of movement. It is not so. The exception should not be
mistaken for the rule, nor the occasional for the permanent.
Incidentally {p.206} to the process of investment, the Boers had
already moved in considerable numbers south of Ladysmith, and had
established batteries on Grobler's Kloof, a ridge two or three miles
west of the railroad, overlooking the Tugela from the north. Thence
they had opened fire on the 2nd of November against Colenso, the town
and railway station upon the southern bank, and against Fort Wylie,
upon the northern, just to the east of the road. Colenso and Wylie
were consequently evacuated by the small British forces there present,
and on the 4th it was announced officially that they had retired to
Estcourt, twenty miles to the southward--twenty-seven by the railroad.
This marked the furthest point of the British retreat; but the fewness
of the troops that there made their stand exposed them for some days
to very serious danger, had the object of the Boers been, as was by
some alleged, with firm purpose to destroy whatsoever of force or of
facilities existed to further the advance of relief to the invested
garrison, and not merely raiding with a view to increase their
resources in the positions they {p.207} had determined to hold,
around Ladysmith and on the Tugela.
Up to the 15th of November an armoured train was sent out daily from
Estcourt to reconnoitre, but on that day, having pushed too far north,
it was intercepted on its return by an advanced party of the enemy,
who, by loosening a rail, threw it off the track. A hundred British,
more or less, were here captured; among them Mr. Winston Churchill, a
war correspondent. Three days later, November 18, there were seen from
Estcourt the advanced patrols of the various raiding parties, who were
sweeping the country on both sides of the railroad over a front of
thirty miles or more, from Weenen on the east to Ulundi on the west.
On the 21st they were reported in the direction of Greytown, forty
miles east of Estcourt and the same distance from the railroad, which
here runs south-east, and also at Impendhla, twenty-five miles west of
the road. Their advance was pushed close to the Mooi River, which the
railroad crosses twenty miles to the southward of Estcourt, and there
artillery shots were exchanged with the camp where Sir {p.208}
Francis Clery was assembling the reinforcements arriving at
Durban--the beginnings of the force destined to the relief of
Ladysmith.
Communication of Estcourt with Mooi River was for a short while
interrupted, both by rail and by telegraph, the enemy occupying
Highlands Station, thirteen miles to the southward, on the 20th, and
also a position commanding Willow Grange, midway between Highlands and
Estcourt. At no time, however, did the Boers make any serious
demonstration, looking towards the permanent isolation of the place;
nor was there any attempt to capture it. The whole movement, as it
resulted, was simply a raid, and nothing more, with no apparent
objects except to secure supplies, and, while so engaged, to insure
their own safety from molestation by occupying positions of command,
which facilitated their defence and--by menace or otherwise--imposed
obstacles upon the movements of the British. A certain amount of
outpost skirmishing of course occurred, and on the night of the 22nd
some 4,000 British, under General Hildyard, moved, by way of Willow
Grange, to attack Beacon Hill, which overlooks {p.209} Estcourt from
the west. The Boers were in force there, and upon still higher ridges
farther to the westward. A sharp engagement took place that night, in
which the British first carried the position, but afterwards retired,
leaving it to be reoccupied by the enemy. The movement on their part
seems to have been simply precautionary, a sharp rap to check the
over-confidence of the opponent, and to deter him from pushing attacks
upon the railroad, which for the time being might be inconveniently
successful; the reinforcements from Durban having as yet only
partially come up, and the organisation for advance being still
incomplete. The British loss was 11 killed, 67 wounded.[20]
[Footnote 20: The latest revised official returns
of casualties now (July 18) accessible to the
author are to be found in the London _Times_ of
July 4, and are complete to June 30.]
No attempt on a large scale was made to arrest the Boer raiding
operations. From this, and from their mutually independent character,
it has resulted that the numbers engaged in them have remained very
uncertain, not having been observed or tested by the usual military
methods. By one correspondent on {p.210} the spot they were estimated
at not over 5,000;[21] by another, equally present, at from 7,000 to
12,000.[22]
[Footnote 21: Atkins, "Relief of Ladysmith," p.
117.]
[Footnote 22: Burleigh, "Natal Campaign," p. 127.]
Sir Francis Clery had apparently determined to concentrate his entire
effort upon organising the relief of Ladysmith, and was not to be
drawn off by side events, however disastrous to local interests. The
British force at Estcourt and at Mooi River were considered safe, and
the enemy's advance in fact did not extend in any force beyond the
latter. Very shortly after the affair at Willow Grange the tide began
to ebb. The precise cause for this is still a matter of surmise. It
may be that Joubert considered he had gathered in all that was needed
to supply his positions around Ladysmith and behind the Tugela; it was
reported at the time that 12,000 head of cattle were among the spoils.
It may be that he found the British force, although yet only partially
concentrated and organised, too strong to justify a more extended
movement. It had been rumoured that he purposed to capture, if
possible, Estcourt and Mooi River, {p.211} and even to push on to
Pietermaritzburg, with the view of stopping the relief column as far
as possible from its point of destination. Such an effort was strictly
accurate from the strategic standpoint, and accordingly his whole
movement may have been of the nature of a reconnaissance in force, to
receive greater development if circumstances favoured, and in any
event to impose delay by destroying the roads. To this, however, it
must be replied, even in the ground covered, the injury to the rail,
though often attempted was nowhere serious, except where culverts or
bridges offered vulnerable points.
Another interesting and far from improbable story was current at the
time, that Joubert's retirement was due to peremptory orders from
Pretoria, elicited by the progress of Methuen, the operations around
Naauwport, and the increase of British force in that central region
which French's movements, and those of Gatacre before Stormberg,
seemed to indicate. This report is mentioned by two correspondents
then at Estcourt,[23] as based upon despatches captured {p.212} on
Boer couriers on November 25, directing Joubert to return at once to
Ladysmith, and even to prepare for moving homeward. An official
synopsis of the papers,[24] then given to the press by the military
authorities, does not fully establish the truth of the rumour, but it
does give fair ground to infer that such an influence was exerted upon
the counsels of Pretoria by the operations in Cape Colony; notably by
the battle of Belmont, November 24, and the consequent demoralisation
among the Free State burghers.
[Footnote 23: Burleigh, "Natal Campaign," p. 128,
129. Atkins, "Relief of Ladysmith," p. 116.]
[Footnote 24: Burleigh, "Natal Campaign," p. 129.]
Whatever foundation of truth it may have, the incident irresistibly
suggests, though it does not certainly demonstrate, the advantage of
adhering to the original plan of advance by the Free State line. It
has been stated that, "On all sides in Germany the opinion is
expressed that Kimberley, and even Ladysmith, ought to have been
erased as primary factors in the calculations of those responsible for
the plan of operations. A strong British army advancing towards
Bloemfontein, and turning neither to the left nor to the right, would
have attracted the attention of all the available {p.213} Boer
forces, and would indirectly, but none the less speedily, have
relieved the pressure on Ladysmith and Kimberley.... War is a hard
trade, and must be waged independently of minor considerations and of
many human sympathies."[25] Would it not be juster to say, war must be
waged in the spirit of fortitude, that endures the strain of even a
very great risk, incurred by persisting in a course of action
demonstrably correct?
[Footnote 25: London _Weekly Times_, December 22,
1899.]
Uttered in the week following Magersfontein and Colenso, the opinions
just quoted are certainly open to the charge of being wise after the
event; nevertheless, it is indisputable that they express a
fundamental military truth. A really strong military conception would
have been to concentrate for an advance, such as here suggested,
notifying Sir George White that he could not expect direct relief, but
must plan for a resistance protracted to the farthest, in order that
upon the enemy might be thrown the dilemma of dividing his forces,
thus facilitating the advance of the British central column, or else,
in {p.214} order to oppose this, to drop the eagerly-coveted prize at
Ladysmith. Divided as the total British force already was by the
isolation of the latter, the great resolve would have been, "Let it
fall, if it ultimately must, if only by endurance it prolongs to the
latest moment the dissemination of the enemy's armies." One is
forcibly reminded of the charge of the Archduke Charles to his
subordinate at the critical moment of 1796, which Jomini singles out
for conspicuous eulogium: "It matters not if Moreau gets to Vienna,
provided you keep him occupied till I am done with Jourdan."
Reasonings like these are strictly general in their bearing, liable to
refutation by the special circumstances controlling a particular
action; and it may perfectly well be that considerations of urgency,
amounting even to impossibility, make them inapplicable to the case
before us. Nevertheless, it can scarcely fail that, till such special
considerations are known, and their validity admitted, it is to this
point that military scrutiny and inquiry will be irresistibly drawn.
Whatever the cause of Joubert's retirement, the {p.215} fact was
beyond doubt on the evening of November 25, and on the 26th Hildyard
had advanced a detachment twelve miles, to Frere, hoping thence to act
upon the enemy's line of retreat. Herein he was disappointed, but with
this began the general advance of the British forces in Natal, which a
fortnight later brought the adversaries confronting one another on the
opposite banks of the Tugela. During this period White also was not
idle. Two well-planned and energetic night attacks were made upon the
enemy's siege batteries--on the 8th of December at Gun Hill, a kopje
pertaining to Lombard's Kop, and on the 10th at Surprise Hill, north
of the town, towards Nicholson's Nek. The former, executed chiefly by
Natal colonial forces, resulted in destroying a 6-inch gun and a
4.7-inch howitzer. The second, by Imperial troops, destroyed another
howitzer of the same size. Like the sorties of Kekewich from
Kimberley, these, by compelling the enemy's attention to the place,
contributed to further the movements of Buller, between whom and the
garrison communication, hitherto dependent {p.216} chiefly upon
runners, had now been opened by heliograph and electric-light signals.
Frere had now become the British point of assembly. On the 8th of
December there were there concentrated four infantry brigades,
designated numerically as the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th, as well as the
cavalry and artillery, which a week later took part in the battle of
Colenso. The Boers on their side had taken advantage of the interior
position they held, between the relieving column and the garrison, and
of the fact that the latter could scarcely attempt to break out to the
north, to withdraw their forces in great measure from the latter
quarter, disposing them between Ladysmith and the Tugela in such wise
that they might most easily be concentrated upon the centre, should
the British attack be made there, as it first was, or upon either
flank should a turning manoeuvre be attempted. Their arrangements for
such action appear to have been sagaciously made, as were also the
preparations for contesting the passage of the river at Colenso.
On {p.217} December 12 the final British movement began by the advance
to Chieveley of the 6th Brigade, styled also the Fusilier Brigade,
under Major-General Barton, with 1,000 colonial cavalry, three field
batteries--eighteen pieces--and a number of naval guns, of which two
were of 4.7-inches calibre, and fourteen were long-range 12-pounders.
These were drawn by oxen, even when going into action; the two heavier
guns requiring each fourteen yoke. These batteries were manned by 254
seamen, under the command of Captain Jones, of the cruiser "Forte."
The detachment thus composed settled down a little in advance of
Chieveley, just east of the railroad line, about three miles from
Colenso and four from the kopjes on the far side of the Tugela
overlooking the railroad bridge, upon the nearest of which stands Fort
Wylie. The exact range to the latter, as determined the next day, was
7,200 yards.[26]
[Footnote 26: Four statute miles equal 7,040
yards.]
The following morning, Wednesday, December 13, at 7 A.M., the naval
guns began a heavy bombardment upon the kopjes last mentioned,
{p.218} which lie nearly due north of Colenso, and upon which Sir
Redvers Buller intended to make his main attack. The firing was
maintained for six hours, and did in places considerable damage to
such works as could be discerned; the 4.7-inch guns using lyddite
shells, the bursting effect of which is extremely violent. Despite the
severity of the test to which they were thus subjected, the Boers with
admirable self-control refrained from any reply, and so preserved in
great part the secret of their dispositions from detection by the
enemy.
Next day, Thursday the 14th, the remaining British force marched out
of Frere camp at 4.30 A.M. for Chieveley. The extreme heat of the
days, summer being then well begun, combine with the usual advantages
of timely starting to determine early movements in South Africa. The
last comers pitched camp west of the rail, and about a mile nearer the
Tugela than the 6th Brigade. The naval guns also moved forward
three-quarters of a mile, and resumed the bombardment. The Boers again
making no reply, the disappointment of {p.219} their opponents at
failing to uncover the position of their guns began to yield to an
impression that these had been withdrawn, and even that possibly the
passage would not be contested.
The total British armament now gathered on the south side of the
Tugela has been variously stated at from 20,000 to 23,000 of all arms.
The smaller figure seems the more probable. As regards the number of
their opponents, there is no certain information. Nothing is known,
however, to reduce the estimate previously given--30,000. Allowing for
the necessity of holding in check the garrison at Ladysmith, the Boers
could very well meet Buller in force numerically equal, without taking
account of the passive advantages of a defensive position unusually
strong.
That night were distributed the British orders for forcing the passage
of the Tugela. They were issued by Sir Francis Clery, as commanding
the South Natal Field Forces; but Sir Redvers Buller, by the language
of his subsequent report, has left no doubt that the plan embodied his
own ideas, as Commander-in-Chief in {p.220} South Africa generally,
but present on this scene. This report is the guide in the following
account, the narratives of others having been by the writer used to
supplement or, where necessary, to elucidate.
The general line of the Tugela, for a half-dozen miles above Colenso,
is nearly due east, but its course is extremely winding. In this
section two or three bends of nearly a mile in bulge occur, one of
which had quite an influence in the action. The town itself lies in a
bight of this kind, just west of the railroad, which crosses the river
by a bridge, at that time destroyed. Immediately above it, however, an
iron road-bridge still remained. The latter is the centre of a
semicircle of hills, which surround it to the northward, their crests
being on an average some 1,400 feet high and distant four and a half
miles. The bridge was also the centre of battle, as planned by the
British. Near it, on the north side, are "four small, lozenge-shaped,
steep-sided, hog-backed hills," the one nearest the water, on which
Fort Wylie stands, being the lowest, the others rising in succession
behind. {p.221} They were all "strongly entrenched, with well-built,
rough stone walls along every crest that offered, there being in some
cases three tiers." It was upon these that Buller designed to make his
principal effort. "It was a very awkward position to attack," he says,
"but I thought that if I could effect a lodgment under cover of Fort
Wylie the other hills would to a great extent mask each other, and
shell-fire and want of water would clear them out in time."
The report of the Commander-in-Chief, dealing almost exclusively with
the course of events as they happened, does not particularly describe
the remaining features of the field. These must be supplied from other
sources. Above--west of--Fort Wylie, on the north side, the hills
recede somewhat from the river and rise to one of the crests mentioned
by Buller, known as Grobler's Kloof. This also was heavily fortified,
commanding, it is said, Fort Wylie and the neighbouring hills. If this
be so, success at the latter, had it been achieved, would quickly have
elicited proof of the fact. Under Grobler's Kloof, some two or three
miles up the river, was a drift {p.222} or ford, over which the plan
of attack proposed to pass the 5th or Irish Brigade, commanded by
Major-General Hart, forming the left flank of the British line. This
done, the brigade would move down stream to reinforce the main attack
on the Fort Wylie kopjes.
Below Fort Wylie the river continued south-easterly for something less
than a mile. Then with a bold sweep it curves north, and round west,
to a point half a mile north-east of the fort, when it again flows due
north for a couple of miles. From this formation results a tongue of
land, embraced in the curve, projecting to the south-east, and much
resembling a bastion, to which the subsequent northern stretch serves
as a curtain. In general effect, however, the river may be broadly
said to make below Wylie a sharp turn to the north, running that way
for two or three miles, after which it resumes its general easterly
course towards the sea. The point where it thus resumes its direction
is well to the north--rear--of the line of Boer entrenchments, between
Grobler's and Wylie, so that, if their positions were prolonged on
that {p.223} same line, they would be separated by the river. If, on
the other hand, instead of so continuing, the entrenched works were
made to follow the river course north, keeping always on the same side
of the Tugela, the main Boer positions, confronting the bridge, would
be open to enfilading fire from the eastern hills on the opposite side
below the bend.
Such conditions would seem to make this eastern part of the Boers'
position--their left flank--the weakest. The outcome of the campaign
tends to confirm this conclusion, which the author has been interested
to find also in a letter, not only composed, but published, before the
abortive attempt to turn the west flank at Spion Kop. "To the east of
Fort Wylie," wrote a correspondent of the London _Times_ on December
21, "the Tugela bends sharply northward, and here the left flank of
the Boer position is on the south sides of the river, on a solitary
hill called Hlangwane. This is doubtless the weakest spot in the Boer
position, for if an enemy could take it by storm or otherwise, he
could render the kopjes north of Colenso untenable."[27] {p.224} This
shows that the Boers preferred to have their lines divided by a river
fordable only in places, and at times impassable through floods,
rather than leave their flank uncovered to artillery, a decision
probably correct. As shown by the plans, Hlangwane, as an eminence,
stood by itself; a mile and a half to its east and rear was another
height named Monte Cristo, and again to the westward a range called
Inhlawe Mountain.
[Footnote 27: London _Weekly Times_, January 19,
1900. On the other hand, another correspondent who
shared this view has said, "The consensus of
military opinion seems to be that the ground being
too rough and broken to the eastward, the chief
column will try and effect a crossing far to the
westward of Colenso." (Burleigh--p. 155).]
Of the features mentioned, the Bridle Drift on the west, the iron
road-bridge in the centre, and Hlangwane Hill on the east, are the
principal points to remember. On the British side of the river, a
plain sloped gradually down to the southern bank from a distance of
two or three miles. It was divided north and south by a slight swell
in the ground, flat-topped, of height just sufficient to conceal men
on one side of it from those {p.225} on the other. On the eastern
edge of this rise, the railroad track ran north to the bridge. On the
western side, and between 3000 and 4000 yards from Wylie, was placed
the chief naval battery, the two 4.7-inch and four 12-pounders.
Between these and the railroad was to advance the central column of
attack, the 2nd Brigade under General Hildyard. To the left rear of
this, between it and the 5th Brigade--which, as before said, was
directed upon the Bridle Drift--was placed the 4th, under Major
General Lyttelton, charged with the duty of reinforcing either the 2nd
or the 5th, as circumstances might demand during the progress of the
fight. The 6th Brigade--Major-General Barton--was to advance on the
east of the railroad, in general support of Hildyard. On this part of
the field the ground was flat, but intersected by several dongas. Each
extreme of the line of infantry formed by the four brigades was
covered as usual by a flanking force, chiefly of horse; but while that
on the British left had this function only, that on the right, the
mounted brigade, with one battery--six guns--was {p.226} to attempt
Hlangwane Hill. If successful, it was to enfilade the Wylie kopjes
from that position. The remaining four batteries of field artillery
were intended at the proper moment to concentrate their fire upon the
Wylie kopjes, preparing the way for the crucial charge of the 2nd
Brigade. For this object, two followed Lyttelton's 4th Brigade, and
two the 6th; the last, under Colonel Long, being accompanied by six
naval 12-pounders.
From these dispositions it appears, as is clearly stated by Buller in
his report, that all the differing factors in the attack were to
converge for their object, and according to their respective
qualities, upon "the kopjes north of the iron bridge"--to use Clery's
expression in the orders for battle. The 2nd Brigade marched upon them
direct; the 5th approached their right flank by way of the Bridle
Drift; the 4th and 6th reinforced, as required, each of the others;
the four batteries--two on either side--brought a cross-fire upon the
same objects; while the flanking force on the British right was to
assist by an enfilading fire from Hlangwane. To combine {p.227}
several separate efforts, so that by mutual support and effect each at
the critical moments contributes its due share to the one main
exertion, is always difficult. Failure may ensue from lack of the
nicest attention on the part of any one subordinate, or from those
chances which must always be allowed for in war. The British at
Colenso suffered from both causes.
Hart, on the left, having the longest road to reach the kopjes, moved
first. The brigade reached the river, but missed the ford. It has been
said that the enemy, by building a dam below, had raised the water to
seven feet. Be that as it may, a few venturing in with musket and
ammunition belts were drowned. Groping for the way, and apparently
confused between the tortuous courses of the river itself and a
tributary which enters near by, the mass of the troops blundered into
a sharp bend curving to the northward, thus coming under a cross fire
from the two enclosing banks. Here they became heavily engaged, and
Buller, seeing the hopelessness of the position, recalled them. It was
necessary, however, to send two {p.228} of Lyttelton's battalions and
two batteries to extricate them. Hart's attack therefore had failed,
and his division contributed nothing further except the menace of its
presence, which must retain some of the enemy to resist a possible
renewal.
A yet more decisive mishap meanwhile had occurred in another part of
the field. Reckoning that Hart and Hildyard were to attack in mutual
support, the time had come for the latter to advance, and he had done
so. The beginning of his movement was to have been covered by the six
naval 12-pounders accompanying Long's two field batteries, and a
position had been appointed them to that effect; it being intended
apparently that the army guns should not come into action till later,
when the development of Hildyard's movement would permit them to
approach the enemy within their shorter range without losing the
necessary support of infantry fire,--directly by the 6th brigade,
specifically charged with that duty, and indirectly by the occupation
which Hildyard's attack would necessarily give the Boers. Instead,
however, of attending closely to the requirements of a movement
{p.229} where a certain exactness of touch was evidently necessary,
Long's two field batteries, leaving their infantry escort behind,
galloped rapidly forward on the east side of the railroad and came
into action 1200 yards from Fort Wylie, and, as Buller judged, only
300[28] yards from the enemy's rifle pits. The slow-moving oxen
fortunately were unable to drag the heavier naval guns to the same
position to share the fate that quickly befell. A very heavy fire was
opened from the Boer rifle pits, and although the gunners stuck
manfully to their pieces until the ammunition in the limbers was
exhausted, they were compelled then to leave them on the plain,
retreating for shelter to a donga. The breech-blocks, even, were not
carried away; it is said because they expected to return again to
action. The naval detachment, 300 yards further back, were exposed to
the same fire, but received only its outer fringe. The native drivers
bolted, and many of the oxen were killed or stampeded; but the
{p.230} seamen contrived to drag their guns out of range.
[Footnote 28: This "3" in the copy before me may be
a misprint for "8." The London _Times_
correspondent gives 800 yards for the rifle fire.]
News of this mishap reached Buller as he was returning from witnessing
Hart's discomfiture. Hildyard was directed to move two regiments of
his advancing brigade to the right to save the pieces; but, though the
order was steadily executed, it was found impossible to keep the
troops out of cover under the fire of Wylie, which had been
momentarily silenced by Long's impetuous attack, but had now opened
again. The batteries had failed by preceding, and so losing, infantry
support; the infantry in turn failed because the guns were powerless.
A sudden and desperate rush with harnessed teams succeeded in
withdrawing two of the twelve abandoned pieces, in performing which
service the son of Lord Roberts lost his life. But a second attempt
found the enemy on guard again, and out of 22 horses that started 13
were killed before half-way to the spot.
The naval 12-pounder accompanying Long having been rendered immobile
for the day, and the two batteries sacrificed, Sir Redvers Buller
decided that without their support it would {p.231} be impossible to
force the passage. He therefore directed a general withdrawal to the
camp. The abandoned batteries were left in the open, where, together
with the wounded men and some of the supports sent in by Hildyard,
they were taken by the Boers. The British loss in missing and
prisoners was 21 officers and 207 men. There were killed 135, and
wounded 762. The enemy remained unshaken in his positions.
This mortifying reverse, following sharply upon the heels of
Magersfontein and Stormberg, thoroughly aroused the British people,
who neither at home nor on the field were prepared for it. The day
after the receipt of the news, Saturday, December 16th, a Cabinet
meeting was held, and the next evening it was announced that, as the
campaign in Natal was likely to require the undivided attention of Sir
Redvers Buller, Lord Roberts would be sent to South Africa as
Commander-in-Chief, and would be accompanied by Lord Kitchener as
Chief of Staff. At the same time the rest of the Army Reserve was
called out, and further measures taken which carried the troops
employed in South Africa to, and beyond, {p.232} the large numbers
already quoted as despatched by the end of the following March.
Lord Roberts sailed from England December 23rd. On the 26th, at
Gibraltar, he picked up Kitchener, who had been brought there by a
swift naval cruiser, and on the 10th of January, 1900, he landed at
Cape Town.