WHETHER FORTRESSES AND OTHER THINGS WHICH PRINCES OFTEN MAKE ARE USEFUL
OR INJURIOUS
Some princes, in order to securely hold their possessions, have
disarmed their subjects, some others have kept their subject lands
divided into parts, others have fomented enmities against themselves,
others have endeavoured to win over those whom they suspected at the
commencement of their rule: some have constructed fortresses, others
have ruined and destroyed them. And although one cannot pronounce a
definite judgment as to these things without going into the particulars
of the state to which such a deliberation is to be applied, still I
will speak in such a broad way as the matter will permit of.
A new prince has never been known to disarm his subjects, on the
contrary, when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, for
by arming them these arms become your own, those that you suspected
become faithful and those that were faithful remain so, and from being
merely subjects become your partisans. And since all the subjects
cannot be armed, when you benefit those that you arm, you can deal more
safely with the others; and this different treatment that they notice
renders your men more obliged to you, the others will excuse you,
judging that those have necessarily greater merit who have greater
danger and heavier duties. But when you disarm them, you commence to
offend them and show that you distrust them either through cowardice or
lack of confidence, and both of these opinions generate hatred against
you. And as you cannot remain unarmed, you are obliged to resort to a
mercenary militia, of which we have already stated the value; and even
if it were good it cannot be sufficient in number to defend you against
powerful enemies and suspected subjects. But, as I have said, a new
prince in a new dominion always has his subjects armed. History is full
of such examples. But when a prince acquires a new state as an addition
to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that state, except those
who in acquiring it have sided with you; and even these one must, when
time and opportunity serve, render weak and effeminate, and arrange
things so that all the arms of the new state are in the hands of your
own soldiers who in your old state live near you.
Our forefathers and those who were esteemed wise used to say that
it was necessary to hold Pistoia by means of factious and Pisa with
fortresses, and for this purpose they fomented differences among their
subjects in some town in order to possess it more easily. This, in
those days when Italy was fairly divided, was doubtless well done, but
does not seem to me to be a good precept for the present time, for I do
not believe that the divisions thus created ever do any good; on the
contrary it is certain that when the enemy approaches, the cities thus
divided will be at once lost, for the weaker faction will always side
with the enemy and the other will not be able to stand. The Venetians,
actuated, I believe, by the aforesaid motives, cherished the Guelf
and Ghibelline factions in the cities subject to them, and although
they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, they yet encouraged
these differences among them, so that the citizens, being occupied in
their own quarrels, might not act against them. This, however, did
not avail them anything, as was seen when, after the defeat of Vaila,
a part of those subjects immediately took courage and took from them
the whole state. Such methods, besides, argue weakness in a prince,
for in a strong government such dissensions will never be permitted.
They are profitable only in time of peace, as by means of them it is
easy to manage one's subjects, but when it comes to war, the fallacy
of such a policy is at once shown. Without doubt, princes become great
when they overcome difficulties and opposition, and therefore fortune,
especially when it wants to render a new prince great, who has greater
need of gaining a great reputation than a hereditary prince, raises up
enemies and compels him to undertake wars against them, so that he may
have cause to overcome them, and thus raise himself higher by means
of that ladder which his enemies have brought him. There are many who
think therefore that a wise prince ought, when he has the chance, to
foment astutely some enmity, so that by suppressing it he will augment
his greatness. Princes, and especially new ones, have found more faith
and more usefulness in those men, whom at the beginning of their power
they regarded with suspicion, than in those they at first confided
in. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governed his state more by
those whom he suspected than by others. But of this we cannot speak at
large, as it varies according to the subject; I will merely say that
these men who at the beginning of a new government were enemies, if
they are of a kind to need support to maintain their position, can be
very easily gained by the prince, and they are the more compelled to
serve him faithfully as they know they must by their deeds cancel the
bad opinion previously held of them, and thus the prince will always
derive greater help from them than from those who, serving him with
greater security, neglect his interest. And as the matter requires it,
I will not omit to remind a prince who has newly taken a state with the
secret help of its inhabitants, that he must consider well the motives
that have induced those who have favoured him to do so, and if it is
not natural affection for him, but only because they were not contented
with the state as it was, he will have great trouble and difficulty in
maintaining their friendship, because it will be impossible for him to
content them. And on well examining the cause of this in the examples
drawn from ancient and modern times it will be seen that it is much
easier to gain the friendship, of those men who were contented with
the previous condition and were therefore at first enemies, than that
of those who not being contented, became his friends and helped him to
occupy it. It has been the custom of princes in order to be able to
hold securely their state, to erect fortresses, as a bridle and bit
to those who have designs against them, and in order to have a secure
refuge against a sudden assault. I approve this method, because it was
anciently used. Nevertheless, Messer Niccolo Vitelli has been seen in
our own time to destroy two fortresses in Città di Castello in order
to keep that state. Guid' Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his
dominions from which he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to
their foundations all the fortresses of that province, and considered
that without them it would be more difficult for him to lose again the
state. The Bentivogli, in returning to Bologna, used similar measures.
Therefore fortresses may or may not be useful according to the times;
if they do good in one way, they do harm in another.
The question may be discussed thus: a prince who fears his own people
more than foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has greater
fear of foreigners than of his own people ought to do without them. The
castle of Milan built by Francesco Sforza has given and will give more
trouble to the house of Sforza than any other disorder in that state.
Therefore the best fortress is to be found in the love of the people,
for although you may have fortresses they will not save you if you are
hated by the people. When once the people have taken arms against you,
there will never be lacking foreigners to assist them. In our times
we do not see that they have profited any ruler, except the Countess
of Forli on the death of her consort Count Girolamo, for she was thus
enabled to escape the popular rising and await help from Milan and
recover the state; the circumstances being then such that no foreigner
could assist the people. But afterwards they were of little use to her
when Cesare Borgia attacked her and the people being hostile to her
allied themselves with the foreigner. So that then and before it would
have been safer for her not to be hated by the people than to have the
fortresses. Having considered these things I would therefore praise the
one who erects fortresses and the one who does not, and would blame any
one who, trusting in them, thinks little of being hated by his people.