PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN MAY.
When, on the 10th of May 1858, the course of twelve months had been
completed since the commencement of the mutiny, the nation looked back
at the events of that period as a terrible episode in the history of
British dominion. Into how many thousands of families mourning had been
introduced by it, no one correctly knew; the problem was a dismal one,
which few had the heart to investigate. Those who, not affected by
private grief, or hiding their grief in a sense of public duty, viewed
the twelvemonth’s conflict in a national sense, saw in it a mingled
cause for humiliation and pride—humiliation that British rule should be
so trampled on by those who had been long and peacefully under it; pride
that so many public servants, so many private persons, should have
proved worthy of their country in a time of severe and bitter trial. In
military matters, the once great Bengal native army had almost ceased to
exist. Twenty thousand disarmed sepoys were in and near the Punjaub,
carefully watched lest they should join the ranks of the insurgents;
disarmed regiments were similarly detained elsewhere; others had been
almost annihilated by twelve months of fierce warfare; others were still
engaged as the nuclei of rebel armies; while the number of Bengal sepoys
was very small indeed, reckoned by hundreds rather than thousands, who
still fought faithfully on the side of the British. The Madras and
Bombay troops had, happily for India and England’s interest therein,
remained almost wholly ‘true to their salt;’ enabling the governors of
those two presidencies to send gallant field-forces into the disturbed
northern and central provinces. Sikhs, Punjaubees, Moultanese,
Scindians, Beloochees, and hill-men on the Afghan frontier, had rendered
services of such lasting importance in Hindostan, that they may almost
be regarded as the preservers of the English ‘raj;’ this they had been
enabled to do from two causes—the want of sympathy between the mutineers
and those northwestern tribes; and the admirable system of Punjaub
government organised by the Lawrences. In civil matters, India had
witnessed the almost total breaking up of the ordinary revenue and
magisterial arrangements, in provinces containing at least fifty
millions of souls; Europeans driven into hiding-places, even if not
murdered; and treasuries plundered by bands of ruffians, who gladly
hailed the state of anarchy brought on by the mutiny of the sepoy
regiments. Among the superior members of the government, Viscount
Canning still maintained his position, battling against unnumbered
difficulties; Sir Colin Campbell still remained at the head of the army,
well aware that his utmost skill as a military commander would long be
needed; and Sir John Lawrence still held the Punjaub in his wonderful
grasp, displaying governing powers of the very highest order at an
eminently critical time. On the other hand, the Anglo-Indians had to
mourn over a sad death-list. Henry Lawrence, Havelock, Colvin, Neill,
Venables, Nicholson, William Peel, Adrian Hope, Wheeler, Barnard, Banks,
Battye—all, and a vast many more gallant spirits, had sunk under the
terrible pressure of the past twelve months.
Appropriating the present chapter to a rapid glance at the progress of
events in the month of May, and beginning (as usual) with the Bengal
regions, we may conveniently notice two or three arrangements made by
the Calcutta government, bearing relation either to the state of the
army, or to the condition of civilians affected by the mutiny.
Among the earliest measures taken to reconstruct the Bengal army, so
shattered by the mutiny, was one announced in a government notification
on the 7th of May. It was to the effect that four regiments of Bengal
_European_ cavalry should be formed, in lieu of eight regiments of
Bengal _native_ cavalry, erased from the list of the establishment for
mutinous conduct. Each regiment was to consist of 1 colonel, 2
lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 14 captains, 18 lieutenants, 8 cornets, 1
adjutant, 1 interpreter and quartermaster, 4 surgeons and assistants,
119 non-commissioned and subordinate officers of various kinds, and 700
privates; making a total of 870—an unusually large number for a cavalry
regiment. In addition to these, there were to be native syces,
grass-cutters, and quarter-masters, attached to each regiment; and
various persons employed at the depôt. The pay was to be the same as in
the royal dragoon regiments. Each regiment was to be divided into ten
troops. As the officers were to be about doubly as numerous as the
English officers in the disbanded native regiments, it was calculated
that the four new would absorb the officers of eight old regiments. The
regiments thus extinguished by this first process, were the 1st, 2d, 3d,
4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Bengal native cavalry; the 5th and the 8th
were left to be dealt with at some subsequent period. As for any larger
measures connected with the reconstruction of a _native_ Bengal army,
these were left for determination at a later period, after collating the
opinions of the most experienced authorities in India.
The distress experienced by the British troops from the intense heat of
the Indian sun, and the severe strictures passed by the press and by
members of the legislature on those regimental officers who permitted or
compelled their soldiers to swelter in red cloth, led to the issuing of
orders concerning light summer clothing. It was found that a kind of
gray or dust-coloured linen called _khakee_ or _carkey_ was better
suited than anything else—even white—as a material for clothing in the
hot season; and hence the issuing of an order by the adjutant-general,
on the 21st of May, to the effect noted below.[171] This question
concerning appropriate clothing had long been discussed by military men
in India: the officers of greatest experience being those who most
disapproved the wearing of closely fitting garments in such a climate.
General Jacob had resolutely contended against the adoption of English
uniforms by the sepoys of the Company’s army. He said: ‘A sepoy of the
line, dressed in a tight coat; trousers in which he can scarcely walk,
and cannot stoop at all; bound to an immense and totally useless
knapsack, so that he can scarcely breathe; strapped, belted, and
pipe-clayed within an inch of his life; with a rigid basket-shako on his
head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance, and which cuts
deep into his brow if worn for an hour; and with a leather-stock round
his neck, to complete his absurd costume—when compared with the same
sepoy, clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with regard to his comfort
and efficiency—forms the most perfect example of what is madly called
the “regular” system with many European officers, contrasted with the
system of common sense now recommended for adoption.’ The graphic
description by Mr Russell, of the officers and men in Sir Colin
Campbell’s army of Oude, shews how eager soldiers are to get rid of
their irksome uniforms when permitted, under the influence of a heat
denoted by the cabalistic mark 100° F. or 110° F.: ‘Except the
Highlanders—and when they left Lucknow they were panting for their
summer clothes, and had sent officers to Cawnpore to hurry them—not a
corps that I have seen sport a morsel of pink or shew a fragment of
English scarlet. The Highlanders wear eccentric shades of gray linen
over their bonnets—the kilt is discarded, or worn out in some regiments;
and flies, mosquitoes, and the sun are fast rendering it impossible in
the others. Already many officers who can get trews have discarded the
ponderous folds of woollen stuff tucked into massive wads over the hips,
and have provided some defence against the baking of their calves by
day, and have sought to protect their persons against the assaults of
innumerable entomological enemies by night. The artillery had been
furnished with excellent head-covers and good frocks of light stuff....
The 7th Hussars, the Military Train, have vestiary idiosyncrasies of
their own; but there is some sort of uniformity among the men. Among the
officers, individual taste and fantasy have full play. The infantry
regiments, for the most part, are dressed in linen frocks, dyed carkey
or gray slate-colour—slate-blue trousers, and shakos protected by
puggerees, or linen covers, from the sun. The peculiarity of carkey is
that the dyer seems to be unable to match it in any two pieces, and that
it exhibits endless varieties of shade, varying with every washing, so
that the effect is rather various than pleasing on the march or on the
parade-ground. But the officers, as I have said, do not confine
themselves to carkey or anything else. It is really wonderful what
fecundity of invention in dress there is, after all, in the British mind
when its talents can be properly developed. To begin with the
head-dress. The favourite wear is a helmet of varying shape, but of
uniform ugliness.... Whatever it might be in polished steel or burnished
metal, the helmet is a decided failure in felt, or wicker-work, or pith,
so far as external effect is concerned. It is variously fabricated, with
many varieties of interior ducts and passages leading to escape-holes
for imaginary hot air in the front or top, and around it are twisted
infinite colours and forms of turbans with fringed ends and laced
fringes. When a peacock’s feather, with the iris end displayed, is
inserted in the hole in the top of the helmet, or is stuck in the
puggeree around it, the effect of the covering is much enhanced; and
this style is rather patronised by some of the staff. The coat may be of
any cut or material, but shooting-jackets hold their own in the highest
posts; and a carkey-coloured jerkin, with a few inches of iron
curb-chain sewed on the shoulders to resist sabre-cuts, is a general
favourite.... As to the clothing of the nether man, nothing but a series
of photographs could give the least notion of the numerous combinations
which can be made out of a leg, leather, pantaloons, and small-clothes.
Long stage-boots of buff-coloured leather—for the manufacture of which
Cawnpore is famous—pulled up over knee-breeches of leather or regimental
trousers, are common. There are officers who prefer wearing their
Wellingtons outside their pantaloons, thus exhibiting tops of very
bright colours; and the boot and baggy trousers of the Zouave officer
are not unknown.’
The next point to be adverted to affected civilians and private traders
more extensively than the military. The compensation to sufferers by the
mutiny, a much-disputed question for nearly twelve months, was put into
a train for settlement by a government order issued at Calcutta in May.
This order applied to Bengal only, as being a region quite large enough
to be brought within one set of official rules. The compensation was to
be for loss of property and effects, leaving losses affecting life or
health to be settled by a distinct machinery. A Mr E. Jackson was
appointed at Calcutta as commissioner to inquire into claims for
compensation. A limit was named, the 26th of August, after which no
claims would be received from persons resident in India: an extension of
time being allowed for those who were not in that country. In cases
where the amount claimed did not exceed fifty thousand rupees, the
application to the commissioner was to be accompanied by a detailed
statement of the particulars of the claim, and of the evidence adducible
in support of it; but where the property was of higher amount, the
regulation required only a general estimate to accompany the
application, a further period of three months being allowed for the
preparation and submission of the detailed statement of losses. It was
at the same time very pointedly mentioned that these preliminary
operations did not constitute an actual _claim_ on the Company for any
compensation whatever. ‘It is to be understood that the registry of
applications above provided for does not imply any recognition of claims
to compensation; the Honourable Court of Directors having expressly
reserved their final decision upon the question, whether or not
compensation for losses sustained by the mutiny shall be awarded.’ The
Company probably deemed it wise, in the uncertainty how large might be
the total aggregate sum claimed, to avoid any formal pledge that these
compensations could be rightfully demanded and would be really paid. The
above, we have said, applied to Bengal; but about the same time a
similar notification appeared at Allahabad, applicable to the Northwest
Provinces. Mr C. Grant and Mr E. H. Longden were named commissioners to
record and register claims. The conditions were generally the same as
those in Bengal; and to them was added an announcement that
‘Applications will be received, subject to the same rules, from natives
of the country for compensation, on account of loss of property caused
by their known loyalty and attachment to the British government.’ A
similar announcement was afterwards made, extending the boon to the
province of Oude.
Superadded to the arrangements made for the succour of those who had
borne pecuniary loss by the mutiny, was one dated May 25th. This was to
the effect that some provision would be made for the relief of the
destitute families of persons who had died after the loss of their
property, even though the death were not occasioned by the mutiny. It
was thereupon determined that grants of money should be given to
families rendered impoverished by this double calamity; the grants to be
regulated on the same principle as those allowed to European and native
officers of the government.
[Illustration:
DACCA.
]
One of the resolutions arrived at by the authorities at Calcutta gave
very general satisfaction—except to a few officers jealous of any
encroachments on the privileges of the army. Whether suggested at home,
or in India, the movement was in the right direction. The regulation was
to the effect that civilians who had distinguished themselves in the
field since the commencement of the mutiny, or who should so distinguish
themselves before the mutiny ended, should be allowed to participate in
the honours which had hitherto been considered peculiar to the military
service. The civil servants of the Company, as a body, greatly raised
themselves in the estimation of the nation by the gallantry which many
of them displayed under circumstances of great peril—not only in
defending their posts against large bodies of insurgents, but in sharing
those field and siege operations which are more immediately sources of
honour to military men. What those honours were to be, depended partly
on the crown, partly on the Company; but the object of the order was to
shew that the civil position of a gallant man should not necessarily be
a bar to his occupancy of an honoured place among military men.
In entering now upon the military operations of the month, it is
satisfactory to know that nothing important presents itself for record
in connection with the eastern regions of Bengal. There were few or no
actual mutinies, for reasons more than once assigned in former chapters.
Notwithstanding this safety, however—partly through the superstitious
character of the natives of India, and partly through the uneasy feeling
prevailing in the minds of Europeans during the mutiny—the newspapers
were frequently engaged in discussing mysteries, rumours, and prophecies
of a strange character. One, connected more with Bengal than with the
other provinces, related to ‘something white,’ which was to be ominous
of British rule in India. Where it arose, or how, remained as
undiscoverable as the chupatty mystery; but the rumour put on various
forms at different times and places. At Tipperah, the native story told
of a ‘white thing’ which would be unprocurable after some time. At
Chittagong, a particular day was named, when, ‘out of four things, three
would be given and one withheld;’ and at Jessore, the bazaar-people
became so excited concerning a prophetic rumour of an equally
enigmatical kind, that the magistrate endeavoured to elicit something
from his police-darogah that might explain it; but the man either could
not or would not tell how the story arose. In Dacca and other places the
prediction assumed this form—that after a certain period, a certain
‘white thing’ would cease to exist in India; and in some instances the
exact interval was named, ‘three months and thirteen days.’
Occasionally, the authorities found it necessary to watch very closely
the proceedings of Mohammedan fanatics; who, at Burdwan, Jessore,
Rungpoor, and other places, were detected in attempts to rouse up the
people to a religious war. Fortunately, the townsmen and villagers did
not respond to these appeals. Southwest of Calcutta, the Sumbhulpore
district, disturbed occasionally by rebel bands intent on plunder, was
kept for the most part tranquil by the firm management of Colonel
Forster. In the month of May he hit upon the plan of inviting the still
faithful chieftains of the districts to furnish each a certain number of
soldiers to defend British interests, on promise of a due recognition of
their services afterwards. The chieftains raised two thousand
matchlockmen among them, and took up such positions as Colonel Forster
indicated—a measure which completely frustrated and cowed the rebels.
We may pass at once to a consideration of the state of affairs in Behar
or Western Bengal, comprising the districts around what may be called
the Middle Ganges. This region, as former chapters have sufficiently
told, and as a glance at a map will at once shew, contains many
important cities and towns, which were thrown into great commotion by
the mutiny—such as Patna, Dinapoor, Arrah, Buxar, Azimghur, Goruckpore,
Ghazeepore, Jounpoor, Sasseram, Benares, Chunargur, and Mirzapore. It is
true that many of these were formerly included within the government of
the ‘Northwest Provinces,’ and then in that of the ‘Central Provinces;’
but this is a matter of little consequence to our present purpose; if we
consider them all to belong to the Mid-Ganges region, it will suffice
for the present purpose.
The condition of the region just defined, during May, depended mainly on
the relation between Sir Edward Lugard on the one hand, and the
Jugdispore rebels on the other. How it fared with this active general
and the troops under his command, when April closed, we have already
seen. It will be remembered that about the middle of that month, Koer
Singh took up a strong position at Azimutgurh, from which Lugard deemed
it necessary to dislodge him; that Lugard himself remained encamped at
Azimghur with the bulk of his Azimghur field-force, in order that he
might watch the proceedings of numerous bands of rebels under the Rajahs
of Nuhurpoor and Naweejer and Gholam Hossein, hovering about the
districts of Sandah, Mundoree, and Koelser; but that he made up a strong
column to pursue Koer Singh. This column, placed under the command of
Brigadier Douglas, consisted of the following troops: H.M. 4th foot; a
wing of the 37th foot; a detachment of Punjaub Sappers; two squadrons of
Sikh cavalry; a squadron of the Military Train; and nine guns and
mortars. Then followed the series of cross-purposes, in which Koer Singh
was permitted or enabled to work much more mischief than Sir Edward had
anticipated. The events may briefly be recapitulated thus: On the 17th
and 18th, Douglas, after starting with his column from Azimghur, came up
with the rebels, defeated them at Azimutgurh, and chased them to Ghosee,
Nugra, and Secunderpore. On the 19th he found that they intended to
cross the Gogra before he could come up to them in pursuit—an intention
which he strove to render nugatory. On the 20th he encountered them
again, at Muneer Khas, defeated them with great slaughter, captured most
of their munitions of war, and dispersed the rebels, the main body of
whom fled towards Bullah and Beyriah. On the 21st, Douglas had the
mortification, on reaching Sheopore, of finding that Koer Singh had
outwitted the officer who had been ordered to guard the passage of the
Ganges in the vicinity of Ghazeepore with about nine hundred men; the
wily chief of Jugdispore had got in the rear of the detachment by a
flank-movement, and had crossed the Ganges at an undefended spot. Then
followed Captain Le Grand’s disastrous expedition to Jugdispore on the
23d; the crossing of the Ganges on the 25th by Douglas, with his column;
and the advance towards Arrah and Jugdispore to retrieve the disaster.
To what results these operations led in the month of May, we have now to
see.
Brigadier Douglas arrived at Arrah with a part of his force on the 1st
of May, the rest having arrived two days earlier; but Douglas not being
in sufficient force to effectually encompass the enemy, and the
importance of thoroughly routing Koer Singh being evident, Sir Edward
Lugard, leaving a few troops to guard Azimghur, set out for the Ganges
with his main column, crossed over into the Shahabad district on the 3d
and following days, and prepared for operations in the direction of
Arrah and Jugdispore. The rebels, estimated at seven or eight thousand,
were supposed to be intrenching themselves, and getting in supplies. On
the 8th, Sir Edward arrived in the vicinity of Jugdispore, and came in
sight of some of the rebels. Two companies of the 84th foot, with
detachments of Madras Rifles, and Sikh horse, aided by two
horse-artillery guns, were sent back to Arrah, to protect that place
while operations were being directed against Jugdispore. The
commissioner of Patna at the same time sent the steamer _Patna_ up the
Ganges, to watch the ghâts or ferries. On the 9th, Sir Edward marched
his force from Beheea to an open plain a little to the west of
Jugdispore. Here he intended to encamp for a while, to allow Colonel
Corfield to come up with some additional troops from Sasseram.
Circumstances occurred, however, to change his plan. In the afternoon of
this day a large body of rebels formed outside the jungle, and moved in
the direction of Arrah; but these were quickly followed by cavalry and
horse-artillery, and driven back into the jungle. Another body, much
more numerous, began to fire into Sir Edward’s camp before he could get
his baggage well up and tents fixed. This determined him to attack them
at once. Dividing his force into three columns, he planned an assault on
Jugdispore on three points at once. The place was carried after a little
skirmishing, the rebels making only a slight resistance; they retired to
Lutwarpore, in the jungle district, taking with them two guns which they
had captured from the British in the preceding month. The loss on both
sides was trifling. Leaving a strong party to retain Jugdispore, Lugard
returned to his camp in the evening. According to the rumours prevalent,
Koer Singh, who had so long been a source of annoyance to the British,
had died of his wounds; and the rebels, under his brother Ummer Singh,
were ill supplied and in much confusion. A nephew of Koer Singh, named
Ritbhunghur Singh, gave himself up to the British a short time
afterwards—hopeful of insuring forgiveness by being able to shew that,
in earlier months, he had befriended certain Europeans in a time of
great peril. On the 10th, after ordering all the fortifications at
Jugdispore, and all the buildings which had belonged to Koer Singh, to
be destroyed, Lugard prepared to follow the rebels into the jungle. He
arranged that Colonel Corfield, with the Sasseram force, should approach
Lutwarpore in one direction, while he himself intended to advance upon
it from Jugdispore. On the 11th and 12th much fighting took place. Sir
Edward took the rebels by surprise; they expected to be attacked from
Arrah or Beheea, but he marched westward through a belt of jungle to
Hettumpore, and attacked them on a side which they believed to be quite
safe. Lugard and Corfield were everywhere successful. It was, however, a
harassing kind of warfare, bringing more fatigue than glory; the rebels,
though chastised everywhere, avoided a regular engagement, and retreated
into the jungle after every partial skirmish. At Arrah, Jugdispore,
Lutwarpore, Hettumpore, Beheea, Peroo, and Chitowra, Lugard defeated and
cut them up at various times in the course of the month; yet he could
not prevent them from recombining, and collecting around them a rabble
of budmashes and jail-felons. Sir Edward hoped, at any rate, to be able
so to employ a strong detachment of cavalry as to prevent the rebels
from crossing the river Sone, and carrying anarchy into other districts.
They nevertheless continued to harass the neighbourhood by freebooting
expeditions, if not by formidable military projects. After Lugard’s
defeat of the main force, some of the insurgents broke up into bands of
a few hundreds each, and were joined by budmashes from the towns and
revolted villages. One party attacked an indigo factory near Dumoran,
and burned it to the ground; another effected a murderous outbreak at
the village of Rajpore, near Buxar; another threatened the
railway-bridge works at Karminassa. These mischievous proceedings
naturally threw the whole district into agitation. The threat against
the railway-works was fully carried out about the end of the month; for
the devastators destroyed the engineers’ bungalows and the workmen’s
sheds, set fire to all the wood and coal collected for brick-burning,
destroyed everything they could easily lay their hands on, and
effectually stopped the works for a time. Nothing could be done to quell
these disturbances, until a British force appeared.
Practically, therefore, the ‘Azimghur field-force,’ under Sir Edward
Lugard, succeeded in breaking down the military organisation of the
rebels in that part of India, without being able to prevent the
formation of roaming bands bent on slaughter and devastation. And even
the limited amount of advantage gained was purchased at a high price;
for the tremendous heat of the sun struck down the poor soldiers with
fatal certainty; numbers of them were carried from Jugdispore to Arrah,
towards the close of the month—prostrated by sickness, wounds, fatigue
from jungle fighting, and sun-stroke.
Somewhat further to the north, in the Goruckpore district, another group
of rebels continued to harass the country, disturbing the operations of
peaceful planters and traders. About the end of May, the rebel leader
Mahomed Hussein, with four thousand men, suddenly made an attack upon
the Rajah of Bansee, one of those who had remained faithful to the
British government. The rajah was obliged to flee to a stronghold in a
neighbouring jungle; and then his palace, with the town of Bansee, were
plundered by the rebels. Mr Wingfield, the commissioner of Goruckpore,
immediately started forth with two hundred and fifty Europeans and some
guns to the relief of the rajah, whom he found besieged in his
stronghold. The enemy fled precipitately on hearing of Wingfield’s
approach, notwithstanding the immense disparity of force. The energetic
commissioner then proceeded with the rajah to attack some rebel
villages; while a simultaneous advance was made on Amood by Colonel
Rowcroft. The object of these demonstrations was to keep the rebels in
check until the rains set in, and the waters of the Gogra rose. Towards
the end of the month, four Europeans came into Goruckpore from a
neighbouring station, where they had been suddenly attacked by a body of
rabble under one Baboo Surdoun Singh, and other leaders. This was one
among many evidences of a still disturbed condition of the Goruckpore
district. The district was in a slight degree protected by the passage
of a body of troops who, though retiring rather than fighting, exerted
some kind of influence on the evildoer of the country. We speak of the
Goorkhas of Jung Bahadoor’s Nepaulese contingent. These troops retreated
slowly from Oude towards their own country, neither receiving nor giving
satisfaction from their late share in the warlike operations. After a
sojourn of some time at Goruckpore, they resumed their march on the 17th
of May, proceeding by brigades, and consuming much time in arranging and
dragging their enormous supply of vehicles. They crossed the river
Gunduck at Bagaha, with much difficulty. A distance of about thirty
miles then brought them to Bettiah, and fourteen more to Segowlie—very
near the frontier of the British dominions. It was early in the
following month when the Goorkhas finally reached their native country,
Nepaul—their leader Jung Bahadoor being, though still faithful as an
ally, somewhat dissatisfied by his failure in obtaining notable
advantage from the governor-general in return for services rendered.
Viscount Canning had, many months earlier, received fierce newspaper
abuse for not having availed himself more promptly of aid offered by
Jung Bahadoor; but there now appeared much probability that caution had
been all along necessary in dealing with this ambitious chieftain.
Directing attention next to the region of the Jumna and the Upper
Ganges, we have to notice the continuance of insubordination around the
Allahabad region, almost in the very presence of the governor-general
himself, who still remained, with his staff, in that station. One of the
most vexing symptoms of mischief at this place was the occurrence of
incendiarism—the burning of buildings by miscreants who could not be
discovered. On the 24th of May a new range of barracks was found to be
on fire, and six bungalows were completely destroyed. The prevalence of
a fierce wind, and the scarcity of water, frustrated for some time all
attempts to extinguish the flames. One poor invalid soldier was burned
to death, and many others injured. Beyond the limits of the city itself,
it was a state of things very unexpected by the supreme authorities,
that the road from Allahabad through Futtehpoor to Cawnpore—a road more
traversed than any other by British troops throughout twelve months of
anarchy—should in the middle of May be scarcely passable without a
strong escort. Yet such was the case. The opposition to the British raj,
though it had assumed a guerrilla character, was very harassing to deal
with. The British were strong in a few places; but the rebels were in
numerous small bodies, scattered all over the surrounding country; and
these bodies occasioned temporary panics at spots where there was no
force to meet them. The thorough knowledge of the country, possessed by
some of the leaders, enabled them to baffle the pursuers; and thus it
arose that these petty bands occasioned alarms disproportionate to the
number of men comprising them. Sometimes they would occupy the great
trunk-road, between Allahabad and Cawnpore, and close up all means of
transit unless attacked and driven away by force. On the other hand,
this district exhibited a remarkable union of the new with the old, the
European with the oriental, the practical with the primitive—arising out
of the opening of a railway through a part of the route. After reading,
as we so often have in this volume, of toilsome marches by sunburnt and
exhausted troops over rough roads and through jungle-thickets, it is
with a peculiar feeling of interest that we find an announcement to the
effect, that ‘on the 26th of May a special train left Allahabad with a
party of Sikhs to reinforce Futtehpoor, which was said to be threatened
by a large force of the enemy.’ Had this railway been opened when or
soon after the Revolt began, there is at least a fair probability that
the Cawnpore massacre might have been prevented—provided always that the
railway itself, with its locomotives and carriages, were _not in rebels’
hands_.
Allahabad, about the period now under notice, was made the subject of a
very important project, one of many arising out of the mutiny. The
Indian government had long and fully considered the various advantages
likely to be derived from the founding of a great Anglo-Indian capital
at some spot far removed from the three older presidential cities of
Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The spot selected was Allahabad. The
peculiarities of this very important station, before and during the
mutiny, have been frequently noticed in past chapters. Occupying the
point of the peninsula formed by the junction of the two grand rivers
Ganges and Jumna, Allahabad is scarcely paralleled for situation by any
other city in India. The one river brings down to it a stream of traffic
from Kumaon, Rohilcund, Furruckabad, Cawnpore, Futtehpoor, and the
southwestern districts of Oude; while the other brings down that from
Kurnaul, Roorkee, Meerut, Delhi, Muttra, Agra, Calpee, and a wide range
of country in Rajpootana, Bundelcund, and the Doab. On the other sides,
too, it has an extraordinary number of large military and commercial
towns within easy reach (in peaceful times), such as Lucknow, Fyzabad,
Sultanpore, Goruckpore, Azimghur, Jounpoor, Benares, Ghazeepore,
Mirzapore, Dinapoor, and Patna. Agra was at one time intended to have
been converted into a presidential city, the capital of an Agra
presidency; but the intention was not fully carried out; the Northwest
Provinces were formed into a lieutenant-governorship, with Agra as the
seat of government; but the events of the mutiny shewed the necessity of
holding with a strong hand the position of Allahabad, as a centre of
great influence; and Agra began to fall in relative importance.
[Illustration:
FYZABAD.
]
It has been remarked that England has seldom built cities as a nation,
as a government; cities have _grown_, like the constitution, without
those preconceived theories of centralised organisation which are so
prevalent on the continent of Europe. It has been much the same in India
as in England. The three presidential capitals—Calcutta, Madras, and
Bombay—became what they are, not from the development of a plan, but
from a series of incidents having little relative connection. ‘Our three
capitals are congeries of houses, without order, or beauty, or
healthiness other than nature may have supplied. Our cantonments, which
sometimes grow into cities, are generally stuck down in a plain as a
kind of petrified encampment. Even when founding, as in Rangoon, it is
with the utmost difficulty we can compel successive governors to care
whether the original plan be not set aside.’ A problem arose whether
Allahabad might not be an exception to this rule. Standing at the
extreme end of the Doab, and bounded by two fine rivers on the north,
south, and east, it is susceptible of any degree of enlargement by
including additional ground on the west; it might be made one of the
strongest forts in India; and its rivers, aided by the railway when
finished, might make it a great centre of trade. Most of the conditions,
therefore, were favourable to the building of a fine Anglo-Indian city
on that spot. The river frontages, it is easily seen, might easily be
defended against any attacks which orientals could bring against them.
On the west or land side, it was proposed to construct a line of
intrenchment, or a sort of intrenched camp, four miles in length, from
river to river. This fortification would consist mainly of two great
redoubts on the river-banks, each capable of holding an entire regiment,
but each defensible by a small force if necessary. With these two
redoubts, and one midway between them, and earthern embankments to
connect the three, it would be possible to render Allahabad impregnable
to any hostile force likely to be brought against it. Within the space
thus marked out by the embankment and the rivers would be included a
cantonment, a European town, and a native town. The cantonment, a
complete military establishment for four or five regiments, would be
near the western boundary, on the Jumna side. Eastward of this would be
the new English town, built in plots of ground let on lease to builders
(native or European), who would be required, in building houses, shops,
and hotels, to conform to some general plan, having reference to the
railway station as a centre of trade. Nearer the Ganges would be the
native town; while at the point of junction of the two rivers would be
the existing fort, extended and enlarged so as to form if needed a last
stronghold for all the Europeans in Allahabad. Many of the details in
the plan were suggested during a period of panic fear, when the natives
were looked upon as if they were permanently bitter enemies; and, during
the long course of years necessary for working out the idea, great
modification in these details might be expected; but the general
character of the scheme, as developed about the period to which this
chapter relates, may be understood from the above brief sketch.
It was on the 5th of May that a notification appeared at Allahabad,
signed by Mr Thornhill, officiating commissioner under the
governor-general, concerning the leasing of land in that city for
building purposes. The terms were evidently framed with the intention of
attracting the notice of commercial firms, at Calcutta and elsewhere, to
Allahabad as a future emporium of commerce. The regulations may be
summarily noticed as follow: A new civil European town to be formed near
the railway station at Allahabad, distinct from the cantonment, the
native town, and the fort. Land, in plots of three acres each, to be let
on lease by the government, for the erection of shops, hotels,
warehouses, and other buildings requisite for a European population.
Each plot to have a frontage of three hundred feet on a public road,
with a smaller road in the rear. Some of the plots to be let for
dwelling-houses; and these, as well as the hotels and shops, to receive
a certain systematic arrangement, laid down by the authorities for the
general convenience of the whole community. Priority of choice to be
given to those who intend to construct hotels, on account of the great
necessity for that species of accommodation in a newly collected
community. Plots, competed for by two or more persons, to be sold by
auction to the highest bidder. The lease to be for fifty years, unless a
shorter time be specified by agreement; and the lessee to have the
privilege of renewal, under approval as to conditions, but not with any
rise of rental. The rent to be thirty rupees (about £3) per acre per
annum. Leases to be transferable, and sub-letting to be permitted, on
payment of a registration fee; provided the transferree or sublessee
enter into an engagement to fulfil the necessary conditions to the
government. Every lessee to specify the kind of structures he intends to
build on his plot; to commence building within one year after obtaining
the lease; and to finish in three years—on forfeiture both of the lease
and of a money penalty, if the building fail in kind, value, or time.
Lessees to be subject to such rates and taxes as may be imposed for
municipal purposes, and to all regulations of police and conservancy.
Lessees to be placed under stringent rules, concerning the employment of
thatch or other inflammable materials for the roofs of buildings. As a
general rule, one plot to one lessee; but if a special application be
made, and supported on sufficient grounds, two or more plots to be
leased together.—Such were the general regulations. At the time of
issuing the order, there were about forty plots set out as a
commencement to the system.
The turbulent province of Oude next calls for attention; and as Sir
Colin Campbell’s operations bore almost equal reference to Oude and
Rohilcund, we will treat both provinces together.
It will be remembered, from the details given in the last chapter, that
after the great conquest of Lucknow in March, a considerable time
elapsed before any effective attempts were made to overtake and defeat
the rebels who had escaped from that city. A few troopers and a few guns
were, it is true, sent in pursuit, but with no resources for a long
series of marchings and encampings. We have seen that Brigadier John
Jones, with the Roorkee field-force, about three thousand strong—H.M.
60th Rifles, 1st Sikh infantry, Coke’s Rifles, 17th Punjaub infantry,
the Moultan Horse, and detachments of artillery and engineers—advanced
into the heart of Rohilcund from the northwest, while Sir Colin Campbell
and General Walpole operated from the Oude or southeastern side: the
object being to hem in such of the rebels as had assembled in any force
in Rohilcund. Recapitulating the narrative in a few words, we may remind
the reader that Jones started from Roorkee on the 15th of the month;
crossed the Ganges on the 17th; defeated a body of rebels at Nagul on
the same day; and advanced during the next four days steadily on the
road to Mooradabad. On the 22d, he fought and won the battle of Nageena;
on the 23d, at Noorpoor, he struck into the high road from
Mozuffernugger to Mooradabad, with a view of protecting one of the ghâts
or ferries of the Ganges; on the 24th, he reached Chujlite, where he
learned that Feroze Shah, one of the numerous princes of the House of
Delhi, had taken and entered Mooradabad two days before; and on the 25th
he reached that town, which had been hastily evacuated by Feroze Shah on
the news of Jones’s approach. Encamping outside the town, Jones ordered
Lieutenant-colonel (formerly Major) Coke, who commanded the infantry
portion of his force, to march into Mooradabad, and make a diligent
search for a number of rebel chieftains believed to be hidden there.
This search was attended with unexpected success. Coke placed parties of
the Moultan cavalry at all the outlets of the city, to prevent escapes,
and then he attacked and searched all the houses in which rebel
chieftains were believed to be concealed. The capture of one of them was
marked by a daring act of intrepidity on the part of an English officer.
Nawab Mujjoo Khan, the chief of the rebels hereabouts, had caused
himself to be proclaimed Nawab of Mooradabad, and had instigated the
people to murder and plunder the Europeans in the place, many months
earlier. To capture this villain was a point of some importance. Coke
proceeded to the Nawab’s house with two guns, a party of Sappers, and
the 1st Punjaub infantry. The soldiers of the Nawab’s guard making a
stout resistance, many of them were shot down, including the son and
nephew of the Nawab. Lieutenant Angelo then burst open the door of the
room in which the Nawab and another of his sons were concealed, and
captured them. While so occupied, he was fired upon by some of the
Nawab’s guard, from an upper room; whereupon he rushed up stairs, burst
open the door, entered the room single-handed, and shot three men in
succession with his revolver; some of his troops then coming up, he
captured the rest of the guard. In short, the search was thoroughly
successful. The names and titles of twenty-one rebel chieftains
captured, containing many repetitions of Khan, Sheik, Ali, Hossein, Beg,
and Shah, shewed that these evildoers were mostly Mohammedans—the
Hindoos of Rohilcund having been much less extensively involved in
rebellion. While Jones was thus operating in the northwest, Walpole was
engaged, though less successfully, in the southeast. He started on the
9th from Lucknow, with the ‘Rohilcund Field-force,’ five thousand
strong; received a mortifying discomfiture on the 14th at Fort Rhodamow,
rendered more distressing by the death of Brigadier Adrian Hope;
defeated the rebels at Sirsa on the 22d; and crossed the Ramgunga at
Allygunje on the 23d. The commander-in-chief himself left Lucknow about
the middle of the month; started from Cawnpore at the head of a small
column on the 18th; advanced to Kilianpore, Poorah, Urrowl,
Meerun-ke-serai, Gosaigunje, and Kamalgunje between that date and the
24th; entered Furruckabad and Futteghur on the 25th; crossed the Ganges
on the 26th and 27th; joined Walpole’s field-force on the banks of the
Ramgunga on the 28th; marched to Kanth on the 29th; and reached
Shahjehanpoor on the 30th, in force sufficient to retake that city, but
not in time to capture the rebel Moulvie of Fyzabad, who escaped to work
mischief elsewhere.—We thus call to mind that, at the end of April,
Campbell and Walpole had advanced from the southeast as far as
Shahjehanpoor; while Jones had advanced from the northwest to
Mooradabad—the two forces being separated by the city of Bareilly, and a
wide expanse of intervening country. About the same time General Penny
was planning a march with a third column towards a point between
Bareilly and Shahjehanpoor, after crossing the Ganges at Nudowlee; he
was to march through the Budayoon district, and to unite his column with
Sir Colin’s main force at Meeranpore Kutra, six marches distant from
Futteghur. Bareilly, the chief city of Rohilcund Proper, became the
point to which the attention of the commanders of all three forces were
directed. We have now to see to what result these combinations led in
the following month.
On the 2d of May the Rohilcund field-force, of which Sir Colin Campbell
now assumed the command in person, started from Shahjehanpoor, to
commence operations against Bareilly. A small force was left behind for
the defence of Shahjehanpoor, comprising one wing of the 82d foot, De
Kantzow’s Irregular Horse, four guns, and a few artillerymen and
sappers, under Colonel Hall. What befel this small force will presently
appear. Sir Colin marched on the 2d to Tilmul, over a fertile flat
country, diversified with topes of trees, but nearly overwhelmed with
dust, and inhabited by villagers who were thrown into great doubt by the
approach of what they feared might be a hostile force. On the 3d he
advanced from Tilmul to Futtehgunje; where he was joined by the force
which General Penny had undertaken to bring into Rohilcund from the
west.
At this point it is desirable, before tracing the further operations of
the commander-in-chief, to notice the course of events which led to the
death of General Penny. Being at Nerowlee, on the 29th of April, and
believing that the rebels were in some force at the town of Oosait,
Penny set out with a column for service in that direction. This column
consisted of something under 1500 men: namely, 200 Carabiniers, 350 H.M.
64th, 250 Moultan Horse, 360 Belooch 1st battalion, 300 Punjaub 2d
infantry, a heavy field-battery, and a light field-battery with four
guns. The column left Nerowlee about nine in the evening; but various
delays prevented Penny from reaching Oosait, seven miles distant, until
midnight. It then appeared that the enemy had retired from Oosait, and,
as native rumour said, had retreated to Datagunje. The column advanced
deliberately, under the impression that no enemy was near; but when
arrived at Kukerowlee, it suddenly fell into an ambuscade. From the
language used by Colonel Jones of the Carabiniers, whose lot it was to
write the official account of this affair, it is evident that General
Penny had been remiss in precautionary measures; he shared the belief of
Mr Wilson, a political resident who accompanied him, that no enemy was
near, and under the influence of this belief he relaxed the systematic
order of march which had been maintained until Oosait was reached. ‘From
this point,’ we are told, ‘military precautions were somewhat neglected,
the mounted portion of the column being allowed very considerably to
outmarch the infantry; and eventually, though an advanced-guard was kept
up, it was held back immediately in front of the artillery.’ Penny with
his staff, and Mr Wilson, were riding at the head of the advanced-guard;
when at four o’clock, near Kukerowlee, they came into the midst of a
wholly unexpected body of the enemy; who poured out grape and round shot
at not more than forty yards’ distance, charged down from the left with
horsemen, and opened fire with musketry in front. One of the first who
fell was General Penny, brought low by grape-shot. Colonel H. R. Jones,
who now took the command, made the best arrangements he could to meet
the emergency. The four guns of the light field-battery were quickly
ordered up to the front, and the cavalry were brought forward ready for
a charge. There were, however, many difficulties to contend against. The
enemy’s right occupied a mass of sand-hills; their left was protected by
thick groves of trees; the town of Kukerowlee was in their rear to fall
back upon; and the dimness of the light rendered it impossible rightly
to judge the number and position of the rebels. Under these
circumstances, Colonel Jones deemed it best merely to hold his ground
until daylight should suggest the most fitting course of procedure, and
until the infantry should have arrived. When the 64th came up with the
cavalry and artillery which Penny had imprudently allowed to go so far
ahead, Colonel Bingham at once charged the enemy in front, and drove
them into the town. This done, Jones ordered the artillery to shell the
town; this completely paralysed the rebels, who soon began to escape
from the opposite side. Hereupon Jones sent his cavalry in pursuit; many
of the enemy were cut up, and one gun taken; but it was not deemed
prudent to continue this pursuit to any great distance, in a district
imperfectly known. This battle of Kukerowlee was thus, like nearly all
the battles, won by the British; and had it not been for the unfortunate
want of foresight on the part of General Penny, he might have been
spared to write the dispatch which described it. He was the only officer
killed. Those wounded were Captains Forster and Betty, Lieutenants
Eckford, Davies, and Graham. Eckford’s escape from death was very
extraordinary. The first fire opened by the rebels shot his horse from
under him; he then mounted an artillery-horse; a party of
Ghazees—fanatics who have sworn to die for their ‘deen’ or
faith—attacked him, wounded him, and stabbed his horse; Eckford fell
off; and a Ghazee gave him a tremendous cut over the back of the right
shoulder, and left him for dead; Surgeon Jones came up, and helped the
wounded lieutenant along; but the enemy pursuing, Eckford was made to
lie down flat on his face as if dead; the enemy passed on without
noticing him, and he was afterwards rescued by some of his companions.
Three days after this encounter with the rebels, Colonel Jones succeeded
in bringing poor Penny’s column into safe junction with Sir Colin’s
force at Futtehgunje—the mutineers and ruffians from the district of
Budayoon retiring before him, and swelling the mass of insurgents at
Bareilly.
While this was doing, another Jones was marching through Rohilcund in a
different direction. It is necessary to avoid confusion in this matter,
by bearing in mind that Brigadier John Jones commanded the ‘Roorkee
field-force;’ while Colonel H. R. Jones held the temporary command of
the column lately headed by General Penny. The brigadier, in pursuance
of a plan laid down by Sir Colin, directed his march so that both might
reach Bareilly on the same day, the one from Mooradabad and the other
from Shahjehanpoor. While on his march, Jones expected to come up with
the rebels at Meergunje, a place within a few miles of Bareilly. He
found, however, that after constructing two batteries at the first-named
place, they had apparently misdoubted their safety, and retreated to
Bareilly. Cavalry, sent on in pursuit, overtook the rear of the rebels,
cut down great numbers of them, and captured two guns. At an early hour
on the 6th, the brigadier with his force arrived within a mile and a
half of a bridge contiguous to Bareilly, known as Bahadoor Singh’s
bridge. His reconnoitring party was fired upon. A skirmish at once
ensued, which lasted three hours, and ended in the capture of the
bridge; the rebels were driven back with great slaughter into Bareilly.
Just as Jones reached the margin of the city, he heard a cannonading
which denoted the arrival of the commander-in-chief from the opposite
direction.
Having thus noticed the coalescence of the forces under the two Joneses,
we shall be prepared to trace the march of Sir Colin Campbell towards
the common centre to which the attention of all was now directed.
After being reinforced at Futtehgunje by the column recently under the
command of Penny, Sir Colin resumed his march on the 3d of May. As he
advanced, he received news that the rebels were in much disorder.
Several of the chiefs had left them; and Nena Sahib, a coward
throughout, had sought safety by fleeing towards the border-region
between Oude and Nepaul. The main body had been some time at Fureedpore;
but when they heard of Sir Colin being at Futtehgunje they retreated to
Bareilly—thereby running into the power of another column. The
villagers, mostly Hindoos, told distressing tales of the extortions and
wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the Mohammedan chieftains,
during the twelve months that Rohilcund had been in the power of the
rebels; they made great profession of their joy at seeing the arrival of
an English army; but past experience had shewn that such profession
should be received with much qualification. Certain it was, that Sir
Colin Campbell, during his marches through Oude, the Doab, and
Rohilcund, received very little aid, and very little correct
information, from the villagers of the districts through which he
passed; they were either timid, or double-dealing, or both. In one of
his dispatches he said: ‘In spite of the assumed friendship of the
Hindoo portion of the population, I have not found it easier to obtain
information in Rohilcund, on which trust could be put, than has been the
case in dealing with the insurrection in other parts of the empire.’ On
the 4th, the commander-in-chief advanced from Futtehgunje to Fureedpore,
only one march from Bareilly. Rumours now arrived that not only Nena
Sahib, but the Delhi prince Feroze Shah, had sought safety by flight
from Bareilly; but that Khan Mahomed Khan still remained at the head of
the rebels. On this point, however, and on the number of the enemy’s
forces, no information was obtained that could be relied upon. As for
Bareilly itself, supposing no fortifications to have been thrown up by
the rebels, it could not long maintain a siege; seeing that, with the
exception of a stream with rather steep banks, there was no obstacle to
the entrance of a force from without. The city itself consisted mainly
of a street two miles long, with numerous narrow streets and lanes
branching off to the right and left; outside these streets and lanes
were large suburbs of detached houses, walled gardens, plantations, and
enclosures; and outside the suburbs were wide plains intersected by
nullahs. It was at present uncertain whether the two forces, from
Shahjehanpoor and Mooradabad, could prevent the escape of the enemy over
these lateral suburbs and plains; but such was certainly the hope and
wish of the commander-in-chief.
[Illustration:
Hindoo Fruit-girl.
]
Early in the morning of the 5th, Sir Colin left his camping-ground at
Fureedpore, and advanced towards Bareilly. After a brief halt, the
videttes detected a body of rebel cavalry in the distance; and Sir Colin
at once marshalled his forces for an attack. The whole force was
brigaded into two brigades of cavalry, under Jones and Hagart; one of
artillery, under Brind; and two of infantry, under Hay and Stisted.[172]
Without reference to the brigades, however, the order of advance was
thus arranged: the 2d Punjaub cavalry formed a line of skirmishers on
the left of the main-road; the Lahore light horse formed a similar line
on the right; while across the road, and in support of these
skirmishers, was a line formed by troops of the 9th Lancers and the 1st
Punjaub cavalry, a troop of horse-artillery, and several field-guns.
Then came the 78th Highlanders, and a body of Sappers and Engineers,
along the road; the 93d foot on the right of the road; and the 42d
Highlanders on the left. Next, supporting and flanking these, were the
79th foot, the Carabiniers, the Moultan Horse, the remainder of the 9th
Lancers and of the Punjaub cavalry, and a wing of the Belooch battalion.
Then came the siege-train and the enormous array of baggage; flanked by
the 64th foot, a wing of the 82d, the 2d Punjaub infantry, and the 4th
Punjaub rifles. Lastly came the rear-guard, comprising the 22d Punjaub
infantry, the 17th irregular cavalry, a squadron of the 5th Punjaub
cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery. As this strong force advanced,
the rebels fired a few shot from a battery set up at the entrance to
Bareilly; but they made scarcely any attempt to fortify or defend either
the stream that crossed the high road, or the bridge over the stream.
The enemy’s infantry appeared to be mostly congregated in the old
cantonment or sepoy-lines, while the cavalry were hovering about in
topes of trees. The infantry scarcely shewed; but the cavalry, aided by
horse-artillery, made demonstrations as if about to attack, in numbers
estimated at two or three thousand. This did not stay the progress of
Sir Colin, who was too strong to be affected by such an attempt.
Advancing through a suburb on one side of the city, he ordered the 42d,
the 79th, and a Sikh or Punjaub regiment, to explore a ruined mass of
one-storied houses. What followed may best be told in the language of Mr
Russell, who was with the army at the time: ‘As soon as the Sikhs got
into the houses, they were exposed to a heavy fire from a large body of
matchlockmen concealed around them. They either retired of their own
accord, or were ordered to do so; at all events, they fell back with
rapidity and disorder upon the advancing Highlanders. And now occurred a
most extraordinary scene. Among the matchlockmen, who, to the number of
seven or eight hundred, were lying behind the walls of the houses, was a
body of Ghazees or Mussulman fanatics, who, like the Roman Decii, devote
their lives with solemn oaths to their country or their faith. Uttering
loud cries, “Bismillah, Allah, deen, deen!” one hundred and thirty of
these fanatics, sword in hand, with small circular bucklers on the left
arm, and green cummerbungs, rushed out after the Sikhs, and dashed at
the left of the right wing of the Highlanders. With bodies bent and
heads low, waving their tulwars with a circular motion in the air, they
came on with astonishing rapidity. At first they were mistaken for
Sikhs, whose passage had already somewhat disordered our ranks.
Fortunately, Sir Colin Campbell was close up with the 42d; his keen,
quick eye detected the case at once. “Steady, men, steady; close up the
ranks. Bayonet them as they come on.” It was just in time; for these
madmen, furious with bang, were already among us, and a body of them
sweeping around the left of the right wing got into the rear of the
regiment. The struggle was sanguinary but short. Three of them dashed so
suddenly at Colonel Cameron that they pulled him off his horse ere he
could defend himself. His sword fell out of its sheath, and he would
have been hacked to pieces in another moment but for the gallant
promptitude of Colour-sergeant Gardiner, who, stepping out of the ranks,
drove his bayonet through two of them in the twinkling of an eye. The
third was shot by one of the 42d. Brigadier Walpole had a similar
escape; he was seized by two or three of the Ghazees, who sought to put
him off his horse, while others cut at him with their tulwars. He
received two cuts on the hand, but he was delivered from the enemy by
the quick bayonets of the 42d. In a few minutes the dead bodies of one
hundred and thirty-three of these Ghazees, and some eighteen or twenty
wounded men of ours, were all the tokens left of the struggle.’
Sir Colin had not yet reached Bareilly. The little skirmishing that had
occurred was in one of the suburbs. The enemy’s cavalry, though
powerless for any serious attack, succeeded in creating, by a dash
across the plain towards the baggage, an indescribable amount of alarm
among the camp-followers, bazaar-traders, horses, camels, bullocks, and
elephants. There was not much real fighting throughout the day; but the
heat was so intense, the poor soldiers suffered so much from thirst, so
many were brought low by sun-stroke, and all were so fatigued, that Sir
Colin resolved to bivouac on the plain for the night, postponing till
the next day an advance into, and the capture of, the city of Bareilly.
Whether this delay on the road to victory was sound or not in a military
sense, it afforded the enemy an opportunity to escape, which they did
not fail to take advantage of. On the morning of the 6th, it was
ascertained that many of the leaders, and a large body of rebel troops,
had quietly left the place. Guns were brought to bear upon certain
buildings in the city, known or suspected to be full of insurgents; and
it was while this cannonade was in progress that Sir Colin became aware
of the arrival of Brigadier Jones, already adverted to. On the 7th the
two forces advanced into the city, and took complete possession of it,
but without capturing any of the leaders, or preventing the escape of
the main body of rebels. A large quantity of artillery, mostly of recent
native manufacture, fell into the hands of the victors, together with a
great store of shell, shot, and powder, for the manufacture of which,
materials and machinery had been provided by the rebels.