DISCUSSIONS ON REBEL PUNISHMENTS.
Before entering on the military struggles that marked the month of
April, it may be desirable to notice the phases of public feeling
concerning the amount of punishment due to the mutineers and rebels in
India. The discussions on this subject undoubtedly influenced the course
of proceeding adopted both by the military and the civil authorities;
although it may not be possible to measure the exact amount of that
influence, or the exact date at which it was felt. Some of the
proceedings of Viscount Canning at Calcutta, in reference to this
matter, belonged to the month of March; some of the discussions in the
imperial parliament, and at the India House, bearing on Canning’s line
of policy, belonged to later months; but it will be useful to give a
rapid sketch, in this place, of the nature of the discussion generally,
and of the remarkable tone given to it by party politics in England. All
reference to the debates concerning the reorganisation of the Indian
government, whether at home or in India itself, may more fittingly be
postponed to a later chapter.
Almost from the first, a large portion of the Anglo-Indian population
cried aloud for most summary and sanguinary vengeance on rebels and
mutineers of all kinds, Mohammedan and Hindoo, towns-people and country
peasants. General Neill was idolised for a time by this class—not so
much because he was a gallant soldier and a skilful commander, as
because he was supposed to be terribly severe in his treatment of
insurgents. This matter has been adverted to in former pages, as well as
the torrents of abuse that were poured upon the governor-general for
‘clemency’—a word used in a mocking and bitter spirit. Many of the
censors afterwards joined the ranks of those who abused the same
governor-general for a policy supposed to be antagonistic to that of
‘clemency.’ The fact is again mentioned here, owing to its connection
with a controversy that gave rise to formidable parliamentary struggles
many months afterwards. The proceedings of four different bodies—the
Calcutta government, the Board of Control, the Houses of Parliament, and
the Court of Directors—must be briefly noticed to shew the course of
this controversy.
At first, when the mutiny was still in its earlier stages, the friends
and relations of those who had suffered barbarous treatment at the hands
of the natives gave utterance to a wild demand for vengeance, springing
not unnaturally from an excited state of feeling. The following, from
one of the Calcutta journals, is a fair example of this kind of writing
in its milder form: ‘Not the least amongst the thousand evils which will
follow in the track of the rebellion is the indurating effect it will
have upon the feelings of our countrywomen when the struggle is over.
There are many hundreds of English ladies who lie down nightly to dream
of horrors too great for utterance; who scarcely converse except upon
one dreadful subject; and who would be found almost as willing as their
husbands and fathers to go out and do battle with the mutineers, _if
they could only insure the infliction of deep and thorough vengeance_.
It is a contest with murderers who are not satisfied with their life’s
blood, that they have to expect daily. Their very servants are perhaps
in league to destroy them. They suffer almost hourly worse than the
pains of death. Many have already died by homicidal hands; but more from
the pangs of starvation and travel, from the agonies of terror, and the
slow process of exhaustion. _And all this while friends and relatives
sigh vainly for the coming of the day of retribution._’ The italicised
passages shew only a very moderate use of the words ‘vengeance’ and
‘retribution,’ but may suffice to indicate the feeling here adverted to.
The Calcutta government, as has been duly recorded in the proper
chapters, from time to time issued orders and proclamations relating to
the treatment which the mutineers were to receive, or which was to be
meted out to non-military natives who should shew signs of
insubordination. There was, as one instance, the line of policy
contested between Mr Colvin and Lord Canning. The former issued, or
intended to issue, a proclamation to the mutineers of the Northwest
Provinces, in which, among other things, he promised that ‘soldiers
engaged in the late disturbances, who are desirous of going to their own
homes, and who give up their arms at the nearest government civil or
military post, and retire quietly, shall be permitted to do so
unmolested;’ whereas Lord Canning insisted that this indulgence or
leniency should not be extended to any regiments which had murdered or
ill-used their officers, or committed cruel outrages on other persons.
Then there were several orders and statutes proclaiming martial law in
the disturbed districts; appointing commissioners to try mutineers by a
very summary process; authorising military officers to deal with rebel
towns-people as well as with revolted sepoys; enabling the police to
arrest suspected persons without the formality of a warrant; making
zemindars and landowners responsible for the surrendering of any
ill-doers on their estates; and other measures of a similar kind. When,
in the month of July, Viscount Canning found it needful to check the
over-zeal of some of the tribunals at Allahabad, who were prone to hang
accused persons without sufficient evidence of their guilt, he was
accused of interference with the righteous demand for blood. It is true,
that these were, in the first instance, merely newspaper accusations;
but as the English public looked to newspapers for the chief part of
their information concerning India, these controversies gave rise to a
very unhealthy excitement; and weeks, or even months, often passed
before the truth could be known—as was strikingly evidenced in the case
of the lieutenant-governor of the Central Provinces, whose supposed
‘clemency’ (in a matter of which, as soon appeared, he knew absolutely
nothing) was held over him as a reproach for nearly four months. In
September appeared a proclamation at Agra, warning the natives of the
possible consequences of any complicity on their parts in the
proceedings of the mutineers. Part of the proclamation ran as follows:
‘The government of these provinces calls on all landowners and farmers,
with their tenantry, and on all well-disposed subjects, to give all
possible assistance to the authorities in bringing those outcasts
(mutineers and rebels) to justice. Landowners and farmers of land,
especially, are reminded of the terms of their engagement not to harbour
or countenance criminals and evil-disposed persons. The government
requires proofs of the fidelity and loyalty of all classes of its
subjects, in recovering the arms, elephants, horses, camels, and other
government property, which have been feloniously taken by the offenders.
All persons are warned against purchasing or bartering for any such
property of the state under the severest penalties; and rewards will be
paid to those who, immediately on obtaining possession of the same,
bring them to the nearest civil or military station.’
So far as concerns the imperial parliament, little took place during the
year 1857 touching on the subject of the present chapter. The opposition
party sought to shew that her Majesty’s ministers were responsible for
the outbreak; some members of both Houses broached their views
concerning the causes of the mutiny; others criticised the mode in which
troops were sent to India; some condemned, others defended, Viscount
Canning; many put forth suggestions concerning the future government of
India; many more sought to overwhelm with guilt the East India Company;
while missionaries, civil servants, Indian judges, aristocratic
officers, favoured commanders, were made subjects of frequent and warm
debate—but the members of the legislature generally held aloof from that
excessive demand for a sanguinary policy towards the insurgents, so much
dwelt on by many of the Anglo-Indians. After passing an act, containing
among other provisions clauses relating to ‘The Punishment of Mutiny and
Desertion of Officers and Soldiers in the Service of the East India
Company,’ parliament was prorogued on the 28th of August. During the
recess, the press was busy on those accusations and reclamations already
adverted to—in turn correcting, and corrected by, the official documents
which from time to time appeared. Commercial troubles having agitated
the country during the autumn, parliament met again on the 3d of
December, for a short session before Christmas. Although the purpose of
meeting was prescribed and limited, the members of the legislature did
not deem it necessary or desirable to remain silent on a subject so
uppermost in men’s thoughts as the mutiny in India. Speeches were made,
motions brought forward, explanations given, and returns ordered, on the
state of the army, the mode of sending over troops, the conduct of the
government, and various other matters bearing on the struggle in the
East. The speech from the throne contained many allusions to that
struggle, but none that bore on the mode of punishing the rebels. The
Earl of Derby, in a speech on the opening-night, sought to discourage
the cry for vengeance raised in many quarters. After urging that England
should deal with the mutineers in justice and not in revenge, he added:
‘For every man taken with arms in his hands there ought to be a
righteous punishment, and that punishment death. For those miscreants
who have perpetrated unmentionable and unimaginable atrocities upon
women, death is too mild a sentence. On them should be inflicted the
heavier punishment—a life embittered by corporal punishment in the first
instance, and afterwards doomed to the most degrading slavery. Be they
Brahmins of the highest caste, they should be forced to undergo the
lowest, most degrading, most hopeless slavery. But, while he would take
this course, he earnestly deprecated the extension of a feeling of
hostility to the whole native population. From letters which he had
seen, he feared that every white man in India who had suffered in any
way by the mutiny came to regard every man with a black face as his
enemy. Now, that was a feeling which should be restrained, if not by
Christianity, at least by motives of sound policy. Measures should be
taken to convince the natives that the English are their masters; but
they must also be convinced that the English are their benefactors. We
should not try to govern India by the sword alone.’ This sentiment was
also well expressed by Mr Mangles, chairman of the East India Company,
at the Haileybury examination on the 7th of December. Addressing the
assembled professors, prizemen, students, and Company’s officers
present, he adverted to the sudden rupture of friendly relations in
India, and added: ‘For many years to come, there must exist strong
mistrust and suspicion, if not more bitter feelings, between those who
rule and those who are subject. It is impossible that it should be
otherwise, after the scenes which have been passed through, the
treacheries and murders—and worse than murders—that have been rife
throughout the land. But, gentlemen, you are bound to struggle with
those feelings and subdue them. It will be your duty to remember that
only a small part, an infinitesimal part, of the population of India
have been engaged in these frightful and scandalous outrages.’ [Here
many striking instances of fidelity were brought to notice.] ‘It would
therefore be most unjust to bring the charge of treachery against the
whole people of India. It will be your duty, under these circumstances,
to struggle against the suspicion and distrust which have been
engendered by recent events, and to endeavour to win the affections of
the people over whom you are called upon to exercise power. If we cannot
govern India in that way, we ought to give up the country and come
away.’
When parliament met for the usual session, in February, a question was
put by the Earl of Ellenborough, concerning the policy intended to be
pursued towards the rebels. Adverting to a rumour of some very wholesale
series of military executions in Central India, he said: ‘Without
questioning the justice of the sentence in that particular case, he
doubted if capital punishment was so efficacious as a severe flogging.
The natives were not afraid of death, but shrank from corporal pain.
Besides, it is quite impossible to hang all the mutineers, and the
continued exhibition of unrelenting severity must inevitably create a
blood-feud between the natives and their European masters.’ Earl
Granville, on the part of the government, replied that no particular
instructions had been sent out to Viscount Canning on this matter,
because the utmost reliance was placed on the justice and firmness of
that nobleman: he added, that he agreed in the opinion that the frequent
spectacle of capital punishment must have the worst possible effect; and
he concluded by stating that the governor-general was directing his
thoughts towards the possibility of transporting some of the evildoers
to the Andaman Islands.
Now occurred a change in political matters which threw Indian
discussions into a new channel. Hitherto, the subject of the punishment
of mutineers had been discussed in parliament with reference rather to
persons than to property. The ministry, however, having been changed on
grounds quite irrespective of Indian affairs, and the Earl of Derby
having succeeded Viscount Palmerston as premier, India was dragged into
the consequences of this change. The Earl of Ellenborough, admitted on
all hands to be a well-informed statesman on Indian matters, however
opinions might differ concerning his temper and prudence, was appointed
president of the Board of Control. When governor-general of India, many
years earlier, he had been in frequent collision with the East India
Company, as represented both by the Court of Directors and by the
Calcutta government; and it was thought probable that his new assumption
of authority in Indian affairs would be marked by something notable and
important. It was so. The singular termination of his ministerial career
was closely and immediately connected with the subject to which this
chapter relates, in a way that may now be briefly narrated.
At first this question of punishment had to be discussed by the new
government in the same manner as before—that is, in relation to the
sanguinary vengeance advocated by many writers of letters and newspaper
articles, especially at Calcutta. On the 18th of March, Mr Rich moved in
the House of Commons for the production of certain papers which he
expected would throw light on this matter, he contended that the conduct
of the army, in the punishment of the insurgents, was merciless and
cruel. He intimated the necessity of requiring the authorities in India
to act strictly up to the instructions of Lord Canning, who, he thought,
deserved honour for his firmness and humanity. The Calcutta journals, he
asserted, recommended that Oude should be made one wide slaughter-house,
in which extermination should be the rule rather than the exception; and
it was but right that the government should at once check this terrible
feeling of sanguinary animosity. Most of the speakers in the debate that
followed agreed in the view taken by Mr Rich; and more than one of them
broached the doctrine that the insurgents in Oude ought not to be
treated like rebel sepoys—seeing that, whether wisely or unwisely, they
were fighting for what they deemed national independence.
During the first half of the month of April, nothing occurred in
parliament involving any very great collision of opinions on this
particular subject; but towards the close of the month a clashing of
views on Oude affairs became manifest to the public. Throughout the
first ten months of the mutiny, while Viscount Palmerston was at the
head of affairs, the opposition party, in both Houses of Parliament,
frequently appeared as advocates for the deposed royal family of Oude,
dwelling on the injustice involved in the deposition. Much of this
advocacy may have been sincere, but much also was mere special pleading;
for the speakers well knew that, if in office, they would not and could
not seek to undo what had been done. No sooner did a change of ministry
take place, than the new occupants of office became much more cautious
in denouncing the ‘annexation of Oude;’ seeing that, if an iniquity at
all, it was one in which the Marquis of Dalhousie, the Calcutta
government, the Court of Directors, the Crown, and both Houses of
Parliament, were all implicated. Every one now saw that the practical
question before the country was—not the rights or wrongs of the
annexation—but the treatment of insurgents engaged in the warlike
struggle. It became known that the Secret Committee of the Court of
Directors had sent a letter to the governor-general in council, dated
the 24th of March, relating to the treatment which it was desirable that
rebels and mutineers should receive. So peculiar and anomalous were the
functions of this Secret Committee, that although nominally belonging to
the Court of Directors, it was little other than the mouthpiece of the
president of the Board of Control. The letter was really from the Earl
of Ellenborough, rather than from any one else.
Before pursuing this narrative, it may be well to say a few words
concerning the organisation and functions of this Secret Committee—one
of the many anomalies connected with our government of India. Mr Arthur
Mills (_India in 1858_) described the relation between the Secret
Committee, the Court of Directors, and the Board of Control, in the
following terms: ‘The Court of Directors meets weekly at the East India
House for the transaction of business, the ordinary details of which are
discharged by three committees—1. Finance and home; 2. Political and
military; 3. Revenue, judicial, and legislative. There is also a “Secret
Committee,” with peculiar functions altogether different from those of
the three ordinary committees. The office of the Secret Committee is
purely ministerial. It receives from India all dispatches on matters
with respect to which secrecy is deemed important—including those which
relate to war, peace, or negotiations with native powers or states
within the limits of the charter, or other states or princes; and
forwards such dispatches to the Board of Control. The Secret Committee
also transmits to India, after signature, dispatches prepared by that
Board, which it is bound to do, under oath, “without disclosing the
same.” The Secret Committee is composed, as prescribed by act of
parliament, of three directors. The court may elect whom they please;
but the chairman, deputy-chairman, and senior member of the court, are
almost invariably appointed. The papers of the Secret Committee are in
charge of the examiner at the East India House, who is clerk to the
committee.... There is also a secret department in the Board of Control,
for the purpose of carrying on written and oral communications with the
Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. The oral communications are
for the most part carried on through the president personally; in the
written communications he is assisted by a senior clerk, and
occasionally by the secretaries of the Board. On the arrival of secret
dispatches from India, the copy intended for the Board is sent to the
senior clerk in the secret department, who prepares a _précis_ of all
the letters and enclosures, which he lays before the president; who
thereupon gives him instructions, oral or written, for the preparation
of an answer, or sometimes drafts one himself. It is then copied in
official form, and transmitted to the Secret Committee of the East India
House.’
The secret dispatch, produced by the authority here described, began by
expressing a hope[157] that, as soon as Lucknow should fall before the
conquering arm of Sir Colin Campbell, the governor-general would feel
himself sufficiently strong to act towards the natives with the
generosity as well as the justice which is congenial to the British
character. The subsequent paragraphs laid down the propositions that it
would be better, except in aggravated instances, to award punishment
such as is usual against enemies captured in regular war, than against
rebels and mutineers—the exceptions being those in which the fighting by
the insurgents ‘exceeded the licence of legitimate hostilities;’ that
the insanity of ten months ought not to blot out the recollection of a
hundred years of fidelity; that the punishment of death had been far too
frequently awarded; and that the governor-general ought sternly to
resist the entreaties of those who would urge him to the adoption of a
sanguinary policy.
The 6th of May was the date on which the battle may be said to have
begun in parliament, on the policy to be pursued towards Oude. Mr
Bright, in the House of Commons, asked the ministers whether there was
any authenticity in a certain proclamation concerning Oude, said to have
been issued by Viscount Canning; whether, if authentic, it had been
issued in accordance with any directions from the home government; and,
if not so sanctioned, what steps the government intended to take in
relation to it? These questions came upon the House generally by
surprise, as indicating a revelation of things hitherto hidden; and it
was then for the first time made public, by the minister who replied to
these questions—that the government had, three weeks before, received a
dispatch containing a copy of the proclamation adverted to; that the
matter was immediately taken into consideration by the government; that
a _secret_ dispatch had been sent off, stating the views of the
government on the matter; and that there would be no objection to
produce both the proclamation and the dispatch. This announcement was
the forerunner of a storm, in which the passion of party was strongly
mixed up. On the 7th, in the House of Lords, the Earl of Ellenborough
moved for the production of certain papers, analogous to those ordered
by the other House on the preceding night; and then arose a debate
whether Viscount Canning had really issued the proclamation he intended;
whether it was a proper proclamation to issue; whether it was right that
the Earl of Ellenborough should reprimand Viscount Canning in so
imperious a way as he was accused of doing; whether the secret dispatch
containing that reprimand should have been kept so entirely concealed
from the Court of Directors; whether it should have been sent out to
Calcutta at the time it was; and whether a so-called _secret_ dispatch
ought to make its appearance among parliamentary papers, unrelieved by
any comments on it by Viscount Canning. There was unquestionably
something strange in the mode of proceeding; for the dispatch, although
not made known to the Court of Directors until the morning of the 7th,
had been communicated to certain members of both Houses on the 6th. Earl
Granville urged that, if the government wished to get rid of Viscount
Canning, the usual course might have been adopted for so doing; but that
it was neither just nor generous to keep him in office, and yet give
publicity to such insulting censure on him. The Earls of Derby and
Ellenborough replied that it was not intended to dismiss Viscount
Canning, or even to censure him; but to induce him to make such
modifications in his proposed proclamation as would render the policy
adopted in Oude less severe.
It now becomes necessary to attend to this much-canvassed proclamation
itself, before noticing the further debates concerning it.
The proclamation in question, and the explanations bearing on it, were
dated at a period when, from the absence of an electric telegraph
between England and India, they could not of course be known in the
former country. On the 3d of March, while at Allahabad, paying anxious
attention to the daily telegrams received from Oude, Viscount Canning
sent a proclamation and an explanatory letter to that province, relating
to the treatment to be meted out to rebels.[158] Although Sir Colin
Campbell commanded the army of Oude, and conducted the military
operations, Sir James Outram was chief-commissioner of the province; and
on his shoulders rested, at that time, all that could be effected in the
way of civil government. The proclamation was to be at once a sentence,
a warning, and a threat, addressed to the inhabitants of Oude. It
announced that Lucknow, after months of anarchy, was now again in
British hands; it dwelt on the fact that many of the citizens, even
those who had shared the bounty of the government, had joined the
insurgents; and it declared, that the day of retribution for evildoers
had arrived. It proceeded to name six rajahs, thalookdars, and
zemindars, who had remained faithful amid great temptation, and who were
not only to retain their estates, but were to receive additional
rewards. It promised a proportionate reward to all other chieftains who
could prove that they had been loyal. With these exceptions, the whole
proprietary right to the soil of Oude was declared to be forfeited to
the British crown—subject only to such indulgences as might, as a matter
of _favour_, be conceded to individuals, conditional on their immediate
submission to the supreme authority, their surrendering of arms, and
their steady assistance in the maintenance of order and discipline; and
conditional, also, on their innocence of shedding the blood of
Englishmen and Englishwomen in the cruel outrages which had taken place.
The stringent and startling clause in this proclamation was that which
related to the confiscation: declaring that, with the few specified
exceptions, ‘the proprietary right in the soil of the province is
confiscated to the British government, which will dispose of that right
in such manner as it may seem fitting.’ In the letter to Sir James
Outram accompanying this draft of a proclamation, Viscount Canning
stated that the proclamation was not to be issued until Lucknow had been
fully conquered by Sir Colin Campbell; and that, when so issued, it was
to be addressed only to the non-military inhabitants of Oude, without in
the slightest degree offering pardon or lenity to rebel sepoys. The
proclamation was spoken of as a very indulgent one; seeing that it
promised an exemption, almost general, from the penalties of death and
imprisonment, to Oudian chieftains and others who had gone against the
government; the confiscation of estates was treated as a merciful
diminution of punishment, rather than as a severe measure of justice.
Sir James Outram was to exercise his judgment as to the mode and the
time for issuing the proclamation, in the English, Hindee, and Persian
languages. He was supplied with suggestions, rather than strict
instructions, how to deal with those Oudians who had been inveterate
opponents of the government, but without being concerned in actual
murder; how to regard those who had fought in the insurgent ranks, but
shewed a willingness to surrender their arms; and how to draw a line
between the chieftains on the one hand and their less responsible
retainers on the other.
Such being the general character of the proposed proclamation and its
accompanying letter, we proceed with the debate.
After the discussions on Friday the 7th of May, the conduct of the
government underwent much discussion out of parliament; the supporters
of Viscount Canning contending that the publication of the secret
dispatch was unfair to that nobleman, even if the dispatch itself were
defensible. On the 10th, the Earl of Shaftesbury gave notice of a
resolution condemnatory of the publication; and Mr Cardwell gave notice
of a similar resolution in the House of Commons. In the course of an
irregular discussion, it appeared that the government had not received a
single official dispatch from Viscount Canning since that which
contained the draft of his proposed proclamation, and they were quite in
the dark whether the proclamation had been issued, altered or unaltered.
It also became known that the _late_ president of the Board of Control,
Mr Vernon Smith, had received a letter from Viscount Canning, stating
that the proclamation would require an explanatory dispatch, which he
had not had time to prepare.
On the next day, March 11th, parliament was surprised by an announcement
that the Earl of Ellenborough, without consulting his colleagues, had
resigned into the Queen’s hands his seals of office as president of the
Board of Control. Amid the courteous expressions of regret on the part
of the other ministers, at losing so important a coadjutor, it soon
became evident that the publication of the secret dispatch had emanated
from the Earl of Ellenborough, without the knowledge or consent of the
Earl of Derby and the cabinet. He found that he had drawn them into
trouble; and he resolved to take the whole blame on himself—resigning
office to shield others from censure. There was a generosity in this
which touched his colleagues. The Earl of Derby candidly admitted that
there were parts of the secret dispatch which he could not quite
approve, and that the publication of it was indefensible; but that he
deeply regretted the resignation of the Earl of Ellenborough.
This will be the proper place in which to notice the celebrated dispatch
fraught with such important consequences. On the 24th of March, after
Viscount Canning’s proclamation had been penned, but long before any
news concerning it could reach England, the Secret Committee wrote to
him on the subject of the treatment of the rebels generally. The letter
was virtually from the Earl of Ellenborough; although, on account of the
absurd system of double government, it professed to emanate from a
committee sitting in Leadenhall Street. The general character of this
letter was noticed in a recent paragraph, and the letter itself is given
in Note G; it may therefore be passed without further notice here. When,
on the 12th of April, a draft-copy of Viscount Canning’s proposed
proclamation reached England, the Earl of Ellenborough wrote the
much-discussed ‘secret dispatch,’ purporting, as before, to come from
the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. A few days elapsed
before the writing, and a few more before the forwarding, of this
document. The earl[159] expressed his apprehension that the proposed
proclamation would raise such a ferment in Oude as to render
pacification almost impossible. He declared his belief that the mode of
settling the land-tenure when the British took possession of Oude had
been in many ways unjust, and had been the chief cause of the general
and national character of the disaffection in that province. He asserted
that the Oudians would view with dismay a proclamation which cut them
off, as a nation, from the ownership of land so long cherished by them;
and would deem it righteous to battle still more energetically than
before against a government which could adopt such a course of policy.
He went through a process of argument to shew that the Oudians regretted
the dethronement of their native king; that their regret ought to be at
least respected; that they had never, as a nation, acknowledged British
suzerainty; that they ought not to be treated as rebels in the same
sense as the inhabitants of those parts of India which had long been
under British control; and that the conflict in which they had engaged
should on this account be regarded rather as legitimate war than as
rebellion. The haughty and stinging portions of the dispatch were
contained in the fifteenth and two following clauses or paragraphs; in
which the earl, addressing the greatest British functionary in India,
said: ‘Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming
resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of
punishment; but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to
the great body of the people. You have acted upon a different principle.
You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have
struck with what they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass
of the inhabitants of the country. We cannot but think that the
precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been
conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the
precedent you have made.’
[Illustration:
East India House.
]
Such was the celebrated secret dispatch, the writing and promulgation of
which led to the resignation of the Earl of Ellenborough. That
resignation produced an exciting controversy in and out of parliament.
As the offender, the president of the Board of Control, had sacrificed
himself, was it necessary or desirable to make the ministry generally
responsible for his supposed or alleged misdeeds? Party considerations
speedily became mixed up with the discussion of this question. The Whigs
had recently been displaced by the Conservatives, under circumstances
that occasioned much irritation; and each party availed itself of the
India controversy as a handle to be employed against the other. On the
one side it was contended that Viscount Canning deserved praise rather
than censure, for his untiring attention to the affairs of India during
a troubled period; that, even if his proposed proclamation were
injudicious, it was not right to publish the secret dispatch relating
thereto, until he had explained the reasons for framing his
proclamation; and that the ministers ought not to be shielded from blame
simply on account of the resignation of their colleague. On the other
hand, the ministers endeavoured to shew that this resignation ought to
be taken into account; and when this failed, they took up the cause of
the Oudians, contending that the inhabitants of that province were in a
different category from the other natives of India.
When the great debates on this subject came on in both Houses, on the
14th of May, the ministers dwelt forcibly on the conduct of Mr Vernon
Smith, who had received a letter or letters from Viscount Canning, which
he ought, in the interests of the public, to have communicated to the
government, but which he shewed only to members of his own party. It was
urged—and the argument made a great impression both in and out of
parliament—that if the Earl of Ellenborough had known of Viscount
Canning’s intention to send home an explanation concerning the intent
and scope of the proclamation, it might possibly have led to a
modification of the secret dispatch, or even to an abandonment of it. In
the House of Lords, the case against the government was argued by Lords
Shaftesbury, Argyll, Somerset, Cranworth, Grey, Newcastle, and
Granville; while the arguments on the other side were maintained by
Lords Ellenborough, Derby, Carnarvon, Chelmsford, and Donoughmore. The
Earl of Shaftesbury had couched his resolution in such a form[160] as he
thought was calculated to insure Viscount Canning fair-play whenever his
intentions and proceedings should be really known. Without undertaking
to defend the proclamation, in the absence of any proof whether that
document had or had not undergone modification, he contended that the
dispatch passed on the governor-general a cruel and unmerited censure;
that this so-called ‘secret’ dispatch was evidently intended by its
writer to be a public one, administering rebuke that should be known to
all the world; that its publication was perilous, even seditious,
inasmuch as it encouraged the people of Oude to persevere in rebellion,
and virtually absolved them from all blame for their past conduct. The
Earl of Ellenborough, in reply, defended every word of the dispatch; he
insisted that it would be impossible to govern India peacefully even for
a day, if the proclamation were acted on in its full spirit. He cared
not for office; he resigned because he had unintentionally embarrassed
his colleagues, not because he regretted any part of his conduct. The
Earl of Derby, and other members of the cabinet, described the
resolutions as a party manœuvre to overthrow the government; claimed an
acquittal on the plea that their colleague had taken all the blame of
the publication to himself; and complained that the governor-general had
not sent one single letter to the new government, explanatory of his
plans and motives. When the debate was ended, the result shewed a very
close division—there being contents, 159, non-contents, 168; giving a
majority of 9 for ministers.
Far more exciting and influential was the debate in the Commons on the
same night. From the day when Mr Cardwell gave notice of his
resolutions, the case was regarded as a serious one for the ministers;
seeing that he was a distinguished member of an independent party in the
House, and would be able to bring a large accession to the regular
opposition votes. The very fact of the Earl of Ellenborough having
resigned, seemed to afford proof that the publication of the dispatch,
if not the writing of it, was disapproved by some of the ministers, and
would weaken them in the approaching debate. Mr Cardwell’s
resolutions,[161] like those of the Earl of Shaftesbury, did not bind
the House to any approval of the much-talked-of proclamation, whether
issued or unissued; they related only to the unfairness of the dispatch
in the absence of further news from India, and to the still greater
unfairness of making the reproof contained in that dispatch patent to
all the world. The members of the Whig opposition, and all who sided
with them in the debate, adhered pretty closely to this line of
argument; but the ministers and their supporters travelled much further.
They felt that the only justification for the dispatch and its
publication was to be found in the proclamation; and they therefore gave
the proclamation as black a character as it could well receive. Viscount
Canning was abused in round terms as a tyrant and spoliator; and those
who supported him were accused of being influenced purely by factious
motives in bringing forward the resolutions. The attack against the
government was maintained by Mr Cardwell, Lord John Russell, Mr Vernon
Smith, Mr Lowe, Colonel Sykes, and others, and resisted by the
solicitor-general, Lord Stanley, Mr Baillie, &c. The debate was
adjourned to the 17th, when it became evident that many of the
independent members intended to support the government—partly because
they disapproved of the Canning proclamation; partly because they
suspected the Whigs of an intention to make this Indian question a
stepping-stone to a return to office; and partly because they condemned
the conduct of the late president of the Board of Control, in
withholding Canning’s letter. This last-named circumstance told very
seriously against the Whig party; the Conservatives made the most of it,
and won over many adherents from among the independent members. Again
was the debate adjourned, to the 18th. It now became still more evident
that the division-list would present an aspect far different from that
at first expected; the prophesied majority for the resolutions gradually
fell, and the ministers began to look confidently to a decision in their
favour. A new element had entered into the case. If the Derby ministry
would have resigned office when beaten, there was a sufficient number of
independent members ready to carry the motion against them; but as there
was a threat of a dissolution, and as many seats would be endangered by
a general election, self-interest became mixed up with patriotism.
Another adjournment took place, to the 20th, on which day the House was
addressed by Sir James Graham, Mr Bright, Sir R. Bethell, Mr Labouchere,
and other members of influence. The current of debate set in very much
in favour of the government. It transpired that many eminent men in
India—including Sir James Outram, Sir John Lawrence, General Mansfield,
and General Franks—had all in various ways expressed an opinion that
Lord Canning’s proclamation, if issued in the form originally intended,
would be productive of some mischief in Oude.
This, therefore, will be a convenient place in which to notice the
officially recorded opinions of Outram on the subject—the only ones
which were presented before the House in a formal and undoubted manner.
The documents received from India shewed that Sir James entertained many
misgivings concerning the proclamation and its probable tendency. The
proclamation and its accompanying letter being sent to him from
Allahabad, he replied on the 8th, in a communication[162] pointing out
to Viscount Canning the paragraphs which appeared to him mischievous. He
declared his belief that there were not a dozen landowners throughout
the whole of Oude who had not in some way or other assisted the rebels
during the past struggle; and that, therefore, there would be hardly any
exceptions to the sweeping confiscation proposed by the
governor-general. He asserted most distinctly his conviction that, as
soon as the proclamation should be made public, nearly all the chiefs
and thalookdars would retire to their domains, and prepare for a
desperate resistance. He expressed an opinion that the landowners had
been very unjustly treated in the land-settlement after the annexation;
that, apart from this, their sympathy with the rebels was an exceedingly
natural feeling, under the peculiar circumstances of Oude; that it was
not until the mutiny was many weeks old that they turned against us;
that they ought to be regarded rather as honourable enemies than as
rebels; that they would be converted into relentless enemies if their
lands were confiscated, maintaining a guerrilla war which would ‘involve
the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure;’
but that if their lands were insured to them, they would probably be
more attached to British rule than ever they had yet been. It is evident
that Sir James Outram had already discussed this subject with the
governor-general, for he apologises for ‘once more’ urging his views
upon his lordship. A brief reply[163] was immediately sent to this
letter, proposing a very slight increase of leniency in the treatment of
the landowners, but leaving the general spirit of the proclamation
untouched. Later in the month, the governor-general replied more at
length to the arguments of Sir James. He admitted[164] that the
inhabitants of Oude were far differently placed from those of Bengal and
the Northwest Provinces, in respect to allegiance to the British crown;
both because the annexation had been recent, and because it had been no
voluntary act on the part of the Oudians. But he would not admit that,
on those grounds, the rebel thalookdars should be treated so indulgently
as Outram proposed. He urged that exemption from death, transportation,
and imprisonment, was a great boon, sufficiently marking the treatment
of the Oudians from that of other natives. Without entering on the
question whether the settlement of the land-claims had been unjust, he
offered his reasons for thinking that that matter had not had much to do
with the complicity of the thalookdars in the rebellion. He attributed
this complicity mainly to ‘the repugnance which they feel to suffer any
restraint of their hitherto arbitrary powers over those about them; to a
diminution of their importance by being brought under equal laws; and to
the obligation of disbanding their armed followers, and of living a
peaceful and orderly life.’ He maintained that if Sir James’s suggestion
were acted on, the rebels would be treated, not merely as honourable
enemies, but as enemies _who had won the day_; and that this would be
accepted by the natives as a confession of fear and weakness,
encouraging them to regard rebellion as likely to be a profitable game.
In short, Viscount Canning insisted on his proclamation being maintained
in its chief features.
It was impossible that such a letter as that of Sir James Outram could
fail, when made known, to exert a considerable influence in the House of
Commons. The resemblance between it and the Earl of Ellenborough’s
dispatch was very close, except in relation to discourteous and haughty
language, which Outram neither did nor could use. On the 21st of May,
after five nights’ debate, marked by speeches from almost all the
eminent men in the House, the contest ended in a kind of drawn battle.
Influenced by a great variety of motives, the opponents of the
government urged upon Mr Cardwell the withdrawal of his resolutions.
They did not wish to be compelled to vote. Some had been impressed by
the recorded opinion of Outram, and the rumoured opinions of Lawrence
and other eminent men in India; some disliked party tactics, even
against their opponents; some were afraid of a general election, if
their votes should lead to a dissolution of parliament. All the leaders
of the Whig party joined in a wish to withdraw the resolutions; and this
was done. The affair had, however, been so managed throughout as to give
a good deal of triumph to the Conservative government, and to strengthen
that government for the rest of the session.
What was the ultimate fate of the much-condemned proclamation, will
remain to be shewn in a later page. Two further documents relating to
this matter are given in Notes I and K.
Notes.
The official documents referred to in this chapter are of so much
importance, in reference to the political history of the Indian
Revolt, and to the opinions entertained by public men concerning the
feelings of the natives, that it may be well to present the chief of
them in full. Owing to the length of time necessary for the
transmission of letters between England and India, two or more of
these documents were crossing the ocean at the same time, in
opposite directions, and therefore could not exactly partake of the
nature of question and answer. We shall attempt no other
classification than that of placing in one group the documents
written in India; and in another those written in London—observing,
in each group, the order of dates.
A.
The first document here given is a letter dictated by Viscount
Canning when at Allahabad, and signed by his secretary, Mr
Edmonstone. It was addressed to Sir James Outram, in his capacity of
chief-commissioner of Oude, and was written at a time when the fall
of Lucknow was soon expected:
‘ALLAHABAD, _March 3, 1858_.
‘SIR—I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor-general, to
enclose to you a copy of a proclamation which is to be issued by the
chief-commissioner at Lucknow, as soon as the British troops under
His Excellency the Commander-in-chief shall have possession or
command of the city.
‘2. This proclamation is addressed to the chiefs and inhabitants of
Oude only, and not to the sepoys.
‘3. The governor-general has not considered it desirable that this
proclamation should appear until the capital is either actually in
our hands or lying at our mercy. He believes that any proclamation
put forth in Oude in a liberal and forgiving spirit would be open to
misconstruction, and capable of perversion, if not preceded by a
manifestation of our power; and that this would be especially the
case at Lucknow—which, although it has recently been the scene of
unparalleled heroism and daring, and of one of the most brilliant
and successful feats of arms which British India has ever
witnessed—is still sedulously represented by the rebels as being
beyond our power to take or to hold.
‘4. If an exemption, almost general, from the penalties of death,
transportation, and imprisonment, such as is now about to be offered
to men who have been in rebellion, had been publicly proclaimed
before a heavy blow had been struck, it is at least as likely that
resistance would have been encouraged by the seeming exhibition of
weakness, as that it would have been disarmed by a generous
forbearance.
‘5. Translations of the proclamation into Hindee and Persian
accompany this dispatch.
‘6. It will be for the chief-commissioner in communication with His
Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to determine the moment at which
the proclamation shall be published, and the manner of disseminating
it through the province; as also the mode in which those who may
surrender themselves under it shall be immediately and for the
present dealt with.
‘7. This last question, considering that we shall not be in firm
possession of any large portion of the province when the
proclamation begins to take effect, and that the bulk of our troops,
native as well as European, will be needed for other purposes than
to keep guard through its districts—is one of some difficulty. It is
clear, too, that the same treatment will not be applicable to all
who may present themselves.
‘8. Amongst these there may be some who have been continuously in
arms against the government, and who have shewn inveterate
opposition to the last, but who are free from the suspicion of
having put to death or injured Europeans who fell in their way.
‘9. To these men their lives are guaranteed and their honour; that
is, in native acceptation—they will neither be transported across
sea, nor placed in prison.
‘10. Probably the most easy and effectual way of disposing of them,
in the first instance, will be to require that they shall reside in
Lucknow under surveillance and in charge of an officer appointed for
that purpose.
‘11. Their ultimate condition and place of residence may remain to
be determined hereafter, when the chief-commissioner shall be able
to report fully to the governor-general upon the individual
character and past conduct of each.
‘12. There will be others who, although they have taken up arms
against the government, have done so less heartily, and upon whom,
for other causes, the chief-commissioner may not see reason to put
restraint. These, after surrendering their arms, might be allowed to
go to their homes, with such security for their peaceable conduct as
the chief-commissioner may think proper to require.
‘13. One obvious security will be that of making it clearly
understood by them, that the amount of favour which they shall
hereafter receive, and the condition in which they shall be
re-established, will be in part dependent upon their conduct after
dismissal.
‘14. The permission to return to their homes must not be considered
as a reinstatement of them in the possession of their lands, for the
deliberate disposal of which the government will preserve itself
unfettered.
‘15. There will probably be a third class, less compromised by acts
of past hostility to the government, in whom the chief-commissioner
may see reason to repose enough of confidence to justify their
services being at once enlisted on the side of order, towards the
maintenance of which in their respective districts they might be
called upon to organise a temporary police.
‘16. The foregoing remarks apply to the thalookdars and chiefs of
the province. As regards their followers who may make submission
with them, these, from their numbers, must of necessity be dismissed
to their homes. But before this is done, their names and places of
residence should be registered, and they should receive a warning
that any disturbance of the peace or resistance of authority which
may occur in their neighbourhood, will be visited, not upon the
individual offenders alone, but by heavy fines upon the villages.
‘17. I am to observe that the governor-general wishes the
chief-commissioner to consider what has been above written as
suggestions rather than instructions, and as indicating generally
the spirit in which his lordship desires that the proclamation
should be followed up, without tying down the action of the
chief-commissioner in matters which may have to be judged under
circumstances which cannot be foreseen.
‘18. There remains one more point for notice.
‘19. The proclamation is addressed to the chiefs and inhabitants of
Oude, not to mutineers.
‘20. To the latter, the governor-general does not intend that any
overture should be made at present.
‘21. But it is possible that some may surrender themselves, or seek
terms, and it is necessary that the chief-commissioner should be
prepared to meet any advances from them.
‘22. The sole promise which can be given to any mutineer is, that
his life shall be spared; and this promise must not be made if the
man belongs to a regiment which has murdered its officers, or if
there be other _primâ facie_ reason to suppose that he has been
implicated in any specially atrocious crime. Beyond the guarantee of
life to those who, not coming within the above-stated exception,
shall surrender themselves, the governor-general cannot sanction the
giving of any specific pledge.
‘23. Voluntary submission will be counted in mitigation of
punishment, but nothing must be said to those who so submit
themselves which shall bar the government from awarding to each such
measure of secondary punishment as in its justice it may deem
fitting.—I have, &c.,
(Signed) ‘G. F. EDMONSTONE.
_’Allahabad, March 3, 1858.’_
B.
The proclamation referred to in the above letter ran as follows:
‘PROCLAMATION.
‘The army of His Excellency the Commander-in-chief is in possession
of Lucknow, and the city lies at the mercy of the British
government, whose authority it has for nine months rebelliously
defied and resisted.
‘This resistance, begun by a mutinous soldiery, has found support
from the inhabitants of the city and of the province of Oude at
large. Many who owed their prosperity to the British government, as
well as those who believed themselves aggrieved by it, have joined
in this bad cause, and have ranged themselves with the enemies of
the state.
‘They have been guilty of a great crime, and have subjected
themselves to a just retribution.
‘The capital of their country is now once more in the hands of the
British troops.
‘From this day it will be held by a force which nothing can
withstand, and the authority of the government will be carried into
every corner of the province.
‘The time, then, has come at which the Right Honourable the
Governor-general of India deems it right to make known the mode in
which the British government will deal with the thalookdars, chiefs,
and landholders of Oude, and their followers.
‘The first care of the governor-general will be to reward those who
have been steadfast in their allegiance at a time when the authority
of the government was partially overborne, and who have proved this
by the support and assistance which they have given to British
officers.
‘Therefore the Right Honourable the Governor-general hereby declares
that
‘Drigliejjie Singh, Rajah of Bulrampore;
‘Koolwunt Singh, Rajah of Pudnaha;
‘Rao Hurdeo Buksh Singh, of Kutiaree;
‘Kasheepershaud, Thalookdar of Sissaindee;
‘Zuhr Singh, Zemindar of Gopaul Kheir; and
‘Chundeeloll, Zemindar of Moraon (Baiswarah),
are henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which
they held when Oude came under British rule, subject only to such
moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them, and that those
loyal men will be further rewarded in such manner and to such extent
as, upon consideration of their merits and their position, the
governor-general shall determine.
‘A proportionate measure of reward and honour, according to their
deserts, will be conferred upon others in whose favour like claims
may be established to the satisfaction of the government.
‘The governor-general further proclaims to the people of Oude that,
with the above-mentioned exceptions, the proprietary right in the
soil of the province is confiscated to the British government, which
will dispose of that right in such manner as it may seem fitting.
‘To those thalookdars, chiefs, and landholders, with their
followers, who shall make immediate submission to the
chief-commissioner of Oude, surrendering their arms and obeying his
orders, the Right Honourable the Governor-general promises that
their lives and honour shall be safe, provided that their hands are
unstained with English blood murderously shed.
‘But, as regards any further indulgence which may be extended to
them, and the condition in which they may hereafter be placed, they
must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British
government.
‘To those among them who shall promptly come forward and give to the
chief-commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and
order, this indulgence will be large, and the governor-general will
be ready to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to
the restitution of their former rights.
‘As participation in the murder of Englishmen and Englishwomen will
exclude those who are guilty of it from all mercy, so will those who
have protected English lives be specially entitled to consideration
and leniency.
‘By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.
‘G. F. EDMONSTONE,
_Secretary to the Government of India_.’
C.
Sir James Outram, not fully satisfied with this proclamation,
directed his secretary, Mr Couper, to write as follows to Mr
Edmonstone:
‘CAMP, CHIMLUT, _March 8, 1858_.
‘SIR—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No.
191, dated 3d inst., enclosing a proclamation to be issued to the
landholders, chiefs, and inhabitants of Oude, upon the fall of the
capital.
‘2. In this proclamation a hereditary title in their estates is
promised to such landholders as have been steadfast in their
allegiance, and, with these exceptions, the proprietary right in the
soil of the province is confiscated.
‘3. The chief-commissioner desires me to observe that, in his
belief, there are not a dozen landowners in the province who have
not themselves borne arms against us, or sent a representative to
the durbar, or assisted the rebel government with men or money. The
effect of the proclamation, therefore, will be to confiscate the
entire proprietary right in the soil; and this being the case, it
is, of course, hopeless to attempt to enlist the landowners on the
side of order; on the contrary, it is the chief-commissioner’s firm
conviction that as soon as the chiefs and thalookdars become
acquainted with the determination of the government to confiscate
their rights, they will betake themselves at once to their domains,
and prepare for a desperate and prolonged resistance.
‘4. The chief-commissioner deems this matter of such vital
importance, that, at the risk of being deemed importunate, he
ventures to submit his views once more, in the hope that the Right
Hon. the Governor-general may yet be induced to reconsider the
subject.
‘5. He is of opinion that the landholders were most unjustly treated
under our settlement operations, and even had they not been so, that
it would have required a degree of fidelity on their part quite
foreign to the usual character of an Asiatic, to have remained
faithful to our government under the shocks to which it was exposed
in Oude. In fact, it was not until our rule was virtually at an end,
the whole country overrun, and the capital in the hands of the rebel
soldiery, that the thalookdars, smarting as they were under the loss
of their lands, sided against us. The chief-commissioner thinks,
therefore, that they ought hardly to be considered as rebels, but
rather as honourable enemies, to whom terms, such as they could
without loss of dignity accept, should be offered at the termination
of the campaign.
‘If these men be given back their lands, they will at once aid us in
restoring order; and a police will soon be organised with their
co-operation, which will render unnecessary the presence of our
enormous army to re-establish tranquillity and confidence.
‘But, if their life and freedom from imprisonment only be offered,
they will resist; and the chief-commissioner foresees that we are
only at the commencement of a guerrilla war for the extirpation,
root and branch, of this class of men, which will involve the loss
of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure. It must
be borne in mind that this species of warfare has always been
peculiarly harassing to our Indian forces, and will be far more so
at present, when we are without a native army.
‘6. For the above reasons, the chief-commissioner earnestly requests
that such landholders and chiefs as have not been accomplices in the
cold-blooded murder of Europeans may be enlisted on our side by the
restoration of their ancient possessions, subject to such
restrictions as will protect their dependents from oppression. If
his lordship agree to this proposition, it will not yet be too late
to communicate his assent by electric telegraph before the fall of
the city, which will probably not take place for some days. Should
no such communication be received, the chief-commissioner will act
upon his present instructions, satisfied that he has done all in his
power to convince his lordship that they will be ineffectual to
re-establish our rule on a firm basis in Oude.—I have, &c.,
(Signed) ‘G. COUPER,
‘_Secretary to Chief-commissioner_.
‘_Chief-commissioner’s Office, Camp, Chimlut, March 8._’
D.
Mr Edmonstone, on the part of Viscount Canning, wrote the following
brief reply, suggesting an additional clause to the proclamation,
and promising a more detailed communication at a future time:
‘ALLAHABAD, _March 10, 1853_.
‘SIR—Your secretary’s letter of the 8th instant was delivered to me
at an early hour this morning, by Captain F. Birch, and it will
receive a detailed reply in due course.
‘Meanwhile, I am desired by the Right Honourable the
Governor-general to subjoin a clause which may be inserted in the
proclamation (forwarded with my letter, No. 191, of the 3d instant),
after the paragraph which ends with the words, “justice and mercy of
the British government.”
‘“To those amongst them who shall promptly come forward, and give to
the chief-commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and
order, this indulgence will be large, and the governor-general will
be ready to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to
a restitution of their former rights.”
‘2. This clause will add little or nothing to your discretionary
power, but it may serve to indicate more clearly to the thalookdars
the liberal spirit in which the governor-general is prepared to
review and reciprocate any advances on their part.
‘3. It is expected that you will find means to translate this
additional clause into the vernacular languages, and that you will
be able to have copies of the proclamation, so amended, prepared in
sufficient numbers for immediate use. If more should be required,
the magistrate of Cawnpore will lithograph them on your requisition.
‘4. It is very important, as you will readily see, that every copy
of the vernacular version of the proclamation sent to you, with my
letter of the 3d instant, should be carefully destroyed.—I have,
&c.,
(Signed) ‘G. F. EDMONSTONE,
‘_Secretary, Government of India, with the
Governor-general_.
‘_Allahabad, March 10, 1858._’
E.
It was not until after a lapse of three weeks that the promised
detailed reply was sent to Sir James Outram, in the following terms:
‘ALLAHABAD, _March 31, 1858_.
‘SIR—In replying at once on the 10th inst. to your secretary’s
letter of the 8th, in which you urged reasons against the issue of
the proclamation to the thalookdars and landholders of Oude, which
had been transmitted to you by the Right Hon. the Governor-general,
my answer was confined to communicating to you the addition which
his lordship was willing to make to that proclamation, without
entering into the general questions raised in your letter. The
governor-general desires me to express his hope that you will not
have supposed that the arguments adduced by you were not fully
weighed by him, or that your opinion upon a subject on which you are
so well entitled to offer one, has not been received with sincere
respect, although he was unable to concur in it.
‘2. I am now directed by his lordship to explain the grounds upon
which the course advocated in your letter—namely, that such
landholders and chiefs as have not been accomplices in the
cold-blooded murder of Europeans should be enlisted on our side by
the restoration of their ancient possessions, subject to such
restrictions as will protect their dependents from oppression—is, in
the opinion of the governor-general, inadmissible.
‘3. The governor-general entirely agrees with you in viewing the
thalookdars and landholders of Oude in a very different light from
that in which rebels in our old provinces are to be regarded. The
people of Oude had been subjects of the British government for
little more than one year when the mutinies broke out; they had
become so by no act of their own. By the introduction of our rule
many of the chiefs had suffered a loss of property, and all had
experienced a diminution of the importance and arbitrary power which
they had hitherto enjoyed; and it is no marvel that those amongst
them who had thus been losers should, when they saw our authority
dissolved, have hastened to shake off their new allegiance.
‘4. The governor-general views these circumstances as a palliation
of acts of rebellion, even where hostility has been most active and
systematic. Accordingly, punishment by death or imprisonment is at
once put aside by the proclamation in the case of all who shall
submit themselves to the government, and who are not murderers; and
whilst confiscation of proprietary rights in the land is declared to
be the general penalty, the means of obtaining more or less of
exemption from it, and of establishing a claim to restitution of
rights, have been pointed out, and are within the reach of all
without injury to their honour. Nothing more is required for this
than that they should promptly tender their adhesion, and help to
maintain peace and order.
‘5. The governor-general considers that the course thus taken is one
consistent with the dignity of the government, and abundantly
lenient. To have followed that which is suggested in your
secretary’s letter would, in his lordship’s opinion, have been to
treat the rebels not only as honourable enemies, but as enemies who
had won the day.
‘In the course of the rebellion, most of the leaders in it, probably
all, have retaken to themselves the lands and villages of which they
were deprived, by the summary settlement which followed the
establishment of our government in Oude. If upon the capture of
Lucknow by the commander-in-chief, before our strength had been seen
or felt in the distant districts, and before any submission had been
received or invited from them, the rights of the rebel chiefs to all
their ancient possessions had been recognised by the government, it
is not possible that the act would not have been viewed as dictated
by fear or weakness. It would have led the people of Oude, and all
who are watching the course of events in that province, to the
conclusion that rebellion against the British government cannot be a
losing game; and although it might have purchased an immediate
return to order, it would not assuredly have placed the future peace
of the province upon a secure foundation.
‘6. You observe, indeed, that the landholders were most unjustly
treated under our settlement. The governor-general desires me to
observe that if this were unreservedly the case, or if the
proceedings of the commissioners by which many of the thalookdars
were deprived of portions of their possessions had been generally
unjust, he would gladly have concurred in your recommendation, and
would have been ready, at the risk of any misinterpretation of the
motives of the government, to reinstate the thalookdars at once in
their old possessions. But it is not so. As a question of policy,
indeed, the governor-general considers that it may well be doubted
whether the attempt to introduce into Oude a system of village
settlement in place of the old settlement under thalookdars was a
wise one; but this is a point which need not be discussed here. As a
question of justice, it is certain that the land and villages taken
from the thalookdars had, for the most part, been usurped by them
through fraud or violence.
‘7. That unjust decisions were come to by some of our local officers
in investigating and judging the titles of the landowners is, the
governor-general fears, too true; but the proper way of rectifying
such injustice is by a re-hearing where complaint is made. This, you
are aware, is the course which the governor-general is prepared to
adopt, and to carry out in a liberal and conciliatory spirit. It is
a very different one from proclaiming that indiscriminate
restitution of all their ancient possessions is at once to be
yielded to the landowners.
‘8. That the hostility of the thalookdars of Oude who have been most
active against the British government has been provoked, or is
excused, by the injustice with which they have been treated, would
seem to be your opinion.
‘But I am to observe, that there are some facts which deserve to be
weighed before pronouncing that this is the case.
‘9. No chiefs have been more open in their rebellion than the rajahs
of Churda, Bhinga, and Gonda. The governor-general believes that the
first of these did not lose a single village by the summary
settlement, and certainly his assessment was materially reduced. The
second was dealt with in a like liberal manner. The Rajah of Gonda
lost about 30 villages out of 400; but his assessment was lowered by
some 10,000 rupees.
‘10. No one was more benefited by the change of government than the
young Rajah of Naupara. His estates had been the object of a civil
war with a rival claimant for three years, and of these he was at
once recognised as sole proprietor by the British government, losing
only six villages out of more than a thousand. His mother was
appointed guardian, but her troops have been fighting against us at
Lucknow from the beginning.
‘11. The Rajah of Dhowrera, also a minor, was treated with equal
liberality. Every village was settled with his family; yet these
people turned upon Captain Hearsey and his party, refused them
shelter, pursued them, captured the ladies, and sent them into
Lucknow.
‘12. Ushruf Bux Khan, a large thalookdar in Gonda, who had long been
an object of persecution by the late government, was established in
the possession of all his property by us; yet he has been strongly
hostile.
‘13. It is clear that injustice at the hands of the British
government has not been the cause of the hostility which, in these
instances at least, has been displayed towards our rule.
‘14. The moving spirit of these men and of others amongst the chiefs
of Oude must be looked for elsewhere; and, in the opinion of the
governor-general, it is to be found mainly in the repugnance which
they feel to suffer any restraint of their hitherto arbitrary powers
over those about them, to a diminution of their importance by being
brought under equal laws, and to the obligation of disbanding their
armed followers, and of living a peaceful and orderly life.
‘The penalty of confiscation of property is no more than a just one
in such cases as have been above recited; and although
considerations of policy and mercy, and the newness of our rule,
prescribe a relaxation of the sentence more or less large according
to the features of each case, this relaxation must be preceded by
submission, and the governor-general cannot consent to offer all,
without distinction, an entire exemption from penalty, and the
restoration of all former possessions, even though they should not
have been guilty of the murder of Europeans.—I have, &c.,
(Signed) ‘G. F. EDMONSTONE,
‘_Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-general_.
‘_Allahabad, March 31, 1858._’
F.
The following document, though not pertaining to the affairs of
Oude, may usefully be given here, bearing as it does on the
treatment proposed to be adopted towards mutineers and rebels. It
was written, in the name of Viscount Canning, by the secretary to
the government of the Northwest Provinces, and was addressed to the
functionaries of the disturbed province of Rohilcund:
‘AGRA, _April 28, 1858_.
‘SIR—I am directed to communicate to you the general principles
which the Right Honourable the Governor-general desires to see
followed by all civil and other officers who will exercise judicial
or magisterial powers in Rohilcund, on the re-entry of British
troops into that province.
‘2. The condition of Rohilcund has been, in some respects, peculiar.
The progress of the Revolt in the interior has until lately suffered
little check. The people, left to themselves, have in many quarters
engaged actively in hostilities against each other; but direct
opposition to British authority has been mainly confined to the
several Sudder towns, to the frontier on the Ganges, and to the
expeditions against Nynee Tal.
‘3. Under these circumstances, his lordship considers it just to
distinguish, by a widely differing treatment, the simple bearing of
arms, or even acts of social violence committed at a period when the
check of lawful government was removed, from acts directly involving
treason against the state, or a deliberate defiance of its
authority. Excepting instances of much aggravation, it is not the
wish of government that public prosecutions should be set on foot on
account of offences of the former class.
‘4. Further, in respect of treason and defiance of British
authority, his lordship desires that criminal proceedings shall be
taken only against leaders, and against such persons, whether high
or low, as have distinguished themselves by activity and rancour
against the government, or by persistence in opposition to its
authority after the advance of troops and the re-occupation of
stations. The governor-general will admit to amnesty all other
classes, even though they have borne arms on the side of the rebels,
provided that they tender an early and complete submission. But
continuance in opposition will exclude from pardon.
‘5. The governor-general has reason to believe that an impression
exists in Rohilcund that the Mohammedan population, as such, is to
be proscribed and crushed. It is likely that the rumour has been
raised and fostered by the rebel leaders to excite apprehension and
mistrust of the government. His lordship desires that every
appropriate occasion may be taken to disabuse the people of this
gross error. Such suspected rebels as may be brought to trial will
be tried each by his own acts. Each will stand or fall by the line
of conduct which he shall be proved to have followed. The government
will maintain, as it has always maintained, a strict impartiality in
its administration. Equal justice will be shared by all its
subjects, whether Hindoos or Mohammedans. You will make public these
views, and instruct the chief district officers to make them widely
known, in such manner as may appear to be most effectual.
‘6. It will be your care, in accordance with the injunctions of
his lordship’s orders, embodied in the circular order dated the
19th February, to bring forward, for early notice by the
governor-general, the several examples of conspicuously faithful
conduct exhibited by many of the inhabitants of Rohilcund, under
circumstances of peculiar difficulty.—I have, &c.,
‘W. MUIR,
‘_Sec. to Govt. NW. P._’
G.
We now transfer attention to four of the documents written in
London. The first was nominally from the ‘Secret Committee,’ really
from the Earl of Ellenborough, and was suggested by the state of
affairs in India during the second half of the month of February:
‘_The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India
Company, to the Governor-general of India in Council, March 24,
1858._
‘The telegram from Calcutta, dated the 22d ult., which arrived this
morning, conveys intelligence of the concentration of the force
under the commander-in-chief, and of that under Jung Bahadoor, upon
Lucknow; and we trust we may indulge the expectation that, ere this,
that city has been evacuated by the rebels, and that no considerable
corps remains united against us in the field.
‘2. If this happy result should have been attained, it will be very
satisfactory to us to learn that you have deemed yourselves
sufficiently strong to be enabled to act towards the people with the
generosity, as well as the justice, which are congenial to the
British character.
‘3. Crimes have been committed against us which it would be a crime
to forgive; and some large exceptions there must be, of the persons
guilty of such crimes, from any act of amnesty which could be
granted; but it must be as impossible, as it would be abhorrent from
our feelings, to inflict the extreme penalty which the law might
strictly award upon all who have swerved from their allegiance.
‘4. To us it appears that, whenever open resistance shall have
ceased, it would be prudent, in awarding punishment, rather to
follow the practice which prevails after the conquest of a country
which has defended itself to the last by desperate war, than that
which may perhaps be lawfully adopted after the suppression of
mutiny and rebellion, such acts always being excepted from
forgiveness or mitigation of punishment as have exceeded the licence
of legitimate hostilities.
‘5. While we may be unable to forget the insanity which, during the
last ten months, has pervaded the army and a large portion of the
people, we should at the same time remember the previous fidelity of
a hundred years, and so conduct ourselves towards those who have
erred as to remove their delusions and their fears, and
re-establish, if we can, that confidence which was so long the
foundation of our power.
‘6. It would be desirable that, in every case, the disarming of a
district, either by the seizure of arms or by their surrender,
should precede the application to it of any amnesty; but there may
be circumstances which would render expedient a different course of
proceeding. Upon these exceptional cases, you and the officers
acting under your orders must decide.
‘7. The disarming of a district having been effected, with
exceptions, under your licence, in favour of native gentlemen, whose
feelings of honour would be affected by being deprived of the
privilege of wearing arms, and of any other persons in whom you may
confide, we think the possession of arms should be punished in every
case by a severe penalty; but unless the possession of arms should
be combined with other acts, leading to the conclusion that they
were retained for the perpetration of crimes, that penalty should
not be death. Of course the possession of arms by Englishmen must
always remain lawful.
‘8. Death has of late been but too common a punishment. It loses
whatever terror it might otherwise have when so indiscriminately
applied; but, in fact, in India there is not commonly a fear of
death, although there ever must be a fear of pain.
‘9. In every amnestied district, the ordinary administration of the
law should as soon as possible be restored.
‘10. In carrying these views into execution, you may meet with
obstruction from those who, maddened by the scenes they have
witnessed, may desire to substitute their own policy for that of the
government; but persevere firmly in doing what you may think right;
make those who would counteract you feel that you are resolved to
rule, and that you will be served by none who will not obey.
‘11. Acting in this spirit, you may rely upon our unqualified
support.’
H.
Three or four weeks afterwards, was written the ‘secret dispatch’
which gave rise to so vehement a debate in parliament:
‘_April 19, 1858._
‘Our letter of the 24th of March 1858 will have put you in
possession of our general views with respect to the treatment of the
people in the event of the evacuation of Lucknow by the enemy.
‘2. On the 12th inst., we received from you a copy of the letter,
dated the 3d of March, addressed by your secretary to the secretary
to the chief-commissioner in Oude, which letter enclosed a copy of
the proclamation to be issued by the chief-commissioner as soon as
the British troops should have command of the city of Lucknow, and
conveyed instructions as to the manner in which he was to act with
respect to different classes of persons, in execution of the views
of the governor-general.
‘3. The people of Oude will see only the proclamation.
‘4. That authoritative expression of the will of the government
informs the people that six persons, who are named as having been
steadfast in their allegiance, are henceforward the sole hereditary
proprietors of the lands they held when Oude came under British
rule, subject only to such moderate assessment as may be imposed
upon them; that others in whose favour like claims may be
established will have conferred upon them a proportionate measure of
reward and honour; and that, with these exceptions, the proprietary
right in the soil of the province is confiscated to the British
government.
‘5. We cannot but express to you our apprehension that this decree,
pronouncing the disinherison of a people, will throw difficulties
almost insurmountable in the way of the re-establishment of peace.
‘6. We are under the impression that the war in Oude has derived
much of its popular character from the rigorous manner in which,
without regard to what the chief landholders had become accustomed
to consider as their rights, the summary settlement had, in a large
portion of the province, been carried out by your officers.
‘7. The landholders of India are as much attached to the soil
occupied by their ancestors, and are as sensitive with respect to
the rights in the soil they deem themselves to possess, as the
occupiers of land in any country of which we have a knowledge.
‘8. Whatever may be your ultimate and undisclosed intentions, your
proclamation will appear to deprive the great body of the people of
all hope upon the subject most dear to them as individuals, while
the substitution of our rule for that of their native sovereign has
naturally excited against us whatever they may have of national
feeling.
‘9. We cannot but in justice consider that those who resist our
authority in Oude are under very different circumstances from those
who have acted against us in provinces which have been long under
our government.
‘10. We dethroned the King of Oude, and took possession of his
kingdom, by virtue of a treaty which had been subsequently modified
by another treaty, under which, had it been held to be in force, the
course we adopted could not have been lawfully pursued; but we held
that it was not in force, although the fact of its not having been
ratified in England, as regarded the provision on which we rely for
our justification, had not been previously made known to the King of
Oude.
‘11. That sovereign and his ancestors had been uniformly faithful to
their treaty engagements with us, however ill they may have governed
their subjects.
‘12. They had more than once assisted us in our difficulties, and
not a suspicion had ever been entertained of any hostile disposition
on their part towards our government.
‘13. Suddenly the people saw their king taken from amongst them, and
our administration substituted for his, which, however bad, was at
least native; and this sudden change of government was immediately
followed by a summary settlement of the revenue, which, in a very
considerable portion of the province, deprived the most influential
landholders of what they deemed to be their property—of what
certainly had long given wealth, and distinction, and power to their
families.
‘14. We must admit that, under these circumstances, the hostilities
which have been carried on in Oude have rather the character of
legitimate war than that of rebellion, and that the people of Oude
should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration, than made
the objects of a penalty exceeding in extent and in severity almost
any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued
nation.
‘15. Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming
resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of
punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their
clemency to the great body of the people.
‘16. You have acted upon a different principle. You have reserved a
few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what
they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the
inhabitants of the country.
‘17. We cannot but think that the precedents from whom you have
departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom
superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made.
‘18. We desire that you will mitigate in practice the stringent
severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the
landholders of Oude.
‘19. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the
willing obedience of a contented people; there cannot be contentment
where there is general confiscation.
‘20. Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country
where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong; and
if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a
consummation to be desired.’
I.
The Court of Directors, before the secret dispatch became known to
them, adopted courteous language in the following letter of
instructions sent to Viscount Canning, referring to an earlier
communication:
‘_May 5, 1858._
‘1. You will have received, by the mail of the 25th of March, a
letter from the secret committee, which has since been laid before
us, respecting the policy which it becomes you to pursue towards
those natives of India who have recently been in arms against the
authority of the British government.
‘2. That letter emphatically confirms the principles which you have
already adopted, as set forth in your circular of the 31st of July
1857, by impressing upon you the propriety of pursuing, after the
conquest of the revolted provinces, a course of policy distinguished
by a wise and discriminating generosity. You are exhorted to temper
justice with mercy, and, except in cases of extreme criminality, to
grant an amnesty to the vanquished. In the sentiments expressed by
the secret committee we entirely concur. While there are some crimes
which humanity calls upon you to punish with the utmost severity,
there are others of a less aggravated character, which it would be
equally unjust and impolitic not to pardon and to forget.
‘3. The offences with which you will be called upon to deal are of
three different kinds. Firstly, high crimes, instigated by malice
prepense, and aggravated by treachery and cruelty. Secondly,
offences the results rather of weakness than of malice, into which
it is believed that many have been drawn by the contamination of
example, by the fear of opposing themselves to their more powerful
countrymen, or by the belief that they have been compromised by the
acts of their associates, rather than by any active desire to
embarrass the existing government. And, thirdly, offences of a less
positive character, amounting to little more than passive connivance
at evil, or at most to the act of giving such assistance to the
rebels as, if not given, would have been forcibly extorted, and
which in many cases it would have been death to refuse to bodies of
licentious and exasperated mutineers.
‘4. It is the first only of these offences, the perpetrators of
which, and their accomplices, it will be your duty to visit with the
severest penalty which you can inflict; and it is, happily, in such
cases of exceptional atrocity, that you will have the least
difficulty in proving both the commission of the offence and the
identity of the offender. In the other cases you might often be left
in doubt, not only of the extent of the offence committed, but of
its actual commission by the accused persons; and although we are
aware that the retribution which might be righteously inflicted upon
the guilty may be in some measure restricted by too much nicety of
specification, and that, in dealing with so large a mass of crime,
it is difficult to avoid the commission of some acts of individual
injustice, we may still express our desire that the utmost exertion
may be made to confine, within the smallest possible compass, these
cases of uncertain proof and dubious identity, even though your
retributary measures should thus fall short of what in strict
justice might be inflicted.
‘5. As soon as you have suppressed the active hostility of the
enemy, your first care will be the restoration of public confidence.
It will be your privilege when the disorganised provinces shall no
longer be convulsed by intestine disorder, to set an example of
toleration and forbearance towards the subject people, and to
endeavour by every means consistent with the security of the British
empire in the east, to allay the irritation and suspicion, which, if
suffered to retain possession of the minds of the native and
European inhabitants of the country, will eventually lead to nothing
less calamitous than a war of races.
‘6. In dealing with the people of Oude, you will doubtless be moved
by special considerations of justice and of policy. Throughout the
recent contest, we have ever regarded such of the inhabitants of
that country as—not being sepoys or pensioners of our own army—have
been in arms against us as an exceptional class. They cannot be
considered as traitors or even rebels, for they had not pledged
their fidelity to us, and they had scarcely become our subjects.
Many, by the introduction of a new system of government, had
necessarily been deprived of the maintenance they had latterly
enjoyed; and others feared that the speedy loss of their means of
subsistence must follow from the same course. It was natural that
such persons should avail themselves of the opportunity presented by
the distracted state of the country, to strike a blow for the
restoration of the native rule, under which the permitted
disorganisation of the country had so long been to them a source of
unlawful profit. Neither the disbanded soldiers of the late native
government, nor the great thalookdars and their retainers, were
under any obligation of fidelity to our government for benefits
conferred upon them. You would be justified, therefore, in dealing
with them as you would with a foreign enemy, and in ceasing to
consider them objects of punishment after they have once laid down
their arms.
‘7. Of these arms they must for ever be deprived. You will
doubtless, in prosecution of this object, address yourself in the
first instance to the case of the great thalookdars, who so
successfully defied the late government, and many of whom, with
large bodies of armed men, appear to have aided the efforts of the
mutinous soldiery of the Bengal army. The destruction of the
fortified strongholds of these powerful landholders, the forfeiture
of their remaining guns, the disarming and disbanding of their
followers, will be amongst your first works. But, whilst you are
depriving this influential and once dangerous class of people of
their power of openly resisting your authority, you will, we have no
doubt, exert yourself by every possible means to reconcile them to
British rule, and encourage them, by liberal arrangements made in
accordance with ancient usages, to become industrious
agriculturists, and to employ in the cultivation of the soil the men
who, as armed retainers, have so long wasted the substance of their
masters and desolated the land. We believe that these landholders
may be taught that their holdings will be more profitable to them
under a strong government, capable of maintaining the peace of the
country, and severely punishing agrarian outrages, than under one
which perpetually invites, by its weakness, the ruinous arbitration
of the sword.
‘8. Having thus endeavoured, on the re-establishment of the
authority of the British government in Oude, to reassure the great
landholders, you will proceed to consider, in the same spirit of
toleration and forbearance, the condition of the great body of the
people. You will bear in mind that it is necessary, in a transition
state from one government to another, to deal tenderly with existing
usages, and sometimes even with existing abuses. All precipitate
reforms are dangerous. It is often wiser even to tolerate evil for a
time, than to alarm and to irritate the minds of the people by the
sudden introduction of changes which time can alone teach them to
appreciate, or even, perhaps, to understand. You will be especially
careful, in the readjustment of the fiscal system of the province,
to avoid the imposition of unaccustomed taxes, whether of a general
or of a local character, pressing heavily upon the industrial
resources and affecting the daily comforts of the people. We do not
estimate the successful administration of a newly acquired province
according to the financial results of the first few years. At such a
time we should endeavour to conciliate the people by wise
concessions, and to do nothing to encourage the belief that the
British government is more covetous of revenue than the native ruler
whom it has supplanted.’
K.
The last document here given is a letter of instructions from the
Court of Directors, kind and courteous towards the governor-general,
but evidently conveying an opinion that the proposed proclamation,
unless modified and acted on with caution, would be too severe for
the purpose in view:
‘_Political Department, 18th of May (No. 20) 1858._
‘1. The secret committee has communicated to us the
governor-general’s secret letter, dated 5th March (No. 9) 1858, with
its enclosures, consisting of a letter addressed to the
chief-commissioner of Oude, dated 3d of March, and of the
proclamation referred to therein, which was to be issued by Sir
James Outram to the chiefs and inhabitants of Oude as soon as the
British troops should have possession or command of the city of
Lucknow.
‘2. We have also received communication of the letter addressed to
your government by the secret committee, under date the 19th of
April last, on the subject of the draft of proclamation.
‘3. Our political letter of the 5th of May has apprised you of our
strong sense of the distinction which ought to be maintained between
the revolted sepoys and the chiefs and people of Oude, and the
comparative indulgence with which, equally from justice and policy,
the insurgents of that country (other than sepoys) ought to be
regarded. In accordance with these views, we entirely approve the
guarantee of life and honour given by the proposed proclamation to
all thalookdars, chiefs, and landholders, with their followers, who
should make immediate submission, surrender their arms, and obey the
orders of the British government, provided they have not
participated in the murder “of Englishmen or Englishwomen.”
‘4. We are prepared to learn that in publicly declaring that, with
the exception of the lands of six persons who had been steadfast in
their allegiance, the proprietary right in the soil of the province
was confiscated to the British government, the governor-general
intended no more than to reserve to himself entire liberty of
action, and to give the character of mercy to the confirmation of
all rights not prejudicial to the public welfare, the owners of
which might not, by their conduct, have excluded themselves from
indulgent consideration.
‘5. His lordship must have been well aware that the words of the
proclamation, without the comment on it which we trust was speedily
afforded by your actions, must have produced the expectation of much
more general and indiscriminate dispossession than could have been
consistent with justice or with policy. We shall doubtless be
informed, in due course, of the reasons which induced the
governor-general to employ those terms, and of the means which, we
presume, have been taken of making known in Oude the merciful
character which we assume must still belong to your views. In the
meantime, it is due to the governor-general that we should express
our entire reliance that on this, as on former occasions, it has
been his firm resolution to shew to all whose crimes are not too
great for any indulgence, the utmost degree of leniency consistent
with the early restoration and firm maintenance of lawful authority.
‘We accordingly have to inform you, that on receiving communication
of the papers now acknowledged, the Court of Directors passed the
following resolution:
‘“Resolved—That in reference to the dispatch from the secret
committee to the governor-general of India, dated the 19th ult.,
with the documents therein alluded to, and this day laid before the
Court of Directors, this court desires to express its continued
confidence in the governor-general, Lord Canning, and its conviction
that his measure for the pacification of Oude, and the other
disturbed districts in India, will be characterised by a generous
policy, and by the utmost clemency that is found to be consistent
with the satisfactory accomplishment of that important object.”—We
are, &c.
(Signed)
‘F. CURRIE,
W. J. EASTWICK,
&c. &c.
‘_London, May 18, 1858._’
[Illustration:
Ganges Transport Boat.
]
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Footnote 157:
See Note G, at the end of the chapter.
Footnote 158:
See notes A and B, at the end of the chapter; where many of the
documents here referred to are printed in full.
Footnote 159:
See Note H.
Footnote 160:
‘1. That it appears, from papers laid upon the table of this House,
that a dispatch has been addressed by the Secret Committee of the
Court of Directors, to the governor-general of India, disapproving a
proclamation which the governor-general had informed the court he
intended to issue after the fall of Lucknow.
‘2. That it is known only from intelligence that has reached this
country, by correspondence published in newspapers, that the intended
proclamation has been issued, and with an important modification, no
official account of this proceeding having yet been received; that
this House is still without full information as to the grounds upon
which Lord Canning had acted, and his answer to the objections made to
his intended proclamation in the dispatch of the Secret Committee
cannot be received for several weeks.
‘3. That, under these circumstances, this House is unable to form a
judgment on the proclamation issued by Lord Canning, but thinks it
right to express its disapprobation of the premature publication by
her Majesty’s ministers of the dispatch addressed to the
governor-general; since this public condemnation of his conduct is
calculated to weaken the authority of the governor-general of India,
and to encourage those who are now in arms against this country.’
Footnote 161:
‘That this House, whilst it abstains from expressing any opinion on
the policy of any proclamation which may have been issued by the
governor-general of India with relation to Oude, has seen with great
and serious apprehension that her Majesty’s government have addressed
to the governor-general of India, through the Secret Committee of the
East India directors, and have published, a dispatch condemning in
strong terms the conduct of the governor-general. And this House is of
opinion that such a course upon the part of her Majesty’s government
must tend, under the present circumstances of India, to produce a most
prejudicial effect, by weakening the authority of the
governor-general, and encouraging further resistance on the part of
those who are still in arms against us.’
Footnote 162:
See Note C.
Footnote 163:
See Note D.
Footnote 164:
See Note E.
[Illustration:
JUNG BAHADOOR, of Nepaul.
]