necessary to notice a very remarkable episode at Shahjehanpoor. It will
be remembered that when Sir Colin Campbell started from that place on
the 2d of May, to advance on Bareilly, he left behind him a small
defensive force. In his dispatch he said: ‘When I passed through
Shahjehanpoor, I was informed that the Fyzabad Moulvie, and the Nawab of
the former place, were at Mohumdee, with a considerable body of men who
had retired from Shahjehanpoor; and I thought it would be impolitic to
leave the district without evidence of our presence.’ He therefore told
off a small defensive force; comprising a wing of the 82d foot,
Lieutenant De Kantzow’s irregular horse, a few artillerymen, and four
guns. In obedience to orders left by Sir Colin, Colonel Hall, of the
82d, marched this small force from the camp at Azeezgunje, to occupy the
jail in the cantonment of Shahjehanpoor as a military post. There being
no shade within the cantonment, he pitched his camp for a time in a tope
of trees near the jail. He next formed the jail into a small intrenched
position, with four guns, and as large a supply of provisions as he
could procure. All this was done in one day, the 2d of May; and, indeed,
not an hour was to be lost; for a spy appeared on the following morning
to announce that a large body of rebels had arrived within four miles of
the place. This announcement proved to be correct. A strong band of
insurgents from Mohumdee in Oude, taking advantage of Sir Colin’s
departure from Shahjehanpoor, were advancing to regain possession of
that station. Colonel Hall immediately sent his baggage and provisions
into the jail, and ordered four companies of the 82d to guard the camp
during this transfer. Going out to reconnoitre, he saw the enemy’s
cavalry approaching. Lieutenant De Kantzow would willingly have charged
the enemy with his small body of horse; but the colonel, knowing the
overwhelming force of the rebels, and noting his instructions to act on
the defensive, forbade this charge. Both went into the jail, with their
handful of troops, and prepared for a resolute defence. The rebels
arrived, seized the old fort, plundered the town, put many of the
principal inhabitants to death, and established patrols on the river’s
bank. It was computed that they were little less than eight thousand
strong, with twelve guns. Against this strong force, Hall held his
position for eight days and nights, sustaining a continuous bombardment,
without thinking for an instant of yielding. Not until the 7th of the
month did the commander-in-chief hear of this disaster at Shahjehanpoor.
He at once made up a brigade; consisting of the 60th Rifles, the 79th
Highlanders, a wing of the 82d foot, the 22d Punjaub infantry, two
squadrons of Carabiniers, Cureton’s Horse, with some artillery and guns.
Brigadier Jones, who commanded this brigade, received at the same time
from Sir Colin discretionary power to attack the enemy at Mohumdee after
the relief of Hall at Shahjehanpoor, if he should so deem it expedient.
Jones, at the head of his brigade, started from Bareilly on the 8th, and
reached Shahjehanpoor on the 11th. At daybreak, a body of the enemy
having been seen, Jones sent out the Mooltan Horse to pursue them; but a
heavy mass of troops being now visible, it became necessary to draw up
in order of battle. The enemy’s cavalry began the battle; these were
driven off by Jones’s howitzers. Then the Highlanders and Rifles were
pushed on as skirmishers, supported by horse-artillery; and in a short
time the rebels were put to flight—allowing the brigadier to select his
own point of entrance into Shahjehanpoor. Fortunately he made himself
acquainted with the fact that many buildings in the suburbs had been
loopholed for musketry, and with the probability that many others in the
heart of the town had been similarly treated; he thereupon avoided the
main street, and made a detour through the eastern suburbs. No enemy was
visible within the town, until a strong party of troopers were found
drawn up near the school-house; these were quickly dispersed by a few
shrapnell shells, and a pursuit by the Carabiniers, leaving a gun and
some ammunition-wagons behind them. Jones continued his march by the
church, and across the parade-ground to the jail, where the gallant
little garrison under Colonel Hall had so long defended themselves
against an overwhelming force. The bold stand made by this officer was
an enterprise that excited little attention amid the various excitements
of the period; but Sir Colin Campbell did not fail to see that the
defence had been prompt, energetic, and skilful. The adjutant-general,
writing to the governor-general, said: ‘I am directed by the
commander-in-chief to inform his lordship that the lieutenant-colonel
hardly does justice to himself in his report of this defence, which was
conducted by him with prudence and skill, and consequently with trifling
loss. I am to add that Lieutenant-colonel Hall, although he makes no
mention of the fact, was himself wounded by a musket-bullet in the leg,
from the effect of which he has not yet (May 29th) recovered.’
To return to Bareilly. After the operations which have now been briefly
described, the insurgents were so completely driven out of Mooradabad,
Bareilly, and Shahjehanpoor, the principal towns in this province, that
it was no longer deemed necessary to keep up the ‘Rohilcund field-force’
in its collected form; the various brigades, cavalry and infantry, were
broken up, and Sir Colin gave separate duties to his various officers,
according to the tenor of the information received from various parts of
the country. Some corps and detachments remained at Bareilly; some went
to Lucknow; one or two Punjaub regiments set off towards Meerut; and
General Walpole was placed in command in Kumaon and Rohilcund. It was
just at this time, the 11th of May, that Sir Colin Campbell received an
official notification from the Queen to thank his troops in her name for
their gallant services in earlier months. The address was, of course,
merely of a customary kind under such circumstances; but it constituted
one among the list of honours to which soldiers look as some reward for
their hard life.[173] The ‘last stronghold’ adverted to by him was
Bareilly; he could not then know that another stronghold, Gwalior, was
destined to be the scene of a much more sanguinary struggle.
Among the arrangements more immediately affecting Rohilcund, was the
formation of a column for special service in the country districts. This
column, placed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel (now Brigadier)
Coke, comprised a wing of the 42d Highlanders, the 1st Punjaub rifles,
the 1st Sikh infantry, a detachment of the 24th Punjaub infantry, a
squadron of Carabiniers, the Moultan Horse, a detachment of the 17th
irregular cavalry, and a considerable force of artillery. With three
weeks’ supplies for the European troops, and four weeks’ for the native,
this column set forth from Bareilly on the 12th of May.
The commander-in-chief, leaving instructions for the formation of
efficient defences at Bareilly, started off to some more central
station, where he could be in easy communication with the various
columns engaged in different parts of Northern India. General Walpole
took command of the whole of the Rohilcund troops; having under him
Coke’s brigade just adverted to, and Major Lennox to superintend the
engineering works at Bareilly. Mr Alexander established himself as civil
commissioner, to reorganise a government for that long-distracted
province. Being thus satisfied that affairs were in a good train, Sir
Colin started on the 15th, taking with him his head-quarters staff, the
64th foot, a wing of the 9th Lancers, and detachments of other troops.
The veteran commander bore heat and fatigue in a manner that astonished
his subordinates; he got through an amount of work which knocked up his
aids-de-camp; and was always ready to advise or command, as if rest and
food were contingencies that he cared not about. The natives, when any
of them sought for and obtained an interview with him, were often a good
deal surprised to see the commander of the mighty British army in
shirt-sleeves and a pith-hat; but the keen eye and the cool manner of
the old soldier told that he had all his wits about him, and was none
the worse from the absence of glitter and personal adornment. His
advance in the first instance was to Fureedpore, as a first stage
towards Futteghur; his second to Futtehgunje; but here he heard news
that changed his plans. To understand what occurred, we must revert to
the affairs at Shahjehanpoor.
When Brigadier Jones had relieved Colonel Hall from his difficulties on
the 11th, he found that he had been engaged with a fragment only of the
enemy’s force; and he prepared for the contingency of a hostile
encounter. On the 15th he was attacked with great fury and in great
force by the rebels, who were headed by the Moulvie of Fyzabad, the
Begum of Oude, the Shahzada of Delhi, and (as some thought) by Nena
Sahib. The struggle continued throughout the day, and needed all the
activity and resources of the brigadier. So large was the body of
rebels, indeed, that he could do nothing more than act on the defensive
until reinforcements could reach him. This was the information received
by Sir Colin when at Futtehgunje. He immediately re-arranged his forces.
Leaving the 47th and 93d foot, the 17th Punjaub infantry, the 2d Sikh
cavalry, and some horse and foot artillery, to guard Bareilly; he
hastened towards Shahjehanpoor with the 64th foot, the Belooch
battalion, the 9th Lancers, and some horse and foot artillery. On the
17th he marched to Tilhur; moving cautiously, for the rebels were known
to be in great force not far distant. He rested during the mid-day heat,
in a tope of mango-trees beyond the village of Tilhur. In the evening,
information arrived that the Moulvie, with a large force, was strongly
posted on the Mohumdee road, a few miles northeast of Shahjehanpoor.
Mohumdee, which had been made a stronghold by the rebels, comprised a
brick-fort, mounted with twelve or fifteen guns, strengthened in various
ways, and protected within and without by troops. The Moulvie, as the
most skilful of the insurgent leaders, held the chief command in these
parts; but the Begum of Oude, and the Shahzada of Delhi, were believed
to be near at hand. Mohumdee itself was about twenty miles from
Shahjehanpoor; but the whole road was more or less commanded by the
rebels. In the early morn of the 18th Sir Colin started again. Arriving
at Shahjehanpoor, he passed the old camping-ground, made a partial
circuit of the city to the bridge of boats, crossed the bridge, and
traversed the city to the other side. It was found that the city had
suffered considerably by the cannonading which Brigadier Jones had been
compelled to inflict upon it, in his operations for the relief of the
little garrison under Colonel Hall; and that many of the respectable
inhabitants had deserted the place until more peaceful times, more
facilities for quiet trade, should arrive.
When Sir Colin’s force joined that under Brigadier Jones, and the two
commanders compared notes, it was found that the brigadier’s troops had
suffered intensely from the heat. Mr Russell, who at that time—sick and
hurt by a kick from a horse—was carried in a doolie or litter among the
‘baggage’ of Sir Colin’s army, was not sufficiently in front to witness
much of the fighting; but his diary is full of vivid pictures of
camp-life under a burning sun: ‘In Rose’s attack on the enemy at Koonch,
eight men fell dead in the ranks, and upwards of twenty officers and men
had to be carried from the field through the heat of the sun. Nineteen
of our casualties at Bareilly, ten of which were fatal, were caused in
the same way. In fact, every march henceforth after ten o’clock in the
morning must be attended with loss of life.’—‘A peep into most of the
tents would discover many of the head-quarters’ staff panting on their
charpoys, in the nearest possible approach to Adamite costume, and
gasping for breath like carp on the banks of a moat. It may readily be
imagined—if officers, each of whom has a tent to himself, with kuskus
tatties, punkahs, and similar appliances to reduce the temperature,
suffer so much from heat—what the men endure, packed ten or twelve in a
tent, and in some regiments eighteen or twenty, without such resources,
and without change of light clothing; and how heavily picket-duty,
outlying and inlying, presses upon them.’ In encamping after a twilight
morning march, ‘it may be easily imagined how anxiously each man surveys
the trees about his tent as the site is marked out, and calculates what
shelter it will give him, and at what time the sun will find out his
weak points during the day; for indeed the rays do strike through every
interstice like red-hot shot. There is no indecision of shadow, no
infirmity of outline; for wherever the sun falls on the side of a tent,
it seems to punch out a fervid blazing pattern on the gray ground of the
canvas.’—‘The motion of a doolie is by no means unpleasant; but I
confess my experience of its comforts has now lasted quite long enough.
It is a long cot slung from a bamboo-pole, borne on the shoulders of
four men, two in front and two behind, who at a shuffling pace carry you
along the road at the rate of four miles an hour; and two spare men
follow as a relief. As the bottom of the litter hangs close to the
ground, the occupant has more than his share of all the dust that is
going; but if the curtains or tilts are let down, the heat becomes
insupportable.’—‘The march of Jones’s column to the relief of
Shahjehanpoor had told heavily upon the men. Upwards of thirty rank and
file of the 79th fell out in marching to and through the city; and the
60th Rifles, accustomed though they be to Indian warfare, were deprived
of the services of upwards of forty men from sun-stroke. It was
pitiable, I was told, to see the poor fellows lying in their doolies,
gasping their last. The veins of the arm were opened, and leeches
applied to the temples; but notwithstanding every care, the greater
number of the cases were fatal almost immediately; and even among the
cases of those who recovered, there are few who are fit for active
service again, except after a long interval of rest.’—‘I own I am
distressed when I see the 60th Rifles dressed in dark-green tunics,
which absorb the heat almost as much as if they were made of black
cloth, and their cloth forage-caps poorly covered with a few folds of
dark cotton. What shall we say of the 79th Highlanders, who still wear
that picturesque and extraordinary head-dress, with the addition of a
flap of gray cloth over the ears? If it were white, perhaps it would
afford some protection against the sun; but, as it is, this mass of
black feathers is surely not the head-dress that would be chosen by any
one, except a foolish fantastic savage, for the plains of India.’
Having arrived at Shahjehanpoor on the 18th, the commander-in-chief
wished to give his troops a little needful rest during the heat of the
day. A cavalry detachment, however, having gone out to reconnoitre, came
in sight of a small mud-fort containing four guns; the guns fired upon
the cavalry; the report of this firing brought forward a body of the
enemy’s troopers; and the appearance of these drew out Sir Colin and
nearly the whole of his force. Thus a battle-array was very unexpectedly
formed. Among the rebels was a large body of Rohilla troopers—active,
determined, well mounted, and well armed; and as these men fought better
than was wont among the enemy, and were supported by many guns, there
followed a good deal of cavalry and artillery skirmishing. During the
firing, a round-shot passed so close to Sir Colin Campbell and General
Mansfield as greatly to endanger both, and to increase the desire among
the soldiers generally that the commander-in-chief, who was very careful
of his men’s lives, would attach a little more value to his own.
Although the result of the encounter was to drive off the enemy to a
greater distance, it was not wholly satisfactory or decisive; Sir Colin
had not intended to resume active service until his troops had been
refreshed by a few hours’ rest; but the reconnaissance had been so
managed as to precipitate an engagement with the enemy. It was only a
small part of the rebel force that was thus encountered on the 18th; the
main body, eight or ten thousand strong, was at Mohumdee.
The commander-in-chief, finding himself too weak in cavalry to pursue
the enemy with any effect, suspended operations for a few days;
remaining at Shahjehanpoor until Brigadier Coke’s column could join him
from the district of Pileebheet. Coke, in accordance with a plan already
noticed, was preparing to sweep round the country by way of Boodayoun to
Mooradabad; but he now joined Sir Colin, on the 22d; and preparations
were made for an immediate advance upon the rebel position at Mohumdee.
Again were the enemy beaten, and again did the Moulvie and the other
leaders escape. When the British marched to that place on the 24th they
found that the rebels had evacuated their strong fort, after destroying
the defence-works. They had also destroyed Kujoorea, a very strong
doubly intrenched position, surrounded by thick bamboo-hedges, and
having a citadel. Several guns were dug up at the last-named place; and
much property was discovered which had once belonged to the unfortunate
Europeans murdered by the rebels nearly twelve months earlier.
Throughout the operations in Oude and Rohilcund, from May 1857 till May
1858, one of the master-spirits among the rebels was the Moulvie of
Fyzabad—a man whose name has been so often mentioned: ‘A tall, lean, and
muscular man, with lantern jaws, long thin lips, high aquiline nose,
deep-set large dark eyes, beetle brows, long beard, and coarse black
hair falling in masses over his shoulders.’ During the investigations
which were subsequently made into the plans and intrigues of the rebels
in Oude, the fact was ascertained that this Moulvie had been known many
years before as Ahmed Shah, a sort of inspired fanatic or fakeer. He
travelled through the Northwest Provinces on some sort of miraculous
mission which was a mystery to the Europeans; his stay at Agra was of
considerable duration, and was marked by the exercise of much influence
over the Mohammedan natives. Mr Drummond, magistrate of that city, kept
an eye on him as a suspicious character; and it was afterwards regarded
as a probability that the Moulvie had been engaged in some plotting
inimical to the English ‘raj.’ The commencement of the mutiny in May
1857 may have been determined by unforeseen circumstances; but abundant
proofs were gradually obtained that some sort of conspiracy had been
long before formed, and hence a reasonable inference that the Moulvie
may have been one of the conspirators. When the troops mutinied at
Fyzabad in June, they placed the Moulvie at their head. He had been in
that city in April, attended by several fanatic followers; and here he
circulated seditious papers, openly proclaiming a religious war.
Although the police on this occasion were ordered to arrest him, he and
his followers made an armed resistance which could not be suppressed
without military aid. The Moulvie was captured, tried, and condemned for
execution; but the Revolt broke out before he could thus be got rid of,
and then he suddenly changed character from a felon to a leader of a
formidable body of armed men. Though sometimes eclipsed in power by
other leaders, he maintained great influence over the rebels throughout
the turbulent proceedings of the period. There can be little doubt that
he had much of the sincerity of a true religious fanatic; and as he was
an able man, and free from the dastardly cruelty that so stained the
names of Nena Sahib and other leaders of unenviable notoriety, a certain
kind of respect was felt for him by the British whom he opposed.
When the month of May ended, and Sir Colin Campbell had proceeded to
Futteghur as a central station whence he could conveniently watch the
progress of events, the Rohilcund and Roorkee field-forces were broken
up; and the regiments which had composed them were set apart for various
detached duties. Brigadier Seaton remained at Shahjehanpoor, with the
60th Rifles, the 82d foot, the 22d Punjaub infantry, Cureton’s cavalry,
two squadrons of the 6th Dragoon Guards, and some artillery. The 79th
Highlanders, and various detachments of artillery, took their departure
for Futteghur. The 64th went to Meerut; the 9th Lancers to Umballa; and
Coke’s Sikh brigade to Boodayoun or Pileebheet. At the end of the month
all was quiet at and near Shahjehanpoor, and the peaceful portion of the
inhabitants were returning; but it was doubtful how soon a new irruption
of rebels from Oude would throw everything again into confusion. Indeed
there were at that time many rebel leaders at the head of small bodies
of insurgents, ready for mischief; among whom were Baboo Ramnarain of
Islamnuggur, and Nizam Ali of Shahee—but these men could safely be
regarded rather as guerrilla chieftains than as military leaders.
It was on this fitting occasion, when there seemed to be a lull in the
din of war, that Sir Colin Campbell issued a congratulatory address to
the troops of the Anglo-Indian armies. Although the address was not made
publicly known to the troops by the adjutant-general until the following
month, it was dated the 28th of May, and ran as follows:
‘In the month of October 1857 the garrison of Lucknow was still shut up,
the road from Calcutta to Cawnpore was unsafe, the communications with
the northwest were entirely closed, and the civil and military
functionaries had disappeared altogether from wide and numerous
provinces. Under instructions from the Right Honourable the
Governor-general, a large plan was designed, by which the resources of
the three presidencies, after the arrival of reinforcements from
England, should be made available for combined action. Thus, while the
army of Bengal, gathering strength from day to day, has recovered the
Gangetic Doab, restored the communications with the northwest of the
empire, relieved the old garrison of Lucknow, afterwards taking that
city, reoccupying Rohilcund, and finally insuring in a great measure the
tranquillity of the old provinces—the three columns put in movement from
Bombay and Madras have rendered like great and efficient services in
their long and difficult marches on the Jumna, through Central India,
and in Rajpootana. These columns, under Major-generals Sir Hugh Rose,
K.C.B., Whitlock, and Roberts, have admirably performed their share in
the general combination arranged under the orders of his lordship the
governor-general. This combination was spread over a surface ranging
from the boundaries of Bombay and Madras to the extreme northwest of
India. By their patient endurance of fatigue, their unfailing obedience,
and their steadfast gallantry, the troops have enabled the generals to
fulfil their instructions. In no war has it ever happened that troops
have been more often engaged than during the campaigns which have now
terminated. In no war has it ever happened that troops should always
contend against immense numerical odds, as has been invariably the case
in every encounter during the struggle of the last year; and in no war
has constant success without a check been more conspicuously achieved.
It has not occurred that one column here, another there, has won more
honour than the other portions of the army; the various corps have done
like hard work, have struggled through the difficulties of a hot-weather
campaign, and have compensated for paucity of numbers in the vast area
of operations by continuous and unexampled marching, notwithstanding the
season. It is probable that much yet remains for the army to perform;
but now that the commander-in-chief is able to give the greater part of
it rest for a time, he chooses this moment to congratulate the generals
and troops on the great results which have attended their labours. He
can fairly say that they have accomplished in a few months what was
believed by the ill-wishers of England to be either beyond her strength,
or to be the work of many years.’
This address is not fully intelligible without taking into account
certain brilliant proceedings in Central India, hereafter to be noticed;
but it is transcribed here as a suitable termination to the Rohilcund
operations in the month of May. The other important affairs bearing
relation to it will find their due place of record.
Oude itself has been very little mentioned in this chapter. The reason
is, that the most important section of the rebels escaped from that
province into Rohilcund, after the great siege of Lucknow, thereby
determining the main scene of struggle during May. There was not,
however, a total cessation of fighting in Oude. Sir Hope Grant, who had
been left at Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell, had more than one encounter
with the rebels in the course of the month. Some of these operations
brought him, on the 10th, to a place called Doundea Khera, a fort
belonging to the rebel Ram Buksh. This fort, though of mud, was of
considerable strength; it was square, with earthen walls and bastions of
considerable thickness; it had four guns, and was rendered difficult of
approach by a ditch and belt of prickly jungle. The fort was, however,
found deserted when Sir Hope arrived. His work then consisted in
destroying the fort, and such of the buildings as could be shewn to have
belonged to Ram Buksh. This done, he advanced on the 12th to Nuggur.
Hearing that two thalookdars or chieftains, Beni Madhoo and Shewrutten
Singh, had assembled an army of fifteen thousand infantry, sixteen
hundred cavalry, and eleven guns, at Sirsee, a village and fort about
five miles off, Grant determined to attack them at once. He left all his
baggage, supplies, &c., with tents struck, in a safe position, with a
force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery for their protection. From the
extreme difficulty of obtaining correct information in that country, Sir
Hope was in much doubt concerning the ground occupied by the enemy; and
eventually he found it stronger than he had expected. The rebels were
drawn up on the banks of a nullah, with an extensive thick jungle in
their rear, rendered still stronger by the fortified village of Towrie.
At five in the afternoon the enemy’s first gun opened fire; but as soon
as Grant had formed his column, with cavalry and horse-artillery
covering his right flank, the rebels were attacked with such boldness
and vigour that they gave way, and were driven into the jungle, leaving
two iron guns behind them. Grant’s column was at one time almost
surrounded by the rebels; but a prompt movement of some of the regiments
speedily removed this difficulty. The rebels suffered severe loss,
including that of one of their leaders, Shewrutten. Sir Hope Grant,
deeming it imprudent to allow his troops to enter the jungle, bivouacked
for the night on the ground where the battle had been fought, and
returned on the morning of the 13th to his camp at Nuggur. During these
operations, he found himself within a short distance of the small Hindoo
temple in which Lieutenants Delafosse and Thomson, and several other
Europeans, sought refuge after their escape from the boat-massacre at
Cawnpore, eleven months earlier.[174] Much blood having been spilled on
that occasion, one of the objects of the present expedition was to bring
certain of the native miscreants to justice. Mr Elliott,
assistant-commissioner, who accompanied the column, went on to the
temple with a squadron of cavalry, took a few prisoners, and then
destroyed the temple—which still exhibited the shot-holes resulting from
the dastardly attack of a large body of natives on a few unarmed
Europeans.
Towards the close of the month, Hope Grant found that a body of the
enemy was threatening Bunnee, and endeavouring to obtain command of the
high road between Lucknow and Cawnpore; this necessitated an expedition
on his part to frustrate the design. As a means of better controlling
approach to the capital, he blew up the stone-bridge over the Goomtee,
thus leaving the iron suspension-bridge as the only mode of crossing.
Of Lucknow, little need be said in this chapter. The engineers were
employed in constructing such batteries and strongholds, and clearing
away such native buildings, as might enable a small British force to
defend the place; while Mr Montgomery, the newly appointed
chief-commissioner, was cautiously feeling his way towards a
re-establishment of civil government. Viscount Canning had given him
plenary powers, in reference to the issue of any proclamation to the
natives—powers which required much tact in their exercise; for there was
still a large amount of fierce opposition and vindictive feeling to
contend against.
In the Doab, and the district adjacent to it, several minor affairs took
place during the month, sufficient to indicate a very turbulent
condition of portions of the population, even if not of great military
importance. At one period of the month five thousand rebels, in two
bodies, crossed the Kallee Nuddee, and marched along the western
boundary of the Futteghur district, burning and destroying villages.
They then crossed the Ganges into Oude by the Shorapore Ghât, taking
with them several guns. Here, however, they were watched and checked by
a small force under Brigadier Carthew, and by Cureton’s Horse. About the
same time, a party of a thousand rebels, with four guns, marched from
Humeerpore to Asung, on the great trunk-road between Lullutpore and
Cawnpore; they commanded that road for several days, until a force could
be sent out to dislodge them. Higher up the Doab, the fort and village
of Ayana, in the Etawah district, were taken by a party of Alexander’s
Horse, and a rebel chief, named Roop Singh, expelled. Colonel Riddell,
who commanded a column from Etawah, encountered and defeated small
bodies of rebels near Ooriya and Sheregurh, and then descended the
Ganges in boats to Calpee, to take part in an important series of
operations in which the Central India field-force was mainly concerned.
Brigadier Showers, during the greater part of this month, was employed
in various ways around Agra as a centre. Among other measures, he
organised a corps of Jât cavalry, to defend the ghâts of the Ganges, and
prevent rebels from crossing the river. Agra itself, with the brigadier
at hand to check rising disturbances, remained free from serious
troubles; though from time to time rumours were circulated which threw
the Europeans into some uneasiness. As the native inhabitants still
possessed a number of old firelocks, swords, and other weapons; it was
deemed prudent to issue an order for disarming. An immense collection of
queer native weapons was the result—not very formidable to English
troops, but mischievous as a possible element of strength to the
disaffected. Many of the guns in the fort were kept pointed towards the
city, as a menace to evildoers.
In reference to many parts of the Doab, there was ample reason for
British officers feeling great uneasiness at the danger which still
surrounded them in the Northwest Provinces, wherever they were
undefended by troops. The murder of Major Waterfield was a case in
point. About the middle of May the major and Captain Fanshawe were
travelling towards Allygurh _viâ_ Agra. In the middle of the night, near
Ferozabad, a band of a hundred and fifty rebels surrounded the vehicle,
shot the driver, and attacked the travellers. The two officers used
their revolvers as quickly as they could; but the unfortunate Waterfield
received two shots, one in the head and one through the chest, besides a
sword-cut across the body; he fell dead on the spot. Fanshawe’s escape
was most extraordinary. The rebels got him out of the carriage, and
surrounded him; but they pressed together so closely that each prevented
his neighbour from striking. Fanshawe quickly drew his sword, and swung
it right and left so vigorously that he forced a passage for himself
through the cowardly crew; some pursued him, but a severe sword-cut to
one of them deterred the rest. The captain ran on at great speed,
climbed up a tree, and there remained till the danger was over. His
courage and promptness saved him from any further injury than a slight
wound in the hand. Poor Waterfield’s remains, when sought for some time
afterwards, were found lying among the embers of the burned vehicle;
they were carried into Agra, and interred with military honours. The
native driver was found dead, with the head nearly severed from the
body.
Nynee Tal, Mussouree, and the other hill-stations towards which the sick
and the weak looked with so much yearning, were almost wholly free from
disturbance during May. One of the few events calling for notice was an
expedition from Huldwanee by Captain Crossman. Receiving news that two
rebel leaders, Nizam Ali Khan and Kali Khan, were preparing for mischief
at a place called Bahonee, he started off on the 8th of May, with two or
three companies of his own regiment, and a hundred Goorkhas mounted on
elephants. He missed the two leaders, but captured many other rebels,
included Kali Khan’s brother—all in the service of the notorious Khan
Bahadoor Khan, self-appointed chief of Bareilly. After burning five
rebel villages, in which great atrocities had been perpetrated against
Christians many months before, Crossman returned to Huldwanee—having
been in incessant movement for twenty-six hours.
Fortunately, the other regions of India presented so few instances—with
a notable exception, presently to be mentioned—of rebellious
proceedings, that a few paragraphs will suffice for their treatment.
During the earlier half of the month of May, minor engagements took
place in the Nagpoor territory, for the dispersion of bands of marauders
and insurgents. The rebels were so little influential, the troops sent
against them so few in number, and the towns and villages so little
known, that it is unnecessary to trace these operations in detail. The
localities concerned were Arpeillee, Ghote, Ashtee, Koonserra,
Chamoorshee, and others equally obscure. The insurgents were a
contemptible rabble, headed by refractory zemindars; but as their
country was almost a complete jungle, it was very difficult work for
Lieutenant Nuttall and Captain Crichton to put them down. The first of
these two officers had under him five companies of the Nagpoor irregular
infantry, with one gun; the other was deputy-commissioner of the
district. A party of two thousand rebels, under the zemindar of
Arpeillee—about a hundred miles south of Nagpoor—ravaged many villages;
and at one spot they brutally murdered Mr Gartlan and Mr Hall,
electric-telegraph inspectors, taking away all the public and private
property from the station. The marauders and murderers were gradually
put down; and this necessary work, though difficult from the cause above
mentioned, was facilitated by the peaceful tendencies of the villagers
generally, who rather dreaded than favoured Yenkut Rao, Bapoo Rao, and
the other rebel zemindars. It also tended to lessen the duration of the
contest, and insure its success, that Milloo Potail, and some other
chieftains, sided with the British. Bapoo Rao, the head rebel of the
district, was believed to be bending his steps towards the Nizam’s
country; but as he would there fall into the hands of an ally of the
British, little doubt was entertained that his career would soon be cut
short.
The Nizam and his prime-minister kept the large territory of Hyderabad
free from any extensive military disturbances; but the country districts
were so harassed by bands of marauding Rohilla freebooters, that the
Nizam requested the Bombay government to furnish a small force for
putting down this evil. Accordingly a corps of a few hundred men were
sent to the region between Aurungabad and Jaulnah—with very evident and
speedy effect.
It will be remembered that, in connection with the events of the month
of April, the intended disarming of the province of Gujerat was adverted
to. This critical and important operation was carried out during May.
Sir Richmond Shakespear, who held a military as well as a political
position in that province, managed the enterprise so firmly and
skilfully that village after village was disarmed, and rendered so far
powerless for mischief. Many unruly chieftains regarded this affair as
very unpalatable. It was a work of great peril, for the turbulent
natives were out of all proportion more numerous than any troops Sir
Richmond could command; but he brought to bear that wonderful influence
which many Englishmen possessed over the natives—influence shewing the
predominance of moral over physical power. The native sovereign of
Gujerat, the Guicowar, had all along been faithful and friendly to the
British; he trusted Sir Richmond Shakespear as fully as Scindia trusted
Sir Robert Hamilton, and gave an eager assent to the disarming of his
somewhat turbulent subjects. The Nizam, the Guicowar, Scindia, and
Holkar—all remained true to the British alliance during the hour of
trouble; if they had failed us, the difficulties of reconquest would
have been immensely increased, if not insuperable.
Of the Bombay presidency mention may be postponed to the chapter
relating to the month of June, so far as concerns the appearance and
suppression of slight rebellious symptoms. One of the minor events in
Bombay city at this period was the conferring of a baronetcy on a native
gentleman, the high-minded liberal Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy. He had long
before been knighted; but his continued and valuable assistance to the
government through all trials and difficulties now won for him further
honour. The Parsee merchant became Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy,
Bart.—perhaps the most remarkable among baronets, race and creed
considered. Whatever he did, was done in princely style. In order that
his new hereditary dignity might not be shamed by any paucity of wealth
on the part of his descendants, he at once invested twenty-five lacs of
rupees in the Bombay four per cents., to entail an income of ten
thousand pounds a year on the holder of the baronetcy. A large mansion
at Mazagon was for a like purpose entailed; and the old merchant-prince
felt a commendable pride in thinking that Bombay might possibly, for
centuries to come, count among its inhabitants a Sir Jamsetjee
Jejeebhoy.
The reader will have observed that this chapter is silent concerning the
brilliant campaign of Sir Hugh Rose in Central India, and of the
subsidiary operations under Generals Roberts and Whitlock. It has been
considered advantageous, on account of the great importance of Sir
Hugh’s exploits, and of the intimate manner in which his proceedings in
June were determined by those of May, to treat those transactions in a
separate chapter, apart from those connected with the names of Campbell,
Lugard, Douglas, Grant, Walpole, Jones, and Penny. The narrative will
next, therefore, take up the affairs of Central India during the months
of May and June.
Note.
_Transport of Troops to India._—Early in the session of 1858, many
members of the legislature, anxious to witness the adoption of the
speediest mode of transporting troops to India, insisted not only
that the overland route viâ Suez ought to have been adopted from
the first, but also that the government and the East India Company
ought to receive national censure for their real or supposed
remissness on this point. In former chapters the fact has been
rendered evident that, among the many important questions pressed
upon the attention of the government, none was more imminent than
that which related to the mode of strengthening the British army
in India. England, not a military country in the continental
estimate of that phrase, could ill spare troops to wage a great
war in her Eastern possessions; and yet such a course was
absolutely necessary. With ninety-nine regiments of line-infantry,
and a proportionate number of troops of other kinds, she had to
defend nearly thirty colonies besides the home country. Nay, at
the very time when the mutiny began, she had barely finished a war
with Persia, and had just commenced another with China—superadded
to the defensive requirements just adverted to. Had the Persian
expedition not been brought to a successful termination in the
spring of 1857, and had the regiments destined for China become
practically engaged in hostilities in that country at that time,
it is difficult to imagine how the governor-general could have
sent up any reinforcements from Calcutta, or Lord Elphinstone from
Bombay, until summer had far advanced. Under the particular
circumstances of time and place, however, Generals Outram and
Havelock were released from their duties in Persia time enough to
conduct the important operations at Lucknow and elsewhere—bringing
with them the Queen’s troops and Company’s troops which had been
engaged in the war in that country; while, on the other side,
troops intended for service in China were rendered available for
the needs of India. Still, this did not affect the strictures
passed in the home country. Members of the legislature inquired,
and journalists inquired: ‘Why was not the overland route adopted
for or by troops sent from England?’ Hence the appointment of a
committee of the House of Commons—‘To inquire concerning the
measures resorted to, or which were available, and as to the lines
of communication adopted for reinforcing our army during the
pending Revolt in India, and report thereon to the House: with a
view to ascertaining the arrangements which should be made towards
meeting any future important emergencies involving the security of
our Eastern dominions.’
As the report given in by the committee was comprised within a few
paragraphs, we will present it unaltered here, and then touch upon a
few matters of detail connected with the subject.
The committee agreed to report:
‘1. That the inquiry which this committee has been appointed to
conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to
the overland route to India; the second, to the employment of
steamers, as compared with sailing-vessels, for the transport of
troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made
during the mutiny of the military resources of this country and of
the colonies.
‘2. That the Court of Directors appear, from the first intelligence
of the mutiny at Meerut, to have been sensible of the advantages of
the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its
adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred her
Majesty’s ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation.
‘3. That the committee cannot judge of the validity of those
political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from
inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first
week of September, when the more serious character of the war and
the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to
a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a
compliance with it on the part of the cabinet.
‘4. That it would have been desirable, independently of political
considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route at the
earliest possible period; and, apart from such considerations, it is
much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to
transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to
at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body
of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the
evidence laid before the committee leaves great room to doubt
whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the
months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India
so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great
advantage in favour of this route.
‘5. That although the overland route may be advantageously employed
in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be
relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to
India.
‘6. That if steamers had been used in greater numbers, the
reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did
by sailing-vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the
committee to shew that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater
amount of steam-transport was attainable; whilst it has been shewn
that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route
would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam-vessels than
were actually employed.
‘7. That steamers should for the future be always made use of, as
far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of
the ordinary reliefs, the committee would not recommend the adoption
of so costly a mode of transport.
‘8. That the governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and
valuable assistance to the government of India, and deserve great
praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the
governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and
horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but
that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was
instructed by the home government to transmit to India; that the
committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of
the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this
course.
‘9. That the committee observe with satisfaction that the people of
Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the
mother-country, and that the committee are of opinion that it is
highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations
of loyalty on the part of the colonies.
‘10. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger,
and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the committee
are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of
the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which
they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to
the army in India during the past year.’
From the tenor of this report, it is evident that the East India
directors were ready to adopt the overland route before the
government gave in their adhesion. The ‘political reasons’ for
avoiding that route were connected with the relations between Egypt
and various European countries: relations often involving jealousy
and diplomatic intrigue, and likely to be thrown into some
perplexity by the passage of troops belonging to another nation. The
ministers were unwilling to speak out plainly on this point,
possibly for fear of giving offence to France; and the committee,
though sorely against the wish of some of its members, refrained
from pressing them on this point; hence the cautious phraseology of
the report, throwing a sort of shield over the government.
In reference to the proceedings connected with the transport of
troops to India, it may be well to advert to a few dates. The home
government received, on the 9th of April, the first intimation that
a disaffected spirit had made its appearance among the native troops
at Barrackpore. On the 19th of May, Lord Ellenborough inquired in
the House of Lords whether reinforcements were being sent to India;
a reply in the affirmative was given, accompanied by an expression
of opinion that the disaffection was of very minor character.
Shortly afterwards, in the House of Commons, a similar belief was
expressed by members of the government that the occurrences at
Barrackpore were trifling, not likely to lead to serious results. At
that period, as we have already seen,[175] the Bengal presidency,
including the vast range of territory from Pegu to Peshawur,
contained about 23,000 European troops and 119,000 native; the
Madras presidency, 10,000 European and 50,000 native; the Bombay
presidency, 5000 European and 31,000 native—making a total of about
38,000 Company’s and Queen’s European troops, and 200,000 native.
These, the actual numbers, were exclusive of the large brigades of
the Bombay army at that time engaged in, or not yet returned from,
the Persian expedition. During May, the government and the East
India directors decided that more European troops ought to be in
India, in consideration both of the condition of India itself, and
of the incidence of war in Persia and China; and the early dispatch
of four regiments was decided on. At length, on the 27th of June,
arrived a telegram announcing the revolt at Meerut and the seizure
of Delhi by the mutineers. While Lord Elgin on the way to China,
Lord Harris at Madras, Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, Sir Henry Ward at
Ceylon, Sir James Higginson at Mauritius, and Sir George Grey at the
Cape of Good Hope, were using their best exertions to send troops to
aid Viscount Canning, the home authorities considered what best
could be done in furnishing reinforcements from England. There were
no less than 13,000 troops at the Cape of Good Hope at that time,
including ten regiments of Queen’s infantry; it was fully believed
in England that the governor might well have spared the greater
portion of these troops; and the smallness of the number really
contributed by him led to much disappointment in India, and much
adverse criticism in England.
When the authorities at the War-office commenced their arrangements
for despatching troops to India, they had to provide for a
sea-voyage of about fourteen thousand miles. A question arose
whether, without changing the route or shortening the distance, the
duration of the voyage might not be lessened by the employment of
steam-vessels instead of sailing-ships. The Admiralty, and most
members of the government, opposed this change on various grounds,
principally in relation to difficulties in the supply of fuel, but
partly in relation to monsoons and other winds. By the 10th of July,
out of 31 vessels chartered by the government and the Company for
conveying troops to India, nearly all were sailing-ships. A change
of feeling took place about that date; the nation estimated time to
be so valuable, that the authorities were almost coerced into the
chartering of some of the noble merchant-steamers, the rapid voyages
of which were already known. Between the 10th of July and the 1st of
December, 59 ships were chartered, of which 29 were screw-steamers.
The autumnal averages of passages to India were greatly in favour of
steamers. Within a certain number of weeks there were 62 troop-laden
ships despatched from England to one or other of the ports,
Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Kurachee; the average duration of all the
voyages was 120 days by sailing-vessels, and only 83 days by
steamers—a diminution of nearly one-third. Extending the list of
ships to a later date, so as to include a greater number, it was
found that 82 ships carried 30,378 troops from the United Kingdom to
India—thus divided: 66 sailing-ships carried 16,234 men, averaging
299 each; 27 steamers carried 14,144, averaging 522 each. It was
calculated that 14,000 of these British soldiers arrived in India
_five weeks earlier_, by the adoption of steam instead of
sailing-vessels. It is impossible to estimate what amount of change
might have been produced in the aspect of Indian affairs, had these
steam-voyages been made in the summer rather than in the autumn; it
might not have been permitted to the mutineers to rule triumphant at
Lucknow till the spring of the following year, or the fidelity of
wavering chieftains to give way under the long continuance of the
struggle.
Besides the two inquiries concerning the promptness with which
troops were sent, and the kind of vessels employed to convey them,
there was a third relating to the route adopted. From the earliest
news of the revolt at Meerut, many persons in and out of parliament
strenuously recommended the use of the overland route, as being much
shorter than any possible ocean-route. The Court of Directors viewed
this proposal more favourably than the government. Until the month
of September, ‘political difficulties’ were dimly hinted at by
ministers, but without any candid explanations; and as the
objections gave way in the month just named, the nation arrived at a
pretty general conclusion that these difficulties had never been of
a very insurmountable character. It is only fair to state, however,
that many experienced men viewed the overland route with distrust,
independently of any political considerations. They adverted to the
incompleteness of the railway arrangements between Alexandria and
Cairo; to the difficulty of troops marching or riding over the sandy
desert from Cairo to Suez; to the wretchedness of Suez as a place of
re-embarkation; and to the unhealthiness of a voyage down the Red
Sea in hot summer weather. Nevertheless, it was an important fact
that the East India directors, most of whom possessed personal
knowledge concerning the routes to India, urged the government from
the first to send at least a portion of the troops by the Suez
route. It was not until the 19th of September that assent was given;
and the 13th of October witnessed the arrival of the first
detachment of English troops into the Indian Ocean _viâ_ Suez. These
started from Malta on the 1st of the month. On the 2d of October,
the first regiment started from England direct, to take the overland
route to India. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation
Company, having practically almost a monopoly of the Suez route,
conveyed the greater portion of the troops sent in this way; and it
may be useful to note the length of journey in the principal
instances. The following are tabulated examples giving certain
items—such as, the name of the steamer, the date of leaving England,
the number of troops conveyed, and the time of reaching Alexandria,
to commence the overland portion of the journey:
Steamer. Left England. No. of Days to
Troops. Alexandria.
_Sultan_, 1857. Oct. 2 248 13 days.
_Dutchman_, Oct. 14 256 17 days.
_Sultan_, Nov. 17 264 14 days.
_Euxine_, Dec. 2 236 15 days.
_Indus_, Dec. 4 83 14 days.
_Abeona_, Dec. 8 861 15 days.
_Pera_, 1858. Feb. 4 231 15 days.
_Ripon_, Feb. 11 242 15 days.
_Sultan_, Feb. 24 244 13 days.
_Malabar_, Mar. 11 264 14 days.
_Ripon_, Mar. 27 420 14 days.
_Benares_, Apr. 8 607 17 days.
Thus the voyage was made on an average in about 14½ days, from the
shores of England to those of Egypt. The landing at Alexandria, the
railway journey to Cairo, the journey by vans and donkeys across the
desert, the short detention at Suez, and the embarkation in another
steamer at that port, occupied a number of days varying from 2 to
17—depending chiefly on the circumstance whether or not a steamer
was ready at Suez to receive the troops when they arrived from
Alexandria; the average was about 5½ days. From Suez the voyages
were made to Kurachee, Bombay, Ceylon, Madras, or Calcutta. The
steamers took forward all the troops mentioned in the above list, as
well as others which reached Alexandria by other means. Most of
these troops were landed at Bombay or Kurachee, as being nearer than
Calcutta; and the average length of voyage was just 16 days. The
result, then, presented was this:
England to Alexandria, 14½ days’ average.
Alexandria to Suez, 5½ days’ average.
Suez to India, 16 days’ average.
———
36 days’ average.
Those which went to Calcutta instead of Bombay or Kurachee, were
about 3 days longer. Comparing these figures with those before
given, we arrive at the following remarkable conclusion:
Sailing-ships round Cape, 120 days’ average.
Steamers round Cape, 83 days’ average.
Suez route, 36 days’ average.
This, as a question of time, triumphantly justified all that had
been said by the advocates of the shortest route; nor did it appear
that there were any counterbalancing disadvantages experienced.
Between the 6th of November 1857, and the 18th of May 1858, more
than 5000 officers and soldiers landed in India, who had travelled
by the Suez overland route from England.
[Illustration]
-----
Footnote 171:
‘With the concurrence of the government, the commander-in-chief is
pleased to direct that white clothing shall be discontinued in the
European regiments of the Honourable Company’s army; and that for the
future the summer-clothing of the European soldiers shall consist of
two suits of “khakee,” corresponding in pattern and material with the
clothing recently sanctioned for the royal army of England. Corps are
to be permitted to wear out serviceable summer-clothing of the old
pattern now in use; but in regiments in which this clothing requires
to be renewed, the new pattern now established is to be introduced
without delay. Commanding officers will take steps to obtain patterns
from regiments of her Majesty’s service. A complete suit, including
cap-cover, should not exceed in cost 4-12 rupees. The summer-clothing
now authorised will be supplied from the clothing agency of the
presidency to all recruits of the Company’s service arriving at
Calcutta between 1st February and 1st October, to be issued with the
least possible delay after arrival of the recruits.’
Footnote 172:
_Cavalry._—_1st Brigade_, under Brigadier Jones (6th Dragoon Guards).
Head-quarters and two squadrons 6th Dragoon Guards, under Captain
Bickerstaff; Captain Lind’s Moultanee horse. _2d Brigade_, under
Brigadier Hagart (7th Hussars). Her Majesty’s 9th Lancers, under Major
Coles; 2d Punjaub cavalry, under Major S. Browne; detachments of
Lahore light horse, 1st Punjaub cavalry, 5th Punjaub cavalry, and 17th
irregular cavalry.
_Artillery._—Under Lieutenant-colonel Brind, C.B., B.A.;
Lieutenant-colonel Tombs’s troop, B.H.A.; Lieutenant-colonel
Remington’s troop, B.H.A.; Major Hammond’s light field-battery, B.A.,
four guns; two heavy field-batteries. Captain Francis, B.A.;
siege-train with Major Le Mesurier’s company, B.A., under Captain
Cookworthy’s detachment, B.A.; detachment R.E. Bengal and Punjaub;
Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant-colonel Harness, R.E.,
chief-engineer to the force.
_Infantry._—_Highland Brigade_, under Lieutenant-colonel Leith Hay,
C.B. (her Majesty’s 92d Highlanders). Her Majesty’s 42d Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-colonel Cameron; her Majesty’s 79th Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-colonel Taylor, C.B.; her Majesty’s 93d Highlanders,
under Lieutenant-colonel Ross; 4th Punjaub Rifles, Lieutenant M’Queen;
Belooch Battalion, Captain Beville. _Brigadier Stisted’s_ (70th)
_Brigade_. Seven companies her Majesty’s 64th foot, Lieutenant-colonel
Bingham, C.B.; her Majesty’s 78th Highlanders, Colonel Hamilton; 4
companies her Majesty’s 82 foot, Colonel the Hon. P. Herbert, C.B.; 2d
Punjaub infantry, Lieutenant-colonel Greene; 22d Punjaub infantry,
Captain Stafford.
Footnote 173:
‘The commander-in-chief has received the most gracious commands of her
Majesty the Queen to communicate to the army an expression of the deep
interest felt by the Queen in the exertions of the troops, and the
successful progress of the campaign.
‘Sir Colin Campbell has delayed giving execution to the royal command,
until he was able to announce to the army that the last stronghold of
rebellion had fallen before the persevering attempts of the troops of
her Majesty and the Hon. East India Company.
‘It is impossible for the commander-in-chief to express adequately his
sense of the high honour done to him in having been chosen by the
Queen to convey her Majesty’s most gracious acknowledgments to the
army, in the ranks of which he has passed his life.
‘The commander-in-chief ventures to quote the very words of the Queen:
‘“That so many gallant, brave, and distinguished men, beginning with
one whose name will ever be remembered with pride, Brigadier-general
Havelock, should have died and fallen, is a great grief to the Queen.
To all Europeans and native troops who have fought so nobly and so
gallantly—and amongst whom the Queen is rejoiced to see the 93d—the
Queen wishes Sir Colin to convey the expression of her great
admiration and gratitude.”’
Footnote 174:
See Chap. viii., p. 138.
Footnote 175:
Chapter xii., p. 208.
[Illustration:
SIR HUGH ROSE.
]