CHAPTER IV {p.102}

THE WESTERN FRONTIER TO MAGERSFONTEIN AND STORMBERG--OPERATIONS OF

GENERAL FRENCH ABOUT COLESBERG

As was the case a century ago, on the eve of the French Revolution,

Great Britain last year indulged too long her dream of peace, and

awaked from it too late for timely preparation. Like a man who starts

behindhand with his day, the catching up meant double worry, if not

double work. Hildyard's brigade, which sailed October 20, had, thirty

days before, been preceded by two hospital ships, three batteries of

field artillery and a thousand infantry;[7] the last-named getting

away on the 19th, only one day before Hildyard. No British field

troops had then reached South Africa, save a couple of {p.103}

battalions additional to Cape Colony, and the reinforcements to Sir

George White drawn mainly from India, which, with most of his corps in

Natal, and despite his well-directed energy, the Boers by their

superior numbers were able to round up and corral in Ladysmith in

three weeks after their ultimatum was issued. There were then also on

the way some fifteen hundred of the Army Service Corps, an organised

body of men trained for the supply and transport service of the army,

and of skilled mechanics, whose duties are to construct and maintain

works of various kinds for the facilitation of army supply--transport

and depot. These had sailed in the early days of October.

[Footnote 7: There may have been one or two more

battalions of infantry, but I have not been able to

trace such.]

Such was the mighty enginery antecedently set in motion, to crush the

liberties of the Transvaal. An interesting further illustration of the

way decision was precipitated toward the end is found in the fact that

Sir George White was gazetted Governor of Gibraltar in the last week

in August, and on September 15 sailed to command the forces in Natal.

"My small experience," wrote Steevens about October 12 from the

well-advanced station {p.104} of Stormberg Junction, in Cape Colony,

"has been confined to wars you could put your fingers on; for this war

I have been looking long enough and have not found it.... We are

heavily outnumbered, and have adopted no heroic plan of abandoning the

indefensible. We have an irregular force of mounted infantry at

Mafeking, a regiment (regulars) at Kimberley, a regiment and a half at

De Aar" (the most important of junctions), "half of the Berkshires at

Naauwport, the other half here." Stormberg and Naauwport were also

junctions, secondary only, if secondary, to De Aar, in the strategic

importance that always attaches to cross-roads. "The famous fighting

Northumberlands came crawling up behind our train, and may now be at

Naauwport or De Aar. Total, say, 4,100 infantry, of whom 600 mounted;

no cavalry, no field guns. The Boer force available against these

isolated positions might be very reasonably put at 12,000 mounted

infantry, with perhaps a score of guns.... It is dangerous--and yet

nobody cares. There is nothing to do but wait--for the Army Corps that

has not yet left England. Tiny forces, half {p.105} a battalion in

front, and no support behind--nothing but long lines of railway with

ungarrisoned posts hundreds of miles at the far end of them. It is

very dangerous. No supports at this moment nearer than England."[8]

[Footnote 8: "From Cape Town to Ladysmith," pp.

16-20.]

In this brief and pregnant summary the reader will note outlined the

elements characteristic of all strategic situations: the bases, the

seaports; the communications, the railway lines; the front of

operations, the frontier of the Orange Free State, or rather, perhaps,

in this defensive--or defenceless--stage, the railroad line parallel

to it, which joins De Aar, Naauwport and Stormberg.

Dangerous, sure enough; how much so needs only a glance at the map to

show. Before reinforcements could arrive Sir George White was shut up

in Ladysmith by forces double his own. These he held there, it is

true; and the fatal delay of the Boers before his lines, reflected in

their no less fatal inactivity on the frontier of the Cape Colony,

whence Steevens wrote the words quoted, doubtless threw away the game;

but we are now speaking, as he was then writing, of the time {p.106}

when the cards had only been dealt and the hand was yet to play. Put

your marks on each of the places named--Mafeking, Kimberley, De Aar,

Naauwport, Stormberg--note their individual and relative importance,

the distances severing them from one another, the small bodies of men

scattered among them, incapable through weakness and remoteness of

supporting each other, and with no common supports behind. Mafeking is

from Kimberley 223 miles; Kimberley from De Aar, 146; De Aar from

Naauwport, 69; Naauwport from Stormberg 80, as the crow flies over a

difficult country, at least 130 by rail. All three junctions with

their intervening lines of rail, bridges, culverts and all, are little

over fifty miles from the Orange River, which hereabout forms the

boundary separating Cape Colony from the Free State. And White is

about to be invested in Ladysmith, and the Army Corps has not yet left

England.

The average length of a transport's voyage from the United Kingdom to

Cape Town, as determined from 162 records, was 22-1/6 days. The first,

with Hildyard's brigade, accomplished it {p.107} in 20 days, arriving

November 9; the last of the four took 25 days, coming in on the 14th.

With them, and their one predecessor, 6,000 additional troops were at

the latter date--five weeks after the Boers' ultimatum became

operative--landed at the far base of operations, yet 500 miles by

railroad from the front. Kimberley and Mafeking were then already

invested, and the bombardment at both places begun. The British troops

had evacuated Stormberg Junction November 3, falling back to the

southward toward Sterkstrom and Queenstown; thus abandoning railroad

communication between East London, one of the sea bases, and the

western theatre of war toward Naauwport and De Aar. Naauwport had also

been quitted at about the same time, but the Boer grasp in that

central quarter was never as firm as it was to the eastward and

westward. General French was early established with his cavalry at

Hanover Road, midway on the line from Naauwport to De Aar, and his

activity, skilfully directed against the flanks of the enemy, imparted

to the latter a nervousness which the frontal attacks on the eastern

{p.108} line failed to produce. Naauwport was reoccupied by the

British November 19, and De Aar was never by them abandoned; but the

Boers on the 25th of November blew up a bridge on the line from

Naauwport _via_ Middelburg and Rosmead to Port Elizabeth, thereby

momentarily cutting out the line from this sea base also, as their

advance upon Stormberg had eliminated East London. They made also

strenuous efforts, at many points, to destroy the main road from

Kimberley south to Orange River, blowing up culverts and bridges, but

the damage effected was afterward found to be less than had been

expected, owing to the clumsiness of their methods; a fact which

probably indicates that their cause was supported mainly by a rural

population, and that few mechanics--townsfolk--were in their ranks.

There seems to have been no serious attempt to interrupt

communications south of the Orange River, important though it was to

do so. The British Corps, to the command of which Lord Methuen was

assigned, assembled at the Orange River Bridge without opposition or

difficulty, its concentration being effected {p.109} on the 19th of

November. The advance thence, in fact, began on the 21st, and on the

23rd was fought its first battle, that of Belmont.

It will be well here to summarize, map in hand, the character and

result of the Boers' operations in this western theatre, during the

priceless five weeks of opportunity secured to them by the

over-confidence, or the remissness, or the forbearance, of their

powerful enemy. The conditions differed from those in the eastern

scene of war--in Natal--because there the just anxiety of the

inhabitants, reflected in that of the colonial and Imperial

governments, had occasioned the concentration of by far the greatest

mass of available British troops.

The exposure of Natal in its more vital and strictly British interests

greatly exceeded that of Cape Colony, where, owing to the remoteness

of the seaboard, near which the British chiefly congregated, the first

of the Boer invasion would fall upon a population strongly sympathetic

with the cause of the enemy, though British in allegiance. Therefore

while this disloyalty was ominous and detrimental {p.110} to the

British cause as a whole, direct injury to British interests was less

immediately threatened. The Cape frontier, accordingly, was left

defenceless, as has been shown; and in a strictly military point of

view it was quite correct thus wholly to neglect one, rather than

weakly to divide between two.

The consequence was that in Natal occurred during ten days the severe

and nearly continuous fighting already narrated, with the result of

shutting up in Ladysmith, on the direct line of any further advance

contemplated by the Boers, a very strong British force; incapable,

doubtless, of taking the field against the vastly superior numbers

confronting it, but most capable, by numbers and position, of

embarrassing any onward movement of the enemy. This aspect of the case

has been too much neglected in the general apprehension.

The British in Ladysmith were doubtless an isolated and endangered

garrison, the relief of which constrained the movements of its friends

away from more proper objectives; but in the early days of the siege,

while {p.111} in the prime of the physical strength afterward drained

away by hunger, and up to the time that reinforcements had arrived to

bar in front the progress of the enemy, it was also to the latter what

Mantua in 1796 was to Bonaparte, and Genoa in 1800 was to the

Austrians prior to Marengo--a force which, if advance were attempted,

would be on the rear of the army, flanking the communications. To

secure these it would be necessary, before forward movement, either to

carry the place by assault, suitably prepared and executed, thus

sweeping it out of the way for good, or else to keep before it a

detachment of sufficient strength to check any effort seriously to

interrupt the communications. But this would be to divide the Boer

forces, to which doubtless Joubert did not feel his numbers adequate.

This was the important--the decisive--part played by Ladysmith in the

campaign.

Had the Boers' "exclusiveness of purpose"--to use Napoleon's happy

phrase--answered to the demands of their military situation, they

would have done for military reasons what their opponents were

compelled to do through {p.112} unpreparedness and considerations of

civil policy. They would have neglected the frontiers of Cape Colony,

and concentrated their effort against the organised force which

exceptionally favourable circumstances, that could not be expected

either to continue or to recur, had enabled them to isolate in Natal.

What effect the failure to do this produced in the latter colony will

be examined later. We have now to consider how the Boers, having

decided to follow two widely divergent plans of operations, utilised

the opportunity afforded them by the long period of weakness undergone

by their antagonists in the debatable ground, where the frontiers of

Cape Colony and the Orange Free State adjoin, along the banks of the

Orange River from Basutoland to Kimberley. Remote and detached

Mafeking, the news of whose deliverance comes as these lines are

writing, remains a romantic episode, a dramatic centre of interest,

from the heroic endurance and brilliant gallantry displayed by its

garrison; but, from the practical side, the action of friend and foe,

the fact of occupation and the conduct of {p.113} the siege, present

a military riddle not readily solved.

Noting the natural military line of the Orange River, the importance

of which in more military countries would be emphasized by

corresponding works of precaution, for defence and for movement, in

its vicinity, it will be observed that parallel to it, at a distance

of about fifty miles, within the borders of the colony, there is the

stretch of railway from Stormberg, _via_ Rosmead Junction and

Naauwport, to De Aar. Beyond the last-named point the line, now become

the main road, converges steadily and rapidly upon the border of the

Free State, within a dozen miles of which it continues from the point

where it crosses the Orange River until abreast the boundary between

the Free State and the Transvaal. Between Stormberg and De Aar this

line consists simply of the branches that there tie together the main

roads, through which the principal seaports--Cape Town, Port

Elizabeth, and East London--seek access to the interior. The

direction, alike of the main and branch roads, as well as the position

of the junctions, are doubtless determined {p.114} by local

considerations of topography and traffic.

Although constructed for commercial purposes, the line of rail from

Stormberg to De Aar has particular military value as an advanced base

of operations, from which to start, and upon which, for the initial

stages, to rest a campaign. It is central as regards the extremities

of the hostile frontier opposed to it; it is moderate in length; and,

from the rapidity of transfer from end to end afforded by the

railroad, it permits movements on one flank or the other to be

combined with comparative facility. Add to this the convergence upon

it of the several lines of supply from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and

East London, and it is evident that the line would present particular

advantages for the assembling of a British army intending to invade

the Free State by the most probable, because most advantageous, route,

the direct highroad to Bloemfontein. It is, indeed, the key, the

central military position of this theatre of war; not geometrically,

by mere measurement of distance, but as the place where converge and

unite all the great communications from {p.115} the opposing bases of

operations, which at the first would be, for the Free State, the

Orange River, and for Great Britain, the line of seaports.

The distance from the frontier and the interposition of the mountain

range in the Steynsburg district would combine to make observation of

preliminary movements difficult to the enemy, except, indeed, by

information from the disaffected inhabitants who abounded. The secure

and undisturbed tenure of this line would therefore much facilitate

the British campaign, should it develop against the Free State;

consequently the first aim of the Boer commanders should have been to

hold, or if not able to hold, to destroy it effectually as regards

steam communication.

It is as yet impossible to say exactly what was the force of the Boers

on their western frontiers between the middle and the end of October.

Steevens, as above quoted, thought 12,000 at the earlier date. A more

likely reckoning seems to me to be 8,000, but it probably rose near

the higher figure before November, and must much have exceeded it by

the 1st of December, unless British {p.116} estimates are more wide

of the mark than is probable. The lowest maximum for the forces of the

two republics that I have seen was given by one of the Boer envoys

now[9] in the United States; viz., 38,000. Allowing 30,000 to Natal by

November 1, there is nothing immoderate in the supposition that there

were then from 10,000 to 12,000 on the line of the Orange River, and

from thence round to Mafeking. Personally, I believe that the totals

were larger, for very considerable numbers of the Dutch population in

Cape Colony and Natal joined the Boers, and the indications are that

all the available men were put--and very properly--at once in the

field. The emergency was great, time was invaluable, and the

maintaining of a reserve, judicious in many cases, would under the

conditions of the Boers have been a mere dividing and frittering of

forces, by the immediate employment of which alone might success be

snatched.

[Footnote 9: May 19, 1900.]

To allow Great Britain time to arouse, to assemble and put forth her

strength, before some really decisive advantage, material or moral,

{p.117} was gained over her, was to ensure defeat. This, however, was

what the Boers did. Although they put in force successfully a _levée

en masse_, and thus in point of time concentrated into action their

whole fighting population, they did not with equal exclusiveness of

purpose concentrate in force upon a single military objective; nor was

such choice as they made dictated by sound military principle, or

carried out with sound military judgment.

It so happened that the conditions at the opening of the campaign bore

a curious resemblance, though on a considerably larger scale, to those

attending the hostilities of 1881 in South Africa. Then, as now, the

British were in number far inferior. Then, as now, they were scattered

here and there in small detachments. Then the Boers had achieved

successes which doubtless surprised themselves as well as their

enemies, and had produced for them the unfortunate result of

overvaluing their own prowess, and of inducing a secure belief that

both they and their opponents, after twenty years, remained in native

and acquired qualities in the same relative {p.118} positions of

individual superiority and inferiority that they had somewhat

prematurely assumed.

It was a natural result of such prepossessions that, instead of

concentrating to hold in mass some decisive position by which to

prolong the war, or to destroy or capture some important

detachment--such as that at Ladysmith--they should settle themselves

down to sieges, to a war of posts. In 1881, of several posts they had

in the same manner leisurely invested, one surrendered. They probably

believed that the others would have done so, had not the British

Government of that day yielded and made peace. Whatever the reasoning,

it was to the method of 1881 that the Boers resorted. After the

preliminary battles in Natal, already narrated, in each of which the

British attacked, they settled down with facile indolence to an

investment of Ladysmith.

The dissemination of the enemy on the Free State frontier, so

graphically summarized by Steevens, could not induce them to crush,

with the concentrated force permitted by their imposing superiority of

numbers, any one {p.119} of the small detachments thus fatally

exposed. The place, not the force within, had military value in their

eyes. To the general result contributed no doubt the tendency of local

interest to dominate general considerations in a rural and loosely

organised population. It was noted at the time that the principle of

local operation decided not only that the Transvaal should operate

chiefly in Natal, and the Orange Free State toward Cape Colony, but

also determined the course of action within each state. "There has

been very little moving about of burghers from one part of the

Transvaal or Free State to the other.... In the latter, the eastern

commandos have gone to Natal, the western ones to Kimberley, and to

the southern ones, numbering probably less than 4,000 men altogether,

have been left the double task of invading Cape Colony and keeping off

the Basutos; and as the ordinary Free State burgher is much more

anxious about his own farm than about turning our colony upside down,

the result is that practically nothing has been done to attack the

most vulnerable point in our defence."

The {p.120} same correspondent, writing from Cape Town, October 25,

said that there were not 3,000 men of regular troops, and no

artillery, in Cape Colony when the war broke out. His means of

information were doubtless better than those of Steevens, who was in

Cape Town less than forty-eight hours and made his guess--4,100--before

he had time for personal observation over the ground.

It is scarcely necessary to point out what an opportunity was here

presented for a rapid succession of blows at isolated detachments,

such as military history has often before witnessed. It is difficult

to believe that the frontier could not have been swept clean from end

to end, and the entire railroad system, essential to the advance and

centralised action of the British forces, hopelessly dislocated and

smashed by an operation embodying the most elementary conceptions of

concentration. Instead of that the centre of the line was kept almost

undisturbed, the principal demonstrations of the Boers across the

border being on the flanks--Kimberley and Mafeking on their right,

Stormberg and the {p.121} districts north and east of it on their

left; the railroad from Naauwport to De Aar, and thence to the Orange

River, being scarcely molested, and for working purposes remaining

intact. So far as military purpose can be inferred from military

action, the effort of the Boers was concentrated--or rather

localised--upon the occupation of unprotected and friendly districts

in the east, where they took up scattered defensive positions, while

for offensive operations they satisfied themselves with the investment

of Kimberley and Mafeking.

An American correspondent--evidently not unfriendly--writing of

Pretoria about October 20, records an instructive anecdote, which

reveals much of the Boer idea and purpose, and suggests food for

thought as to underlying causes, not unprecedented in history, which

from the first, if then known, would have foretold sure defeat. "A

large door on the opposite side of the room opened, and a clerk

informed the Secretary (Mr. Reitz) that he was wanted in the Executive

Council room. While he was collecting a number of papers on his desk I

could hear the conversation of {p.122} men in the adjoining room.

Suddenly there was a deep roar--almost like that of a lion--and at the

same time a bang on the table that made the windows rattle. And the

voice--it was that of a man--continued its deep bellowing, and again

there was a thundering bang on the table. 'The old President has met

with some obstacle in his plans,' said the Secretary of State, smiling

at my look of surprise at the sound of such a human voice, and he

disappeared with an armload of papers.... When he returned he was

chuckling to himself. 'General Cronje wants to assault Mafeking,' he

said. 'He has wired that he can take the town in a hand-to-hand fight,

but the old President won't listen to it. He says the place is not

worth the lives of fifty burghers, and has just issued an order that

Cronje is to continue the siege and simply see to it that Colonel

Baden-Powell and his troops do not escape. The Council was divided;

some thought that Cronje should be permitted to storm the place. The

President has just ordered that one of the big siege-guns shall be

sent to Cronje.'"[10]

[Footnote 10: _Harper's Monthly Magazine_, May,

1900, p. 827.]

Time {p.123} apparently was of no account. The burghers and the Boers

had only to wait open-mouthed for plums to drop--at Mafeking, at

Kimberley, at Ladysmith. Mafeking very possibly was not in itself

worth the lives of fifty burghers; but it was worth a great deal more

if it was to be the means of detaining them before its little worth to

their exclusion from action concentrated elsewhere, which their

numbers would have gone to make overpowering, and which by proper

direction would have been decisive--not perhaps of ultimate

issues--but of those prolonged delays in which lies the best hope of a

defence. It is an interesting commentary on Kruger's decision that, at

the moment these lines are writing, the deliverance of Mafeking is

known to have been preceded immediately by a fruitless assault of the

burghers, which cost more than that presumed for the attack at the

outset, which a competent general on the spot believed then would be

successful. Control at a distant capital, exercised by an obstinate,

overbearing old man, who, though unquestionably shrewd and acute, was

equally unquestionably narrow with the narrowness of contracted

experience and {p.124} limited military knowledge, boded ill for the

Boer cause. While Cronje at Mafeking, and Wessels at Kimberley, and

Joubert at Ladysmith were waiting for a moment that never came, time

was flying, the hostile reinforcements were speeding forward 300 miles

a day, and the very danger of the three places was goading the British

people into wide-awake activity.

Yet more imminent was the nearer opportunity, fast disappearing into

the nearer danger, ultimately to become the established and fatal

centre of ruin--at De Aar. "This was not the sort of fighting-ground

the Boer is wont to choose," wrote one there present, "but we felt

that he must come because we menaced his frontier sixty miles away,

and tempted him with such an amount of stores, guns, and ammunition as

would enable him to prolong his warfare at least two months longer

than his own resources would permit." A somewhat narrow view this,

leaving out of the account De Aar's intrinsic advantage in position;

but to continue--"Every day that the Boers delayed our camp grew

stronger, though this was not the case before General {p.125} Buller

arrived at the Cape (October 31). Until then we had only one

battalion--about 800 men--to protect stores estimated at half a

million pounds; but within forty-eight hours a battery and a

half--nine guns--had arrived from England, to be followed by another

half battery from the Orange River."[11]

[Footnote 11: Ralph's "Toward Pretoria," p. 97.]

The position of De Aar indicated it absolutely as a point which the

British must hold, fortify, and use as a depot and base. Camps and

buildings began to be laid out and put up about October 25, and stores

to accumulate; ten days later came the batteries and also

reinforcements; but these--400 in number--imperatively demanded by the

superior importance and exposure of De Aar, which required

concentration upon it, were obtained by evacuating Colesberg and

Naauwport, the latter a most regrettable necessity. But what were the

Boers doing while these fragments were drawing together into a single

body, while batteries were arriving, and works, not yet existent, were

being thrown up? They were besieging Kimberley and Mafeking, 150

{p.126} and 300 miles away, and pottering about just within Cape

Colony, occupying undefended towns and making proclamations of

annexation. "Fancy," says the writer just quoted,--"fancy the Orange

River sixty miles away, with 2,500 men (British) holding the

(railroad) bridge over it, and a battalion of 1,000 men broken into

five bodies of troops isolated at as many points--all, excepting the

force at Orange River, inviting certain destruction."[12]

[Footnote 12: Ralph's "Toward Pretoria," p. 104.]

The concentration ordered by Buller, just mentioned, drew the British,

on the left flank of their line in Cape Colony, into two principal

bodies--2,500 at Orange River Station, where the railroad to Kimberley

crosses the river, and some 1,500 at De Aar. Stormberg Junction on the

right of the line was evacuated at the same time as Naauwport, the

troops falling back upon Queenstown, fifty miles distant by rail. This

abandonment of the two junctions severed from each other the right and

left flanks of the general front, which extended from Stormberg to De

Aar, depriving them of mutual support; a condition of disadvantage

{p.127} that was not wholly removed until after the occupation of

Bloemfontein. This gain to the Boers, however, was due to no

well-combined active operations on their side, but to the mere fact

that their opponents were everywhere so hopelessly weaker in numbers

that it was insanity any longer to risk these small detachments in

places where they ought to have been captured days before.

From these withdrawals it resulted that the British movements in

either quarter were of no assistance to those in the other by direct

co-operation, but only by diversion--by occupying in front of either

flank a certain proportion of the enemy. The latter attempted no

serious movement of attack, but simply waited. Their plan, alike in

the strategy of the campaign and in the tactics of the battlefield,

was to abide attack, with the advantages, usual to the defensive, of a

carefully chosen position diligently improved. So placed and secured,

they hoped to repel and to hold fast; but at the worst to inflict loss

greater than they received and then to slip away successfully,

avoiding capture, to another similar position in the rear of the

first, {p.128} there to repeat again the same tactic. For such

retreat provision of horse mounts was always carefully made, and to

its success their superiority in horseflesh, their habit of isolated

movement, their knowledge of the country, and the friendliness of the

inhabitants, greatly contributed. The student of naval history will

easily recognise in these methods an analogy to the battle tactics

plausibly ascribed to the French by Clerk in his celebrated treatise.

It was often successful on the ground, but it did not win campaigns.

The mastery of the sea remained with the British, whose blindly

headlong attacks with their ships resembled in much the free and often

foolish exposure of their troops in the beginning of the present war.

Nevertheless, the temper is one which wins, nor is there any necessary

incompatibility between a vigorous initiative and reasonable caution.

There is much to be said for such a plan as suited to the force

numerically inferior, and especially when, as with the Boers, it is

composed of men untutored in the military formations and manoeuvres

essential to successful movement in battle. Defence of the character

{p.129} indicated requires little change after the primary

dispositions have been made; the men for the most part stand fast when

placed, and do not incur the risk of confusion from which the

well-practised only can extricate themselves.

The mistake of the Boers was in failing to recognise that a nation

compelled to such a mode of action by its conditions of inferiority,

in numbers and in drill, is doomed to ultimate defeat, unless at the

very beginning, while the enemy has not yet developed or concentrated

his powers, such an advantage is gained by a vigorous initiative as

shall either prevent his obtaining the necessary initial positions, or

shall at least postpone his doing so long enough to affect materially

the course of the war, and give room for the chapter of accidents--for

the intervention of the unforeseen. The Boers, having surprised their

enemy at unawares, had the opportunity so to act. It may be that, had

they done so, ultimate success would not certainly have followed--the

odds were very great; but it is safe to say that only so, by rushing

the campaign at the beginning, had they any chance of final {p.130}

victory. "Desperate conditions," said Nelson, "require desperate

remedies." The Boers' position was desperate from the first, to be

saved only by the most vigorous handling of numbers which for a brief

and critical period were largely superior.

Thus it was that these opening weeks decided the character and issue

of the war, beyond chance of subsequent reversal. By the Boers' own

choice, interest was fixed not upon one or two, but upon several

quarters, and these--save Ladysmith--determined not by their inherent,

and therefore lasting and decisive, strategic importance, but by

questions of commercial value and of the somewhat accidental presence

in them of very small bodies of regular troops. At two places,

Mafeking and Kimberley, the assailants were, as an English journal

justly put it, "foiled by colonial forces hastily organised, and

stiffened by small regular detachments which have shown far more

enterprise on the offensive than their besiegers have done."

Such a situation, under the existing conditions of the general

campaign, should have been met, not by protracted investment in

force, {p.131} but by assault; or, if that were inexpedient, a

sufficient detachment should have been left to hold the garrison in

check, while considerations of more decisive military importance

elsewhere received concentrated attention.

Immediately after the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller he found the

investment of the three garrisons--Ladysmith, Kimberley, and

Mafeking--already accomplished. The question before him was

complicated by the introduction of these new factors. As has before

been said, it is generally understood that the expectation of the

British authorities had been to proceed at once to an invasion of the

Orange Free State, presumably by the line to Bloemfontein, with

flanking movements on either side of it, while the forces in Natal

were to stand simply on the defensive, until, by the advance of the

army of invasion within supporting distance, the time for co-operation

with it should arrive. In Natal, now, the tables were turned, the

defence had broken down, and the army charged with it was shut up by a

force so far superior as to enable it, not only to carry on the siege,

but {p.132} to make at least serious inroads upon the colony, if not

to advance permanently to positions of more extensive control, to

dislodge it from which greater effort would be needed. The question

now to be decided was whether relief would be best effected by

adhering to the original plan of moving in force upon Bloemfontein,

leaving Ladysmith to look out for itself, and only strengthening the

forces in Natal outside of the place sufficiently to check any further

advance of the enemy; or whether to attempt speedier succour by a

direct advance along the roads leading to one or both of the besieged

places.

The first, if successfully carried out, would eventually take in the

rear the assailants both of Kimberley and Ladysmith, threatening them

with the severance of their communications--concerning which the Boers

are exceptionally sensitive--and thus would raise the siege by

compelling the retreat of the besiegers. This plan, moreover, would be

faithful to general military principle, by keeping the great mass of

the British Army concentrated upon a single object, and under a single

hand.

The {p.133} alternative possessed the drawback of dividing the army

into two bodies virtually independent in their several movements, out

of mutual supporting distance, and each distinctly weaker than the

single mass intended for the great central operation of the former

plan. The second also laboured under the other disadvantages that a

direct advance naturally has as compared to a turning movement. The

enemy would be met always in front--thus covering his communications

and with retreat open--in positions assumed tactically with a view to

prevent flank attacks and to compel assault in front, the most

dangerous to make.

In choosing their ground for their objects, the Boers have shown

remarkable aptitude. If overpowered and dislodged, unless routed and

dispersed, the defender falls back continually upon the bases in his

rear, recuperating his losses by reinforcements from them, while the

victorious assailant must either press on with diminished numbers or

must wait for reinforcements to come up, a delay that enables the

defence still more to improve the next position, which, in a campaign

of this sort, {p.134} has commonly been selected long before. It may

be said here that this was precisely the character of the advance on

Kimberley about to be narrated. In such a direct operation, by its

very nature, the defence gains strength and shortens his line of

communications to be defended, while the reverse conditions

unremittingly drain the powers of the assailant.

As an abstract military question there need be no hesitation in saying

that the advance through the Orange Free State was in principle the

correct plan, even under the existing conditions, as far as these are

accurately known. But conditions are never accurately known to

outsiders so immediately after a war. Even the hard bottom facts which

ultimately appear, the residuum left after full publicity, and

discussion, and side lights from all sources have done their work, do

not correctly reproduce the circumstances as present to the mind of

the general officer who decides. What is known now was doubtful then;

what now is past and certain, was then future and contingent; what

this and that subordinate, this force and that force could {p.135}

endure and would endure we now know, but who could surely tell six

months ago? Who, whatever his faith in the heroism and patience of the

garrisons, believed in December, 1899, that Ladysmith and Kimberley

and Mafeking could hold out, without relief, as long as they did? What

therefore, between the known uncertainties of the past and the

certainly imperfect information of the present, we, who had not the

responsibilities of decision, may modestly refrain from positively

judging the particular decision, even by the generally sound

principles which commonly govern such cases. Warfare is an art, not a

science; it knows no unvarying laws, and possesses neither specifics

nor panaceas.

Whatever the reason, the decision was reached to attempt

simultaneously the relief of Kimberley and of Ladysmith. It is with

the former, which also was first in order of time, that we now have

immediately to do. This advance had begun, had reached its furthest

limit, had been brought to a standstill, and so had failed, before the

clash of arms at Colenso, on December 15, signalized the opening of

the campaign for the relief of Ladysmith. {p.136} This priority was

naturally to be expected; for not only was Cape Town the first port of

arrival from England, but the much larger number of the besiegers at

Ladysmith made a much longer time necessary to accumulate the force

adequate to contend successfully against them. The details of the

assembling of Methuen's division at Orange River Station need not

detain us. The 2,500 men there in the first week of November had been

increased by November 19 to nearly 10,000, and began to advance on the

21st. It will be well, however, to say a word about their objective,

Kimberley, its conditions, its defences, and its defenders, as well as

about the country through which runs the railroad that marks the

general line of Methuen's proposed operation.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kekewich, who had been ordered to command the

forces in Kimberley, had arrived there on the 13th of September.

Already portions of the Transvaal levies were out, "on commando," as

the Boer phrase is, moving on the Free State side of the boundary

line; and many reasonably authenticated rumours were heard of

intentions {p.137} to destroy the railroad bridges--notably over the

Modder and Orange Rivers--south of the place, as well as others north

of it. The guard of the road generally was then in charge of a mounted

body called the Cape Police, detachments of which watched the bridges.

Political and other considerations prevented immediate steps from

being taken to fortify the town, but plans were matured, and

information concerning the surrounding country had already been

procured by subordinate officers, whose arrival had preceded that of

Kekewich. On the 18th of September, construction of defence works

began, reports of movements by the burghers of the Free State as well

as by Transvaalers being received, and arousing apprehension of a

sudden attack. On the 27th of September, an officer of the garrison,

by personal observation at Boshof in the Free State, ascertained that

the burghers of the latter had been ordered out. The works were then

pressed forward, and the formation of citizens into town guards

already planned, was begun; 1,156 combatant members being enrolled,

and placed under drill by non-commissioned officers of {p.138} the

regular battalion in garrison. The Boer forces continued to approach

Kimberley, and on October 4, a week before war began, advanced bodies

were within twelve miles. By October 7 the earthworks were so far

forward that Kekewich considered the place practically safe against

any attempt on the part of the enemy to rush it suddenly.

When the ultimatum expired, October 11, the garrison proper consisted

of 570 Imperial and 630 colonial troops, for the defence of an

unwalled town which contained 40,000 inhabitants and, being built in

rambling fashion, had a very long circuit--about eleven miles--to be

guarded. The ready co-operation of the citizens in military duty, both

those already belonging to volunteer bodies and those not previously

organised, but now enrolling themselves for the purpose, alone made

the defence possible. From them, particularly, was formed a corps of

irregular horse, which filled the want of mounted troops that at first

was severely felt. Colonel Kekewich, recognising the enemy's

overpowering superiority of numbers, rapidly drew {p.139} into

Kimberley all the outlying forces of every character under his

command.

Although deeply concerned for the safety of the Modder River bridge,

upon which in a measure would depend the advance of a relief column,

"I was most anxious," he says, "that no disposition of troops made by

me should give the enemy a chance of scoring a first success, even

where the smallest body of British troops might be concerned. Taking

into consideration that the enemy would probably not regulate his

movements in accordance with the dictates of sound strategy, that he

was in possession of mobile artillery in my immediate neighbourhood, I

felt that if I had detached a small body of troops, necessarily

without artillery, which it was not in my power to support from

Kimberley, the enemy would in all probability concentrate very

superior numbers, with artillery, against the small British post, and

endeavour to destroy the troops composing the same. It was principally

for this reason that I determined to concentrate all my available

forces, including the Cape Police, at the point of greatest importance

in my command--Kimberley."

The {p.140} inference of Colonel Kekewich as to the Boers' strategy

was as accurate as his general action was militarily judicious. The

concentration and development of his resources not merely deterred the

enemy from assault, but detained them there in force, to the neglect

of matters elsewhere much more urgently worthy of their efforts. The

gain of Kimberley, had they gained it, would have been poor

compensation for the daily increasing solidity of the still weak

British grasp on the central positions outlined by De Aar, Orange

River and Naauwport. This absorption of the Boers' attention by

Kimberley was maintained by frequent sorties of the garrison, in every

direction, which at an early period of the siege became possible

through the ready facility with which the citizens were converted into

irregular mounted troops. "It will be observed," wrote Kekewich, "that

portions of the mounted corps were employed on every occasion" of the

continued sallies in greater or less force, especially at the period

of Methuen's advance.

At the same time the enemy was preparing to bombard, and was busily

engaged in {p.141} taking possession, by small bodies of from 100 to

250 men, of the undefended towns and villages in Griqualand West--the

thinly peopled district to the west of Kimberley. This pleasant but

useless pastime occupied them agreeably, and diverted them from

molesting the British at Orange River and De Aar.

"My general plan for the defence of Kimberley," says Kekewich in his

report, "was based on the principle of always keeping the enemy on the

move, and constantly in fear of an attack from an unexpected quarter.

Later, when the advance of the relief column from the Orange River

commenced, and I was put in possession of information concerning the

probable date of its arrival in Kimberley, I adopted such measures as

I hoped would cause the retention of a large force of the enemy in my

immediate neighbourhood, and thus enable the relief column to deal

with the Boer force in detail. It was with these objects that the

numerous sorties and demonstrations in force were made by portions of

the garrison of Kimberley."

Such {p.142} continual offensive action is of the essence of dexterous

defence, especially when designed in support of movements elsewhere

occurring. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lord Roberts, in

forwarding Kekewich's report, comments that "the greatest credit is

due him for his able dispositions, for his rapid organisation of an

auxiliary force, and for the tact, judgment, and resolution which he

displayed throughout the siege." This admirable service was performed

at a loss of 38 killed and 133 wounded, of all the troops employed

from the beginning of the investment to the day of relief.

Orange River, where Methuen's relief force was assembling, is seventy

miles from Kimberley. The country between is part of the great inland

plateau, in general contour rolling, but with frequent stony hills,

which locally have the name of kopjes, now become so familiar. These

kopjes are of varying heights, from fifty to five hundred feet, and

consist mainly of large boulders, with, however, a plentiful

sprinkling of smaller rocks not too heavy for handling. The steepness

and roughness of the surface make climbing a matter {p.143} of hands

as well as of feet, and are therefore a source of particular

difficulty and exposure to an assailant; while, on the other hand, the

broken heaps of huge stones afford to the defence much natural

protection, and can be further improved by building shelter places,

which it was the habit of the Boer to do, forming semicircular

breastworks. In this way, with natural and artificial cover, was

obtained a strong line of defence, depending in extent upon the length

and formation of the kopje.

Superficial advantages at once strike the eye and impress the mind,

and it was to the kopje therefore that the Boer first looked as the

natural feature upon which to found his tactical and strategic scheme

of offence. Its command over the plain country, by permitting fire

tier above tier, compensated in part for any lack of development due

to limited length or other causes, and afforded also several lines of

defence to be successively occupied. But the height, while it imposes

difficulties upon the attacker, has also drawbacks of its own. A

downward, plunging fire demands definite precision and accuracy of

{p.144} aim, and in mark firing error in elevation is more commonly

found than swerving to the right or left. The ordinary shot is more

apt to fire over a man's head, or strike the ground ahead of him, than

to miss him to one side or the other. When, therefore, it had been

found by a few experiences--Talana Hill, Elandslaagte, Belmont and

Graspan, in all of which the kopje bore a principal part in the scheme

of defence--that the British soldier could not be stopped by them

alone, the Boers, without abandoning the kopjes, reinforced them where

the ground allowed by utilising the beds of the streams, which except

in time of flood are nearly waterless. Men looking over the edge of a

steep trench glance nearly along the ground in front of them, and if

that be clear, unless they are singularly inexpert, their shots sweep

along the surface so little above it that they are sure to catch men

in front, so far as their height is concerned. This was done at Modder

River, two-thirds of the way--forty-five miles--from Orange River, and

also at Colenso; while at the disastrous battle of Magersfontein the

Boers had strengthened one {p.145} flank of their line by an

artificial trench, which was backed by a kopje.

A peculiarity of the Boer tactical methods should here be described,

originating in their habits of life and curiously adapted to the

purely defensive scheme upon which they rely. Their aim is to consume

the opponent's strength by compelling him to frontal attacks upon well

covered men, who at the proper moment shall slip away, leaving the

enemy an empty position and the prospect of another similar experience

at each succeeding stage. To effect this, their horses were hobbled in

the rear of the line, protected by the kopje, if one, or by such other

means as offered; it is said even that many of the better to do,

coming from a distance, would ride one horse to the place as to a

hunting meet, and reserve a better and fresher for the retreat, which,

in the earlier stages of Methuen's advance, was probably intended from

the first. So far do they push the endeavour to leave a barren result

to the victor that they carry away upon their horses, as far as may be

and at some risk, not only their wounded but their dead; and of the

{p.146} latter those that cannot be removed are concealed. The

singularity of this point of honour, and the tenacity of its

observance, seem more congruous to primeval than to modern warfare.

The above description gives a general idea of the conditions

confronting Methuen on the 21st of November, when he began his

advance. In it he fought four actions: at Belmont, November 23; at

Graspan on the 25th; at Modder River on the 28th; and finally at

Magersfontein, December 11. These places are distant from Orange

River, approximately, 18, 28, and 45 miles; Magersfontein being some

three miles beyond the Modder.

The gathering of Methuen's division had not been unwatched by the

Boers, and their forces, which, in two principal bodies of about 3,000

each, had been besieging Mafeking and Kimberley, and in other smaller

detachments were scattered along the railroad between the two places,

began to concentrate. On the 16th of October, 2,000 had occupied the

Modder River Station. On the 10th of November a reconnaissance from

Orange {p.147} River had found them occupying the ridges about

Belmont, in numbers estimated at 700. At about the same time Kimberley

noticed that the besiegers were increasing in numbers, while at

Mafeking they were observed to be decreasing. On the 20th it was known

that Cronje, whose reputation as a leader stood high, had been

detached with his commando from before Mafeking, leaving it to the

care of the local Boer troops, and going south. To these and other

unrecorded movements of the same kind, all entirely correct in

principle, are to be attributed the increasing numbers which Methuen

encountered in his successive actions. It is to be remarked here that

the Boers knew that inadequate transport material tied the British

general to the railroad; and it was the continuance of this belief,

when the difficulty had been obviated, that betrayed Cronje to his

ruin at a later date.

Leaving Orange River on the early morning of Tuesday, November 21, the

army, having rested during the extreme heat of the noons, camped on

the evening of the 22nd within five miles of the enemy's position.

This {p.148} was west of Belmont Station, and is described as a line

of kopjes extending east and west, and about two hundred feet high.

Lord Methuen's purpose in this and other actions was to cross the more

dangerous open ground of the approach by dark, arriving at the foot of

the kopjes before daylight. His line of advance being, in a general

sense, parallel to the hostile front, it had been his intention that

the left wing, after securing an eminence called Table Mountain on the

enemy's right, should swing its own left around, performing a

flanking, or else a general turning movement, pivoting upon the right

wing. In the obscurity, however, the latter lost direction and the

general found himself in consequence committed to a frontal attack.

Orders were therefore sent to the left wing, which had not lost its

direction, to conform its movements to those of the right, and the

attack was delivered in front. The Boers are estimated to have been

2,000 to 2,500 men, the kopjes affording them three lines of defence

in successive ridges.

Although the error in direction had necessitated a change in the

method of attack, the {p.149} time had been exact; the line had

started at 3 A.M., reaching the foot of the hills before daybreak.

This could scarcely have been much later than 4 A.M., for in the

southern hemisphere summer was near. The musketry fire of the Boers

opened soon after, "and the troops instinctively moved toward the

enemy's position." The advance was covered by artillery, which,

however, was slow in its movements, "the horses not having yet

recovered from a five weeks' voyage." Criticism has said that the

artillery was not sufficiently employed to silence the enemy's

riflemen, but Lord Methuen alleges that shrapnel does not kill men in

kopjes; "it only frightens them, and I intend to get at my enemy." The

inferiority of shrapnel to shell, in use against kopjes, has been

asserted by many observers. For these various reasons the battle of

Belmont reduced itself to a magnificent charge by a much superior

force up a stony and precipitous hill against an enemy strongly

intrenched. "At 6.10 the last height was cleared, the enemy in large

numbers galloping into the plain, their laager trekking across me

3,000 yards off, {p.150} my mounted troops unable to carry out their

orders on one side--left--because the retreat was covered by kopjes,

and on the other--right--because too far; the artillery dead beat and

unable to help me. A cavalry brigade and a horse artillery battery

from my right would have made good my success." The British loss at

Belmont was 53 killed, 275 wounded; that of the Boers is not

accurately known.

Two days later at Graspan the Boers were in about the same force and

the natural conditions similar in general character. The Boer line

extended east and west, and at the latter end--their right--were "two

high hills." These were bombarded with shrapnel, the effect of which

was more thoroughly tested, one battery alone firing 500 rounds to

clear the summit, before the infantry were allowed to advance. The men

again fought their way to the top, but again the enemy got away. "The

heights gained, I found I had taken the whole Boer force in flank, and

had entirely cut them off from their line of retreat. My guns played

on the masses of horsemen, but my few cavalry, dead beat, were

{p.151} powerless, and for the second time I longed for a cavalry

brigade and horse artillery battery to let me reap the fruits of a

hard-fought action." "The loss in both these actions," Methuen says,

"was great, and convinces me that if an enemy has his heart in the

right place he ought to hold his own against vastly superior forces,

and it does our men great credit that nothing stops them."

Both actions, in short, illustrate the same lessons, the Boers'

particular advantages for defence, their readiness in retreat, and, it

must be added, the prompt facility with which they resorted to it.

When the most that can be said has been said for their methods--and

much can be said--it still remains that an eye ever to the rear, upon

escape, is militarily a demoralising attitude upon which no sound

system of warfare can be built up. The nervousness of the Boers at any

seeming threat to their line of retreat has been so obvious as to

elicit frequent comment. As a predominant motive it is ruinous.

The loss of the British at Graspan was 16 {p.152} killed, 169

wounded. Lord Methuen noted in his report that he had fought

distinctly different Boers on the two occasions. If he was not

mistaken, this helps to account for the greatly increased numbers

encountered three days later at Modder River. At Kimberley also it had

been observed that the number of the besiegers was now much

diminished, and a report, substantially correct, was received there

that Cronje was marching south with 3,000 men. These, with the two

bodies already fought, would bring the Boer force up to the 8,000

estimated by Methuen to be present at the next action, of November 28.

The Kimberley garrison did not fail to occupy the attention of their

besiegers by frequent sorties, one in considerable strength occurring

on the day of the Modder River fight; but such measures, however

commendable, cannot beyond a certain point impose upon a sagacious

commander with good information, and Cronje well knew that to stop

Methuen was his principal affair.

The British force rested two days after Graspan, and at 4 A.M. of

November 28 resumed {p.153} its northward march. Methuen's

information had led him to believe that the Modder was not held in

force, and that he would meet his next serious opposition at

Spytfontein, where the Boers would make their last stand; the country

between it and Kimberley, a dozen miles further on, being open and

unfavourable to their defensive tactics. Reckoning upon this, he first

intended, taking five days' rations, to make a circuit eastward by way

of Jacobsdaal, crossing the Modder higher up, and coming in upon

Spytfontein from that direction. The railroad, protected by

earthworks, was to be left under guard of one or two thousand men. On

the very eve of starting, intelligence came in that Modder River

Station was strongly occupied, and the general, fearing under that

condition to risk the railroad, decided to advance direct upon the

river. He was still ignorant, and even unsuspicious, that the enemy

had massed to the number of 8,000 to oppose the passage of the 7,000

to which casualties and the care of lengthening communications had

reduced his own division.

The {p.154} position taken by the Boers was on the south bank of the

Modder, at the point where it is joined by the Riet. The two streams,

flowing respectively from east and south-east, inclose an angle of

forty-five degrees, the ground between them being called an island,

though not so properly. The railroad crosses by a bridge--by this time

destroyed--just below the junction; Modder River Station, a small,

pleasant village, being on the north bank. In the approach from the

south, by which the British were advancing, the land--or veldt--slopes

evenly and regularly downward to the river, rising again beyond in

such wise that the island is higher than the southern bank, but is in

turn commanded by the northern.

Cronje had intrenched his riflemen along a line of three miles of the

river bed, by which they were entirely concealed. On the island, which

is covered with trees and brush, he had placed sharpshooters and

quick-firing guns. On the extreme Boer right their position was

further strengthened by broken, rocky ground and small kopjes,

considerably in advance of their line. This forward {p.155} cover

they held by a strong detachment, as they did also another slight

eminence, six hundred yards further east, upon which was a farm-house

and kraal. From these a cross-fire upon the enemy served to protect

their right flank, which by position otherwise was the weaker.

Although unconscious that he was about to encounter numbers equal to,

if not greater than his own, Methuen, who expected them to retire

after a show of opposition, considered it still his best course to

advance with his two brigades on an extended front, the Guards on the

right, the 9th Brigade on the left, the two carefully keeping touch

from end to end and crossing in that order. Thus approaching, at 8.10

A.M. a very heavy fire showed that the river was held in force and

caused numerous casualties, many men falling at once. "The Scots Guard

Maxim detachment were completely wiped out." On the British

right--Boer left--there was no break in the even slope of the ground,

the Guards were visible for three miles from the river, and fully

exposed alike to the fire of the trenches and that from the island;

but the latter, {p.156} without solid cover, was in turn closely

searched by the British batteries, which, massed principally upon the

right of their line, threw in the action over three thousand rounds.

Under such heavy fire the Guards were directed to extend to the right,

at the same time swinging round their extreme right companies toward

the left. It was hoped thus to outflank and enfilade the hostile line;

but the movement was checked by the Riet, which, contrary to the

intelligence received, was not fordable. Colonel Codrington with a

score of officers and men did get across; but the water was too deep

for support to follow, and in returning some of the party were nearly

drowned, having to hold hands to stem the force of the current. There

was nothing for the right wing but to lie down when they had got

within 1,100 yards of the enemy, and then patiently to await an

outcome. Accordingly they thus remained from 10 A.M. until the sun

went down at 6.20; the fire never ceasing, yet for all its intensity

causing few casualties while the men lay quiet. "No one," wrote

Methuen, in his report, "could get on a horse with any {p.157} safety

within 2,000 yards of the enemy." Under these conditions the

conveyance of orders to different parts of the line was much

embarrassed.

The left of the British front extended some distance west of the

railroad. Here a rising ground, parallel to the river course,

concealed the troops in their advance until its summit was reached,

but there the same withering fire checked them. About 2 in the

afternoon, however, two companies of light infantry succeeded by a

rush in carrying the farm-house in front of the Boer lines, and almost

at the same moment another detachment dislodged the enemy from the

advanced kopjes on his extreme right. The parties thus established so

threatened the Boers' flank as to shake their position.

An attempt was next made to gain and pass the river by a ford, which

lies behind the farm-house, but this was too near the strength of the

hostile fire and the effort was repelled. On their furthest left the

British had better success. There the advanced kopjes supported the

movement, and there the enemy's fire was weakest. A place deep

{p.158} but passable was found, and the Boers' right flank was turned

under a heavy fire of infantry supported by a battery. First a party

of twenty crossed, under Colonel Barter, of the Yorkshire Light

Infantry--the names of all the men who do such a deed should be

remembered, but their leader at least may be mentioned. Three or four

hundred followed, and fixed themselves on the north bank, winning the

outskirts of the village. Thence an advance of three-quarters of a

mile up the river-side was made, the general of the brigade having now

crossed; but this ground could not be held, and the British were

forced back. Reinforcements were sent, and in performing this service

Methuen's chief-of-staff, Colonel Northcott, was killed, the battle

raging along the front in full severity. When the fire ceased at dark,

the Boers still occupied their trenches, but the British were firmly

settled upon their right flank and rear, on the north bank, and had

possession of a practicable ford. During the night the Boers evacuated

their positions, and the field of battle remained with the British,

who continued to hold the line of the river {p.159} up to the time

that Roberts began his advance.

The battle of the Modder showed that, with the modern improvements in

rapid-firing arms, it is possible for troops well entrenched over an

extended front to sweep a plain field of approach with such a volume

of fire as is impossible to cross. This it shows, but otherwise the

lessons to be derived have been greatly exaggerated. Witnesses exhaust

their descriptive powers to portray the evidences of the innumerable

falls of bullets, shown by the kicking up of the dust. "A fire so

thick and fearful that no man can imagine how any one passed under or

through it. Many crippled lay flat for hours, not daring to rise for

succour. If any one asked a comrade for a drink of water, he saw the

bottle, or the hand passing it, pierced by a Dum-Dum or a one-pounder

shell. If he raised his head to writhe in his pain, he felt his helmet

shot away."[13]

[Footnote 13: Julian Ralph, "Toward Pretoria," p.

153.]

The impression produced by the scene is most forcibly betrayed by the

exaggerated phrase of the veteran commander in his first

telegram--"One of the hardest and most trying {p.160} fights in the

annals of the British Army." Yet, as far as result was concerned, it

was an immense expenditure of ammunition and little loss of life. The

frontal attack was so clearly impossible that it was at once

abandoned, and the men lay down. A generation or two ago they would

have persisted, many more would have been killed, and while the

position might at last have been carried in front, more than likely it

would at the last have been turned, as it was at the Modder. The

British loss, 70 killed, 413 wounded, was but 7 per cent. of the

troops engaged--about 7,000--far below that of many of Wellington's

battles.

In point of tactics, the battle may be summarized by saying that the

British line held the enemy in front until a couple of detachments, by

daring rushes, had established themselves in positions of command on

the western flank, whence they worked themselves round, crossed the

river, and fairly turned the hostile flank. And that, so stated, is a

very old story. On the other hand, at Belmont and Graspan, at Talana

Hill and Elandslaagte, it was shown that the same arms of rapid fire

{p.161} do not necessarily control where precision and skill, not mere

torrential volume, are needed. Not only is it not demonstrated that

modern weapons can stop the uphill advance of a resolute infantry on

broken ground; it has been shown to probability that they are

incapable of so doing. Whether such charges are wise is one thing, but

whether they are possible is another. Rapidity of fire has reversed

conditions where rapidity is the essential factor; it has not reversed

them, probably not greatly modified them, where skill and resolution

are chiefly demanded.

After the Modder fight Lord Methuen remained at the position then won,

establishing a pontoon bridge, restoring that of the railroad, and

awaiting reinforcements to replace the men lost in battle and those

necessarily detached to protect his lengthening line of

communications. After three severe actions he had now traversed

forty-five of the seventy miles that lay between the Orange River and

Kimberley; but the inadequacy of his numbers was increasingly felt.

During the ten or twelve days at the Modder a serious demonstration

was made in his rear at Enslin, threatening {p.162} the railroad and

his communications. Although successfully repelled, it was evident

that the enemy's concentration had made them so far superior as not

only to increase greatly his task in front, but also to threaten his

rear. "The longer I remained inactive," said he, in his report, "the

stronger would the enemy become. Therefore, on the day my last

reinforcement arrived, I decided to continue my advance. It was out of

the question to follow the railway, owing to the large kopjes on

either side, which had been strongly entrenched. Besides, by that

route there was not sufficient water."

The railroad, after crossing the Modder, runs on the west side of the

river nearly due north for two miles, and then turns north-west for

two more, when it passes between two kopjes, both fortified. The

right-hand one of these, the Magersfontein, extends to the south-east

for three miles, rising there to an abrupt peak about 150 feet high,

which is the key of the situation. In the prolongation of this range a

low ridge covered with brush extends eastward to the Modder, the bed

of which thereabout follows for some distance {p.163} a north-east

and south-west line. At the foot of the peak, but some little distance

in advance, the Boers had dug a line of trenches, which not only

covered the immediate front, but at the eastern end of Magersfontein

sweep round the curve of the hill to the north for some hundred yards,

and then turned east again, following the bushy ridge to the river.

These dispositions facilitated the passage of troops from one flank to

the other under cover, and preserved control of a ford over the Modder

behind the line. The trenches, especially before the peak, were filled

with riflemen. The kopje itself was also manned, but it is allowable

to believe that the experience of the war, already illustrated by many

encounters, must have persuaded so shrewd a fighter as Cronje of the

superior advantage of the trench system. Before the trenches ran a

continuous line of barbed-wire fence. A probable estimate of the

opposing forces places the Boers at 15,000, the British at 11,000. No

certainty can as yet be predicated for the Boer numbers, which depend

upon the enemy's calculations, but that they were decisively superior

is scarcely doubtful.

After {p.164} considering the problem before him, Methuen concluded

that a turning movement was inexpedient. He could not, on the left,

follow the railroad, for that was commanded on both sides. He could

not, on the right, pass between Magersfontein and the Modder, for the

bushy ground would prevent his artillery from helping him to its full

power, and might even place it in danger of capture. If he deflected

still more to the right, crossing the river, he would have to recross

in the face of a force superior to his own in numbers and mobility.

Moreover, in a circuit requiring time, he was hampered by the lack of

transport which then fettered all British movements. He could take

with him provisions for only five days. In any event he must fight

again at Spytfontein; better therefore meet an enemy badly shaken by

such determined assaults as those of Graspan and the Modder.

Therefore, "I decided to attack the Magersfontein kopje." In this the

main effort against the peak was assigned to the Highland Brigade,

under General Wauchope, which had just joined. The force of this

brigade was about 3,000.

On {p.165} the afternoon of Sunday, December 10, the kopjes of

Magersfontein were bombarded heavily, between 4.30 and 6.30 P.M., by a

4.7-inch gun from a distance of 7,000 yards. The Highlanders were

directed to start a half hour after midnight, so as surely to reach

the foot of the kopjes by daylight, due at 3.30 A.M. A drenching rain

came on at 1, lasting through the night and adding greatly to the

difficulty of keeping the direction, which was done by compass. This,

however, was effected, though at the expense of much delay; but the

danger of separating and struggling in the obscurity made it necessary

that the troops should hold a compact formation, and they advanced in

quarter column. The heaviness of the atmosphere postponed daybreak to

4 A.M. A few moments previously General Wauchope had given the order

for deployment on the prearranged plan--one regiment moving ahead, two

others to the right and left respectively, and a fourth forming in

reserve. Some slight delay occurred, owing to local obstacles; and

before the movement had developed, while the troops were still in mass

and {p.166} changing their places, a tremendous fire at two hundred

yards opened from the line of trenches--every rifle apparently

emptying its magazine as rapidly as the finger could handle the

trigger. Coming wholly unexpectedly in the dark, at the critical

moment of a change of formation, great confusion ensued, and

contradictory orders were given, among which the most disastrous

possible, "Retire," is said to have been uttered, causing a certain

number to turn and break through the ranks behind them. In the final

result the brigade, greatly shattered, lay down, and so remained for

several hours.

Meanwhile the remainder of the army, with the exception of a small

flanking force to the left of the Highland Brigade, took position on

its right, prolonging the front in that direction to the Modder; some

companies being thrown to the rear along the course of the river,

guarding the fords against any attack of the enemy upon the right

flank--demonstrations of which were made but repelled. The British

artillery was brought actively and continuously into play, with

perceptible effect upon the enemy's fire. The battle then resolved

itself into {p.167} both parties holding their positions until

nightfall, when the Highland Brigade was withdrawn from the perilous

position in which it had passed fifteen hours of exposure, heat and

thirst. The British slept on the ground, their general purposing next

morning to occupy the kopje, if deserted, but finding the enemy then

still in the trenches, he withdrew his force to the Modder.

The battle of Magersfontein brought Methuen to a standstill, and

postponed for more than two months the relief of Kimberley. The

disaster which befell the Highland Brigade was one of those incidents

which ought not to have occurred, but determination of blame must

await more precise information than is now accessible. To retain the

cover of darkness for an approach made within effective, though long,

range of the enemy's fire--to deploy as near as possible to him, but

still too distant to be seen--to keep 3,000 men in black darkness in

touch, yet not compacted--these are conditions desirable of attainment

but difficult to combine, and, like all combinations, liable to fail

in some element. The total loss, by the last revised returns, was

{p.168} 171 killed, 691 wounded, four-fifths of which fell on the

Highland Brigade and in the first few moments. Among the slain was

General Wauchope.

From the day of this battle until February 11, the opposing forces

continued in the positions occupied by them before the engagement,

Methuen upon the north bank of the Modder, Cronje holding the ranges

at Magersfontein and Spytfontein. The great comparative mobility of

the Boers, with their more numerous and seasoned horses, enabled them

to maintain the investment of Kimberley, and yet retain the power to

concentrate betimes at any threatened point from this interior

position. Here between the two bodies of the enemy, between Methuen

and Kekewich, was the bulk of their army. Kimberley was never

assaulted, nor did the inhabitants often see their enemy in any force.

During the same calendar week as Magersfontein, there occurred two

other reverses--at Stormberg, December 10, and at Colenso, December

15--which made this the black week of the war for the British arms.

These misfortunes, though chargeable in {p.169} part to faulty

dispositions upon the ground, and in part to the chapter of those

accidents which have always to be allowed for in war, serve more

especially to illustrate the embarrassments attendant upon the

division of a force into two or more parts out of reach for mutual

support, and neither one in decisively preponderant strength to the

enemy to whom it is opposed. This disadvantage is greatest to the

offensive, because to the defensive falls the privilege of increasing

power by choice of position and by fortifying. It was in this dilemma

that the British, in consequence of the abandonment of their original

concentrative plan of advance through the Free State, and the adoption

of two or more lines of operation, found themselves over their whole

front; from Colenso on the east, through Sterkstrom and Naauwport, to

the Modder River. The result throughout was--if not paralysis--at

least a cessation of movement, after the reverses above mentioned,

except in the brilliant and useful, but in scale minor, operations of

General French upon their left centre, about Naauwport and Colesberg.

In {p.170} the centre and east of the border district between Cape

Colony and the Free State--from Naauwport to Stormberg and beyond--the

position now was and continued to be especially critical, because most

exposed. Had the Boer forces there been handled with definiteness of

aim and concentration of effort in aggressive movement, serious

disaster could scarcely have been averted. But direction seems to have

been largely in the hands of the Free State farmers of the locality,

whose aptitudes and leading carried them little above the level of

irregular partisan troops. These are invaluable for their own

purposes, but those purposes are distinctly subsidiary to war on the

great scale, and by themselves alone do not decide campaigns. It is

impossible not to be struck with the general similarity of motive, and

of action, in the Boer operations from November to January in Cape

Colony, from Stormberg to Dordrecht and thence to the Basuto boundary,

and the dashing but militarily abortive raids to the rear of Lord

Roberts' right flank while he was at Bloemfontein. As soon as the

Dutch commandant in the latter instance settled upon {p.171} Wepener

for the expenditure of his strength, he had not only secured that

opportunity for ready retirement to which the partisan looks, but he

had also relieved the British commander from serious anxiety

concerning his communications.

The British disaster at Stormberg possesses no intrinsic interest, or

claim to mention, as a military incident; but as it attracted so much

notice at the time, and carried a certain moral effect, the details

must be summarized. The Dutch were strongly entrenched and in force on

a hill overlooking the place. The British were at Putter's Kraal and

Sterkstrom, some twenty odd miles distant by the railroad, which they

controlled up to Molteno, nine miles from Stormberg. The troops, 2,500

in number, had been marching, or in open railroad trucks, since early

morning of Saturday, December 9, when at 9 P.M. they detrained at

Molteno.

From this place there are two country roads, one direct to Stormberg,

the other branching to the left toward Steynsburg, on the

Stormberg-Naauwport railway. General Gatacre {p.172} intended to

follow the Steynsburg road for four or five miles, and there to take a

turn to the right, which his guides assured him would in another mile

and a half bring him to the south-west angle of the Boer position; but

the turn was missed and passed, with the result that after a very long

circuit, of two hours and a half, the column came out on the

north-west angle. The attack was immediately delivered, but the

troops, greatly exhausted, having halted only forty-five minutes since

9 o'clock, appear to have been incapacitated, by the accumulated

hardships and disappointments of the night, to contend with the

obstacles before them. The character of the casualties sufficiently

indicates the comparative feebleness of the fighting. There were 31

killed, 58 wounded, while in prisoners there were lost 633. The

accounts give the impression that many of the men taken were

physically too depressed to quit the shelter in which they found

themselves, in order to retire further. Two guns also were lost. The

retreat which followed almost immediately was conducted under

difficulties and fatigue, offering "great opportunity for {p.173} an

active enemy"; but it was not disturbed.

Further to the west and north General French, during this same period

and the ensuing month of January, was carrying on continuous active

operations, which will remain an instructive lesson for the military

student, but which, from the smallness of the scale and the technical

character of their merits, cannot well be related in a narrative of

this character. For it he has received, if not popular appreciation,

at least public reward in the high commendation of Lord Roberts, whose

own achievements in a long career of honour give the greatest weight

to his praise. "I consider that General French showed marked ability

and judgment in constantly harassing the enemy and driving them from

one strong position after another, without exposing his men to heavy

loss." Yet even this scarcely measures the full value of French's

services. The untiring molestation to which the enemy was subjected by

him, as testified not only by his full report but by the daily

telegram of this or that brush, first in one quarter, then in another,

unquestionably--or {p.174} rather evidently--produced an impression

and concentrated an anxiety that contributed to divert attention from

the preparations to the westward, which were to result in the relief

of Kimberley and the capture of Cronje. In these later events French

was rewarded by the conspicuous as well as important part he played.

Reaching Cape Town immediately after the investment of Ladysmith,

French was sent up country by Sir Redvers Buller with orders to seize

Naauwport, then recently evacuated, and whenever possible to push on

and gain Colesberg. Naauwport was reoccupied November 19, and

thenceforth activity was incessant. Advancing, retiring, gaining,

losing, on front, flank, or rear, of the enemy, whatever else found

place, repose did not. The report is a record of unrestingness, which

communicated itself to the enemy as uneasiness. On the 16th of

December Arundel, midway from Naauwport to Colesberg, was occupied as

headquarters, and from that time, as before, "every opportunity was

taken to worry the enemy and to harass his flanks and rear until

December {p.175} 29, when he finally evacuated his position in my

front and retired on Colesberg. These operations were fully reported

each night by telegraph." These telegrams journalise the restlessness

of the skilled warrior who looks beyond his minor _rôle_--beyond mere

partisan scurrying to and fro--to the great something to which he

contributes.

Lord Roberts availed himself ably of the disquiet caused by French. As

the fulness of time approached for the relief of Kimberley, the forces

about Naauwport grew larger and more restless than ever. Advance in

menacing force was made not only toward Colesberg, but to the

eastward, along the railroad to Steynsburg and Stormberg. Parties of

colonial horse crossed the country from Gatacre at Sterkstrom to

French and Kelly-Kenny at Steynsburg and Arundel. A general advance in

force seemed imminent. On February 2 French, in closing his long

report to Lord Roberts detailing the events since December 16, said,

"In accordance with the instructions received at Cape Town from the

commander-in-chief, I am now making the arrangements ordered." The

explanation {p.176} of this mysterious allusion appeared thirteen

days later, when, on February 15, he led the relieving column into

Kimberley, two hundred miles distant. The same day his former command,

weakened by his own withdrawal with the cavalry, and by that of

Kelly-Kenny's division, and now under General Clements, had been

forced out of Arundel by greatly superior numbers; but to what avail?

Yet in another ten days the Boers from Kimberley to Colesberg were in

full retreat, and on February 26 Clements not only had regained his

ground, but had entered Colesberg, for which French had so long

manoeuvred in vain. The incident illustrates happily the far-reaching

effect of a great movement in mass, wisely conceived, ably directed,

and secretly executed.